This study is concerned with the application of multivariate nonparametric models known as regression trees to the analysis of the U.S. wage structure. In Chapter 1, I first review regression trees and other available multivariate nonparametric techniques, highlighting their differences and common features. In the second part of Chapter 1, I look at the literature on the U.S. wage structure in connection with the issue of functional specification and argue that regression trees is particularly well suited for analyzing wage structures. In Chapter 2, I implement regression trees on U.S. wages for white male workers to estimate experience-wage profiles and unveil local sudden breaks in the profiles at the end of the working life. For 1980, these breaks account for about 50% of the negative average differential between the last two experience groups. This effect decreases continuously until 1995. In Chapter 3 I propose a simple extension of the Oaxaca-type average wage gap decompositions between any two groups of workers. This procedure can be carried out without any compromise in the interpretation using a nonparametric wage structure. I then study wage gap decompositions for Mexican workers in the U.S. labor market. Finally, in Chapter 4 I apply regression trees to study both the relative growth performance of workers' real wages and the sources of wage dispersion and its evolution in the U.S. from 1980 onwards. On trends, the technique uncovers a linear structure for the growth experience of white workers with less than forty years of experience. On dispersion, at least 10% of the increase in observed variance came from changes in the structure of wages itself.

This thesis focuses on the industry wage differentials, rent-sharing and the gender wage gap. I empirically investigate: i) the interaction between inter-industry wage differentials and the gender wage gap in six European countries, ii) how rent sharing interacts with the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector and iii) the existence of inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium, through the unobserved ability hypothesis. The first chapter is devoted to the analysis of the interaction between inter-industry wage differentials and the gender wage gap in six European countries, i.e. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the U.K. To do so, we have relied on a unique harmonised matched employer-employee data set, the 1995 European Structure of Earnings Survey. As far as we know, this paper is the first to analyse with recent techniques, on a comparable basis, and from a European perspective: i) inter-industry wage differentials by gender, ii) gender wage gaps by industry, and iii) the contribution of industry effects to the overall gender wage gap. It is also one of the few, besides Kahn (1998), to analyse for both sexes the relationship between collective bargaining characteristics and the dispersion of industry wage differentials. Empirical findings show that, in all countries and for both sexes, wage differentials exist between workers employed in different sectors, even when controlling for working conditions, individual and firm characteristics. We also find that the hierarchy of sectors in terms of wages is quite similar for male and female workers and across countries. Yet, the apparent similarity between male and female industry wage differentials is challenged by standard statistical tests. Indeed, simple t-tests show that between 43 and 71% of the industry wage disparities are significantly different for women and men. Moreover, Chow tests indicate that sectoral wage differentials are significantly different as a group for both sexes in all countries. Regarding the dispersion of the industry wage differentials, we find that results vary for men and women, although not systematically nor substantially. Yet, the dispersion of industry wage differentials fluctuates considerably across countries. It is quite large in Ireland, Italy and the U.K., and relatively moderate in Belgium, Denmark and Spain. For both sexes, results point to the existence of a negative and significant relationship between the degree of centralisation of collective bargaining and the dispersion of industry wage differentials. Furthermore, independently of the country considered, results show that more than 80% of the gender wage gaps within industries are statistically significant. The average industry gender wage gap ranges between -.18 in the U.K. and -.11 in Belgium. This means that on average women have an inter-industry wage differential of between 18 and 11% below that for men. Yet, correlation coefficients between the industry gender wage gaps across countries are relatively small and often statistically insignificant. This finding suggests that industries with the highest and the lowest gender wage gaps vary substantially across Europe. Finally, results indicate that the overall gender wage gap, measured as the difference between the mean log wages of male and female workers, fluctuates between .18 in Denmark and .39 in the U.K. In all countries a significant (at the .01 level) part of this gap can be explained by the segregation of women in lower paying industries. Yet, the relative contribution of this factor to the gender wage gap varies substantially among European countries. It is close to zero in Belgium and Denmark, between 7 and 8% in Ireland, Spain and the U.K., and around 