Orientador: Oswaldo Martins Estanislau do Amaral / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-27T16:31:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernandes_MonizeArquer_M.pdf: 2086168 bytes, checksum: 26b3585953586bf012c68634f8b238c4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / Resumo: O objetivo deste trabalho é demonstrar que o contexto local - seja ele sociodemográfico ou institucional - importa na decisão do voto. Assim, buscamos contribuir para a literatura sobre comportamento eleitoral e sobre sistema partidário. A partir de uma amostra representativa de todos os municípios brasileiros, analisamos a volatilidade eleitoral partidária e ideológica para o cargo de vereador nas eleições de 2000 a 2012. Dessa forma, colaboramos com estudos que dizem respeito tanto à organização e ao funcionamento do sistema partidário em nível local, como também àqueles que buscam compreender o que determina a decisão do eleitor, apresentando quais características contextuais são capazes de explicar sua alternância entre os diversos partidos. Os resultados comprovam a relevância das características contextuais para explicar a variação do voto / Abstract: The central aim of this research is to demonstrate that the context matters for the electoral choice. Using a sample of the Brazilian cities, we analyzed the electoral volatility of each political party and of the ideological groups of parties for city councilors in four municipal elections ¿ 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012. Our intention is to identify which variables (sociodemographic or institutional) explain vote change between two consecutive elections. In this way, we contribute to the literature about electoral behavior and about party systems. The results show that context is important to understand the dimensions of the electoral decision / Mestrado / Ciencia Politica / Mestra em Ciência Política

Associé à la démocratie représentative, le vote en France est souvent observé à travers ses résultats (chiffre d’abstention, du vote blanc, inscription ou non inscription sur les listes électorales, etc.), ce qui laisse entendre que le fait démocratique serait caractérisé par les suffrages exprimés. Or, pour le citoyen le vote a un sens qui va au-delà du rituel des urnes. En tant que Sujet socio-psychologique, il vote en agissant autour d’enjeux fondamentaux dans le but de construire et de se construire par un acte puissant et utile en confirmant son histoire.Pour comprendre la signification du vote en tant qu’agir politique articulé à de nombreux agir (s) sociaux, eux-mêmes reposant sur des fondements psychologiques de l’agir humain, nous nous sommes positionnés en amont et en aval de la dynamique électorale et envisagé le comportement votant en fonction des connaissances, des croyances, des prédispositions normatives, affectives, bref, de l’attitude qui le sous-tend.La question générale de notre recherche est de décliner les conditions qui construisent le comportement votant. / Associated with representative democracy, voting in France is often seen through its results (abstention, blank vote, registration or non-registration on electoral lists, etc.), which suggests that the actual democratic would be characterized by the votes cast. For the citizen, the vote has a meaning that goes beyond the ritual of the ballot box. As a socio-psychological subject, he votes regarding fundamental issues in order to bring out solutions and construct himself through this historical action seen as a powerful, effective and useful. In order to understand the significance of voting as a political act expressed in many social actions, which are based on the psychological foundations of human action, we positioned ourselves upstream and downstream of the vote and considered the voting behavior relatively to knowledge, beliefs, normative, affective dimensions, in short, to the attitude that supports it.The general aim of our research is to specify the conditions that construct the voting behavior.

The Exercise of the Voting Right in a Join-Stock Company Abstract The submitted thesis analyses the voting right of a shareholder and the exercise of the voting right in a joint-stock company. In the last few years, a tendency to encourage the engagement of shareholders and to broaden the scope of decision rights of shareholders can be seen. Nevertheless, some authors underestimate the importance of the shareholders' right to vote and conclude that real decision-making power lies with the management or administrative board. The main hypothesis to be proven or rebutted is that the shareholder's voting right is not insignificant and vesting decision-making power in shareholders can have a positive influence on the effectiveness of the management of the company notwithstanding the broad liberty of the shareholder to both freely exercise and dispose of the voting right (the shares) and notwithstanding the existence of deviations from the principle of proportionality. The thesis aims to examine the voting right in its complexity, in contrast to the prevailing approach of contemporary Czech jurisprudence, and to contribute to academic knowledge with original arguments and conclusions. This goal is achieved by extensive use of foreign legal sources, mainly French and Belgian literature and case law, since the...

