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In 1869-70 the Métis of the Red River region in Manitoba resisted the transfer of their homeland from the Hudson’s Bay Company to Canada. The Métis people responded to this transfer by blocking Canadian surveyors, government officials, and taking control of the territory through the establishment of representative institutions. Eventually, the Métis negotiated favourable terms with Ottawa which, this thesis argues, represented according to law, and to the Métis, a treaty. This thesis argues that this treaty was intended to protect the Métis homeland and provide political and social protections. The Manitoba Métis Treaty was intended to guarantee the Métis a land base in Manitoba the total size of which was to be 1.4 million acres. The reservation of this land came with protective obligations so that the entire community would receive a benefit from such lands. While Canada has developed a body of treaty law which will be used to interpret the Manitoba Métis Treaty, matters were convoluted by the enshrinement of this treaty agreement in the Manitoba Act of 1870, a document which would gain constitutional status a year later. The impact of this legislative history has led some researchers to link government obligations entirely to the Act, rather than to the negotiated agreement. Indeed, it would seem that the negotiations have been, for the most part, understood as nothing more than conversations. I reject that position and argue that both the negotiations and the Act must be taken into consideration when assessing the obligations undertaken by the Crown. The unique history of the Manitoba agreement means that Canada was under both constitutional and treaty law obligations to uphold the negotiated agreement between itself and the Métis. This thesis argues that not only is the treaty the correct legal interpretation of the events of 1869-70 but that the government of Canada failed to honour its commitments in several meaningful ways. The approach utilized in this thesis is designed to be reliant upon the basic structure and doctrines of Canadian law but to do so in a manner which gives weight to the Métis voice. It is neither a critique which is wholly internal to Canadian law nor is it completely dismissive of Canadian law. Instead, this thesis will illustrate that with only minor adjustments to the application and interpretation of colonial law, the Manitoba Métis Treaty could find a more receptive audience in Canadian legal thought. In the face of a reasonable alternative, such a project can allow other researchers to question why the courts have chosen a path which denies reception of Métis voice, community and culture in Canadian law.

In 1869-70 the Métis of the Red River region in Manitoba resisted the transfer of their homeland from the Hudson’s Bay Company to Canada. The Métis people responded to this transfer by blocking Canadian surveyors, government officials, and taking control of the territory through the establishment of representative institutions. Eventually, the Métis negotiated favourable terms with Ottawa which, this thesis argues, represented according to law, and to the Métis, a treaty. This thesis argues that this treaty was intended to protect the Métis homeland and provide political and social protections. The Manitoba Métis Treaty was intended to guarantee the Métis a land base in Manitoba the total size of which was to be 1.4 million acres. The reservation of this land came with protective obligations so that the entire community would receive a benefit from such lands. While Canada has developed a body of treaty law which will be used to interpret the Manitoba Métis Treaty, matters were convoluted by the enshrinement of this treaty agreement in the Manitoba Act of 1870, a document which would gain constitutional status a year later. The impact of this legislative history has led some researchers to link government obligations entirely to the Act, rather than to the negotiated agreement. Indeed, it would seem that the negotiations have been, for the most part, understood as nothing more than conversations. I reject that position and argue that both the negotiations and the Act must be taken into consideration when assessing the obligations undertaken by the Crown. The unique history of the Manitoba agreement means that Canada was under both constitutional and treaty law obligations to uphold the negotiated agreement between itself and the Métis. This thesis argues that not only is the treaty the correct legal interpretation of the events of 1869-70 but that the government of Canada failed to honour its commitments in several meaningful ways. The approach utilized in this thesis is designed to be reliant upon the basic structure and doctrines of Canadian law but to do so in a manner which gives weight to the Métis voice. It is neither a critique which is wholly internal to Canadian law nor is it completely dismissive of Canadian law. Instead, this thesis will illustrate that with only minor adjustments to the application and interpretation of colonial law, the Manitoba Métis Treaty could find a more receptive audience in Canadian legal thought. In the face of a reasonable alternative, such a project can allow other researchers to question why the courts have chosen a path which denies reception of Métis voice, community and culture in Canadian law.

Power sharing regimes in resource management, including co-governance and co-management schemes, are now common across New Zealand. These schemes bring together iwi and the Crown to facilitate various environmental objectives. These arrangements often utilise the tenants of tikanga Māori, in particular the concept of kaitiakitanga, and are generally provided for outside of the Resource Management Act 1991. This thesis shows how two iwi, Ngāi Tahu of the South Island, and Ngāi Tūhoe of Te Urewera in the central North Island, are utilising such schemes to promote the interests of their people. It explains that Ngāi Tahu have built up co-governance in a patchwork manner, utilising the provisions of their settlement to build three distinct co-management arrangements in Canterbury. The thesis shows that Ngāi Tahu have yet to gain full co-governance capacity, but may well have a future role at the table in regional Canterbury governance from 2016 onwards. In comparison, Ngāi Tūhoe have been granted a different kind of governance arrangement that arguably goes beyond co-governance. This governance arrangement is based off the fact that legal personality has been granted to Te Urewera, and will allow Ngāi Tūhoe to promote the interests of their people in a unique way. The thesis will show that the face of co-governance is changing, and the future face of such arrangements may well give iwi more control. However, that there are pitfalls associated with such resource management power sharing schemes that must be taken into account when planning for future arrangements.