16% in Italy. Differences in industry wage premia for male and female workers significantly (at the .05 level) affect the gender wage gap in Denmark and Ireland only. In these countries, gender differences in industry wage differentials account for respectively 14 and 20% of the gender wage gap. To sum up, findings show that combined industry effects explain around 29% of the gender wage gap in Ireland, respectively 14 and 16% in Denmark and Italy, around 7% in the U.K. and almost nothing in Belgium and Spain. In conclusion, our results emphasize that the magnitude of the gender wage gap as well as its causes vary substantially among the European countries. This suggests that no single policy instrument will be sufficient to tackle gender pay inequalities in Europe. Our findings indicate that policies need to be tailored to the very specific context of the labour market in each country. The second chapter examines investigates how rent sharing interacts with the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector. Empirical findings show that individual gross hourly wages are significantly and positively related to firm profits-per-employee even when controlling for group effects in the residuals, individual and firm characteristics, industry wage differentials and endogeneity of profits. Our instrumented wage-profit elasticity is of the magnitude 0.06 and it is not significantly different for men and women. Of the overall gender wage gap (on average women earn 23.7% less than men), results show that around 14% can be explained by the fact that on average women are employed in firms where profits-per-employee are lower. Thus, findings suggest that a substantial part of the gender wage gap is attributable to the segregation of women is less profitable firms. The third and final chapter contributes to the understanding of inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium, taking advantage of access to a unique matched employer-employee data set covering the period 1995-2002. Findings show the existence of large and persistent wage differentials among workers with the same observed characteristics and working conditions, employed in different sectors. The unobserved ability hypothesis may not be rejected on the basis of Martins’ (2004) methodology. However, its contribution to the observed industry wage differentials appears to be limited. Further results show that ceteris paribus workers earn significantly higher wages when employed in more profitable firms. The instrumented wage-profit elasticity stands at 0.063. This rent-sharing phenomenon accounts for a large fraction of the industry wage differentials. We find indeed that the magnitude, dispersion and significance of industry wage differentials decreases sharply when controlling for profits.

<p>This thesis comprises three essays. The first two essays examine what inferences can be drawn about the structure of wages from the experiences of displaced workers using the Ontario Ministry of Labour Plant Closure Survey. The third essay examines the effect of unemployment benefits on household consumption during spells of unemployment, with a particular emphasis on durables purchases. It employs data from a second and new data source, the Canadian Out of Employment Panel.</p> <p>The first essay revisits the issue of what can be learned about wage tenure profiles from displaced worker data. The positive relationship between wages and tenure in cross section data is consistent with the accumulation of firm specific capital. Alternatively, it may be explained by unobserved heterogeniety across workers, or by endogenous mobility. Displaced worker data is quite helpful in correcting for the first possible bias, and less so for the second. The relationship between various estimation strategies in the literature is illustrated. Estimates that control for individual heterogeniety and endogenous mobility driven by systematic differences in the pay policies of firms are presented. In this data, 10 years of tenure appears to raise wages by about 7%.</p> <p>The second essay examines intra-industry wage differentials. Even after conditioning on a rich set of worker and job characteristics, firm of employment is a significant determinant of wages. Estimates that employ the longitudinal nature of data demonstrate that sorting of workers across firms by unobserved ability can explain about half of the observed differentials. Firm wage differentials are observed within narrow industries, consistent across broad occupational groups, and robust to conditioning on differences in the mix of skills or job characteristics. Further "high wage" firms exhibit high average tenures suggesting that positive wage premia are associated with reduced mobility. These observations imply that compensating wage differentials are also a poor candidate explanation for the observed differentials. The results are more consistent with models based on rents or some firm monopsony power. The results also raise questions about the interpretation of wage regressions which ignore firm heterogeneity, and about the sources of wages losses among displaced workers.</p> <p> The final essay examines how households smooth consumption over the income losses due to an unemployment spell. A model of "internal capital markets" is proposed, which suggests that households adjust the timing of the replacement of small durables to income flows. The plausibility of this model is investigated empirically, using a series of program changes in the Canadian unemployment insurance scheme for exogenous variation in transitory income. The data are consistent with the predictions of the "internal capital markets model" while rejecting both a standard life cycle model and a "rule of thumb" model of household expenditure patterns.</p> / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

