The purpose of this research is to analyze the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of American federal government, during periods within which these two branches are led by different political parties, to discover whether the legislative branch attempts to independently legislate and enact foreign policy by using “the power of the purse” to either appropriate in support of or refuse to appropriate in opposition to military engagement abroad. The methodology for this research includes the analysis and comparison of certain variables, including public opinion, budgetary constraints, and the relative majority of the party that holds power in one or both chambers, and the ways these variables may impact the behavior of the legislative branch in this regard. It also includes the analysis of appropriations requests made by the legislative branch for funding military engagement in rejection of requests from the executive branch for all military engagements that occurred during periods of divided government from 1946 through 2009

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Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / In the early 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower encouraged citizens to “Wake Up! Sign Up! Look Up!” to the Soviet atomic threat by joining the Ground Observer Corps (GOC). Established by the United States Air Force (USAF), the GOC involved civilian volunteers surveying the skies for Soviet aircraft via watchtowers, alerting the Air Force if they suspected threatening aircraft. This thesis examines the 1950s response to the longstanding problem posed by the invention of any new weapon: how to adapt defensive technology to meet the potential threat. In the case of the early Cold War period, the GOC was the USAF’s best, albeit faulty, defense option against a weapon that did not discriminate between soldiers and citizens and rendered traditional ground troops useless. After the Korean War, Air Force officials promoted the GOC for its espousal of volunteerism and individualism. Encouraged to take ownership of the program, observers appropriated the GOC for their personal and community needs, comprised of social gatherings and policing activities, thus greatly expanding the USAF’s original objectives.

A la fin du 18ème siècle, les Etats-Unis inaugurent les révolutions fondatrices ou refondatrices, directement inspirée des Lumières et ayant dialoguées par-delà l’Atlantique. La période révolutionnaire a vue une élite politique nouvelle aux prises avec la nécessité de bâtir un «ordre nouveau», c'est-à-dire de créer un gouvernement et de définir le rapport au monde de ce nouvel Etat. Cette quête a amené les acteurs politiques de la révolution à chercher un modèle politique différent de celui, dominant, des monarchies absolues. L’idée de république s’impose dès la déclaration d’indépendance. En effet, les Lumières avaient redécouvert le républicanisme qui pouvait incarner l’espoir d’un ordre politique réformé. Cependant, les républiques classiques et les exemples contemporains confirment l’idée alors partagée par tous qu’une république ne peut être qu’une petite entité politique au sein de laquelle vit une population restreinte d’hommes libres et où les différences sociales sont relativement faibles. Non seulement cette petite taille des républiques était-elle un phénomène empirique mais elle semblait être une loi d’airain. Depuis la reformulation du dilemme républicain par Machiavel, l’idée qu’une république ne puisse pas être libre et étendue faisait consensus. Cette première république moderne, fille des Lumières pacifistes, a pourtant mené une expansion quasi-continentale. Comment cette petite république à la périphérie du monde pouvait-elle réconcilier sa volonté de rompre avec les tentations hégémoniques et son désir de puissance ?Comment pouvait-elle s’étendre tout en préservant sa liberté républicaine ?Nous avons formulé l’hypothèse que la réponse à ces questions se trouve dans une redéfinition des principes et des méthodes de leur politique étrangère. Afin de minimiser les risques de corruption de la république, les acteurs de la révolution ont cherché à mettre en place une politique étrangère républicaine fondée sur les idées des Lumières. <p>Cette hypothèse nous a mené à articuler notre travail autour de trois axes de recherche :le premier portant sur la théorie politique internationale, le second sur le débat idéologique autour de la politique étrangère et le troisième sur les institutions de prise de décision et de mise en œuvre de cette politique étrangère. Ces trois axes sont reliés par les idées qui forment la structure intellectuelle des débats entre les acteurs ainsi que les déterminants de la création institutionnelle. <p>C’est là le cœur de notre thèse. En faisant appel à la méthodologie originale développée par Pierre Rosanvallon, qu’il décrit comme une histoire conceptuelle du politique, nous avons tout d’abord procédé à une étude du cadre intellectuel de la révolution américaine en mettant en lumière les évolutions des concepts-clefs de la philosophie des relations internationales par une analyse de la contribution de Montesquieu à la théorie politique internationale. <p>La thèse porte ensuite sur les débats révolutionnaires, la tension entre les idéologies des Lumières telles qu’illustrées par la pensée de Montesquieu et le désir d’expansion territoriale ou de grandeur des acteurs de la révolution. Nous avons choisi de consacrer notre étude aux élites, non pas que nous ne considérions pas l’histoire sociale digne d’intérêt mais nous avons postulé que dans cette phase de bouleversement politique, ce sont les élites politiques qui ont joué le rôle déterminant. Enfin, la troisième partie de la thèse consiste en une étude du cadre constitutionnel, législatif et institutionnel de la politique étrangère républicaine issue de l’interaction entre la structure intellectuelle des Lumières et son interprétation par les acteurs. <p>Ainsi, notre analyse des idées, des acteurs et des institutions de la république américaine nous a permis de contribuer d’une part à la théorie des relations internationales en mettant en lumière les évolutions des concepts-clefs de la politique internationale au cours du 18ème siècle et d’autre part à l’histoire des idées politiques en étendant son champ aux questions internationales. Cela nous a permis également de mettre en lumière le lien étroit entre la structure idéelle, les intérêts et les stratégies des acteurs et la création des institutions politiques. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Following the 1959 victory of the Cuban revolution, the United States government along with the CIA and their Cuban émigré allies immediately undertook a campaign of subversion and terrorism against the Cuban revolution. From 1959 until 1963 a clandestine war was waged between supporters of the revolution and the counter-revolutionary organizations backed by Washington. This project is a new synthesis of this little-known story. It is an attempt to shed light on a little known aspect of the conflict between the United States government and the Cuban revolution by bringing together never-before seen primary sources, and utilizing the two distinct and separate historiographies from the U.S. and Cuba, concerning the clandestine struggle. This is the story of Cuba’s resistance to intervention, the organization of the counter- revolution, and finally how the constant defeat of CIA plots by the Cubans forced changes in U.S. strategy concerning intervention in Cuba and in other parts of the developing world that would have far-reaching and long-last effects.

