<p>On the 13th of June 2005 the Minister of Defence, Leni Björklund, was subjected to a formal complaint addressed to the Committee on the Constitution concerning her handling of a specific co-operation project with France. The project concerned the development of a technology demonstrator for an UCAV called Neuron. The reason for the complaint was that the Minister of Defence had failed to present the project to the parliament and thus bypassed a parliamentary decision. Such negligence might be considered unlawful under the Swedish Constitution. The issue became public during an unscheduled meeting with the Committee on Defence, a meeting that was arranged at the request of the Minister of Defence. During that meeting the Minister announced that the Government in a couple of days planned to take the decision to “go ahead” with the Neuron project without a formal decision by the Parliament. The then estimated cost for the project was about 700 million SEK. The “verdict” from the Committee on the Constitution was “not guilty” according to the Constitution. The Committee on the Constitution limits its investigations to the relation between the Parliament and the Government, which is its main task. The purpose of my essay is to investigate the relation between  the Government and the Swedish Armed Forces. This investigation is conducted in order to find out what kind of role the Armed Forces as a Government Agency has played in the formulation of defence policy regarding the Neuron project. The foundation of a representative democratic system is based on the premise that the formulation of political objectives is the exclusive right of politicians. Only the elected politicians are supposed to have this power, since they are performing their duties on a mandate from the electorate, the people. The formulation of political objectives is, according to this foundation, not something that civil servants, in or out of uniform, should be doing. If and when that however happens we are facing what is normally called “a democratic black hole”.  </p><p>In order to fulfil the purpose of my essay I investigate the communication between the Government and the Armed Forces. The empirical study is performed on two kinds of documents from the Armed Forces. These documents are regularly used as basis for the Government’s decisions and propositions to the Parliament. The first kind is the Armed Force’s yearly reports concerning Long Term Planning, the second kind is documents that the Government needs for the yearly Budgetary Proposition. Both documents are wholly or partly prepared according to instructions from the Government.</p> / <p>Den 13 juni 2005 blir försvarsminister Leni Björklund KU - anmäld för sin sätt att hantera ett svenskt deltagande i projektet Neuron. Neuron-projektet handlar om försvarsmaterielsamarbete med Frankrike om att utveckla en demonstrator av en UCAV, obemannad beväpnad flygfarkost, som kallas Neuron. Anmälan handlar om att försvarsministern och därmed regeringen inte har givit riksdagen möjlighet att fatta beslut om Neuron-projektet. Regeringen hade inte med Neuron-projektet i någon proposition som riksdagen har kunnat ta ställning till, innan den 13 juni 2005. Hela frågan uppdagas när försvarsministern den 7 juni 2005 sammankallar riksdagens försvarsutskott. Vid detta möte informerar försvarsministern utskottets ledamöter om att regeringen har för avsikt att två dagar senare fatta beslut om att inleda samarbetet med Frankrike om Neuron-projektet som då ska kosta ca. 700 miljoner kronor. När KU har granskat frågan färdigt, våren 2006 blir försvarsministern trots allt inte fälld för ”brott” mot Regeringsformen. KU granskade enbart relationen mellan regeringen och riksdagen. Det jag gör i uppsatsen är att granska relationen mellan regeringen och Försvarsmakten. Detta görs för att pröva de tidigare leden i det som kallas den demokratiska styrkedjan och som beskriver hur makt och ansvar bör gå till i en folkstyrd demokrati. Den demokratiska styrkedjan består av: Folket, Riksdagen, Regeringen, Förvaltningen</p><p>Med förvaltningen menas myndigheterna. Styrningen, dvs. maktutövningen, förutsätts gå från vänster till höger, medan ansvarigheten skall gå i den motsatta riktningen. Om det uppstår brott i kedjan eller om den ’börjar gå baklänges’ uppstår något av en ’demokratins svarta hål’.  