As most dedicated observers of voting bodies like the U.S. Supreme Court can attest, it is possible to guess vote outcomes based on statements made during deliberations or questioning by the voting members. In most forms of representative democracy, citizens can actively petition or lobby their representatives, and that often means understanding their intentions to vote for or against an issue of interest. In some U.S. state legislators, professional lobby groups and dedicated press members are highly informed and engaged, but the process is basically closed to ordinary citizens because they do not have enough background and familiarity with the issue, the legislator or the entire process. Our working hypothesis is that verbal utterances made during the legislative process by elected representatives can indicate their intent on a future vote, and therefore can be used to automatically predict said vote to a significant degree. In this research, we examine thousands of hours of legislative deliberations from the California state legislature’s 2015-2016 session to form models of voting behavior for each legislator and use them to train classifiers and predict the votes that occur subsequently. We can achieve legislator vote prediction accuracies as high as 83%. For bill vote prediction, our model can achieve 76% accuracy with an F1 score of 0.83 for balanced bill training data.

Cette thèse porte sur l’évolution de la participation électorale des habitants des quartiers populaires depuis 1999. En France, après les émeutes de 2005, ces quartiers ont été marqués par une forte hausse de l’inscription et de la participation lors de l’élection présidentielle de 2007. Pourtant ils cumulent les caractéristiques susceptibles d’éloigner leurs habitants du vote. C’est ce paradoxe que la thèse cherche à expliquer. Pour y parvenir, elle croise plusieurs champs théoriques (sociologie urbaine, sociologie/géographie électorale, action publique) dans une perspective comparative, analysant ces évolutions électorales dans les périphéries marginalisées de Paris, Madrid et Birmingham. L’hypothèse centrale est celle d’une inclusion politique croissante des habitants des quartiers populaires français. La méthodologie est mixte, croisant analyse de données agrégées resituant le contexte, données de sondage, entretiens avec des habitants des quartiers marginalisés, observations de bureaux de vote en région parisienne et analyse des politiques d’incitation au vote. Les résultats montrent qu’il n’y a pas de fatalité à la non-participation des périphéries urbaines marginalisées. Enfin dans les trois pays les dispositifs d’incitation au vote influencent de façon très inégale l’évolution des comportements politiques. Les politiques publiques généralistes inspirées par la tradition républicaine se révèlent être plus mobilisatrices que les actions ciblées menées au Royaume Uni à destination de groupes sociaux ou de quartiers particuliers. / This research studies the evolution of voting turnout in in Paris, Madrid and Birmingham’s deprived neighborhoods since 1999. In France, after the 2005 riots, both registration and turnout increased sharply during the 2007 presidential election in those places. Yet their inhabitants face numerous social and physical barriers, reducing the likelihood that they would vote. We try to explain this paradox using combined theoretical frameworks from urban sociology, electoral sociology, electoral geography and public policies in a comparative research design. The core hypothesis is that those social groups are increasingly involved in politics and in voting. This study uses several methodological tools involving aggregate data analysis, survey data analysis, polling station observation and field interviews. The results show that public policies designed to influence turnout are sharply divided. Universalistic approaches appear more likely to get voters to participate.

Thesis is about The Czech Social Democratic Party and its activities between 1989 and 1998 focusing on those happening in Kutna Hora district. The aim is to introduce not so well known topic in a comprehensive way - motions of Kutna Hora executive district committee together with descriptions of peoples' personal lives acting in the field of Czech Social Democratic Party. National development of the Czech Social Democratic Party and its influence on Kutna Hora executive district committee has been described. The methods used in processing of this thesis were: exploration of the archival documents, literature research focused on the topic and oral history. Summary of Kutna Hora executive district committee activities as well as reminder of people who were important for the history of Kutna Hora' s Czech Social Democratic Party is, in my opinion, the merit of the thesis.

