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Thesis (D. Litt. et Phil. (History))

Notre thèse se donne pour objectif d’examiner la projection culturelle de la présence militaire américaine en France entre 1944 et 1967. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, alors que le monde bascule dans la Guerre froide, nul ne sait déterminer l’issue de la confrontation politique et idéologique qui se déroule entre les États-Unis et l’Union Soviétique. En 1949, la France fait partie des pays fondateurs de l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique nord (OTAN). Sa participation à l’organisation internationale entraîne le « grand retour » des soldats américains, les GI, sur le territoire français. Celui-ci s’accompagne d’une politique culturelle inédite, qui se traduit par de nombreuses actions menées tant au niveau institutionnel que sur le terrain des bases militaires. Comment et pourquoi les autorités diplomatiques et militaires s’appliquent-elles à développer une stratégie de promotion de la présence militaire américaine en France ? Quelles formes prennent les campagnes de publicité organisées par les services d’information américains en France (USIS-France), pour développer les rapports entre civiles et militaires ? Quelle image les Français et les Américains se font-ils de cette présence militaire en territoire étranger ? À la lumière d’études journalistiques, archivistiques et de terrain, nous montrons que Washington s’emploie à conduire une politique culturelle « parabelliciste » très maîtrisée. Cette notion, adaptée de la pensée de l’intellectuel français Jacques Ayencourt en 1946, caractérise avec à-propos la politique culturelle américaine conduite de l’arrivée des premiers GI en 1944 jusqu’au départ des derniers bataillons en 1967. / Our thesis aims to examine the promotion of the American military presence in France from 1944 to 1967. After World War II, as the world was slowly drifting into the Cold War, the outcome of the political and ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was still uncertain. In 1949, France took part in the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Its participation in NATO led to the return of US soldiers, the GIs, to French territory. Their return was accompanied by an unprecedented cultural policy, implemented both at the institutional level and in the day-to-day lives of French citizens. How and why did the diplomatic circles and the military establishment feel the need to develop a strategy to promote the US military presence in France? How were the advertisement campaigns conceived by the US information services in France (USIS-France) in order to develop a relationship between civilians and the military? What image did the French and the Americans have of this military presence on French soil? Based on journalistic, archival and field studies, our work shows that Washington’s cultural policy was “parabellicist,” aiming deliberately to keep both the French and the Americans on a war footing. This notion, derived from Jacques Ayencourt’s work in 1946, appropriately characterizes American cultural policy conduct from the arrival of the first GIs in 1944 until the last battalions departed in 1967.

Orientador: Shiguenoli Miyamoto / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Institutto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-14T22:31:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dalio_DaniloJose_M.pdf: 2052522 bytes, checksum: d044549918d8c794d75609dbfc3ecde8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Resumo: As relações com os Estados Unidos se constituíram como um dos fatores fundamentais nos planos industrializantes do segundo governo Vargas. Embora inserido em uma conjuntura "quente" da Guerra Fria, de indefinições e incertezas no conflito bipolar, as condições essenciais a uma "política de barganha" não pareciam esgotadas para o governo Vargas. Tanto o alinhamento político-militar como a cooperação econômica eram termos negociáveis na primeira metade dos anos 50. Trata-se, portanto, de entender como o governo Vargas articulou esses termos nas negociações com os Estados Unidos em prol do desenvolvimento econômico nacional. As contradições no governo varguista, provenientes de conflitos e interesses internos e internacionais, são objeto de divergências na historiografia brasileira, sobretudo no tocante à definição do caráter da política externa do governo Vargas, do sentido de seu nacionalismo e do seu projeto de desenvolvimento. A noção de barganha nacionalista-pragmática não pretende refutar essas contradições, mas servir como um fundamento sob o qual elas puderam objetivamente conviver / Abstract: Relations with the United States were established as one of the key factors at industrialization plans of the second Vargas government. Although embedded in a climate "hot" of the Cold War, the unknowns and uncertainties in the bipolar conflict, the conditions essential to a "political bargaining" did not seem exhausted for the Vargas government. Both the political-military alignment and economic cooperation were negotiable terms in the first half of the 50s. This is, therefore, to understand how the Vargas government articulated these terms in negotiations with the United States in support of national economic development. The government varguista contradictions, from conflicts and interests domestic and international, are subject to differences in the Brazilian historiography, with regard to defining the character of the foreign policy of the Vargas government, their sense of nationalism and its development projects. The concept of bargain-pragmatic nationalism is not intended to refute these contradictions, but serve as a basis under which they could live objectively / Mestrado / Relações Internacionais / Mestre em Ciência Política