In the first chapter,a harmonised linked employer-employee dataset is used to study the impact of firm-level agreements on the wage structure in the manufacturing sector in Belgium, Denmark and Spain. To our knowledge, this is one of the first cross-country studies that examines the impact of firm-level bargaining on the wage structure in European countries. We find that firm-level agreements have a positive effect both on wage levels and on wage dispersion in Belgium and Denmark. In Spain, firm also increase wage levels but reduce wage dispersion. Our interpretation is that in Belgium and Denmark, where firm-level bargaining greatly expanded since the 1980s on the initiative of the employers and the governments, firm-level bargaining is mainly used to adapt pay to the specific needs of the firm. In Spain, the structure of collective bargaining has not changed very much since the Franco period where firm agreements were used as a tool for worker mobilisation and for political struggle. Therefore, firm-level bargaining in Spain is still mainly used by trade unions in order to reduce the wage dispersion. In the second chapter, we analyse the impact of the bargaining level and of the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining on rent-sharing in Belgium. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that considers simultaneously both dimensions of collective bargaining. This is also one of the first papers that looks at the impact of wage bargaining institutions on rent-sharing in European countries. This question is important because if wage bargaining decentralisation increases the link between wages and firm specific profits, it may prevent an efficient allocation of labour across firms, increase wage inequality, lead to smaller employment adjustments, and affect the division of surplus between capital and labour (Bryson et al. 2006). Controlling for the endogeneity of profits, for heterogeneity among workers and firms and for differences in characteristics between bargaining regimes, we find that wages depend substantially more on firm specific profits in decentralised than in centralised industries , irrespective of the presence of a formal firm collective agreement. In addition, the impact of the presence of a formal firm collective agreement on the wage-profit elasticity depends on the degree of centralisation of the industry. In centralised industries, profits influence wages only when a firm collective agreement is present. This result is not surprising since industry agreements do not take into account firm-specific characteristics. Within decentralised industries, firms share their profits with their workers even if they are not covered by a formal firm collective agreement. This is probably because, in those industries, workers only covered by an industry agreement (i.e. not covered by a formal firm agreement) receive wage supplements that are paid unilaterally by their employer. The fact that those workers also benefit from rent-sharing implies that pay-setting does not need to be collective to generate rent-sharing, which is in line with the Anglo-American literature that shows that rent-sharing is not a particularity of the unionised sector. In the first two chapters, we have shown that, in Belgium, firm-level bargaining is used by firms to adapt pay to the specific characteristics of the firm, including firm’s profits. In the third and final chapter, it is shown that firm-level bargaining also allows wages to adapt to the local environment that the company may face. This aspect is of particular importance in the debate about a potential regionalisation of wage bargaining in Belgium. This debate is, however, not specific to Belgium. Indeed, the potential failure of national industry agreements to take into account the productivity levels of the least productive regions has been considered as one of the causes of regional unemployment in European countries (Davies and Hallet, 2001; OECD, 2006). Two kinds of solutions are generally proposed to solve this problem. The first, encouraged by the European Commission and the OECD, consists in decentralising wage bargaining toward the firm level (Davies and Hallet, 2001; OECD, 2006). The second solution, the regionalisation of wage bargaining, is frequently mentioned in Belgium or in Italy where regional unemployment differentials are high. In this chapter we show that, in Belgium, regional wage differentials and regional productivity differentials within joint committees are positively correlated. Moreover, this relation is stronger (i) for joint committees where firm-level bargaining is relatively frequent and (ii) for joint committees already sub-divided along a local line. We conclude that the present Belgian wage bargaining system which combines interprofessional, industry and firm bargaining, already includes the mechanisms that allow regional productivity to be taken into account in wage formation. It is therefore not necessary to further regionalise wage bargaining in Belgium.