In 1869-70 the Métis of the Red River region in Manitoba resisted the transfer of their homeland from the Hudson’s Bay Company to Canada. The Métis people responded to this transfer by blocking Canadian surveyors, government officials, and taking control of the territory through the establishment of representative institutions. Eventually, the Métis negotiated favourable terms with Ottawa which, this thesis argues, represented according to law, and to the Métis, a treaty. This thesis argues that this treaty was intended to protect the Métis homeland and provide political and social protections. The Manitoba Métis Treaty was intended to guarantee the Métis a land base in Manitoba the total size of which was to be 1.4 million acres. The reservation of this land came with protective obligations so that the entire community would receive a benefit from such lands. While Canada has developed a body of treaty law which will be used to interpret the Manitoba Métis Treaty, matters were convoluted by the enshrinement of this treaty agreement in the Manitoba Act of 1870, a document which would gain constitutional status a year later. The impact of this legislative history has led some researchers to link government obligations entirely to the Act, rather than to the negotiated agreement. Indeed, it would seem that the negotiations have been, for the most part, understood as nothing more than conversations. I reject that position and argue that both the negotiations and the Act must be taken into consideration when assessing the obligations undertaken by the Crown. The unique history of the Manitoba agreement means that Canada was under both constitutional and treaty law obligations to uphold the negotiated agreement between itself and the Métis. This thesis argues that not only is the treaty the correct legal interpretation of the events of 1869-70 but that the government of Canada failed to honour its commitments in several meaningful ways. The approach utilized in this thesis is designed to be reliant upon the basic structure and doctrines of Canadian law but to do so in a manner which gives weight to the Métis voice. It is neither a critique which is wholly internal to Canadian law nor is it completely dismissive of Canadian law. Instead, this thesis will illustrate that with only minor adjustments to the application and interpretation of colonial law, the Manitoba Métis Treaty could find a more receptive audience in Canadian legal thought. In the face of a reasonable alternative, such a project can allow other researchers to question why the courts have chosen a path which denies reception of Métis voice, community and culture in Canadian law.

L’Union européenne s’est activement engagée depuis le début des années 1990 dans une démarche promotrice des droits de l’homme sur la scène internationale. Cela lui permet aujourd’hui de prétendre contribuer au développement ainsi qu’à la mise en œuvre effective du droit international des droits de l’homme. Le droit de l’Union européenne, et plus précisément le droit de l’action extérieure, détermine sa capacité à s’affirmer comme un acteur autonome, agissant de façon cohérente sur la scène internationale. La cohérence de l’action extérieure conditionne ainsi l’aptitude de l’Union à influer efficacement sur le contenu et l’application des règles de droit international. L’Union ne peut par ailleurs contribuer au droit international que si elle accepte de s’y soumettre. Elle ne peut en effet réclamer le respect du droit international par les États tiers et dans le même temps se dispenser d’en respecter les règles. Il en va de sa légitimité. La contribution de l’Union s’exerce tant sur le contenu matériel des normes que sur leur effectivité. Elle est ainsi en mesure de d’exporter ses propres normes dans l’ordre juridique international, par le truchement de règles conventionnelles ou coutumières, et de participer à l’universalisation des règles existantes. Elle joue en outre un rôle décisif du point de vue de l’effectivité des règles de droit international protectrices des droits de l’homme, soit en sanctionnant directement leur violation, soit en favorisant leur juridictionnalisation. / Since the early 1990s, the European Union has been actively promoting human rights on the global scene. Today, the EU legitimately contributes to the development and implementation of international human rights law. EU law, and more specifically its rules regarding its external relations, determines its capacity to establish itself as an important and autonomous player, acting as one on the international scene. The coherence of the EU’s external action is crucial to its ability to efficiently influence the contents and the implementation of international law. The European Union can only contribute to international law to the extent of its own submission to these standards. It cannot ask other States to respect international law while disrespecting its rules at the same time. It is a matter of legitimacy. The EU’s contribution concerns the substantive content of the rules as well as their effectiveness. It is therefore capable of exporting its own standards in the international legal order, through conventional or customary rules, and therefore pushes for the universalization of existing rules. The European Union also plays a decisive role regarding the effectiveness of international rules protecting human rights, either by sanctioning directly their violation, or by favouring their jurisdictionalization.

