Thesis (Th. M.)--Calvin Theological Seminary, 2005. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 94-98).

The two traditional views in the epistemology of disagreement have offered distinct responses to the challenge of epistemic conflict. The purpose of this dissertation is to challenge these responses and offer a satisfactory position. This position is congruent with social epistemology as well as Christian apologetics. Chapter 1 introduces the epistemology of disagreement, giving attention to the concepts of disagreement found in the literature on religious diversity. This introduction also demonstrates that the two responses to disagreement possess features that are problematic for apologetics. Chapter 2 addresses the epistemic problems of the conciliatory response to disagreement. This chapter concludes that conciliation possesses an excessive view of testimony, and a low view of self-trust. Chapter 3 focuses on the epistemological matters of the steadfast position. This chapter maintains that steadfastness is premised on a deficient view of testimony, and an excessive view of self-trust. These two chapters show the internal deficiencies of both positions; thus, weakening their challenge against apologetics. Chapter 4 presents the position of virtue responsibilism as a satisfactory and advantageous response to the epistemology of disagreement. This response is the virtuous response to disagreement. Chapter 5 expands on the natures of two intellectual virtues: intellectual courage and open-mindedness. These two intellectual virtues are particularly relevant to the discussion of disagreement and apologetics. Chapter 6 applies the virtuous response to disagreement with experts and the challenge of religious diversity. The chapter shows that conciliation and steadfastness are unable to provide satisfactory responses to these issues, while the virtuous response presents an advantageous response for Christian apologetics. Chapter 7 summarizes the main points of the dissertation, offering practical applications as well as areas for further research.

In this thesis I provide an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of moral vice and argue (1) that Aristotle's account is consistent, and (2) that Aristotle is not committed to the view that all vicious agents are incapable of improving their characters. The main argument attempts to show that a proper interpretation of Aristotle's account of vice must observe a distinction between what Aristotle recognizes as two distinct sorts of vicious agents: those who are capable of change, and those who are not. I argue that this distinction amounts to the same thing as what I call the distinction between curably and incurably vicious agents. Recognizing this distinction and drawing out the ideas which ground it, I argue, shows that Aristotle's account of vice is consistent, and that he is not committed to the view that all vicious agents are incapable of improving their characters.

Plato’s “Socratic paradoxes” state that no one does wrong voluntarily and that virtue is knowledge. Outside of moral psychology, the importance of the Socratic paradoxes has been neglected. My dissertation defends two related proposals that showcase their importance in ancient epistemology. The first proposal is that they are a major motivation for Plato to develop a unique view of epistēmē (knowledge or understanding) as an infallible and robust cognitive power that is set over a special class of objects. The second proposal is that understanding the influence of the Socratic paradoxes can help us see how epistēmē improves our doxai (beliefs or opinions) about the world around us, solving a long-standing problem in Plato’s epistemology. I will start by examining the Hippias Minor, in which we see Plato seeking to embrace the Socratic paradoxes (rather than already assuming them) and looking to develop his notion of epistēmē as a result. I will then move to the Protagoras, in order to show Plato proceeding with this project by embracing epistēmē as something that produces good action and involves measurement. I will show the Protagoras’ picture to be fully developed in the Republic, in which epistēmē emerges as something that measures the truth of our doxai and has clear practical benefits as a result. Finally, I will compare this account to Aristotle’s treatment of virtue and epistēmē in the Eudemian Ethics, in order to consider the legacy of the Socratic paradoxes after Plato.

This thesis aims to provide a new definition for philosophy rooted in MacIntyre’s account of a “practice”. In the first chapter, I explain MacIntyre’s concept of a practice as it appears in After Virtue—including its critical components, namely, internal goods, standards of excellence, and the historical dimension of practices—through a consideration of the practice of guitar lutherie. I then use this account to build up an initial definition of philosophy as a practice, and briefly clarify two minor confusions that could easily arise regarding such an account. In my second chapter, I take up MacIntyre’s view that practices are always spatiotemporally situated in order to question whether or not my definition from Chapter One could include non-Western philosophy within it. I argue that this is possible within the peculiar epistemic conditions of modernity, based on a reading of MacIntyre’s paper “Relativism, Power and Philosophy”. In Chapter Three, I consider another key component of MacIntyre’s account—namely, that of institutions—and arrive at some extra qualifications regarding the concepts of both “external goods” and “corruption” to deepen the account, and then introduce my own concept of “institutional hegemony” to account for academia’s present status with regards to the practice of philosophy, which I use to explain a discordance between the present reality of philosophy as a discipline and the conclusions I draw in Chapter Two. I then extend this line of thought in the fourth chapter to look at some objections that could be made against a MacIntyrean view of philosophy-as-a-practice from a feminist and postcolonial lens. These objections are then addressed in the fifth chapter, where I show that the MacIntyrean ought to be in agreement with the feminist and postcolonial projects, and that the MacIntyrean framework can indeed accommodate them.