Στόχος της παρούσας διδακτορικής διατριβής είναι η διερεύνηση της δομής των μισθών και των μισθολογικών διαφορών στην Ελληνική αγορά εργασίας, δεδομένων ορισμένων χαρακτηριστικών της, ιδιαίτερα εκείνων που σχετίζονται με το θεσμικό πλαίσιο που διέπει τη λειτουργία της αγοράς εργασίας και ρυθμίζει τις εργασιακές σχέσεις. Η διδακτορική διατριβή αποτελείται από τέσσερις ξεχωριστές μελέτες, ωστόσο τα ευρήματα και συμπεράσματα της κάθε μίας έχουν γενικότερη εφαρμογή και ερμηνεία. Το πρώτο μέρος της διδακτορικής διατριβής ερευνά τις μισθολογικές διαφορές που οφείλονται στο μέγεθος των επιχειρήσεων, όπως αυτό μετράται από τον συνολικό αριθμό των εργαζόμενων σε αυτές. Οι εκτιμήσεις πραγματοποιούνται μέσω της χρήσης διαστρωματικών ενοποιημένων δεδομένων εργαζόμενων-εργοδοτών. Τα αποτελέσματα των οικονομετρικών εκτιμήσεων υποδεικνύουν την ύπαρξη ενός μισθολογικού πλεονεκτήματος υπέρ των εργαζόμενων σε επιχειρήσεις μεγαλύτερου μεγέθους, το μέγεθος του οποίου είναι ανάλογο με αντίστοιχα εκτιμημένα πλεονεκτήματα τα οποία αναφέρονται στη διεθνή βιβλιογραφία. Επίσης, εξετάζεται η εγκυρότητα διαφόρων πιθανών ερμηνειών που έχουν προταθεί στην σχετική βιβλιογραφία. Σύμφωνα με τα αποτελέσματα των εκτιμήσεων, οι διαφορές σε ανθρώπινο κεφάλαιο, η ύπαρξη ανταποδοτικών αμοιβών, οι μισθοί αποδοτικότητας και η λειτουργία εσωτερικών αγορών εργασίας είναι παράγοντες ικανοί να ερμηνεύσουν το μεγαλύτερο μέρος του μισθολογικού πλεονεκτήματος υπέρ των εργαζόμενων σε μεγαλύτερες επιχειρήσεις. Επίσης, τα αποτελέσματα των εκτιμήσεών υποδεικνύουν ότι το υπό εξέταση μισθολογικό πλεονέκτημα μεταβάλλεται, ανάλογα με τον κλάδο οικονομικής δραστηριότητας. Σκοπός του δεύτερου κεφαλαίου της παρούσας διδακτορικής διατριβής, είναι η διερεύνηση των επιπτώσεων της σύναψης επιχειρησιακών συλλογικών συμβάσεων εργασίας στη δομή των μισθών στην αγορά εργασίας. Για τους σκοπούς της ανάλυσης χρησιμοποιούνται ενοποιημένα στοιχεία εργαζόμενων-εργοδοτών για το έτος 2006, εκτιμήσεις μη δεσμευμένων ποσοστημορίων καθώς και οι σχετικές μέθοδοι διαχωρισμού επιδράσεων. Τα αποτελέσματα επιβεβαιώνουν την ύπαρξη ενός μισθολογικού πλεονεκτήματος υπέρ των εργαζόμενων που καλύπτονται από επιχειρησιακές συλλογικές συμβάσεις εργασίας, το οποίο ακολουθεί μια κοίλη τάση κατά μήκος κατανομής των ατομικών αμοιβών. Επιπλέον, οι μισθολογικές διαφορές μεταξύ των εργαζόμενων που καλύπτονται από επιχειρησιακές συλλογικές συμβάσεις και εκείνων που καλύπτονται από συλλογικές συμβάσεις που υπογράφονται σε πιο κεντρικά επίπεδα διαπραγμάτευσης, οφείλονται σε διαφορές στον τρόπο συλλογικής διαπραγμάτευσης για όσους βρίσκονται στο αριστερό ήμισυ της συνολικής κατανομής των ατομικών αμοιβών, ενώ για όσους βρίσκονται στο δεξί ήμισυ της κατανομής, το μεγαλύτερο μέρος των μισθολογικών διαφορών εξηγείται από διαφορές στο ανθρώπινο κεφάλαιο και στα χαρακτηριστικά των επιχειρήσεων. Το τρίτο μέρος της διδακτορικής διατριβής ερευνά την ύπαρξη μιας καμπύλης μισθών στην Ελληνική αγορά εργασίας χρησιμοποιώντας μικροοικονομικά δεδομένα για την περίοδο 2001-2012.Τα εκτιμημένα αποτελέσματα υποδεικνύουν ότι ο “εμπειρικός νόμος της Οικονομικής Επιστήμης” σύμφωνα με τον οποίο υπάρχει μια βραχυχρόνια αρνητική σχέση μεταξύ ατομικών αμοιβών και τρέχουσας περιφερειακής ανεργίας, μπορεί να επιβεβαιωθεί μόνο για την περίοδο μετά το 2010, όπου μια σειρά δημοσιονομικών μέτρων και μεταρρυθμίσεων του θεσμικού πλαισίου των εργασιακών σχέσεων έλαβαν μέρος, με στόχο τη μείωση του μισθολογικού κόστους και την αύξηση του βαθμού ευελιξίας της αγοράς εργασίας. Πριν το 2010, δεν ήταν δυνατός ο προσδιορισμός μιας συστηματικής σχέσης μεταξύ ατομικών αμοιβών και περιφερειακής ανεργίας. Η ανυπαρξία μιας τέτοιας σχέσης, μπορεί να αποδοθεί κυρίως σε θεσμικές δυσκαμψίες οι οποίες απαγόρευαν τις μισθολογικές προσαρμογές προς τα κάτω. Το συμπέρασμα αυτό ενισχύεται από το γεγονός ότι η ύπαρξη καμπύλης μισθών πριν το 2010, δεν επιβεβαιώνεται ανεξάρτητα από το επίπεδο των συλλογικών διαπραγματεύσεων στο οποίο προσδιορίζονται οι αμοιβές στην Ελληνική αγορά εργασίας. Τέλος, το τέταρτο μέρος της παρούσας διδακτορικής διατριβής πραγματοποιεί την πρώτη αποτίμηση μιας πρόσφατης θεσμικής μεταρρύθμισης στην Ελληνική αγορά εργασίας. Σκοπός της μεταρρύθμισης αυτής είναι η αποκέντρωση του συστήματος των συλλογικών διαπραγματεύσεων έτσι ώστε να διευκολύνεται η προσαρμογή των μισθών στα χαρακτηριστικά των επιχειρήσεων και στις επικρατούσες συνθήκες στην αγορά εργασίας. Για τους σκοπούς αυτής της μελέτης, αναπτύχθηκε μια μοναδική βάση δεδομένων αποτελούμενη από πληροφορίες που προέρχονται από το σύνολο των επιχειρησιακών συμβάσεων που υπογράφηκαν στην ελληνική αγορά εργασίας τα τελευταία χρόνια. Τα αποτελέσματα μιας σειράς εκτιμήσεων υποδειγμάτων περιορισμένων εξαρτημένων μεταβλητών υποδεικνύουν ότι η εισαγωγή της νέας εργασιακής νομοθεσίας επηρεάζει σημαντικά την πιθανότητα τα διαπραγματευόμενα μέρη να συμφωνήσουν σε προς τα κάτω μισθολογική προσαρμογή, ειδικά στο επίπεδο του κατώτατου μισθού που περιγράφεται στην Εθνική Γενική Συλλογική Σύμβαση Εργασίας, ενώ οι τρέχουσες συνθήκες που επικρατούν