The purpose of this research is to analyze the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of American federal government, during periods within which these two branches are led by different political parties, to discover whether the legislative branch attempts to independently legislate and enact foreign policy by using “the power of the purse” to either appropriate in support of or refuse to appropriate in opposition to military engagement abroad. The methodology for this research includes the analysis and comparison of certain variables, including public opinion, budgetary constraints, and the relative majority of the party that holds power in one or both chambers, and the ways these variables may impact the behavior of the legislative branch in this regard. It also includes the analysis of appropriations requests made by the legislative branch for funding military engagement in rejection of requests from the executive branch for all military engagements that occurred during periods of divided government from 1946 through 2009

Post-force congressional rally effects are presented as a new incentive behind presidential decisions to use diversionary behavior. Using all key roll call votes in the House and Senate where the president has taken a position for the years 1948 to 1993, presidents are found to receive sharp decreases in both presidential support and success in Congress shortly after employing aggressive policies abroad. Evidence does suggest that presidents are able to capitalize on higher levels of congressional support for their policy preferences on votes pertaining to foreign or defense matters after uses of force abroad. But, despite these findings, diversionary behavior is found to hinder rather than facilitate troubled presidents' abilities to influence congressional voting behavior.

In an effort to better understand the motivations behind perceived biases in the US cable news industry, 72 hours of CNN, FOX, and MSNBC during the week preceding the 2006 congressional election were analyzed. First- and second-level agenda-setting theories are used to examine how long and in what way federal politicians are portrayed. The results indicate distinct differences in political presentations between the three networks.

Black Capitol investigates the persistence of racial inequality in the federal legislative workforce. I frame the existence of racial inequality in Congress not as an outgrowth of certain racist members of Congress, but as a defining characteristic of the institution. I analyze how these disparities are produced by and through an institutional structure formed by race. This leads me to offer the concept of Congress as a raced political institution. I use the term raced political institution to mean institutions, organized for the purposes of government, in which race is embedded in the organizational structure, and is a determining factor of how labor and space is organized on the formal level. In addition, I use the term to informally capture how perceptions of power influence identity construction, interactions, and culture. I build on scholarship from critical race theorists, to argue that Congress is a seminal institution in the American racial state, responsible for structuring race and inequality in American society. From the perspective of Black legislative staff, who currently or previously worked in the Capitol, I assess how the congressional workforce is stratified, how physical space is segregated, and how interactions and identities are racialized. I employ a mixed methods approach, including over 70 semi-structured interviews with current and former legislative employees, archival research, and ethnographic observations of the staff organizations. This analysis contributes to a wide range of scholarly conversations about citizenship, representation, democracy, and bureaucracy. More broadly, this work raises important questions about the distribution of power in the American political system and how inequality in Congress reverberates off of Capitol Hill.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the possibility of political influence upon the Department of Justice merger decisions within the brewing industry. Political preference was measured by the congressional ratings of a liberal political action committee, The Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), thus giving a liberalness score. Regressions including the merger guideline variables and the political preference measurement were estimated with a logit model. After running numerous regressions, the addition of the political preference variable resulted in insignificance for otherwise significant 1968 and 1982 guidelines variables. These results may indicate an inability of the model to differentiate between political pressure on antitrust enforcement during the establishment of the 1968 and 1982 guidelines, or beyond the establishment of the guidelines. However, the Chair of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, the oversight committee for the Department of Justice, is found to be the most significant with liberalness having a positive impact upon the probability of DOJ merger litigation. / Graduation date: 1995

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This thesis traces the growth the United States Senate's role in the Supreme Court confirmation process from the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to the nomination of Robert H. Bork in 1987. Beginning with an examination of the intellectual origins of the Advice and Consent Clause of the United States Constitution, the thesis goes on to demonstrate that the Senate's role in the confirmation process has expanded well beyond the boundaries established by the Framers of the Constitution, and that this has resulted in a usurpation of the presidential power of appointment. The thesis concludes by arguing that the growth of the Senate's role in the confirmation process has harmed the integrity of the judicial branch by infringing upon the separation of powers, specifically demonstrating how the modern confirmation process has threatened to undermine the independence of the Judiciary.

The congressional speeches of Gerrit J. Diekema are the basis of this study and have been transcribed directly from the Congressional Record. Only those speeches and comments which were deemed illuminating as to the political and personal philosophy of Diekema are included. The speeches are of historical value for two reasons. First, they provide insight into the attitude of a Conservative Republican during the Progressive period. Secondly, the speeches indicate that a Congressman could be swayed in his support of party causes by the needs of his home district. Thus, the picture emerges of the typical congressman paying less attention to the great debate among Congressional leaders and showing more concern over parochial issues than is generally indicated in the histories of the period.

In a time of laissez-faire government, monopolistic businesses and political debauchery, William Andrews Clark played a significant role in the developing West, achieving financial success rivaling Jay Gould, George Hearst, Andrew Carnegie, and J. P. Morgan. Clark built railroads, ranches, factories, utilities, and developed timber and water resources, and was internationally known as a capitalist, philanthropist and art collector. Nonetheless, Clark is unjustly remembered for his bitter twelve-year political battle with copper baron Marcus Daly that culminated in a scandalous senatorial election in January 1899. The subsequent investigation was a judicial travesty based on personal hatred and illicit tactics. Clark's political career had national implications and lasting consequences. His enemies shaped his legacy, and for one hundred years historians have unquestioningly accepted it.

This study examines the possible effect of the president's vote totals in states on Presidents Carter's and Reagan's support among senators. Using senators' Congressional Quarterly (CQ) presidential support scores as the dependent variable, this paper hypothesizes that Carter and Reagan's support is significantly and positively related to their electoral success in that Senator's state for the years 1977 through 1988. Several control variables are included to help explain support. There is qualified corroboration for the hypothesis that senator's presidential support scores are significantly and positively related to the president's electoral success for specific administrations and for specific-party senators, although not for the original hypothesis that aggregated the period 1977 to 1988.