Thesis advisor: James Keenan / This dissertation argues that humility is a cardinal virtue that governs our ecological relationality. I define humility as the virtue of knowing and valuing the truth of our place in the world as interdependent beings. Humility is acquired via the practice of other-centeredness and other-acceptance and enabled by the “graces" of self-doubt and self-affirmation. A global survey of recent Christian scholarship on environmental issues and magisterial Roman Catholic teaching supports three conclusions: 1) interconnectedness characterizes human relationships with creation; 2) current ecological crises indicate the presence of sin and 3) we need to understand our place within creation and appreciate other-centered ways of knowing. Utilizing these three themes, I expand upon James Keenan's framework of rethinking cardinal virtues in terms of human relationality in order to account for an underdeveloped aspect of human relationality, that is, ecological relationality. I propose a more robust account of humility as a mean between two equally problematic extremes: pride and self-deprecation. Furthermore, humility helps us better identify sin both by recognizing how pride and self-deprecation can lead to indifference, understood as a failure to bother to love, that stems from our strength, and by rejecting the isolation that enables the sin of indifference so understood. The final chapter addresses how humility can be understood and cultivated in the United States today. In particular, I argue that the adoption of a plant-based diet generally fosters humility in individuals living in wealthy nations with high rates of meat consumption. In conclusion, I suggest that Catholics reinvigorate the Lenten penitential practice of Friday abstinence from meat by seeing it also as an opportunity to foster the virtue of humility. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Aristotelian eudaimonism – as Daniel Russell puts it – is understood as two things at once: it is the final end for practical reasoning, and it is a good human life for the one living it. This understanding of Aristotelian eudaimonism, on which one’s ultimate reason for doing all that one does is one’s own eudaimonia, has given rise to what I call the “self-absorption objection.” Roughly, proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is the fact that doing so is good for us. In an attempt to adequately address this objection, I break with those contemporary neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation that insist that the virtuous agent ought to be understood as performing virtuous actions ultimately for the sake of her own eudaimonia (enlarged, no doubt, to include the eudaimonia of others). On the alternative neo-Aristotelian account of moral motivation I go on to defend – what I call the altruistic account of motivation – the virtuous agent’s ultimate reason for acting virtuously is based on a desire to act in accordance with her particular conception of the good life, where what makes such a conception good is not that it is good for her, but rather good, qua human goodness. More specifically, on the altruistic account of motivation I advance, the virtuous agent may be understood as being motivated by human goodness, valuing objects and persons only insofar as they participate in human goodness, and where all of the virtuous agent’s reasons, values, motivations, and justifications are cashed out in terms of human goodness – as they say – “all the way down.” / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / In this dissertation, I advance a neo-Aristotelian account of moral motivation that is immune from what I call the “self-absorption objection.” Roughly, proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they wrongly prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is the fact that doing so is good for us. In an attempt to sidestep this objection, I offer what I call the altruistic account of motivation. On this account, the virtuous agent’s main reason for acting virtuously is based on her desire to act in accordance with a particular conception of the good life, where what makes such a conception good is not that it is good for her, but rather good, qua human goodness.

This thesis attempts to demarcate the use of the term “racism” by looking at two of main accounts of what the word means. The first, individualism, defines racism as normally meaning an individual act or attitude of antipathy or apathy towards a person on the basis of their perceived race. The second, structuralism, defines racism as normally meaning the various beliefs, ideologies, laws, and actions that a cultural group participates in as caused by the structures of society which negatively affect a racialized group. I believe that neither of these accounts can adequately define nor address racism. As is shown in chapter III, many of the critiques made against individualism do not adequately answer the major structuralist concerns, but, as is shown in chapter IV, the same can be said for individualist critiques of structuralism. As I show in chapter V, each of them address an important aspect of racism, but fail when they attempt to entirely address it. Both act as a useful evaluative lens, but I will argue that we should be able to use both, rather than have to explain one by using the other / Thesis / Master of Philosophy (MA) / This Thesis discusses individualist and structuralist accounts of racism in an attempt to bridge the two. Many people have discussed this topic in the past 20 years, but nearly all do it from one of these two camps. I propose that we allow for both account to be used in tandom, rather than using one account to explain situations and aspects of situations better explained by the other account.

In this paper I offer an analysis of the Adam Smith Problem. This Problem arises from perceived inconsistencies between Smith's economic work, The Wealth of Nations, and his moral theory, the Theory of Moral Sentiments. I argue that far from being inconsistent with Smith's economic theory, his moral theory serves as a necessary foundation. I suggest that, because he takes humans to be moral by nature, Smith defends social capitalism which requires moral economic agents rather than homo economicus. I then sketch some specific implications for the moral limits of Smithian social systems. / Master of Arts

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