The purpose of this study was to examine the primary reasons for the refusal of the United States to grant diplomatic recognition to the revolutionary government in Greece between 1821-1833. The generally accepted reason has been the Monroe Doctrine. This policy statement by James Monroe in 1823 seemed to preclude any form of diplomatic recognition of the provisional government in Greece by the United States because the Greek Revolution was a European affair. If the American government were to prevent intervention in the Western Hemisphere by the European powers, then certainly the United States should not interfere in an area of primary concern to the Holy Alliance.President Monroe's words in his annual message to Congress were a statement of existing American policy and the principles should not be ignored entirely. However, it is the thesis of this paper that the desire for a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Empire was more significant in the development of American policy toward the Greek War of Independence. The expansion of American trade and commerce were goals of a government that practiced commercial diplomacy. The government of the United States sought in this particular case more trade in the Eastern Mediterranean and the right to navigate the waters of the Black Sea. A treaty with the Ottoman Empire was the key to this goal.To prove this thesis it was necessary to demonstrate that the menace from European powers, or the Holy Alliance, was minimal because those powers were too divided to pose a credible deterrent to American diplomatic recognition of Greece. Chapter one is devoted to a discussion of the European diplomatic situation with particular emphasis on the collapse of the Congress System and the "Eastern Question". Both bore direct bearing on American decisions concerning the Greek Revolution.The next chapter attempts to demonstrate that the United States had direct and serious involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since 1794 the United States had sought commercial advantages in the Levant, indeed, part of America's colonial legacy had been involvement in the Mediterranean trade. In addition to commerce, missionary activity, scholarly concern, and America's democratic heritage drew Americans to the Levant. By the time of the Greek Revolution the United States had bountiful interests in the Ottoman Empire. There were expectations of further advances in many quarters.The United States' response to the Greek Revolution between 1821-1833 is the subject of chapter three. America was divided between the philhellenes who advocated aid and recognition for Greece and those who did not wish to antagonize the Ottoman Empire and thereby lose commercial advantages in the Levant. This was the central issue in the debates on the Greek Question in the eighteenth Congress. Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, led the fight against the philhellene position so as not to jeopardize his secret attempts to secure a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Empire.The negotiations between representatives of the United States and Turkey, conducted in secret throughout the Greek Revolution, is the subject of chapter four. Only after the conclusion of the American-Turkish Treaty of Commerce did the United States grant diplomatic recognition to an already independent Greek nation. A commercial treaty with Turkey, a dying empire, in order to foster the expansion of American trade was the crucial determinant of American policy toward the Greek War of Independence.

Diplomatic stalemate at the seat of the UN Security Council is by no means a recent problem. Nevertheless, it may be argued that 'American unilateralism' reached its apex in July 2002, when the United States stood its ground and demanded immunity from prosecution before the International Criminal Court ("ICC") for US peacekeepers. This request was accompanied by the heavy-handed and deadly serious threat to veto the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, a threat which was realised over the course of the debates. This political brinkmanship, which pitted the United States against friends and foes alike, finally ceased when the US agreed to accept a Security Council Resolution offering a twelve-month deferral of prosecution for peacekeepers before the ICC. It is the legality of this Resolution which is the focus of this thesis. This thesis will expose the Resolution to the limits of international law and question the legitimacy of the tactics employed by the US. It will argue that in order to appease the recalcitrant superpower, the Security Council passed a Resolution contrary to both the Rome Statute of the ICC and the UN Charter. With the ICC still in its embryonic stage, this thesis will suggest the responses available to the Court when faced with a Resolution of such dubious legality which affects its jurisdiction to try the most heinous crimes known to humanity.

ABSTRACT Since the dawn of the atomic age, the United States of America [US] saw the problem of nuclear proliferation as one of its own creation and therefore theirs to rectify. Perhaps motivated by a form of nuclear imperialism, the US held the majority of the aspiration and ability to solve the international problem of nuclear proliferation. In hindsight there is perhaps very little that successive presidential administrations could have done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons during this period without significantly affecting their own international ambitions. However, the possibility that the US could have obtained the signatures of the nuclear non-signatories of India, Pakistan and Israel on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) [NPT] became more remote due to the determination of those states to act independently and demonstrate their authority over their own nuclear matters in the shadow of both the superpowers during the Cold War. Furthermore, the American failure to obtain early agreement on the nuclear issue meant that the long-term nuclear ambitions of these nations could not be reversed. Exploiting an array of archival sources, Bring the Bombs out of the Basement analyses the process by which the US sought to bring these non-compliant states into the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also discusses the significance of the failure of the US to bring the nuclear non-signatories into the fold. Studying the problem under the framework of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation system, it focuses on the period between 1961 and 1974 – from the intensification of NPT negotiations under President John F. Kennedy, to the year in which India detonated its first nuclear device. By analysing the diplomatic interactions between the US and India, Pakistan and Israel, this thesis examines why the US was unable to politically tame one of the most significant scientific research achievements of all time and wield influence in the nuclear arena commensurate to its superpower status. In terms of uniqueness, this is the first study to have comprehensively examined and compared US nuclear policy towards only the nuclear non-signatories.