Nous étudions la manipulation par coalition des modes de scrutin: est-ce qu'un sous-ensemble des électeurs, en votant de façon stratégique, peut faire élire un candidat qu'ils préfèrent tous au candidat qui aurait été vainqueur si tous les électeurs avaient voté sincèrement? D'un point de vue théorique, nous développons un formalisme qui permet d'étudier tous les modes de scrutin, que les bulletins soient des ordres de préférences sur les candidats (systèmes ordinaux), des notes ou des valeurs d'approbation (systèmes cardinaux) ou des objets encore plus généraux. Nous montrons que pour la quasi-totalité des modes de scrutin classiques, on peut réduire strictement leur manipulabilité en ajoutant un test préliminaire visant à élire le vainqueur de Condorcet s'il en existe un. Pour les autres modes de scrutin, nous définissons la condorcification généralisée qui permet d'obtenir des résultats similaires. Puis nous définissons la notion de culture décomposable, une hypothèse dont l'indépendance probabiliste des électeurs est un cas particulier. Sous cette hypothèse, nous prouvons que, pour tout mode de scrutin, il existe un mode de scrutin qui est ordinal, qui partage certaines propriétés avec le mode de scrutin original et qui est au plus aussi manipulable. Ainsi, la recherche d'un mode de scrutin de manipulabilité minimale (dans une classe de systèmes raisonnables) peut être restreinte à ceux qui sont ordinaux et vérifient le critère de Condorcet. Afin de permettre à tous d'examiner ces phénomènes en pratique, nous présentons SVVAMP, un package Python de notre cru dédié à l'étude des modes de scrutin et de leur manipulabilité. Puis nous l'utilisons pour comparer la manipulabilité par coalition de divers modes de scrutin dans plusieurs types de cultures, c'est-à-dire des modèles probabilistes permettant de générer des populations d'électeurs munis de préférences aléatoires. Nous complétons ensuite l'analyse avec des élections issues d'expériences réelles. Enfin, nous déterminons les modes de scrutin de manipulabilité minimale pour de très faibles valeurs du nombre d'électeurs et du nombre de candidats et nous les comparons avec les modes de scrutin classiques. De manière générale, nous établissons que la méthode de Borda, le vote par notation et le vote par assentiment sont particulièrement manipulables. À l'inverse, nous montrons l'excellente résistance à la manipulation du système appelé VTI, également connu par son acronyme anglophone STV ou IRV, et de sa variante Condorcet-VTI. / We investigate the coalitional manipulation of voting systems: is there a subset of voters who, by producing an insincere ballot, can secure an outcome that they strictly prefer to the candidate who wins if all voters provide a sincere ballot? From a theoretical point of view, we develop a framework that allows us to study all kinds of voting systems: ballots can be linear orders of preferences over the candidates (ordinal systems), grades or approval values (cardinal systems) or even more general objects. We prove that for almost all voting systems from literature and real life, manipulability can be strictly diminished by adding a preliminary test that elects the Condorcet winner if one exists. Then we define the notion of decomposable culture and prove that it is met, in particular, when voters are independent. Under this assumption, we prove that for any voting system, there exists a voting system that is ordinal, has some common properties with the original voting system and is at most as manipulable. As a consequence of these theoretical results, when searching for a voting system whose manipulability is minimal (in a class of reasonable systems), investigation can be restricted to those that are ordinal and meet the Condorcet criterion.In order to provide a tool to investigate these questions in practice, we present SVVAMP, a Python package we designed to study voting systems and their manipulability. We use it to compare the coalitional manipulability of several voting systems in a variety of cultures, i.e. probabilistic models generating populations of voters with random preferences. Then we perform the same kind of analysis on real elections. Lastly, we determine voting systems with minimal manipulability for very small values of the number of voters and the number of candidates and we compare them with classical voting systems from literature and real life. Generally speaking, we show that the Borda count, Range voting and Approval voting are especially vulnerable to manipulation. In contrast, we find an excellent resilience to manipulation for the voting system called IRV (also known as STV) and its variant Condorcet-IRV.