στην αγορά εργασίας είναι επίσης σημαντικοί προσδιοριστικοί παράγοντες των συμφωνηθεισών μισθολογικών προσαρμογών. / The purpose of this doctoral thesis, is the investigation of the wage structure and the wage differentials in the Greek labour market, given some specific characteristics, especially those pertaining to the institutional framework which underlies it and governs the labour relations. This thesis consists of four distinct essays, however, their findings and conclusions can be more generally applied. The first part of this doctoral thesis examines the establishment size-wage premium in Greece using a matched employer-employee dataset. The results of the econometric estimation suggest that such a premium is also present in the Greek market sector and its magnitude is in line with those reported in other economies. The validity of various explanations of the size-wage premium, put forward in the pertinent economics literature, is also tested. This exercise suggests that in the Greek case, human capital, compensating wage differentials, incentive payment schemes and internal labor markets are primarily responsible for its presence. Lastly, the analysis reveals that the premium is sector-specific. The second part of this doctoral thesis analyzes the effect of firm-level contracting on the wage structure in the Greek private sector. Using a matched employer–employee dataset for 2006, unconditional quantile regressions and relevant decomposition methods, leads to the identification of a wage premium associated with firm-level contracting, which follows a hump-shaped profile across the wage distribution. Furthermore, the wage differential between workers under firm-level and broader-level collective agreements can be primarily attributed to differences in the regime-specific wage setting structure, for those below the median of the unconditional wage distribution, and to differences in worker and firm-specific characteristics for those in the upper tail. The third part of this doctoral thesis investigates the existence of a wage curve in Greece using microdata for the period 2001-2012. According to the estimated results, the implied by the “empirical law of Economics” short-run negative relationship between regional unemployment and wage levels can be only identified for the period after 2010 where, due to the increasing unemployment rate, a series of fiscal cuts and reforms of the collective bargaining system were imposed in order to reduce the labour cost in the private sector of the economy. Regarding the period before this structural break, a systematic relationship between regional unemployment and individual wage levels could not be identified. This finding can be mainly attributed to institutional rigidities which prevented downward wage flexibility, since a wage curve could not be established at any level of collective bargaining either. Finally, the fourth part of this doctoral thesis uses a unique dataset developed from official firm-level collective agreements signed during the period 2009-2012 to perform a first evaluation of a recent institutional reform which decentralized the highly regulated Greek labour relations framework in order to facilitate wage adjustments to firm-specific and prevailing labour market conditions. The estimated results from a series of limited dependent variable models indicate that the new labour law affects significantly the probability of a bargained downward wage adjustment, especially to the national minimum level, while the prevailing labour market conditions are also important determinants of the bargained wage cuts.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T14:34:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DeboraCM_DISSERT.pdf: 1883306 bytes, checksum: 557a232f7eeb177982ac5561dc639193 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-19 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior / This study aims to analyze the income differentials by gender in Brazil, in the years 1976, 1987, 1996 and 2009. Specifically, there are two objectives. First, attempt to analyze the importance of the effects of composition and wage structure in the job market. In the second, to verify which socioeconomic variables explain the effects of composition and wage structure in the job market. The information in this study was obtained from the microdata of Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domic?lios (PNAD) regarding the respective years. In the first stage of the methodology we used: the index of income distribution Theil-T; the income gap decompositions proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973); and Firpo et al. (2007). In the second stage we applied the RIF regression method (Recentered Influence Function) of Firpo et al. (2007). The results show that income inequality is higher among men than among women in the country. It was observed that the component of inequality between people of the same gender represented the largest share in the decomposition