The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model, this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met, why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the “Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the 3 same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians (both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model, this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met, why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the “Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the 3 same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians (both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Previous research on post-conflict elections has found several criteria important in determining if an area is ready to hold elections and whether or not it is likely to succeed. Although rarely ranked in any determination of importance, several concepts are present in most post-conflict election research. Additionally, there is not an agreed set of standard criteria upon which success can be assumed. When researching the post-conflict election literature two questions arise: (1) is there a set of criteria established to determine if an area is ready to conduct post-conflict elections, and (2) do all criteria need to be present in order to ensure successful post-conflict elections? Most research agrees on common criteria but highlights or researches one dominant criterion, to which is then often attributed to the success of an election. This is found in Krishna Kumar’s focus on international assistance (Kumar, 1998), Staffan Lindberg’s attribution of success to repetition of the election process (Lindberg, 2006), Paul Collier’s focus on per capita income (Collier, 2009), and Marie-Soleil Frere’s research on post-conflict elections and the media (Frere, 2011). When reviewing multiple research sources, it is likely several factors at various times and in various elections will be credited with being the single source criterion for success. This kind of past research is well supported and conclusively argued, but still fails to provide a scope of understanding outside of a single event. In other words, it is case specific and not comparatively applicable across cases. Although this thesis does not intend to “McDonaldize” (Ritzer, 2009) the process of democratization, it does propose to define a common set of criteria necessary, even if in varying degrees, to conduct successful elections in post-conflict environments.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / In this study, rhetorical analysis through the framework of victimage ritual is employed to analyze four Boko Haram messages on You Tube, five e-mail messages sent to journalists from leaders of Boko Haram, and a BlogSpot web page devoted to Boko Haram. The aim of this analysis is to understand the persuasive devices by which Boko Haram leaders create, express, and sustain their jurisprudence on acts of violence. The goal of this study is to understand how leaders of Boko Haram construct and express the group’s values, sway belief, and justify violence. The findings show that Boko Haram desire to redeem non-Muslims from perdition, liberate Muslims from persecution, protect Islam from criticism, and revenge perceived acts of injustices against Muslims. The group has embarked on this aim by allotting blame, vilifying the enemy-Other, pressing for a holy war, encouraging martyrdom, and alluding to an apocalypse. Boko Haram’s audience is made to believe that Allah has assigned Boko Haram the task to liberate and restore an Islamic haven in Nigeria. Therefore, opposition from the Nigerian government or Western forces is constructed as actions of evil, thus killing members of the opposition becomes a celestial and noble cause. This juxtaposition serves to encourage the violent Jihad which leaders of Boko Haram claims Allah assigned them to lead in the first place. As a result of this cyclical communication, media houses, along the Nigerian government, Christians and Western ideals become the symbolic evil, against which Muslims, sympathizers and would-be-recruits must unite. By locking Islam against the Nigerian government, Western ideals and Christianity in a characteristically hostile manner, Boko Haram precludes any real solution other than an orchestrated Jihad-crusade-or-cleanse model in which a possible coexistence of Muslims and the enemy-Other are denied, and the threat posed by the enemy-Other is eliminated through conversion or destruction. As a result, this study proposes that Boko Haram Internet messages Boko Haram’s mission reveals a movement of separatism, conservatism, and fascism. A movement based on the claim that its activism will establish a state in accordance with the dictates of Allah.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / During the early Cold War, 1949 through 1963, the federal government, through such agencies as the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) (1950-1957), the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) (1958-1960), and the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) (1961-1963), regarded children and young adults as essential to American civil defense. Youth-oriented, voluntary organizations, including the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) and the Girl Scouts of the United States of America (GSUSA), assisted the federal civil defense programs by promoting civil defense messages and agendas. In this thesis, I will explore how the GSUSA and BSA translated federal civil defense policies for their Scouts. What were the civil defense messages transmitted to Scouts during the early Cold War? How were those messages disseminated? Why? What was the social impact of BSA and GSUSA involvement with civil defense on America’s evolving national ideals?