ABSTRACT Since the dawn of the atomic age, the United States of America [US] saw the problem of nuclear proliferation as one of its own creation and therefore theirs to rectify. Perhaps motivated by a form of nuclear imperialism, the US held the majority of the aspiration and ability to solve the international problem of nuclear proliferation. In hindsight there is perhaps very little that successive presidential administrations could have done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons during this period without significantly affecting their own international ambitions. However, the possibility that the US could have obtained the signatures of the nuclear non-signatories of India, Pakistan and Israel on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) [NPT] became more remote due to the determination of those states to act independently and demonstrate their authority over their own nuclear matters in the shadow of both the superpowers during the Cold War. Furthermore, the American failure to obtain early agreement on the nuclear issue meant that the long-term nuclear ambitions of these nations could not be reversed. Exploiting an array of archival sources, Bring the Bombs out of the Basement analyses the process by which the US sought to bring these non-compliant states into the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also discusses the significance of the failure of the US to bring the nuclear non-signatories into the fold. Studying the problem under the framework of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation system, it focuses on the period between 1961 and 1974 – from the intensification of NPT negotiations under President John F. Kennedy, to the year in which India detonated its first nuclear device. By analysing the diplomatic interactions between the US and India, Pakistan and Israel, this thesis examines why the US was unable to politically tame one of the most significant scientific research achievements of all time and wield influence in the nuclear arena commensurate to its superpower status. In terms of uniqueness, this is the first study to have comprehensively examined and compared US nuclear policy towards only the nuclear non-signatories.

No description available.

The continuing diplomatic impasse between the United States and Iran dates back to the turbulent events of the late 1970s. Blame for the 'loss' of Iran, which had been one of the 'twin pillars' of US strategy in the Persian Gulf, has inevitably fallen on the White House incumbent at the time, President Jimmy Carter. This thesis offers a reassessment of Carter's decision making and his responses to the fall of the Shah, the Islamic Revolution and the US embassy hostage taking. It demonstrates that the breakdown of US-Iranian relations was not simply a one-president phenomenon and, more significantly, Carter's handling of Iran was not as dire as it is often portrayed. The research is based on a thorough examination of the available archive material, including newly released documents, as well as recent interviews with the major protagonists. When Carter took office in 1977 he inherited a badly creaking Iranian pillar that was soon to collapse altogether. The flawed policies of his predecessors placed strict limitations on his administration and unwittingly created a ticking time bomb in the form of the Shah. Despite these restrictions, Carter battled to reconcile the strategic necessities of Cold War containment with his moral principles in areas such as human rights and arms sales. In an administration seemingly dominated by the disagreements amongst his top two advisors, Carter remained the key decision maker at all times. He recognised the practical limits of American power and assumed sensible positions in response to an ever changing and uncontrollable crisis. Aside from its contemporary significance, Iran is therefore critical to Carter's disputed legacy and how he rates as a foreign policy president.

No description available.

Theodore Roosevelt is considered by many historians to have been one of the most skilled practitioners of foreign policy in American history. But while he continues to draw � considerable interest from scholars, one facet of his diplomacy continues to be poorly understood: the impact of public opinion. There was a discernable evolution in his relationship with public opinion over the course of his tenure, even if many core ideas and practices were already present when he took office. The President was often discouraged by the state of public opinion. In his view, Congress was often a poor partner in conducting foreign policy; sensationalist newspapers had considerable influence; the ideas and policy preferences of many Eastern elites were usually ill-conceived; and the broader public's ignorance and apathy about international affairs were troublesome. But these concerns were balanced by other factors. He had a better working relationship with the Senate than he was willing to admit. He had more success in gaining favourable newspaper coverage than all but . a few Presidents. And he believed strongly in the American system of governance and had faith in the common sense of most of his countiymen. Given these multifaceted ideas about the nature of American opinion, it is not surprising that Roosevelt placed considerable importance upon shaping and educating it. This was both a means to facilitating his foreign policy goals and a way to build and maintain political supp01t. In fact, the two were closely linked. While he enjoyed considerable success in shaping opinion, he also suffered notable setbacks. In the final analysis, public opinion played a key role in Roosevelt's conduct of foreign policy, though its degree of influence in his decision-making process varied according to circumstances. Three main variables seemed to have shaped his behaviour: the impo11ance of a policy to Roosevelt, his perception about the intensity and sources of opposition to it and the level of suppo11 among the broader public.