of income inequality between genders. It was found, in the decomposition of the average income, a downward trend of income gap, but the differential remains favorable to the men. We noticed that the impact of the composition effect in reducing the gap was offset by the positive effect of wage structure. Regarding the distribution quantis, income differential between genres appeared greater at the bottom, in the years 1976, 1987 and 2009; and at the top of the distribution, in 1996 featuring, respectively, the sticky floor and glass ceiling effects in Brazil. As for the decomposition of the RIF, it turns out that the composition effect assisted in the downfall of the income gap between 1976 and 2009, but was offset by the positive effect of the wage structure in quantis 10th, 50th, and 90th. The main socioeconomic variables influenced the drop in income gap were: the composition effect, the manual labor occupations, service sector and low-grade and high school, and the wage structure effect, schooling low and high experience professional and technical occupations and urban centers / Este estudo tem como objetivo analisar os diferenciais de rendimentos por g?nero no Brasil, no per?odo de 1976, 1987, 1996 e 2009. Especificamente, h? dois objetivos. No primeiro, procura-se analisar a import?ncia dos efeitos da composi??o e da estrutura salarial no mercado de trabalho. No segundo, procura-se verificar que vari?veis socioecon?micas explicam os efeitos da composi??o e da estrutura salarial no mercado de trabalho. As informa??es deste estudo foram obtidas nos microdados da Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domic?lios (PNAD), dos respectivos anos. Na primeira etapa da metodologia foram utilizados: o ?ndice de distribui??o de renda Theil-T; as decomposi??es do hiato de renda propostos por Oaxaca (1973) e Blinder (1973); e por Firpo et al. (2007). Na segunda etapa aplicou-seo m?todo de regress?o RIF (Recentered Influence Function) de Firpo et al. (2007). Os resultados mostram que a desigualdade renda ? mais elevada entre os homens do que entre as mulheres no Pa?s. Constatou-se, que o componente de desigualdade intrag?nero representou a maior parcela na decomposi??o da desigualdade de renda entre g?neros. Observou-se, na decomposi??o dos rendimentos pela m?dia, uma tend?ncia declinante do hiato de renda, mas o diferencial se mant?m favor?vel aos homens. Indicando que o impacto do efeito composi??o na redu??o do hiato foi compensado pelo efeito positivo da estrutura salarial. Em rela??o aos quantis da distribui??o o diferencial de renda entre g?nero apresentou-se maior na parte inferior, nos anos de 1976, 1987 e 2009; e na parte superior da distribui??o, em 1996 caracterizando, respectivamente, os efeitos sticky floor e glass ceiling no Brasil. Quanto ? decomposi??o do RIF, verifica-se que o efeito composi??o auxiliou na queda do hiato de renda entre 1976 a 2009, mas, foi compensado pelo efeito positivo da estrutura salarial nos quantis 10th, 50th e 90th. Al?m disso, as principais vari?veis socioecon?micas que influenciaram na redu??o do hiato de renda foram: no efeito composi??o, as ocupa??es de trabalho manual, setor de servi?os e grau de escolaridade baixa e alta; e no efeito estrutura salarial, o grau de escolaridade baixa e alta, experi?ncia, ocupa??es profissionais e t?cnica e ?rea urbana

This thesis focuses on the industry wage differentials, rent-sharing and the gender wage gap. I empirically investigate: i) the interaction between inter-industry wage differentials and the gender wage gap in six European countries, ii) how rent sharing interacts with the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector and iii) the existence of inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium, through the unobserved ability hypothesis.<p><p>The first chapter is devoted to the analysis of the interaction between inter-industry wage differentials and the gender wage gap in six European countries, i.e. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the U.K. To do so, we have relied on a unique harmonised matched employer-employee data set, the 1995 European Structure of Earnings Survey. As far as we know, this paper is the first to analyse with recent techniques, on a comparable basis, and from a European perspective: i) inter-industry wage differentials by gender, ii) gender wage gaps by industry, and iii) the contribution of industry effects to the overall gender wage gap. It is also one of the few, besides Kahn (1998), to analyse for both sexes the relationship between collective bargaining characteristics and the dispersion of industry wage differentials. <p>Empirical findings show that, in all countries and for both sexes, wage differentials exist between workers employed in different sectors, even when controlling for working conditions, individual and firm characteristics. We also find that the hierarchy of sectors in terms of wages is quite similar for male and female workers and across countries. Yet, the apparent