In the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century Hiram W. Johnson was one of themost important men in Ameican public life. He attained his eminence through the power of the spoken wrod; as a master wielder of that power he is deserving subject for a study to which this thesis claim to be only the plodding and inept introduction. This thesis does not pretend to be an exhaustive study of Johnson's methods for three reason: 1. Its analysis of Johnson's speech composition is restricted to the third of the developmental stages listed above; 2. speeches selected for analyisis are restricted to the topic of U. S. foreing policy; 3. All but one of the speeches were made in the Senate, with its unique speech situation. It was felt that with this study thus qualified, it could not be adequately evaluated, nor could its conclusions be justified, without the inclusion of the speeches themselves in the thesis. This reasoning accountf for the fact that seventy-five percent of thtis thesis--the appendix--was written by Johnson. This paper is an attemps to determine the source of Johnson's personal influences on American foreign policy through an analysis of his oratorical methods and effectiveness.

Evaluation des mutations de la stratégie politico-militaire américaine depuis l'occurrence de la Revolution in Military Affairs jusqu'au processus actuel de "Transformation". L'analyse des évolutions vues - y compris à l'aune des opérations menées en Afghanistan et en Irak - montre, au delà du phénomène de technicisation (i.e. le processus d'intégration de nouvelles technologies aux armées) un phénomène de "technologisation". <p><p>Dans ce cadre, le discours stratégique américain, examiné au travers des débats stratégiques et des contributions doctrinales, tendrait à être sur-déterminé par la technologie, du niveau tactique au niveau politique, de sorte que ledit discours tendrait à devenir en soi une technologie. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Thesis (D. Litt. et Phil. (History))

This study deals with various aspects of the life of Henrique Galvão (1895-1970) but principally with the seizure of the liner Santa Maria (1961) in opposition to the regime of Dr Oliveira Salazar (1889-1970). It describes the ship’s hijacking and explores its ramifications within the context of the 1961 Angolan nationalist uprising, Portuguese internal politics and Luso-American relations. A brief discussion of Portuguese history from 1910 to 1933 provides the background to Galvão’s affiliation to Salazar’s regime and his subsequent apostasy. The most salient features of Galvão’s dissidence are discussed: his report on conditions in Portuguese Africa (1947-49); involvement in opposition politics (1951-59); the hijacking of an air liner for propaganda purposes (1961) and appearance before the United Nations (1963). These events are connected to the themes of colonial administration, anti-colonialism, African nationalism, anti-Salazarist politics and the African policy of the United States (1961-63).

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis examines and evaluates the questions involved in American arms sales to Iran and Egypt. The first two chapters outline the historical background and present detailed analyses of Iran's political situations prior to 1968 and United States policy toward it in that period of time. Chapter Three considers the American policies towards Egypt and the United States arms sales to that country. The main argument of the thesis appears in chapter Four which explains the objectives of Iran's government in buying American arms and the United States government's objectives in selling arms to Iran. Conclusions on the study comprise the fifth chapter.

This study deals with various aspects of the life of Henrique Galvão (1895-1970) but principally with the seizure of the liner Santa Maria (1961) in opposition to the regime of Dr Oliveira Salazar (1889-1970). It describes the ship’s hijacking and explores its ramifications within the context of the 1961 Angolan nationalist uprising, Portuguese internal politics and Luso-American relations. A brief discussion of Portuguese history from 1910 to 1933 provides the background to Galvão’s affiliation to Salazar’s regime and his subsequent apostasy. The most salient features of Galvão’s dissidence are discussed: his report on conditions in Portuguese Africa (1947-49); involvement in opposition politics (1951-59); the hijacking of an air liner for propaganda purposes (1961) and appearance before the United Nations (1963). These events are connected to the themes of colonial administration, anti-colonialism, African nationalism, anti-Salazarist politics and the African policy of the United States (1961-63).

Includes bibliographical references (leaves [56]-[62]) Focusses on issues concerning the U.S. military presence on the island. Elaborates on Okinawa's suffering due to the military bases which have hindered Okinawa's economic development, created serious pollution and encouraged crime

This study argues that despite the basic inertia in U.S. China policy during the Kennedy and Johnson years, the period nonetheless witnessed a fundamental evolution in the strategic presumptions underlying Washington’s approach to the China “problem.” By increments, U.S. policymakers began to seriously question the wisdom of a policy predicated on the idea that the containment of the People’s Republic of China necessitated its political and economic isolation. Inversely, a basic consensus emerged in interested corners of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy that considered attempts to engage the Chinese—on levels bilateral and multilateral, official and unofficial—could serve to socialise China’s revolutionaries, thereby facilitating a reduction in Sino-American tensions and paving the way to a bilateral rapprochement. Critically, in this analysis “engagement” was seen as a means of enhancing, rather than simply supplanting, the larger effort to contain China. The dynamics involved in the emergence of this consensus are manifold and complex, and cannot be properly understood without close reference to changes in both the international strategic environment and the domestic political context through the 1960s. At the heart of this process, however, were advocates of policy moderation within the U.S. bureaucracy, mediating external pressures for policy movement, and championing the case for a more conciliatory approach to Sino-American relations. The growing acceptance of what was sometimes articulated as “containment without isolation”—shorthand for a policy framework that implicitly rejects the either/or choice between containment and engagement—found expression in, and was in turn fostered by, basic adjustments in Washington’s posture toward Mao’s China. By the end of 1968 senior U.S. officials had repeatedly signalled that Washington was reconciled to the reality of a Communist-controlled mainland China, and would in fact welcome expanded efforts toward bilateral accommodation and even cooperation. These postural shifts may not have been matched by concrete policy changes, yet they remain significant. In the most immediate sense, the less provocative posture toward China enhanced Washington’s capacity to communicate U.S. intent to China’s leadership, thereby helping avert a direct Sino-American conflict in the 1960s, even as the two sides pursued antithetical objectives in the Asian region. In a longer-term frame of reference, the more flexible posture adopted in the 1960s played an important role in challenging the domestic politicisation of China policy, while establishing a rhetorical framework and conceptual foundation for more substantive policy movement. In the course of tracing these developments, this study also provides new interpretative insights on a number of specific issues pertaining to U.S. China policy in the Kennedy and Johnson years, including the policy preferences, relationships, and roles of key U.S. officials in shaping the policy process; the impact of domestic politics, alliance politics, and various Cold War strategic concerns on policy outcomes; the question of how to deal with China’s nuclear development; and the manner in which major China-related events and developments in the 1960s—such as the failure of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, the 1962 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Sino-Indian border war, China’s involvement in Vietnam, and the Cultural Revolution— were interpreted by U.S. officials, and, in turn, shaped understandings of and responses to the China problem. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1330812 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics, 2008