Orientador: Sebastião Carlos Velasco e Cruz / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-20T21:50:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ferreira_KellydeSouza_M.pdf: 993965 bytes, checksum: 3ef539284f8c3b0704d3e65c6c8c217e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: Nas últimas duas décadas, os Estados Unidos aumentaram substancialmente sua presença na Ásia Central. Por sua vez, a China sempre buscou construir um ambiente estável e pacífico ao redor de seu próprio território, tendo sob sua influência todos os países da Ásia Central; por isso,o incremento da presença norte-americana na região causou desconforto nos políticos chineses. Uma das formas utilizadas pelos últimos para se aproximar dos países dessa região se dá por meio do petróleo. Dessa forma, as companhias de petróleo da China compram direitos de exploração de reservas ou indústrias de petróleo e gás natural de países da Ásia Central e, por meio das empresas chinesas, estabelece e aprofunda os laços de amizade com países como Cazaquistão, Quirguistão, Uzbequistão, Turcomenistão e Tadjiquistão. A prática ficou conhecida como diplomacia do petróleo. Essa nova ferramenta do governo chinês possibilita um duplo efeito: aumentar a projeção chinesa e diluir a influência norte-americana na região, o que desagrada os Estados Unidos, que, por sua vez, buscam ser ainda mais presentes na Ásia Central. O objetivo desta pesquisa é: como a diplomacia do petróleo possibilita um duplo efeito: aumentar a projeção chinesa e diluir a influência norte-americana na região. E como os Estados Unidos usa sua presença na Ásia Central e nas rotas marítimas de transporte de petróleo para conter a expansão chinesa / Abstract: In the last two decades, the United States have substantially increased their presence in Central Asia. Therefore their presence left China in an uncomfortable position, as China seeks to build a stable and peaceful environment in its near abroad, having under its influence all the countries of Central Asia. One of the ways used by the Chinese government to get closer to the countries of this region is through the oil. Being so, the Chinese oil companies buy rights of exploitation of oil and gas reserves in Central Asia and through this establishes and deepens friendly ties with these countries. This practice became known as oil diplomacy. This new tool of the Chinese government has a double effect: it increases the projection of the Chinese power and dilutes the American influence in the region. In other words, it displeases the United States, and in turn tries to be even more present in Central Asia. The main goal to be worked in this study is how the oil diplomacy increases Chinese influence in Central Asia and dilutes American power in the region. It also aims to explain how the United States uses its presence in Central Asia and on sea lines of communication used to transport oil to contain the Chinese expansion / Mestrado / Paz, Defesa e Segurança Internacional / Mestre em Relações Internacionais

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This PhD examines the role of British intelligence in Anglo-American relations during the period of American neutrality in the First \Vorld \Var. Unbeknownst to the Americans, British intelligence began to intercept and decrypt virtually all American diplomatic telegrams between Washington and U.S. diplomatic outposts throughout Europe. Although several studies of Anglo-American relations in this period exist, none consider British intelligence's role. Providing an analysis of the relevant cod.es and cryptographical developments during the war, the thesis traces British intelligence's progress in deciphering these various diplomatic codes and offers an analysis of the distribution and use of this intelligence material. Through an exploration of this intelligence aspect, this thesis challenges existing interpretations of British and American policy in this period. A crucial conflict at the heart of British policy-one missed by previous historians-existed over the importance of the United States. Presaging America's international role later in the twentieth centu1y, many of Britain's leaders came to seriously doubt that, without the United States, the war remained winnable at all. Yet these officials contended with a second, powerful faction that remained wedded to outmoded ideas of America's limited relevance on the global stage and that refused to accept the existence of practical limits to British power. This conflict play~ out in several areas of British policy-over diplomatic, military, financial, and political affairs. Intelligence, however, provea a favoured weapon. Intercepted communications, sometimes ripped from their context, caused serious but spurious paranoia that the Americans were collaborating with Germany. Previous scholars, however, by ignoring the weapon, have failed to see the battle. Until it entered the war, American policymakers worked t:u:elessly to achieve a peaceful settlement. Previous historians have entirely dismissed the significance of these efforts, casting them as well-intentioned but futile. In reality, however, those British leaders who understood Britain's dependence on the United States tended to favour these proposals as a useful way of ending an unwinnable war that was bleeding the country d17- This PhD makes a significant contribution to the history of British intelligence, British policy, and American diplomacy during the period of American neutrality during the First World War.

This work examines the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first year of the Korean War. Officially created in 1947, the Joint Chiefs saw their first true test as an institution during the conflict. At various times, the members of the JCS failed to issue direct orders to their subordinate, resulting in a divide between the wishes of President Truman and General MacArthur over the conduct of the war. By analyzing the interaction between the Joint Chiefs and General Douglas MacArthur, the flaws of both the individual Chiefs as well as the organization as a whole become apparent. The tactical and strategic decisions faced by the JCS are framed within the three main stages of the Korean War.

U.S. policymakers consistently argue that U.S. security depends on hemispheric democracy. As an instrument of U.S. policy, did foreign assistance promote democracy in Central America, 1946 through 1994? Finding that U.S. foreign assistance directly promoted neither GDP nor democracy in Central America, 1946 through 1994, I conclude that U.S. policy failed consistently in this specific regard.

This dissertation examines British munitions procurement chronologically from 1914 through early 1916, the period in which Britain's war effort grew to encompass the nation's entire industrial capacity, as well as much of the industrial capacity of the neutral United States. The focus shifts from the political struggle in the British Cabinet between Kitchener and Lloyd George, to Britain's Commercial Agency Agreement with the American banking firm of J. P. Morgan and Company, and to British and German propaganda in the United States.