similarity between male and female industry wage differentials is challenged by standard statistical tests. Indeed, simple t-tests show that between 43 and 71% of the industry wage disparities are significantly different for women and men. Moreover, Chow tests indicate that sectoral wage differentials are significantly different as a group for both sexes in all countries. Regarding the dispersion of the industry wage differentials, we find that results vary for men and women, although not systematically nor substantially. Yet, the dispersion of industry wage differentials fluctuates considerably across countries. It is quite large in Ireland, Italy and the U.K. and relatively moderate in Belgium, Denmark and Spain. For both sexes, results point to the existence of a negative and significant relationship between the degree of centralisation of collective bargaining and the dispersion of industry wage differentials.<p>Furthermore, independently of the country considered, results show that more than 80% of the gender wage gaps within industries are statistically significant. The average industry gender wage gap ranges between -.18 in the U.K. and -.11 in Belgium. This means that on average women have an inter-industry wage differential of between 18 and 11% below that for men. Yet, correlation coefficients between the industry gender wage gaps across countries are relatively small and often statistically insignificant. This finding suggests that industries with the highest and the lowest gender wage gaps vary substantially across Europe.<p>Finally, results indicate that the overall gender wage gap, measured as the difference between the mean log wages of male and female workers, fluctuates between .18 in Denmark and .39 in the U.K. In all countries a significant (at the .01 level) part of this gap can be explained by the segregation of women in lower paying industries. Yet, the relative contribution of this factor to the gender wage gap varies substantially among European countries. It is close to zero in Belgium and Denmark, between 7 and 8% in Ireland, Spain and the U.K. and around 16% in Italy. Differences in industry wage premia for male and female workers significantly (at the .05 level) affect the gender wage gap in Denmark and Ireland only. In these countries, gender differences in industry wage differentials account for respectively 14 and 20% of the gender wage gap. To sum up, findings show that combined industry effects explain around 29% of the gender wage gap in Ireland, respectively 14 and 16% in Denmark and Italy, around 7% in the U.K. and almost nothing in Belgium and Spain. <p>In conclusion, our results emphasize that the magnitude of the gender wage gap as well as its causes vary substantially among the European countries. This suggests that no single policy instrument will be sufficient to tackle gender pay inequalities in Europe. Our findings indicate that policies need to be tailored to the very specific context of the labour market in each country.<p><p>The second chapter examines investigates how rent sharing interacts with the gender wage gap in the Belgian private sector. Empirical findings show that individual gross hourly wages are significantly and positively related to firm profits-per-employee even when controlling for group effects in the residuals, individual and firm characteristics, industry wage differentials and endogeneity of profits. Our instrumented wage-profit elasticity is of the magnitude 0.06 and it is not significantly different for men and women. Of the overall gender wage gap (on average women earn 23.7% less than men), results show that around 14% can be explained by the fact that on average women are employed in firms where profits-per-employee are lower. Thus, findings suggest that a substantial part of the gender wage gap is attributable to the segregation of women is less profitable firms. <p><p>The third and final chapter contributes to the understanding of inter-industry wage differentials in Belgium, taking advantage of access to a unique matched employer-employee data set covering the period 1995-2002. Findings show the existence of large and persistent wage differentials among workers with the same observed characteristics and working conditions, employed in different sectors. The unobserved ability hypothesis may not be rejected on the basis of Martins’ (2004) methodology. However, its contribution to the observed industry wage differentials appears to be limited. Further results show that ceteris paribus workers earn significantly higher wages when employed in more profitable firms. The instrumented wage-profit elasticity stands at 0.063. This rent-sharing phenomenon accounts for a large fraction of the industry wage differentials. We find indeed that the magnitude, dispersion and significance of industry wage differentials decreases sharply when controlling for profits.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