I Regeringsformen stadgas att regeringen styr riket och att myndigheterna, exempelvis Försvarsmakten, lyder under regeringen. Grundtanken vad gäller relationen mellan regering och myndigheter är att politikerna styr genom att formulera mål och riktlinjer för myndigheterna, medan myndigheterna genomför de politiska målen. Kedjan går baklänges om det istället skulle vara så att myndigheterna börjar formulera målen.</p><p>Efter KU:s granskning stod det klart att det inte fanns något formellt problem mellan riksdagen och regeringen när det gäller hur makt och ansvar hanterades. KU granskade inte, som nämnts ovan, relationen mellan regeringen och Försvarsmakten vilket är det jag gör i uppsatsen. I uppsatsen undersöker jag de underlag Försvarsmakten överlämnar till regeringen. Dessa är årliga budgetunderlag och PerP-rapporter. Budgetunderlagen utarbetas helt efter regeringens anvisningar medan PerP-rapporterna har en dubbelroll. De är både Försvarsmaktens egen perspektivplanering och i delar utarbetade efter regeringens anvisningar.</p>

On the 13th of June 2005 the Minister of Defence, Leni Björklund, was subjected to a formal complaint addressed to the Committee on the Constitution concerning her handling of a specific co-operation project with France. The project concerned the development of a technology demonstrator for an UCAV called Neuron. The reason for the complaint was that the Minister of Defence had failed to present the project to the parliament and thus bypassed a parliamentary decision. Such negligence might be considered unlawful under the Swedish Constitution. The issue became public during an unscheduled meeting with the Committee on Defence, a meeting that was arranged at the request of the Minister of Defence. During that meeting the Minister announced that the Government in a couple of days planned to take the decision to “go ahead” with the Neuron project without a formal decision by the Parliament. The then estimated cost for the project was about 700 million SEK. The “verdict” from the Committee on the Constitution was “not guilty” according to the Constitution. The Committee on the Constitution limits its investigations to the relation between the Parliament and the Government, which is its main task. The purpose of my essay is to investigate the relation between  the Government and the Swedish Armed Forces. This investigation is conducted in order to find out what kind of role the Armed Forces as a Government Agency has played in the formulation of defence policy regarding the Neuron project. The foundation of a representative democratic system is based on the premise that the formulation of political objectives is the exclusive right of politicians. Only the elected politicians are supposed to have this power, since they are performing their duties on a mandate from the electorate, the people. The formulation of political objectives is, according to this foundation, not something that civil servants, in or out of uniform, should be doing. If and when that however happens we are facing what is normally called “a democratic black hole”.   In order to fulfil the purpose of my essay I investigate the communication between the Government and the Armed Forces. The empirical study is performed on two kinds of documents from the Armed Forces. These documents are regularly used as basis for the Government’s decisions and propositions to the Parliament. The first kind is the Armed Force’s yearly reports concerning Long Term Planning, the second kind is documents that the Government needs for the yearly Budgetary Proposition. Both documents are wholly or partly prepared according to instructions from the Government. / Den 13 juni 2005 blir försvarsminister Leni Björklund KU - anmäld för sin sätt att hantera ett svenskt deltagande i projektet Neuron. Neuron-projektet handlar om försvarsmaterielsamarbete med Frankrike om att utveckla en demonstrator av en UCAV, obemannad beväpnad flygfarkost, som kallas Neuron. Anmälan handlar om att försvarsministern och därmed regeringen inte har givit riksdagen möjlighet att fatta beslut om Neuron-projektet. Regeringen hade inte med Neuron-projektet i någon proposition som riksdagen har kunnat ta ställning till, innan den 13 juni 2005. Hela frågan uppdagas när försvarsministern den 7 juni 2005 sammankallar riksdagens försvarsutskott. Vid detta möte informerar försvarsministern utskottets ledamöter om att regeringen har för avsikt att två dagar senare fatta beslut om att inleda samarbetet med Frankrike om Neuron-projektet som då ska kosta ca. 700 miljoner kronor. När KU har granskat frågan färdigt, våren 2006 blir försvarsministern trots allt inte fälld för ”brott” mot Regeringsformen. KU