This paper empirically tests a theory laid out in Scholes et al. (2015, p. 315) that the U.S. worldwide tax system reduces the incentive of U.S. parent companies to be tax aggressive in their foreign subsidiaries. Investors subject to a worldwide tax system pay taxes on their worldwide income, regardless of the origin thereof. Therefore, a U.S. investor pays the difference between the effective tax payment abroad and the higher U.S. statutory tax when profits are repatriated. In contrast, investors subject to territorial tax systems gain the full tax savings from being tax aggressive abroad. Our results show that U.S.-owned foreign subsidiaries have a by 1.2 percentage point higher average GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) compared to subsidiaries owned by foreign investors from countries with a territorial system. We contribute to the literature by showing a mechanism, other than cross-country profit shifting, why U.S. multinational companies have higher GAAP ETRs than multinationals subject to territorial tax systems. (authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

The current United States tax code regarding foreign sourced income is outdated for a heavily globalized and interconnected world. Multinationals have played certain games with the tax code to lower their domestic and foreign tax bill. This form of tax avoidance has real economic effects that are leading to non-optimal economic outcomes. This paper will begin by offering examples of how multinationals are avoiding taxes, especially in the pricing of intangible assets. Other countries have adopted different ways to tax foreign profits; notably most countries either have a worldwide non-deferral tax system or a territorial tax system. There are costs and benefits associated with both systems of taxation that must be considered before adoption. Ultimately, this paper will conclude that a territorial tax system combined with an overhaul of the current rules regarding transfer pricing will lead to a better economic outcome than the current U.S. system of taxation.

Si la fraude et l'évasion fiscales sont aussi anciennes que l'impôt lui-même, la mondialisation et la numérisation de l'économie ont placé les Etats face aux limites de leur pouvoir fiscal, pouvoir qui demeure intimement lié à leur compétence territoriale. Plus récemment, c'est la crise financière de 2007-2008 qui a attiré l'attention de l'opinion publique mondiale sur l'importance du phénomène de fraude et d'évasion fiscales internationales et le rôle essentiel qu’y tiennent les paradis fiscaux. Les outils juridiques conventionnels traditionnels à la disposition des Etats ont montré toutes leurs limites, et ce tant en matière de détection des situations à risque que d’échange d’informations ou d’assistance au recouvrement. S’est ainsi faite jour la nécessité, pour certains Etats, de relancer, sur le plan international, des actions de nature coopérative d’un nouveau type pour tenter d'endiguer les pertes budgétaires massives ainsi subies ou consenties. Ces actions, participant tant de la « soft law » que de la règle de droit, menées par l'OCDE comme par l'Union européenne, se concentrent sur deux aspects fondamentaux que sont, d'une part la transparence fiscale et, d'autre part, la lutte contre les pratiques d'érosion de la base imposable et de transfert des bénéfices vers des Etats ou territoires à fiscalité faible ou nulle. L'analyse de ces tentatives de réforme de la fiscalité internationale conduit à s'interroger non seulement sur la méthode utilisée ainsi que sur le contenu des réglementations qui en découlent, mais également sur les perspectives d'avenir de la lutte contre la fraude et l'évasion fiscales internationales. Face aux carences du « nationalisme fiscal », il convient donc de s'interroger sur la pertinence d'une mondialisation de l'impôt lui-même, et ce tant au niveau de la base imposable que des taux d’imposition. / Tax fraud and tax avoidance are as old as tax itself. Economy’s globalisation and digitalazation have however confronted States with the limitations of their tax power that remains dependant on their territorial boundaries. More recently, the 2007-2008 financial crisis has drawn the attention of the public opinion on the extent of international tax fraud and avoidance as well as on the key role tax heavens play in this frame. The traditional and conventional legal tools States can use have reached their limits in the field of detection of potential risky tax’s situations, exchange of information as well as collection assistance. Some States are willing to revive, on an worldwide level, the international tax cooperation, so as to curb massive budgetary losses they either undergo or consent to. These measures, which are based on « soft law » or on real right rules, are lead by the OECD and the European Union in order to face two main purposes. The first one deals with tax transparency whereas the second one tackles with base erosion and profit shifting towards States and territories with low or nil tax levels. The analysis of these attempts to amend international tax rules leads up to question about the used methods, the regulation’s content and their perspectives. While facing the lacks of « tax nationalism », it is necessary to wonder about the relevancy of globalising taxes themselves through both their basis and their rates.

The United States’ Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) changed a 30-year-old definition of the term “intangible property” and added assessment requirements for two different types of “intangible income”, both of which deviate from the newly changed general definition of “intangible” and most common understandings of the meaning of the word.  While it may appear unlikely that a change in meaning of a single word in a large tax code could have a drastic effect on international taxation, the differing definitions of “intangible” create far-reaching tangible consequences.   The TCJA affects the international taxation of US-based corporations for cross-border transactions, among many ways, by employing different definitions of the word “intangible” in three different provisions.  First, it modifies the general statutory definition of “intangible” to specifically include goodwill, workforce in place, and going-concern value will be examined.  Second, it uses an unusually broad definition of “intangible” in the new tax category of global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI); and third, the meaning of “intangible” as used in assessing so-called foreign-derived intangible income (FDII) essentially creates a broad export subsidy.  Each use of the term will also be assessed on how it ties into the TCJA’s intended purpose for the provision in which it appears.  Additionally, they will be assessed on how they compare with established international tax standards provided by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Plan.   By explicitly changing the definition of “intangible property”, it becomes apparent that the TCJA has increased the scope of potential tax liability for US corporations and has brought the US in line with the OECD’s use of the phrase as used in its model convention.   In examining how the GILTI tax is calculated, it will become evident that the tax can be applied to income that is not connected to intangibles despite the seemingly limited scope implied by its name.  Furthermore, a limitation on foreign tax credit means that GILTI might allow at least some continuation of the old worldwide tax system.  While potentially overly-burdensome, GILTI seems to be broadly in line with the BEPS goal towards reducing profit shifting.   As a result of how “intangible” is defined for purposes of determining FDII, two effects become apparent. First, for tax categorization, it encompasses income from both tangible and intangible assets.  Second, it permits deductions that can be construed as an export incentive.