Why has Xi Jinping, the President of the People’s Republic of China, launched one of the most aggressive anti-corruption campaigns in the history of the country? To answer this question, I constructed a database of over 100 high-level officials who have come under investigation during the campaign. I find that the campaign is disproportionately targeting officials from certain provinces. To understand why, I test a hypothesis that states: Xi is targeting corrupt officials from specific geographical regions for reasons unrelated to combating pervasive corruption, indicating factional politics are driving at least a part of the campaign. I find mixed support for the hypothesis. Out of the four provinces tested against the hypothesis, Sichuan is the only one that Xi appears to be targeting under the guise of anti-corruption. I put these findings in comparative perspective and find that the basic characteristics of Xi’s campaign are similar to Jiang Zemin’s 1995 anti-corruption campaign. This finding further supports the hypothesis that factional politics are driving at least a part of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. I conclude that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign—though exceptional in its intensity—is hardly a departure from China’s historical factional politics. / text

On November 18th 2011, China enact detail rules on the management of governmental vehicle procurement list. Few months later, on February 24th 2012, an unprecedented governmental vehicle procurement list was published. The procurement list includes 412 types of vehicles which are all China's own brands. This research analyzes the effect of this governmental vehicle procurement list on the sales of listed vehicle given the background of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign. The empirical evidence shows that when Xi Jinping launched preliminary policy in December 2012, increased sales of vehicle being on the procurement list in 2013 are averagely 45.5 cars per month more compared to increased sales of unlisted vehicles. Also, the market share of listed vehicle can be witnessed a steady increase over time.

The purpose of this paper has been to analyse the use of soft and hard powerby The People´s Republic of China on the Commonwealth of Australiaduring the period of 2012-2022 which also has been the time when XiJinping has held the power in China. With the use of the concept of softpower introduced by Joseph Nye and hard power, the paper furtheroperationalize these types of power into several resources which are analysedto see how Chinas use of power against Australia has developed during the10-year period. The result of the paper shows that Chinas use of soft andhard power against has become more aggressive due to political developmentin China and the worsening of diplomatic relationship between the states.Furthermore, the study also shows that Chinas use of soft power are distinctto that of other states.

This essay contributes to the broader academic field aiming to understand China's foreign policy objectives. It highlights the BRI as a manifestation of certain Tianxia ideas and challenges existing assumptions in the IR field. It explores discourse on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) within global governance, focusing on the possible traceability of ideas of Tianxia in Chinese president Xi Jinping’s discourse to international audiences. Drawing on Zhao Tingyang's modernised version of Tianxia, the essay asks how the BRI is positioned and if ideas of Tianxia are traceable, if so, how? The questions are explored through qualitative content analysis of fourteen speeches from international forums and other public gatherings. Moving beyond mainstream IR theories, the essay departs from the small pool of research treating Tianxia as a framework to understand foreign policy. Findings suggest the BRI is positioned under the broad themes: Beneficial partnerships, Peaceful rise, Harmony, and Coexistence, and aligns with Zhao’s version of Tianxia. The essay argues that promotion of global institutions, mutual benefit, and inclusive governance in particular reflect Tianxia. The concept ‘true multilateralism’ emerges as a key phrase encapsulating modern Tianxia ideals in Xi’s discourse warranting more exploration in future BRI scholarship.

<p>Distansseminarium pga. COVID-19.</p>

Having conducted a successful long range ballistic missile test in December 2012 and a third nuclear test in February 2013, North Korea increasingly poses a security threat to Northeast Asia. Given these heightened escalations, the international community has come to depend more and more on China’s potential to influence North Korean behavior. Beijing’s unique leverage is based on the historical bilateral relations between the two countries in addition to China’s sole willingness to support the North Korean regime. Therefore, the following paper seeks to determine whether China’s North Korea policy shifted during the consecutive Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping administrations in response to North Korean provocations. Ascertaining China’s North Korean paradigm is constructive and worthwhile in order to understand the future development and hopeful resolution of the North Korean security dilemma. In order to better examine the two administrations, the paper first defines China’s strategic interests regarding the Korean peninsula. Song Jooyoung’s dual threats model and Taewan Kim’s politico-economic linkage model are then used to assess the different factors that influenced China’s decision-making process when deciding whether to maintain its support after each North Korean provocation. Analysis of the two administrations reveals that Beijing’s underlying foreign policy objective of stability remains unchanged. On the other hand, unyielding North Korean provocations have forced Beijing to reassess its current policy of bolstering the North Korean regime toward the end of the Hu administration and even more so during the current Xi administration. In addition, North Korean actions in defiance of China’s public warnings illustrate a North Korea diverging from its usual subservience to Chinese influence. More importantly, the defining reason for the shift in China’s policy is the fact that North Korean behavior undermines Beijing attempts to posture itself as a responsible global power in addition to fulfilling its own strategic interests. Assessing China’s North Korean paradigm is meaningful due to Beijing’s capacity to resolve the North Korean security dilemma. Although skeptics question whether China will ultimately break from its customary support for North Korea due to fears of damaging instability, increasingly public statements rejecting North Korean provocations signal the Xi administration’s recalibration.

University of Macau / Faculty of Arts and Humanities. / Department of English

This thesis wants to analyze the media service of the Empresa Media group during the three-day visit of chinese president Xi Jinping in the Czech Republic in march of 2016. At that time 49 percent share of Empresa Media was owned by chinese company CEFC. The visit was covered with a very high importance in all of the czech media. And not only in connection with the official schedule. Series of demonstration took place in Prague and also some fights occured between supporters of the chinese presindent and his opponents. However, media of the Empresa Media group almost without any exception ignored these events. Any manifestations of disagreement with the finese presindent's visit or China's politics is missing from its coverage. It results from analyzing magazine Tyden, its online version Tyden.cz, evening news of TV Barrandov and online coverage provided by Tyden.cz. This fact stands out even more when compared to some other important czech media.

The study aims to analyse how China, under the Xi Jinping administration, assimilates its ethnic minorities by exploring white papers' underlying motives. The ambition is to understand China’s actions and how they can affect the future. The research asks three questions: How does China frame ethnic minorities in white papers? What arguments are used to justify assimilation and sinicisation? How and why is China assimilating its ethnic minorities now? The results show that China depicts ethnic minorities through two accounts, oneness and backwardness. The former stresses the significance of unity within ethnic minorities and between ethnic groups. The latter describes the condition that ethnic minorities end up in if they do not conform to China’s socialist values. One can be stuck by backwardness if one follows declared enemies or shows signs of separatism, terrorism and religious extremism. The results reveal how China uses ‘war on terror’ and modernisation narratives to justify its assimilation and sinicisation acts. The results also point to three areas where ethnic minorities can stick to backwardness and should, therefore, assimilate Han Chinese. These are language, religion and employment. The study reveals that the CPC and Xi Jinping intend to fix anything that disturbs them from realising the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. Consequently, China’s attempt to attain uniformity means that anything which may be prioritised above the party must be eradicated or sinicised.

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