granskade enbart relationen mellan regeringen och riksdagen. Det jag gör i uppsatsen är att granska relationen mellan regeringen och Försvarsmakten. Detta görs för att pröva de tidigare leden i det som kallas den demokratiska styrkedjan och som beskriver hur makt och ansvar bör gå till i en folkstyrd demokrati. Den demokratiska styrkedjan består av: Folket, Riksdagen, Regeringen, Förvaltningen Med förvaltningen menas myndigheterna. Styrningen, dvs. maktutövningen, förutsätts gå från vänster till höger, medan ansvarigheten skall gå i den motsatta riktningen. Om det uppstår brott i kedjan eller om den ’börjar gå baklänges’ uppstår något av en ’demokratins svarta hål’.  I Regeringsformen stadgas att regeringen styr riket och att myndigheterna, exempelvis Försvarsmakten, lyder under regeringen. Grundtanken vad gäller relationen mellan regering och myndigheter är att politikerna styr genom att formulera mål och riktlinjer för myndigheterna, medan myndigheterna genomför de politiska målen. Kedjan går baklänges om det istället skulle vara så att myndigheterna börjar formulera målen. Efter KU:s granskning stod det klart att det inte fanns något formellt problem mellan riksdagen och regeringen när det gäller hur makt och ansvar hanterades. KU granskade inte, som nämnts ovan, relationen mellan regeringen och Försvarsmakten vilket är det jag gör i uppsatsen. I uppsatsen undersöker jag de underlag Försvarsmakten överlämnar till regeringen. Dessa är årliga budgetunderlag och PerP-rapporter. Budgetunderlagen utarbetas helt efter regeringens anvisningar medan PerP-rapporterna har en dubbelroll. De är både Försvarsmaktens egen perspektivplanering och i delar utarbetade efter regeringens anvisningar.

Submitted by Mauricio Brilhante Mendonça (mauricio_bm@hotmail.com) on 2013-03-21T13:10:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 MAURICIO BRILHANTE MENDONÇA TESE CDAPG.pdf: 2107159 bytes, checksum: f169ebd0a723a4481356850ad3bb58c3 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Eliene Soares da Silva (eliene.silva@fgv.br) on 2013-03-21T13:19:56Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 MAURICIO BRILHANTE MENDONÇA TESE CDAPG.pdf: 2107159 bytes, checksum: f169ebd0a723a4481356850ad3bb58c3 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-03-21T13:57:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MAURICIO BRILHANTE MENDONÇA TESE CDAPG.pdf: 2107159 bytes, checksum: f169ebd0a723a4481356850ad3bb58c3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-02-26 / The Manaus Free Trade Zone (ZFM) is the Union’s regional development policy for the Western Amazonia which is based on the concession of tax incentives to the productive capital. Its main results can be seen in the Industrial Pole of Manaus (PIM). Based on theoretic references on public policies, political decision process and on the framework of historical institutionalism, the thesis analyses three relevant decisions to the ZFM, as well as the public agencies where these decisions are made, characterizing the actors who influence them while also trying to understand the flow of public decisions in each one of the decision making processes. The first one of them refers to the two moments in which the decision of extending the ZFM’s applicability was being discussed in the National Congress, when interest groups were capable of joining their political forces to guarantee the constitutional status of the ZFM. The second one refers to the evaluation of the implantation, update, diversification or extension’s pleas of the industrial projects in the ZFM, on which the research provided understanding that once the technical-economical project is coherently presented, according to the established Basic Productive Process (PPB), the legislation and accompanied by the necessary documentation, the projects of whichever sector will not face any difficulty to be approved by the CAS. The need of a previous PPBs existence makes their establishment process a vital decision in the ZFM policies. This is the third process. PPB is the tool which has allowed the ZFM’s tax incentives’ policy’s governance through the regularization of processes and procedures which are to be abode by the companies which enjoy the benefits. The PPBs are established after negotiation among producers, suppliers and the Federal State, this last one being represented by MDIC, MCTI and SUFRAMA, under the GT-PPB’s management, whose operation is regulated by means of the Interministerial Ordinance MDIC/MCT n°170/2010. The PPB has been used by the State to establish counterparts to the companies which benefit from the ZFM’s tax incentives and also to allow the installation of productive sectors in that zone. It was noted that what is effectively valued is the risk of the PPB being published causing, therewith, the displacement of other productive plants from different regions in Brazil to the ZFM, situation which would turn into a negative decision. However, in cases in which the other federation units, cities or micro regions’ loss is not clear, there may be conflicts of political character, which leaves the decision to be made by negotiation levels and power above the GT-PPB. It is important to mention that the GT-PPB members understand that the ZFM is a public policy for the Western Amazonia, and also that they recognize the power that these members’ functions altogether have, each one with their own specialty, limits and objectives, functions which may influence the formulation and implementation of the industrial, science and technology and regional development policy in Brazil. It was possible to notice the participants’ effort with the current rules to promote improvements in these policies as well as the fact of how these teams are reflected by the lack of an effective national productive development project. / A Zona Franca de Manaus (ZFM) é a política de desenvolvimento regional da União para a Amazônia Ocidental baseada na concessão de incentivos fiscais ao capital produtivo, a qual tem no Polo Industrial de Manaus (PIM) o seu principal resultado. Partindo de referenciais teóricos sobre políticas públicas, processo de decisão política e do arcabouço do institucionalismo histórico, a tese analisa três decisões relevantes para a ZFM, para as quais se buscou identificar as agências públicas onde estas são tomadas, caracterizando os atores que nelas influenciam, ao passo que procurou compreender o fluxo de decisões públicas desses processos decisórios. A primeira delas refere-se aos dois momentos em que a decisão de prorrogar a vigência da ZFM estivera em discussão no Congresso Nacional, quando os grupos de interesse foram capazes de agregar força política para garantir o status constitucional da ZFM. A segunda refere-se à avaliação dos pleitos de implantação, atualização, diversificação ou ampliação de projetos industriais na ZFM, sobre a qual a pesquisa proporcionou o entendimento de que uma vez apresentado o projeto técnico-econômico de forma coerente, de acordo com o Processo Produtivo Básico (PPB) estabelecido, com a legislação e acompanhado da documentação necessária, os projetos de qualquer que seja o setor não enfrentam dificuldades de aprovação no CAS. A necessidade da existência prévia de PPBs torna o processo de estabelecimento destes uma decisão fundamental na política da ZFM. Esse é o terceiro processo. O PPB é a ferramenta que tem permitido a governança da política de incentivos fiscais da ZFM, através da regulação de processos e procedimentos cumpridos pelas empresas que usufruem dos benefícios. Os PPBs são estabelecidos após negociação entre produtores, fornecedores e o Estado brasileiro, sendo este representado pelo MDIC, MCTI e SUFRAMA, sob a gestão do GT-PPB, cujo funcionamento é regulamentado pela Portaria Interministerial MDIC/MCT n°170/2010. O PPB vem sendo utilizado pelo Estado para estabelecer contrapartidas às empresas beneficiárias dos incentivos fiscais da ZFM e para permitir instalação de setores produtivos naquela zona. Notou-se que o efetivamente valorado é o risco de o PPB, ao ser publicado, causar deslocamento de plantas produtivas de outras regiões do Brasil para a ZFM, situação que leva ao indeferimento. Contudo, em situações nas quais não é claro o prejuízo para outras unidades da federação, cidades ou microrregiões, pode haver conflitos de caráter político, alçando a decisão para níveis de negociação e de poder acima do GT-PPB. Destaca-se o entendimento dos membros do GT-PPB de que a ZFM é uma política pública da União para a Amazônia Ocidental e de reconhecerem o poder que, em conjunto, têm suas funções, por meio das quais, cada um com sua especialidade, limites e objetivos, pode influenciar por dentro do Estado brasileiro na elaboração e implementação da política industrial, de ciência e tecnologia e de desenvolvimento regional. Foi possível perceber o esforço dos participantes para, com as regras atuais, promoverem melhorias nessas políticas e como se reflete nessas equipes a falta de um efetivo projeto de desenvolvimento produtivo nacional.