In the first chapter,a harmonised linked employer-employee dataset is used to study the impact of firm-level agreements on the wage structure in the manufacturing sector in Belgium, Denmark and Spain. To our knowledge, this is one of the first cross-country studies that examines the impact of firm-level bargaining on the wage structure in European countries. We find that firm-level agreements have a positive effect both on wage levels and on wage dispersion in Belgium and Denmark. In Spain, firm also increase wage levels but reduce wage dispersion. Our interpretation is that in Belgium and Denmark, where firm-level bargaining greatly expanded since the 1980s on the initiative of the employers and the governments, firm-level bargaining is mainly used to adapt pay to the specific needs of the firm. In Spain, the structure of collective bargaining has not changed very much since the Franco period where firm agreements were used as a tool for worker mobilisation and for political struggle. Therefore, firm-level bargaining in Spain is still mainly used by trade unions in order to reduce the wage dispersion. <p>In the second chapter, we analyse the impact of the bargaining level and of the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining on rent-sharing in Belgium. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that considers simultaneously both dimensions of collective bargaining. This is also one of the first papers that looks at the impact of wage bargaining institutions on rent-sharing in European countries. This question is important because if wage bargaining decentralisation increases the link between wages and firm specific profits, it may prevent an efficient allocation of labour across firms, increase wage inequality, lead to smaller employment adjustments, and affect the division of surplus between capital and labour (Bryson et al. 2006). Controlling for the endogeneity of profits, for heterogeneity among workers and firms and for differences in characteristics between bargaining regimes, we find that wages depend substantially more on firm specific profits in decentralised than in centralised industries ,irrespective of the presence of a formal firm collective agreement. In addition, the impact of the presence of a formal firm collective agreement on the wage-profit elasticity depends on the degree of centralisation of the industry. In centralised industries, profits influence wages only when a firm collective agreement is present. This result is not surprising since industry agreements do not take into account firm-specific characteristics. Within decentralised industries, firms share their profits with their workers even if they are not covered by a formal firm collective agreement. This is probably because, in those industries, workers only covered by an industry agreement (i.e. not covered by a formal firm agreement) receive wage supplements that are paid unilaterally by their employer. The fact that those workers also benefit from rent-sharing implies that pay-setting does not need to be collective to generate rent-sharing, which is in line with the Anglo-American literature that shows that rent-sharing is not a particularity of the unionised sector. <p>In the first two chapters, we have shown that, in Belgium, firm-level bargaining is used by firms to adapt pay to the specific characteristics of the firm, including firm’s profits. In the third and final chapter, it is shown that firm-level bargaining also allows wages to adapt to the local environment that the company may face. This aspect is of particular importance in the debate about a potential regionalisation of wage bargaining in Belgium. This debate is, however, not specific to Belgium. Indeed, the potential failure of national industry agreements to take into account the productivity levels of the least productive regions has been considered as one of the causes of regional unemployment in European countries (Davies and Hallet, 2001; OECD, 2006). Two kinds of solutions are generally proposed to solve this problem. The first, encouraged by the European Commission and the OECD, consists in decentralising wage bargaining toward the firm level (Davies and Hallet, 2001; OECD, 2006). The second solution, the regionalisation of wage bargaining, is frequently mentioned in Belgium or in Italy where regional unemployment differentials are high. In this chapter we show that, in Belgium, regional wage differentials and regional productivity differentials within joint committees are positively correlated. Moreover, this relation is stronger (i) for joint committees where firm-level bargaining is relatively frequent and (ii) for joint committees already sub-divided along a local line. We conclude that the present Belgian wage bargaining system which combines interprofessional, industry and firm bargaining, already includes the mechanisms that allow regional productivity to be taken into account in wage formation. It is therefore not necessary to further regionalise wage bargaining in Belgium. <p> / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished