Univ., Diss.--Göteborg, 2003.

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The aim of the paper is to further discussion on legitimation in international fora, and to contribute to the scholarly debate on the role of the interpretation of the past in state actors’ legitimation. This is pursued by conducting a descriptive qualitative study of Israel’s justification of political claims by remembrance of the past in the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly, between 2009-2017. In a theoretic framework that bridges legitimation theory and the theory of public memory, it is hypothesised that legitimation aid state actors to define national interests, identify threats, mobilize publics and perceive options. The results demonstrate that legitimation through referring to the past is employed by Israel for a wide variety of contemporary political issues, and that different aspects of the past are recalled for different issues. The conclusion is that legitimation through the remembered past seems to support the hypotheses of legitimation, and that Israel’s political leaders during the studied timespan appear to promote some parts of the past over others for justifying political stances.

LL.M. (International Law) / Syria is currently embroiled in a bitter and bloody conflict which began three years ago, in the prime of what was commonly known as the Arab spring. The Syrian people clamoured for new leadership and greater freedoms. However, the hopes of an Arab spring soon faded into a cold, desolate Arab winter. Instead of acceding to the demands of the citizens, the Syrian president has sought to subdue and eliminate them. Resulting in August 2013 of the government forces reportedly unleashed deadly chemical weapons on opposition forces. The United Nations Security Council failed to embark on any action by this point, due to the first veto by Russia and China on 4 October 20113. The death toll subsequently peaked at over 100 000. Whilst on the 24th of November, 2013 following two days of conflict in the Eastern Ghouta region of Syria 160 people were killed. Could the devastation of Syria and its people have been avoided? Is there any organisation responsible for the safety and protection of the Syrian people? The answer lies in an organisation called the United Nations. The United Nations Security Council however has the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security but this is not exclusive. Their primary function (as clearly stated in the United Nations Charter) is the responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security.

This thesis investigates the role nonpermanent members have on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This as the contemporary scholarly debate on the UNSC tends to exclude the nonpermanent members in the study of the only international institution that can bind all UN members under its decisions. Building on the slim literature existing on why states seek the nonpermanent seats, this thesis uses the case of Sweden in order to investigate whether Sweden has met its objectives during its first year on the council. This case also contributes to a broader question of the potential influence nonpermanent members can have on the council. The results of this thesis are in line with the research it is building on, inherited from a liberal strand of international relations, that Sweden has influenced outcomes in line with its objectives and that nonpermanent members can influence the council in terms of resolutions, making them relevant to study in research concerning the UNSC. It also provides additional knowledge to the existing research it is building on by expanding the scope in how nonpermanent members can influence the council, which can be used in future studies.

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As a mode of intervention in which the UN assumed direct authority over disrupted states, transitional administrations represent unique examples of ambitious state-building projects. This thesis investigates the apparent failure of transitional administrations to establish the rule of law in Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor. It identifies nine explanatory factors which are tested against each case study. In addition, it seeks to enhance conceptual understandings of the UN???s state-building agenda and to add to empirical studies regarding attempts by external actors to establish the rule of law in disrupted states. Three findings emerge. First, in each case, UN transitional administrations failed in each of the following ways: to make the best use of their mandate; to establish effective state justice institutions; to build local commitment to the rule of law as a value system; to promote social relationships supportive of the rule of law; to ensure sufficient state capacity post-intervention; to maintain adequate levels of security; to address the existence of informal justice structures; to deal with the legacies of the past; and to ensure an adequate level of mission performance. Of these, establishing effective state justice institutions, building local commitment and addressing informal justice structures proved most crucial. Second, the state-based ???enforcement??? approach adopted by transitional administrations proved ineffective. Enacting laws and establishing coercive state structures such as judicial, police and prison services were critical to, but could not be equated with the rule of law. This approach did not account sufficiently for the importance of entrenched informal justice institutions, of the voluntary consent of local actors, or of appropriate institutional design choices. As a result, it did not offer real solutions to real problems faced by local actors. Finally, the UN failed to consider fully how to create an enabling ???space??? in which internal processes of change could occur, to engage appropriately with local actors, to overcome the tyrannies of truncated deployment, or to address these issues at the ???front-end??? of the mission. This ???entry without strategy??? approach to state-building seriously undermined the UN???s ability to establish the rule of law, as the self-declared touchstone of its state-building agenda.

