Wittgenstein once remarked that the same kind of reasoning that occurs in ordinary conversations about works of art can be found “in Ethics, but also in Philosophy.” That observation has been almost entirely overlooked by his commentators. What is aesthetic reasoning? What does it look like in conversations about art? And where might we find examples of such reasoning “in Ethics”? To set the stage for my answers, I begin with an overview of the early Wittgenstein’s view of ethics and aesthetics, emphasizing two ideas that were retained in his later view of aesthetic reasoning: the moral importance of non-moral descriptions, and the power of a “picture” to regulate action and thought. I illustrate those ideas by considering the moral influence of Tolstoy’s parable of the Good Samaritan on Wittgenstein. Next, I examine the passage in which Wittgenstein introduced aesthetic reasoning, and I articulate some general features of that concept. I also contend that we learn more about aesthetic reasoning by understanding Wittgenstein’s invention of the language-game concept as his reasoning aesthetically “in Philosophy.” Furthermore, I argue that the later Wittgenstein’s notions of aspect perception and grammatical pictures further inform aesthetic reasoning, revealing that it involves the introduction of grammar that can draw a person’s attention to unnoticed aspects of an object and equip him with further descriptions of that object. To illustrate that characterization of aesthetic reasoning, and to offer an example of such reasoning “in Ethics,” I return to Tolstoy’s parable and show that my interacting with it in a particular way involves aesthetic reasoning. Finally, I argue that aesthetic reasoning continues to occur in ethics in that it is woven into discussions of stories in bioethics classes. A student can have her grammatical picture of the case that a story presents reshaped as she sees and accepts aspects of that story that she had not noticed, and this, in turn, might influence her ways of seeing and responding morally to other cases. I close by considering whether aesthetic reasoning occurs in ethics in other ways, and I articulate some implications of my work for further Wittgenstein studies.

In this dissertation, I explicate how scholars implicate themselves in the subfield of organizational communication studies by engaging in antinomic language-games which make the conduct of research (and textwork in particular) possible. My analysis suggests that the studied scholars enact these games to understand a more or less common object of knowledge, but also to constitute a more or less identifiable position in this given social space. Reflection on the ontological complicity between these position and subfield occurs uncommonly, however. I illustrate, in turn, that this lack of reflexivity hinders discussion about the way academic research practices induce breaks with the social realities which these scholars are trying to understand. In light of this argument, and based predominantly on a translation and extension of Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas, this dissertation thus illustrates how the language-games of scholars in organizational communication studies sustain a limited practice of reflexivity and considers its effects on their production of knowledge.

La doxa a pris la mauvaise habitude, lorsque vient le temps de s'intéresser à Wittgenstein, de parler de deux Wittgenstein. Le premier, correspondant au Tractatus logico-philosophicus et le second, correspondant à l'ensemble de ses textes qui suivent le Tractatus et qui, selon un certain point de vue, s'en détacheraient, voire s'y opposeraient. Il est important de noter dès le départ que nous ne voyons pas une distinction marquée entre les deux Wittgenstein et qu'il nous apparaît plus évident de considérer son parcours philosophique comme un cheminement continu, comme participant d'une mosaïque à l'image de sa méthode philosophique, plutôt que comme deux positions distinctes, nettes et tranchées. Toutefois, même s'il est souvent mentionné dans le corpus des manuscrits qui suivent la publication du Tractatus que Wittgenstein propose de nouvelles approches de ses théories se référant explicitement aux thèses défendues dans ce dernier, il n'est nullement justifié de scinder son oeuvre en deux où quelqu'un, qui aborderait son oeuvre pour la première fois, pourrait se permettre le luxe de choisir l'une ou l'autre de ces positions. Ce serait alors occulter la partie la plus importante du corpus à savoir -tel qu'il l'affirme lui-même -que les idées défendues dans la seconde partie de son oeuvre ne peuvent être comprises qu'à la lumière de celles du Tractatus. Le travail qui suit aura touché son but s'il arrive à isoler ce qui, tel le fil d'Ariane, pourrait servir d'invariant à l'ensemble du corpus, à savoir l'intérêt soutenu de Wittgenstein de constamment préciser les jalons d'une grammaire philosophique synoptique encore à venir. En effet, du Tractatus aux Recherches philosophiques, les questions relatives à la grammaire philosophique -que Wittgenstein exemplifie souvent par les concepts de couleur et de douleur, mimant aussi par là la distinction entre l'extérieur et l'intérieur qui, même s'il affirme qu'elle ne l'intéresse pas sont tout de même le coeur de sa pensée -forgeraient les bases de son opus magnum qu'il n'a jamais achevé et constituerait ainsi la plus grande partie de son oeuvre. Il nous apparaît donc important de dégager les très nombreuses mentions des concepts de couleur et de douleur de l'ensemble du corpus pour ainsi proposer une voie d'accès réservée à l'ensemble des textes qui, de cette manière, se verra éclairé d'une lumière téléonomique. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Couleur, Douleur, Grammaire philosophique, Synopticité, Intention, Wittgenstein.