Le travail de thèse s’articule autour de trois chapitres.Le premier chapitre « Electoral Institutions and Political Polarization: An Experiment on Approval Voting in Benin » s’intéresse au rôle des institutions politiques dans la division des sociétés africaines. L’idée principale étant que les institutions politiques pourraient influencer la formation des groupes à l’intérieur des sociétés. Certains systèmes de vote (pluralité, système majoritaire) par leur règle tendent à forcer les électeurs à choisir un camp et pourraient potentiellement conduire à des divisions sociales, ethniques ou religieuses. Les autres règles de vote qui permettent aux électeurs de voter plusieurs candidats à la fois, devraient en théorie éviter ces inconvénients, et ainsi aboutir à une moins grande polarisation politique. Ce chapitre fournit des preuves expérimentales de cette théorie. Nos données proviennent d'une expérience sur le vote d'approbation qui a eu lieu lors de l'élection présidentielle de 2011 au Bénin, un pays démocratique d’Afrique occidentale, multi-ethnique avec un paysage politique caractérisé par une forte fracture nord-sud au niveau sociale et politique. En parallèle au vote officiel (scrutin majoritaire), nous avons proposé le vote par approbation aux électeurs, dont règle leur permet de voter pour plusieurs candidats à la fois. Les résultats montrent que ce système de vote augmente le score de plusieurs candidats consensuels. Nous avons également trouvé que le vote ethnique ne disparait pas et pourrait même augmenter. Dans le chapitre 2 « L’impact du clientélisme électoral: Analyse d’une expérience de laboratoire », nous nous intéressons au clientélisme, son lien avec la modernisation et son impact sur les résultats des élections. Nous avons effectués des expériences de laboratoires dans deux endroits différents (France et Burkina Faso). Les résultats obtenus montrent un effet significatif des campagnes d’achat de vote et de promesses électorales sur le score des candidats dans les deux pays. Mais les campagnes clientélistes sont plus efficaces en Afrique car ils permettent l’élection du candidat clientéliste. Le troisième et dernier chapitre « Quels sont les facteurs qui influencent le consentement à l’impôt en Afrique du Sud Sahara : Une analyse empirique avec des données d’enquêtes d’opinion», fournit une analyse des facteurs déterminant le consentement à payer la taxe des citoyens en Afrique du sud Sahara. En utilisant les données de 29 pays, nous avons montré que la qualité des services publiques, le milieu de résidence, le niveau d’éducation, la confiance aux institutions, la transparence du système fiscal sont des facteurs important dans les décisions des citoyens de consentir à payer la taxe. Nous avions également montré que la présence de ressources naturelle dans un pays, ainsi que le nombre d’habitant dans un pays jouent un rôle dans le consentement à payer la taxes des citoyens. Aussi l’importance accordé aux facteurs déterminant est différent selon la particularité des pays (peuplé ou pas, possédant ou pas des ressources naturelles). / This work is organized in three (3) chapters. the first chapter, « Electoral Institutions and Political Polarization: An Experiment on Approval Voting in Benin » coauthored with J-F Laslier, K.Van Der Straten and L. Wantchekon, focus on the institutions ‘s goal in the division of societies. The main idea is that political institutions can shape political preferences and influence the formation of groups within societies. Some system such Simple plurality and runoff majoritarian voting systems tend to force voters to “choose sides,” potentially exacerbating political, social, ethnic, or religious divisions. Voting rules that allow voters to simultaneously select several candidates should, in theory, avoid these drawbacks, and might thus lead to less polarized political outcomes. This chapter provides experimental evidence in support of this insight. Our data originates from an experiment on Approval Voting that took place during the 2011 presidential election in Benin, a democratic, multi-ethnic country in western Africa, with a political landscape characterized by a strong social and political north-south divide. In contrast to the official runoff rule used in Benin for this presidential election, we proposed Approval Voting to voters, whereby they can vote simultaneously for several candidates. We find that this electoral institution leads to an increase in the overall support for more consensual candidates. We also find that, under Approval Voting, like under Proportional Representation systems, ethnic voting does not disappear, and might even increase. The second chapter continue in the logic of voting motivation by doing some laboratory experiment about electoral clientelism. We focus on the vote buying and electoral promises. We wanted to show the impact on electoral clientelism on the election outcome in one way and in the second way, see if there is a link between modernization and clientelism. We did experiment in two different places (Burkina Faso and France) show that the impact of electoral clientelism is more relevant in Africa countries than in developed countries. The third chapter investigates on tax compliance in Africa by using data from about 29 African countries. The goal is to analyze the citizens’s behaviors when they have to contribute to public funding by paying tax. We want to know which factors may motivate people have a compliance attitude with tax. The main contribution of this research is the effect of country population and the existence of natural resources. We found that citizens living in countries with natural resources are less willing to pay taxes than citizens living in countries without natural resources. Also, we showed that the population matters. Indeed, in the most populated countries, fraud is higher than less popular countries. We then establish for each group of countries the factors for which they should act to have a tax compliance of their citizens. This can help countries to have a great public finance and become more independent from foreign aid.

One fundamental condition for a democracy to work is the possibility for voters to hold their legislators to account. Because voter turnout in European Parliament (EP) elections is so low, however, the task of holding MEPs accountable is passed on to the national parties. These become ‘transmission belts’ between voters and legislators: they instruct the MEPs how to vote and present them threats and rewards to ensure they vote as promised. To study how well this works, this thesis aims at exploring what influences how an MEP votes in situations where the national party and the European Party Group (EPG) hold conflicting policy positions. A new analytical framework is built to generate and preliminarily test hypotheses concerning what influences how an MEP votes. The analytical framework is largely inspired by Strøm (1990), who assumes that legislators are driven by their wishes of getting policy through, reaching high office and being re-elected. Normally, these goals can be reached with the help of the legislator’s party, which is why legislators have an incentive to keep their party happy and vote according to its policy position. In the EP, however, things are complicated by the fact that certain goals can only be reached with the help of legislators’ EPGs. Hypotheses concerning what may drive MEPs to vote either with her national party or with her EPG are tested in the thesis with the help of unique interview data, collected from five Swedish MEPs from parties in government. The thesis’ results show that policy-related incentives are most important to MEPs, and that these incentives are mainly controlled by EPGs. Office- and re-election-related incentives are only ascribed limited importance. There are contextual factors that affect these results: if an issue is perceived as important to Sweden or to the national party or if it receives high media attention, MEPs ascribe less importance to EPG-controlled incentives, although this does not mean that national party-controlled incentives increase in importance. In conclusion, MEPs do not seem to feel pressured by their national parties when deciding how to vote. This leads me to the conclusion that the role of national parties as ‘transmission belts’ between voters and MEPs is defective

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