Both interventionist and anti-interventionist scholars have advanced the view that the 2011 Libyan conflict probes the need to establish an international organisation to settle disputes between nations with a view to maintaining international peace and security. Ironically, 67 years after the founding of the United Nations, post-colonial African states remain deeply troubled and affected by conflicts that are often exacerbated by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions. The 2011 Libyan conflict was not a war for democracy; rather, it represented and demonstrated clearly the asymmetrical relations between Africa and Europe. This study therefore, is anchored on the thesis that the Western Countries—especially Britain and France—within the UNSC ignore the values that are embodied in the Treaty of Westphalia which established state sovereignty. Some Permanent five (P5) members of the UN were typically insensitive to Libya’s sovereignty and to the creed of democracy and this inevitably undermined the national security of the state in favour of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ clause. The outsourcing of the UNSC’s mission, among other things, in Libya to ensure ‘international peace and security’ to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was a critical reason for the loss of human lives and values in the 2011 Libyan pogrom. The introduction of a no-fly zone over Libya and the use of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) contained in UNSC Resolution 1973 clearly stoked the conflict in Libya in order to further the political and pecuniary interests of some of the P5 members. The involvement of NATO and the attendant bombing campaign in Libya served to undermine the militarily weak continent of Africa in its effort to broker peace under the umbrella of the African Union (AU). In order to secure these political and economic interests, the NATO jet bombers declared war against a sovereign UN member state and openly participated in the eventual overthrow and death of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. In essence, this study underscores that the use of Responsibility to Protect in Libya was orchestrated at the highest level of international politics to justify external interference and ultimately, to secure regime change in Libya. The net effect of the outcome of the 2011 Libyan conflict is the post-war imperial control of Libya’s natural resources facilitated by the National Transition Committee established by these imperial forces. The extent of the damage caused by the UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya is also the result of the collective failure of the African Union to assert itself in the Libyan situation. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

As a mode of intervention in which the UN assumed direct authority over disrupted states, transitional administrations represent unique examples of ambitious state-building projects. This thesis investigates the apparent failure of transitional administrations to establish the rule of law in Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor. It identifies nine explanatory factors which are tested against each case study. In addition, it seeks to enhance conceptual understandings of the UN???s state-building agenda and to add to empirical studies regarding attempts by external actors to establish the rule of law in disrupted states. Three findings emerge. First, in each case, UN transitional administrations failed in each of the following ways: to make the best use of their mandate; to establish effective state justice institutions; to build local commitment to the rule of law as a value system; to promote social relationships supportive of the rule of law; to ensure sufficient state capacity post-intervention; to maintain adequate levels of security; to address the existence of informal justice structures; to deal with the legacies of the past; and to ensure an adequate level of mission performance. Of these, establishing effective state justice institutions, building local commitment and addressing informal justice structures proved most crucial. Second, the state-based ???enforcement??? approach adopted by transitional administrations proved ineffective. Enacting laws and establishing coercive state structures such as judicial, police and prison services were critical to, but could not be equated with the rule of law. This approach did not account sufficiently for the importance of entrenched informal justice institutions, of the voluntary consent of local actors, or of appropriate institutional design choices. As a result, it did not offer real solutions to real problems faced by local actors. Finally, the UN failed to consider fully how to create an enabling ???space??? in which internal processes of change could occur, to engage appropriately with local actors, to overcome the tyrannies of truncated deployment, or to address these issues at the ???front-end??? of the mission. This ???entry without strategy??? approach to state-building seriously undermined the UN???s ability to establish the rule of law, as the self-declared touchstone of its state-building agenda.

How is a veto justified? Within the discipline of International Relations, discourse analysis is gaining a higher status. However, there is a surprising lacuna in the literature as a discursive approach to the veto in the United Nations Security Council, is yet to be taken. This is unfortunate, given the Security Council’s prominence. The way in which the council members make meaning through their word choice has profound effects for politics in the international system. There is, nonetheless, a growing debate on the functioning of the council, and the veto-power is an important object of contestation. Motivated by current veto-restraining initiatives, this thesis performs a discourse analysis on the 19 cast vetoes between 2005-2016. The actors of relevance are the permanent Security Council members China, Russia, and the US, and the study demonstrates how the concepts of sovereignty, intervention and legitimacy are employed in the discursive construction of the legitimate veto. The thesis further argues that there are patterns and reoccurring themes in the way meaning is created that can be summarized into a contra-discourse —a veto-discourse —contrasting the dominating discourse within the Security Council.