Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1962. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-130).

Truman's activity prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartly Act, his veto, and his later use and conception of the law will form the main framework for this analysis. Although this will be the main emphasis of the study, an analysis of Harry S. Truman's earlier attitude development, especially toward labor, merits research, in so far as these attitudes affected his actions during the period under consideration.

It was an unprecedented, peacetime attempt of a president to implement by federal law the rights of individuals guaranteed in the Constitution and Bill of Rights. A study of the part President Truman played is important, for a role of some type must be accepted by every American President in the surging drama of civil rights for all Americans.

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Any attempt to tell the story of federal involvement in the dismantling of America's formalized systems of racial discrimination that positions the judiciary as the first branch of government to engage in this effort, identifies the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision as the beginning of the civil rights movement, or fails to recognize the centrality of President Harry S. Truman in the narrative of racial equality is in error. Driven by an ever-increasing recognition of the injustices of racial discrimination, Truman offered a comprehensive civil rights program to Congress on 2 February 1948. When his legislative proposals were rejected, he employed a unilateral policy of action despite grave political risk, and freed subsequent presidential nominees of the Democratic party from its southern segregationist bloc by winning re-election despite the States' Rights challenge of Strom Thurmond. The remainder of his administration witnessed a multi-faceted attack on prejudice involving vetoes, executive orders, public pronouncements, changes in enforcement policies, and amicus briefs submitted by his Department of Justice. The southern Democrat responsible for actualizing the promises of America's ideals of freedom for its black citizens is Harry Truman, not Lyndon Johnson. The shift in white American opinion necessary for the passage of the civil rights acts of the 1960s was generated by the cumulative effects of actions taken between 1945 and 1953. / Master of Arts

The study begins with an overview of the 1948 political situation, followed by the evaluation of Truman's use of ethical appeal using criteria developed by Thonssen, Baird, and Braden. Each of their three constituents of ethical appeal--character, sagacity, and good will--is applied to four speeches. Results of the analysis establish that Truman utilized a strong ethical appeal during the campaign. Conclusions are that his use of ethical appeal probably had a significant effect on the voters of America. Regardless of the quality of his use of pathos or logos, a less capable use of ethical appeal would probably have had a fatal effect on his campaign.

Zu Beginn des Koreakrieges hatte im benachbarten Japan ein Mann de facto alle Macht in seinen Händen, der seit 1942 Oberbefehlshaber der alliierten Truppen im Pazifik gewesen war und am 2. September 1945 mit der Entgegennahme der japanischen Kapitulation den Zweiten Weltkrieg beendete – Douglas MacArthur. Der General, der den Pazifik einst als angelsächsischen See bezeichnet hatte, war unter seiner administrativen Leitung maßgeblich verantwortlich für die japanische Nachkriegsentwicklung und stand nun vor der neuen Herausforderung des Oberbefehls über die Truppen der Vereinten Nationen in Korea. Der über alle Maßen erfolgsverwöhnte MacArthur hatte die an Profilierungsmöglichkeiten nicht zu überbietenden Weltkriege genutzt, um zu einem der höchstdekorierten Offiziere der US-Militärgeschichte aufzusteigen. Innerhalb seines pazifischen Machtbereiches hatte er sich über die Jahre den Status eines quasi souveränen Staatsoberhauptes aufgebaut – mit einem eigenen Verwaltungsapparat, einer eigenen Armee und einem eigenen Geheimdienst, und er betrieb, einem souveränen Herrscher entsprechend, auch seine ganz eigene Politik. In dieser Arbeit wird, ausgehend von der These – MacArthur habe, einen Plan verfolgend, seine Position genutzt, um den Versuch zu unternehmen, den für ihn sehr gelegen und keineswegs überraschend kommenden Krieg in Korea zu einem Entscheidungsschlag gegen den asiatischen Kommunismus auszuweiten, nationalistischen Kräften zur Macht zu verhelfen und den dann endlich nicht mehr zu übertreffenden militärischen Ruhm politisch zu instrumentalisieren, um zur republikanischen Präsidentschaftskandidatur zu gelangen – zunächst das Hauptaugenmerk auf MacArthurs Beziehung zu Mao Tse-tungs Gegenspieler Chiang Kai-shek, dem Machthaber im Süden Koreas, Syngman Rhee, und deren mögliche strategische Einbeziehung sowie zur demokratischen Truman-Administration gelegt. Im zweiten Schwerpunkt werden, beginnend mit dem kurzen Entwurf eines Persönlichkeitsprofils MacArthurs, seine militärischen und politischen Ziele plausibilisiert. Dabei dient die weiter oben formulierte These als Blaupause für die Betrachtung des Kriegsverlaufes mit einem agierenden, aktiv seinen Plan verfolgenden General MacArthur, dessen (politisches) Handeln auch nach seiner Absetzung durch Präsident Truman noch unter dem Licht dieses Plans betrachtet werden kann.

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1961 M36

The problem with which this investigation is concerned is the description and. analysis of President Harry S Truman's use of his Presidential prerogative in recalling the Republican Eightieth Congress into special session on July 26, 1948. The results of this investigation indicate that President Truman's call for a special session of the Eightieth Congress on July 26, 1948, was primarily a tactic in his campaign strategy for the election of that year. However, the full significance of the session can be understood only by taking into account the political environment of the postwar period and the executive-legislative relationships between President Truman and the Republican Eightieth Congress on domestic legislation. The special session was a microcosm of the political events of 1948 and the relationship between the President and the Eightieth Congress.