Les rivières, lacs et aquifères transfrontaliers à travers la planète sont des catalyseurs de tension internationale. Le partage des ressources en eau entre les États est sujet à des défis de plus en plus aigus avec une demande en constante croissance et une variabilité de l’offre exacerbée par les changements climatiques. Cet enjeu bénéficie de peu d’encadrement juridique alors que les accords entre États riverains sont exceptionnels et peu efficaces et que le droit en la matière est controversé. Ce mémoire se veut une étude de trois méthodes d’analyse en droit international public des conflits dans le partage de ces cours d’eau partagés en utilisant l’exemple de la construction d’un ouvrage hydraulique d’envergure sur le Nil Bleu, dont l’Éthiopie, le Soudan et l’Égypte sont les tributaires. Une première méthode consiste à étudier les instruments régionaux qui ont tenté d’attribuer les eaux transfrontières et les droits de développement industriel. Une seconde approche propose d’examiner l’application du droit multilatéral et coutumier relatif aux utilisations des cours d'eau internationaux à des fins autres que la navigation. La troisième démarche vise à déterminer l’étendue et les bénéfices de l’obligation de coopérer en droit international public. Une fois ces trois méthodes appliquées, l’auteur arrive à la conclusion que les instruments régionaux du bassin du Nil et le droit international applicable, notamment codifié dans la Convention sur le droit relatif aux utilisations des cours d'eau internationaux à des fins autres que la navigation, n’offrent aucune solution juridique définitive en raison (i) de l’absence de force contraignante ou (ii) de conflits interprétatifs irréconciliables. Quant à elle, l’obligation de coopérer, quoi que limitée dans son étendue, est source d’optimisme. / Transboundary rivers, lakes and aquifers around the world are catalysts for international tension. The sharing of water resources between States is subject to increasingly acute challenges with a constantly growing demand and a variability of supply exacerbated by climate change. This issue benefits from limited legal guidance, while agreements between riparian states are exceptional and inefficient and the law in this area is controversial. This paper examines three methods of analysis in public international law of conflicts in the sharing of these shared watercourses, using the example of the construction of a major hydraulic structure on the Blue Nile, of which Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt are tributaries. A first approach is to examine the regional instruments that have attempted to allocate transboundary waters and industrial development rights. A second approach proposes to examine the application of multilateral and customary international law relating to the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. The third approach seeks to determine the scope and benefits of the duty to cooperate under public international law. After applying these three methods, the author concludes that the regional instruments of the Nile Basin and the applicable international law, notably codified in the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, do not offer any firm legal solution due to (i) lack of binding force or (ii) irreconcilable interpretative conflicts. As for the obligation to cooperate, although limited in scope, it is a source of optimism.

An important change wrought by the post-1994 South African Constitutions is the attempt to have South Africa recognised as a democratic and sovereign state in the "family of nations." The new Constitutions make extensive reference to the state's international obligations and represent an endeavour to [re]define the status of international law vis-a-vis national law. Some provisions utilise international law in the interpretation and formulation of national jurisprudence and represent an [albeit not totally successful] endeavour to attain greater harmonisation between international and national law. This is an attempt to systematize the various criticisms levelled against these provisions to date, and to highlight certain interpretational difficulties and problems that present themselves in the process. The distinction between the various terminologies and branches of international law is also taken to task. Lastly, this paper attempts to determine the extent to which international law is applied at national level under the post-1994 constitutions. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

An important change wrought by the post-1994 South African Constitutions is the attempt to have South Africa recognised as a democratic and sovereign state in the "family of nations." The new Constitutions make extensive reference to the state's international obligations and represent an endeavour to [re]define the status of international law vis-a-vis national law. Some provisions utilise international law in the interpretation and formulation of national jurisprudence and represent an [albeit not totally successful] endeavour to attain greater harmonisation between international and national law. This is an attempt to systematize the various criticisms levelled against these provisions to date, and to highlight certain interpretational difficulties and problems that present themselves in the process. The distinction between the various terminologies and branches of international law is also taken to task. Lastly, this paper attempts to determine the extent to which international law is applied at national level under the post-1994 constitutions. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

Les conventions internationales de protection des droits de l’Homme ont été élaborées au début de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle. Or, le champ matériel de ces traités est étroitement connecté aux réalités humaines, elles-mêmes en constante évolution, et les développements technologiques, sociaux, économiques ou scientifiques peuvent avoir des implications directes sur l’exercice des droits et libertés fondamentaux. L’interprétation évolutive des ces instruments, consistant à les envisager « à la lumière des conditions actuelles », est alors devenue courante dans la pratique des juridictions spécialisées, bien qu’elle soit parfois envisagée avec méfiance. Absente des règles d’interprétation du droit international formulées dans la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, cette modalité interprétative intrigue dans la mesure où elle conduit le juge à s’écarter parfois explicitement du texte de l’accord et donc de la volonté des parties. L’interprétation évolutive invite par conséquent à une réévaluation de la fonction interprétative du juge international, entre son encadrement théorique traditionnellement strict et les exigences empiriques du droit international contemporain / Human rights treaties have been adopted at the end of the first half of the XXth century, in a technological, social and economic context which has since then deeply evolved. To maintain the effectiveness and relevance of those treaties, specialised jurisdictions have therefore increasingly interpreted their provisions in light of current living conditions. This method, called evolutive interpretation of treaties, is still looked at with suspicion. Indeed, it is not recognised by the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties and it may lead the judge to depart from the parties intention as expressed in the text of the convention. The evolutive interpretation of treaties invites therefore to reconsider the international judge’s interpretative function, between its strict theoretical conception and the empirical needs of contemporary international law