Dissonant Voices has a twofold aspiration. First, it is a philosophical treatment of everyday pedagogical interactions between children and their elders, between teachers and pupils. More specifically it is an exploration of the possibilities to go on with dissonant voices that interrupt established practices – our attunement – in behaviour, practice and thinking. Voices that are incomprehensible or expressions that are unacceptable, morally or otherwise. The text works on a tension between two inclinations: an inclination to wave off, discourage, or change an expression that is unacceptable or unintelligible; and an inclination to be tolerant and accept the dissonant expression as doing something worthwhile, but different. The second aspiration is a philosophical engagement with children’s literature. Reading children’s literature becomes a form of philosophising, a way to explore the complexity of a range of philosophical issues. This turn to literature marks a dissatisfaction with what philosophy can accomplish through argumentation and what philosophy can do with a particular and limited set of concepts for a subject, such as ethics. It is a way to go beyond philosophising as the founding of theories that justify particular responses. The philosophy of dissonance and children’s literature becomes a way to destabilise justifications of our established practices and ways of interacting. The philosophical investigations of dissonance are meant to make manifest the possibilities and risks of engaging in interactions beyond established agreement or attunements. Thinking of the dissonant voice as an expression beyond established practices calls for improvisation. Such improvisations become a perfectionist education where both the child and the elder, the teacher and the student, search for as yet unattained forms of interaction and take responsibility for every word and action of the interaction. The investigation goes through a number of picture books and novels for children such as Harry Potter, Garmann’s Summer, and books by Shaun Tan, Astrid Lindgren and Dr. Seuss as well narratives by J.R.R. Tolkien, Henrik Ibsen, Jane Austen and Henry David Thoreau. These works of fiction are read in conversation with philosophical works of, and inspired by, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell, their moral perfectionism and ordinary language philosophy.

This study is an inquiry into architecture understood as an apparatus of immortalization and glorification by means of a dialectic formulation on the architecture of the synecdochic Interwar (angst) Period (1919-1939) based on the assumptions of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). It is claimed that a dialectical relation between Wittgenstein and his contemporaries may contribute to the understanding of the conceptions regarding ideal of [true] architecture itself. The thesis suggests that these assumptions may maintain a critical pattern for the understanding of the architectural milieu of the Interwar Period, which was a summit for modern architecture. The structure is based on a remark of Wittgenstein stating, Architecture immortalizes and glorifies something and its tripartite formulation is reflected upon the framework. In the second part, it is aimed to introduce the concepts in order to draw a framework of the milieu. This part also focuses on the remarks of Wittgenstein regarding [true] architecture. In the third part, the aspects of [true] architecture are discussed by means of a historical study. This part also focuses on the principle of architecture as an apparatus. In the fourth part, a dialectical relationship is maintained between Wittgenstein and his contemporaries to shed light on the [true] architecture of the Angst Period. The emphasis of this part is on the arguments regarding [true] architecture. Finally, the fifth part involves arguments on the aspects of immortalization and glorification focusing on its several aspects and something immortalized and glorified by means of [true] architecture.

In this dissertation, I explicate how scholars implicate themselves in the subfield of organizational communication studies by engaging in antinomic language-games which make the conduct of research (and textwork in particular) possible. My analysis suggests that the studied scholars enact these games to understand a more or less common object of knowledge, but also to constitute a more or less identifiable position in this given social space. Reflection on the ontological complicity between these position and subfield occurs uncommonly, however. I illustrate, in turn, that this lack of reflexivity hinders discussion about the way academic research practices induce breaks with the social realities which these scholars are trying to understand. In light of this argument, and based predominantly on a translation and extension of Pierre Bourdieu’s ideas, this dissertation thus illustrates how the language-games of scholars in organizational communication studies sustain a limited practice of reflexivity and considers its effects on their production of knowledge.

Texte remanié de: Habilitationsschrift. / Bibliogr. p. 473-499.

Reproduction de : Thèse de doctorat : Philosophie : Paris 8 : 2007. / Titre provenant de l'écran-titre. Bibliogr. p. 517-521.

Thesis (M.A.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2001. / Bibliography: leaves 168-173.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-126). Also available in print.