Clinical supervision is integral to promoting the professional development of counselors-in-training and gatekeeping the counseling services provided by counselor trainees (Bernard & Goodyear, 2014). Despite the value of studying participants’ retrospective perceptions about or reflections upon supervision, the supervisory process in which supervision transpires is infrequently quantified and measured (Holloway, 1982; Holloway, 1987). As described by most developmental supervision models, clinical supervision is “a process with sequential and qualitatively distinct stages through which supervisors and trainees progress” (Littrell, Lee-Borden, & Lorenz, 1976, p. 134). In order to capture these stages and phenomena with observable and measurable units, the author used six states of interest to measure the supervision process, which exhibit the progressively complex nature of clinical supervision. The six states include: (a) social interfacing (non-skills phase), (b) reflecting on foundational competencies, (c) deepening case conceptualization, (d) processing the relational management, (e) overcoming personal and multicultural barriers, and (f) furthering professional development. These states underpin the codebook of this study and are used to conceptualize the supervision process. Although the interactions between the supervisor and supervisee are transient and difficult to grasp, supervisory interactions move from one state to another. Indeed, state-transitional dynamics of clinical supervision are subject to a constellation of factors that supervisors and supervisees initially bring in and constantly reinforce, such as supervisory styles, supervisee developmental levels, supervisory working alliance, and supervisee satisfaction with clinical supervision. By using Markov chain analysis, this study detects the overall transitional dynamics of supervisory dyads and investigates how transitional dynamics vary based on the aforementioned variables that manifest themselves as supervision dynamics unfold and closely interface with other supervision variables. Results of this study provide implications for clinical supervisors, counselor educators, and counselors-in-training.

This dissertation consists of three essays, taking different perspectives on human capital. The first essay looks at human capital from a growth perspective. Essays two and three focuses on the individual’s occupational decision and its relation to family background. The first essay attempts to capture the effects on long run economic growth and transitional dynamics of the interaction between human capital and R&amp;D. We do this by allowing for endogenous human capital accumulation in an economy where the number of products and technologies expands because profit maximizing entrepreneurs do R&amp;D. We find that, in the absence of scale effects, long run growth is determined by the economy’s capacity to accumulate human capital. A relative lack of R&amp;D capital causes the economy to grow slowly during its transition to the steady state, while a relative abundance of R&amp;D capital gives high growth rates during transition. In the second essay, the classical Roy-model of selection on the labor market is extended in order to analyze intergenerational mobility. This is done through the introduction of ability uncertainty that is linked to family background. In contrast to to additional human capital models of intergenerational mobility, this mechanism rather than differences in access to capital markets links occupational oucomes of offspring to parents. We study the effects of income redistribution on mobility and talent allocation. It is found that redistribution has implications for intergenerational mobility and talent allocation through its influence on individual occupational choices. However, we conclude that the presence of a trade-off between redistribution and intergenerational mobility depends on the extent of similarity of occupations with regard to ability sensitivity and wage rates, and on the degree of individual risk aversion. Whether redistribution occurs only within an occupation or simultaneously within and across occupations is also inportant for the implicatons for mobility and talent allocation. In essay three, a model of occupational choice and human capital investment is developmed and tested. The model allows family background to influence occupational choice through access to economic resources, differences in costs of schooling, and ability uncertainty linked to background similar to that discussed in essay two. It is predicted that life time utility of children from less well-off background is more sensitive to economic incentives when risk aversion is strong. The model also predicts that people are more sensitive to economic incentives when considering occupations distant from their parent occuations. The implications of the theoretical model are tested and largely confirmed on Swedish data using a mixed multinominal logit framework which explicitly accounts for unobserved ability heterogeneity. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1998</p>

Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles en macroéconomie et finances publiques. Elle développe des modèles d'Equilibre Général Dynamique et Stochastique pour analyser les implications macroéconomiques des politiques d'imposition des entreprises en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits. Le premier chapitre analyse les mécanismes de transmission à l'économie, des effets d'un ré-échelonnement de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises. Dans une économie constituée d'un gouvernement, d'une firme représentative et d'un ménage représentatif, j'élabore un théorème de l'équivalence ricardienne avec l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises. Plus particulièrement, j'établis que si les marchés financiers sont parfaits, un ré-échelonnement de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises qui ne change pas la valeur présente de l'impôt total auquel l'entreprise est assujettie sur toute sa durée de vie n'a aucun effet réel sur l'économie si l'état utilise un impôt forfaitaire. Ensuite, en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits, je montre qu'une une baisse temporaire de l'impôt forfaitaire sur le profit des entreprises stimule l'investissement parce qu'il réduit temporairement le coût marginal de l'investissement. Enfin, mes résultats indiquent que si l'impôt est proportionnel au profit des entreprises, l'anticipation de taxes élevées dans le futur réduit le rendement espéré de l'investissement et atténue la stimulation de l'investissement engendrée par la réduction d'impôt. Le deuxième chapitre est écrit en collaboration avec Rui Castro. Dans cet article, nous avons quantifié les effets sur les décisions individuelles d'investis-sement et de production des entreprises ainsi que sur les agrégats macroéconomiques, d'une baisse temporaire de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits. Dans un modèle où les entreprises sont sujettes à des chocs de productivité idiosyncratiques, nous avons d'abord établi que le rationnement de crédit affecte plus les petites (jeunes) entreprises que les grandes entreprises. Pour des entreprises de même taille, les entreprises les plus productives sont celles qui souffrent le plus du manque de liquidité résultant des imperfections du marché financier. Ensuite, nous montré que pour une baisse de 1 dollar du revenu de l'impôt, l'investissement et la production augmentent respectivement de 26 et 3,5 centimes. L'effet cumulatif indique une augmentation de l'investissement et de la production agrégés respectivement de 4,6 et 7,2 centimes. Au niveau individuel, nos résultats indiquent que la politique stimule l'investissement des petites entreprises, initialement en manque de liquidité, alors qu'elle réduit l'investissement des grandes entreprises, initialement non contraintes. Le troisième chapitre est consacré à l'analyse des effets de la réforme de l'imposition des revenus d'entreprise proposée par le Trésor américain en 1992. La proposition de réforme recommande l'élimination des impôts sur les dividendes et les gains en capital et l'imposition d'une seule taxe sur le revenu des entreprises. Pour ce faire, j'ai eu recours à un modèle dynamique stochastique d'équilibre général avec marchés financiers imparfaits dans lequel les entreprises sont sujettes à des chocs idiosyncratiques de productivité. Les résultats indiquent que l'abolition des impôts sur les dividendes et les gains en capital réduisent les distorsions dans les choix d'investissement des entreprises, stimule l'investissement et entraîne une meilleure allocation du capital. Mais pour être financièrement soutenable, la réforme nécessite un relèvement du taux de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises de 34\% à 42\%. Cette hausse du taux d'imposition décourage l'accumulation du capital. En somme, la réforme engendre une baisse de l'accumulation du capital et de la production respectivement de 8\% et 1\%. Néanmoins, elle améliore l'allocation du capital de 20\%, engendrant des gains de productivité de 1.41\% et une modeste augmentation du bien être des consommateurs. / This thesis is a collection of three papers in macroeconomics and public finance. It develops Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models with a special focus on financial frictions to analyze the effects of changes in corporate tax policy on firm level and macroeconomic aggregates. Chapter 1 develops a dynamic general equilibrium model with a representative firm to assess the short-run effects of changes in the timing of corporate profit taxes. First, it extends the Ricardian equivalence result to an environment with production and establishes that a temporary corporate profit tax cut financed by future tax-increase has no real effect when the tax is lump sum and capital markets are perfect. Second, I assess how strong the ricardian forces are in the presence of financing frictions. I find that when equity issuance is costly, and when the firm faces a lower bound on dividend payments, a temporary tax cut reduces temporary the marginal cost of investment and implies positive marginal propensity of investment. Third, I analyze how do the intertemporal substitution effects of tax cuts interact with the stimulative effects when tax is not lump-sum. The results show that when tax is proportional to corporate profit, the expectations of high future tax rates reduce the expected marginal return on investment and mitigate the stimulative effects of tax cuts. The net investment response depends on the relative strength of each effect. Chapter 2 is co-authored with Rui Castro. In this paper, we quantify how effective temporary corporate tax cuts are in stimulating investment and output via relaxation of financing frictions. In fact, policymakers often rely on temporary corporate tax cuts in order to provide incentives for business investment in recession times. A common motivation is that such policies help relax financing frictions, which might bind more during recessions. We assess whether this mechanism is effective. In an industry equilibrium model where some firms are financially constrained, marginal propensities to invest are high. We consider a transitory corporate tax cut, funded by public debt. By increasing current cash flows, corporate tax cuts are effective at stimulating current investment. On impact, aggregate investment increases by 26 cents per dollar of tax stimulus, and aggregate output by 3.5 cents. The stimulative output effects are long-lived, extending past the period the policy is reversed, leading to a cumulative effect multiplier on output of 7.2 cents. A major factor preventing larger effects is that this policy tends to significantly crowd out investment among the larger, unconstrained firms. Chapter 3 studies the effects of the 1992's U.S. Treasury Department proposal of a Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) reform. According to the U.S. tax code, dividend and capital gain are taxed at the firm level and further taxed when distributed to shareholders. This double taxation may reduce the overall return on investment and induce inefficient capital allocation. Therefore, tax reforms have been at the center of numerous debates among economists and policymakers. As part of this debate, the U.S. Department of Treasury proposed in 1992 to abolish dividend and capital gain taxes, and to use a Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) to levy tax on corporate income. In this paper, I use an industry equilibrium model where firms are subject to financing frictions, and idiosyncratic productivity and entry/exit shocks to assess the long run effects of the CBIT. I find that the elimination of the capital gain and dividend taxes is not self financing. More precisely, the corporate profit tax rate should be increased from 34\% to 42\% to keep the reform revenue-neutral. Overall, the results show that the CBIT reform reduces capital accumulation and output by 8\% and 1\%, respectively. However, it improves capital allocation by 20\%, resulting in an increase in aggregate productivity by 1.41\% and in a modest welfare gain.