A classification of the negotiating tactics used by Russian diplomats has been a facet of Soviet diplomatic behavior which has been relatively ignored. A survey of Western writings on Soviet negotiating behavior indicates that Russian diplomats employ a wide range of bargaining tactics in attempts to gain concessions from Western negotiators. These various bargaining methods have been classified in this paper as to the type of maneuver they represent. There are four discernible Soviet negotiating maneuvers. The first maneuver is comprised of tactics designed to turn a conference or part thereof into a forum for Russian propaganda. Of all the tactics employed those related to propaganda are found most frequently in negotiations primarily because of the relative ease with which they can be utilized. While some propaganda tactics are straightforward, such as slogans and epithets, others are subtle such as the use of general rather than specific terms. The second Russian maneuver contains a large number of tactics designed to obstruct negotiations. A common aspect of Soviet diplomatic behavior has been the skillful use of delaying tactics so that negotiations either drag on or collapse. The Russians use obstructionist tactics frequently to prevent a decision on a proposal which they believe will be inimical to Soviet interests. They also use it to stall for time so that a new policy can be formulated as well as to make the West concede points in order to end Russian delays. The third Soviet maneuver is comprised of offensive tactics designed to obtain as many concessions as possible from the West before an agreement is reached on a particular proposal. Because there are a relatively large number of offensive tactics, for purposes of discussion in this paper, they have been sub-divided into three groups: overt, subtle and those which exploit the inclinations of Western diplomats. The fourth and last group of maneuvers is comprised of Russian duplicity tactics. According to Western observers, the Russians have utilized a number of tactics designed to deceive Western negotiators. The most prominent duplicity tactic has been the feigning of agreements. During the Second World War the Russians entered into many verbal and written agreements largely to demonstrate to the Western allies their co-operative spirit so that lend lease supplies and any post-war territorial gains promised by the West would not be jeopardized. Before the end of the war the Russians stalled on implementing most agreements but as soon as the war finished and lend lease supplies stopped, Soviet violations of agreements and treaties occurred frequently. However, since Khrushchev enunciated the doctrine of peaceful coexistence in 1956, the Russians have used duplicity tactics less frequently although they have demonstrated as recently as the Cuban missile incident in 1962, that if the stakes are high enough they will resort to deception to gain an advantage. According to Western observers, the Russian diplomat is more a specialized messenger or a mechanical mouthpiece than a diplomat in the traditional sense. The Western diplomat can comment extemporaneously on proposals and can advise his government on policy whereas his Soviet counterpart cannot. When Western descriptions of their own diplomats are compared with their descriptions of Soviet diplomats it becomes apparent that many Western observers have black and white conceptions with respect to the differences between Russian and Western behavior. Many Westerners see their diplomats as honest, polite, and cooperative whereas they see the Russian diplomat as insincere, rude and intransigent. Negotiations with the Soviet Union since 1945 have left a number of impressions upon Westerners and some of these impressions have crystallized into a number of strongly held beliefs as to how the West should negotiate with the Russians. These four beliefs concern firmness (temporized by prudence), an anti-conciliatory attitude (because the Soviets supposedly look upon conciliation as appeasement), a stress on specific, written agreements, and a belief that relations between states must be based on trust. However, it is suggested that trust is not a reliable ground upon which to base agreements between states. Basing agreements on mutual self-interest rather than trust might offer greater opportunities for East-West settlements. Moreover, a new Western conciliatory attitude combined with shrewdness in the light of Sino-Soviet difficulties might help to improve East-West relations. Historical examples of Soviet negotiating behavior lend support to the beliefs of those Western observers who claim that the Russians use negotiations for more than just a method of resolving disputes and accommodating interests. Indeed, Soviet diplomatic behavior seems to have been generally consistent with Communist ideological beliefs on the role of diplomacy as another method for furthering international communism against "bourgeois" interests. Western diplomats who have negotiated with the Soviets describe Russian tactics fairly specifically, but rarely do they mention any use of their own tactics. The implication is that many Westerners may have a narrow view of the negotiating process. That is, they see the Russians using tactics but not themselves. This dichotomy is incorrect because Westerners utilize negotiating tactics such as those related to propaganda and offensive maneuvers. Two types of maneuvers which the West has not utilized are duplicity and obstruction, neither of which are really related to the bargaining process. When overt acknowledgment of Western tactics occurs, East-West bargaining should not be as difficult, frustrating or disappointing as Westerners claim it now is. All Soviet actions will not be construed as vile once Westerners accept many Soviet tactics as a legitimate part of the bargaining process. Westerners should also consider that the Soviets are probably wary of Western negotiating tactics. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The purpose of this study has been to address an imbalance existing in the historiography relating to American-Canadian relations in the period between 1919-1924. Relying primarily on American sources, this study has attempted to argue that the Canadian government had a unique opportunity to inititiate and execute an independent foreign policy by exploiting her position within the British Empire as well as her close relationship with the United States. In contrast to a number of Canadian studies which have argued that the United States impeded Canada's diplomatic growth in the post World War I period, this work maintains that the United States tried to encourage Canada to assume a more autonomous position because it was in America's interest to do so. Canada's similar attitudes with the United States towards the questions of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Asian immigration and Article Ten in the League of Nations' Covenant convinced the United States that the Canadian government was potentially useful to the American government in helping to protect its international interests in institutions where it was not represented. The evidence presented in this study maintains that it was the Canadian and British governments that were reluctant to carry out the final steps of appointing a separate Canadian representative to Washington in the early 1920s. As a result, Canada lost her opportunity to establish an independent policy because the United States found alternative methods of protecting its international interests. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate