O Realismo Científico tem sido defendido quase exclusivamente através do Argumento do Milagre, segundo o qual ou assumimos que as teorias científicas são verdadeiras ou tornamos o sucesso da atividade científica em um fenômeno misterioso e inexplicável. No primeiro momento, as principais críticas ao argumento do milagre são reunidas em cinco objeções: (i) apresenta-se uma explicação alternativa para o sucesso da ciência que não assuma a verdade das teorias científicas e que compita com a explicação realista; (ii) defende-se que a hipótese realista não é uma explicação satisfatória para o sucesso da ciência, acusando-a de vacuidade explicativa, ou (iii) acusando-a de não satisfazer os critérios de rigor metodológico científico que ela mesmo impõe à justificação de teorias; (iv) afirma-se que o argumento seja uma petição de princípio, por pressupor uma regra de inferência abdutiva aceita apenas pela posição realista; (v) propõe-se que o argumento constitua uma falácia estatística ao ignorar um índice de fundo relevante. Ao replicar às objeções apresentadas, alguns autores propõem distinguir entre uma versão semântica do argumento, baseada no sucesso empírico obtido pelas teorias científicas enquanto entidades semânticas; e uma versão metodológica do argumento, baseada no sucesso pragmático dos cientistas em escolher teorias férteis e descobrir teorias bem sucedidas. Além disso, outros autores propõem uma segunda distinção entre uma versão geral do argumento, baseada estatisticamente no sucesso generalizado das teorias científicas, e uma versão retalhada do argumento, baseada na sua aplicação específica a uma teoria tomada individualmente. Após comparar as vantagens e desvantagens de cada interpretação, critica-se a relevância das distinções propostas e defende-se uma versão do argumento que sintetize suas diferentes interpretações de modo a solucionar as objeções inicialmente apresentadas. / Scientific Realism has been defended almost exclusively by the Non-Miracle Argument, which states that either it‘s assumed that scientific theories are true or the success of the scientific enterprise becomes a mysterious and unexplainable fact. At first, the main criticisms of the Non-Miracle Argument are gathered in five objections: (i) it‘s presented an alternative explanation to the success of science that competes with the realist explanation and does not assume the truth of the scientific theories; (ii) it‘s defended that the realist hypothesis is not a satisfactory explanation to the success of science, charging it of being an empty explanation, or (iii) charging its capacities to reach the scientific methodological rigorousness that itself imposes to the warrant of theories; (iv) it‘s affirmed that the argument is a petition principii, on account of presupposing an abductive rule of inference accepted only by the realist perspective; (v) it‘s proposed that the argument constitutes a statistical fallacy on account of neglecting a relevant base rate; When replying to the presented objections, some authors come up with the distinction between a semantic version of the argument, based on the empiric success reached by scientific theories considered as semantic entities, and a methodological version of the argument, based on the pragmatic success of scientists at choosing fruitful theories and discovering succeeded theories. Furthermore, other authors offer a second distinction between a general version of the argument, statistically based on the generalized success of science, and a retail version of the argument, based on its specific application to an individual theory. After comparing the advantages and drawbacks of each interpretation, the relevance of each distinction is reanalyzed and a new version of the argument by making a synthesis of its different interpretations is defended in a way to answer the five initial objections.

This dissertation inaugurates a study on the connections between the philosophies of Aristotle and Charles S. Peirce. It discusses, first, Peirce's reading of Aristotle's works and philosophy, with an emphasis on three studies by Peirce of a translation of Aristotle's Categories, a study on Aristotle's notion of priority, and a study on the current situation of the Corpus Aristotelicum. Secondly, this dissertation deals with logic, particularly induction, abduction, and analogy. In the case of induction, Peirce claimed that Aristotle stated perfectly the form of induction in Prior Analytics II 23. However, Aristotle's concept of induction is not univocal, but, I argue, it stands for six different notions. Peirce seemed to neglect such diversity in Aristotle's concept of induction, even though his own concept of induction is also diverse. Aristotle's six concepts of induction and Peirce's kinds of induction do not match each other, and therefore, the chapter on induction closes with a comparison between these notions in order to determine to what extent they resemble or differ from each other. With regard to abduction, Peirce claimed that it originated in Prior Analytics II, 25. I argue that Peirce was mistaken in focusing on this passage. This does not mean that Aristotle did not have an idea of abduction. As I will show, there are other passages in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, neglected by Peirce, in which it is possible to find such an analysis of this kind of reasoning. In the case of analogy, both philosophers have a similar and clear account of it as a compound or composite. However, whereas Aristotle claimed it to be composed of induction and deduction, Peirce included abduction too. Thirdly, I explore and compare their theories of cognition. Peirce did not feel indebted to Aristotle and, on the contrary, criticized the positions of the Greek philosopher. However, I will argue that their theories of cognition agree in their general features, namely, empiricism, realism, and synechism. Peirce's critiques of Aristotle are in part due to a misinterpretation of Aristotle's philosophy that took Aristotle to be, in modern terms, a dualist and a rationalist. In sum, I aim to show through these three features, the ways in which Peirce's philosophy is ‒and is not‒ aligned with that of Aristotle.

Trata-se de uma proposta de investigação das ideias cosmológicas de Charles S. Peirce, particularmente das que dizem respeito à pertinência da inclusão de esquemas de explicação que façam uso da causalidade final como instância determinante do desenvolvimento dos fenômenos naturais. Anterior à avaliação desse tipo de explicação cabe uma investigação sobre as características mais relevantes de seu pensamento, que o próprio autor julgava construído arquitetonicamente. Com esse objetivo, centramos a análise no conceito de continuum, que pode ser visto como fundamental para o desenvolvimento da obra de Peirce. É o estudo do continuum que permitirá e conduzirá a investigação das categorias ontológicas peirceanas: acaso, existente e lei. A passagem do acaso à lei, isto é, a própria origem do cosmos, se dá por um processo evolutivo que tem na lei da mente seu principal motor. A lei da mente, por sua vez, atua de modo finalístico, tornando mais provável o desenvolvimento dos fenômenos em certas direções, restringindo, assim, o horizonte das possibilidades, sem, contudo, esgotá-lo. / This thesis is about the cosmological ideas of Charles S. Peirce, particularly those concerning the relevance of the inclusion of explanatory schemes that make use of final causality as an instance determinant of the development of natural phenomena. Before the evaluation of this type of explanation, it is important to perform an investigation into the most relevant features of his thought, which the author believed was architecturally built. With this aim, we focus on the concept of the continuum, which can be seen as fundamental to the development of the work of Peirce. It is the study of the continuum that will lead to investigation of Peirce\'s ontological categories: chance, existent and law. The passage of chance to law, that is, the very origin of the cosmos, is given by an evolutionary process in which the law of the mind is its main engine. The law of the mind, in turn, acts in a finalistic way, making more probable the development of phenomena in certain directions, thus restricting the horizon of possibilities, without, however, exhausting it.

O Realismo Científico tem sido defendido quase exclusivamente através do Argumento do Milagre, segundo o qual ou assumimos que as teorias científicas são verdadeiras ou tornamos o sucesso da atividade científica em um fenômeno misterioso e inexplicável. No primeiro momento, as principais críticas ao argumento do milagre são reunidas em cinco objeções: (i) apresenta-se uma explicação alternativa para o sucesso da ciência que não assuma a verdade das teorias científicas e que compita com a explicação realista; (ii) defende-se que a hipótese realista não é uma explicação satisfatória para o sucesso da ciência, acusando-a de vacuidade explicativa, ou (iii) acusando-a de não satisfazer os critérios de rigor metodológico científico que ela mesmo impõe à justificação de teorias; (iv) afirma-se que o argumento seja uma petição de princípio, por pressupor uma regra de inferência abdutiva aceita apenas pela posição realista; (v) propõe-se que o argumento constitua uma falácia estatística ao ignorar um índice de fundo relevante. Ao replicar às objeções apresentadas, alguns autores propõem distinguir entre uma versão semântica do argumento, baseada no sucesso empírico obtido pelas teorias científicas enquanto entidades semânticas; e uma versão metodológica do argumento, baseada no sucesso pragmático dos cientistas em escolher teorias férteis e descobrir teorias bem sucedidas. Além disso, outros autores propõem uma segunda distinção entre uma versão geral do argumento, baseada estatisticamente no sucesso generalizado das teorias científicas, e uma versão retalhada do argumento, baseada na sua aplicação específica a uma teoria tomada individualmente. Após comparar as vantagens e desvantagens de cada interpretação, critica-se a relevância das distinções propostas e defende-se uma versão do argumento que sintetize suas diferentes interpretações de modo a solucionar as objeções inicialmente apresentadas. / Scientific Realism has been defended almost exclusively by the Non-Miracle Argument, which states that either it‘s assumed that scientific theories are true or the success of the scientific enterprise becomes a mysterious and unexplainable fact. At first, the main criticisms of the Non-Miracle Argument are gathered in five objections: (i) it‘s presented an alternative explanation to the success of science that competes with the realist explanation and does not assume the truth of the scientific theories; (ii) it‘s defended that the realist hypothesis is not a satisfactory explanation to the success of science, charging it of being an empty explanation, or (iii) charging its capacities to reach the scientific methodological rigorousness that itself imposes to the warrant of theories; (iv) it‘s affirmed that the argument is a petition principii, on account of presupposing an abductive rule of inference accepted only by the realist perspective; (v) it‘s proposed that the argument constitutes a statistical fallacy on account of neglecting a relevant base rate; When replying to the presented objections, some authors come up with the distinction between a semantic version of the argument, based on the empiric success reached by scientific theories considered as semantic entities, and a methodological version of the argument, based on the pragmatic success of scientists at choosing fruitful theories and discovering succeeded theories. Furthermore, other authors offer a second distinction between a general version of the argument, statistically based on the generalized success of science, and a retail version of the argument, based on its specific application to an individual theory. After comparing the advantages and drawbacks of each interpretation, the relevance of each distinction is reanalyzed and a new version of the argument by making a synthesis of its different interpretations is defended in a way to answer the five initial objections.

Humans readily infer the meanings of novel symbols in communicative contexts of varying complexity, and several researchers in the field of language evolution have explicitly acknowledged that inference plays a key role in accounting for the evolution of symbolic communication. However, in this field at least, there has been very little investigation into the nature of inference in this regard. That is, evolutionary linguists have yet to address the following questions if we are to have a fuller picture of how humans came to communicate symbolically: 1. What kinds of inference are there? Specifically, i Diachronically, what forms of inference are comparatively simpler in evolutionary terms, and thus shared with a wider range of species? What forms of inference are more complex, and limited to humans or to us and our closest relatives? ii Synchronically, if humans are capable of several kinds of complex inference, how do we know which particular kind of inference is being applied in solving a given problem? 2. How do symbol-learning problems vary? Specifically, i What makes a particular symbol-learning problem more or less complex in terms of the kind of inference needed to solve it? ii How would the communicative context of our pre-linguistic ancestors have been different from that of a human child learning words from its linguistic parent? This dissertation takes a step towards answering these questions by investigating a little-known form of inference called `abduction' (or insightful hypothesis generation), which has thus far been wholly overshadowed in language evolution by a much better understood form called `induction' (or probabilistic hypothesis evaluation). I will argue that abduction and induction are both comparatively complex in the diachronic terms expressed above in 1.i, and while induction is useful in accounting for how modern children learn words from linguistic adults, abduction is more important in situations like those that would have faced our pre-lingistic ancestors as they first began to use symbols. That is, I will argue on both theoretical and empirical grounds that abductive inference was an evolutionary milestone as our ancestors crossed what Deacon (1997) calls the symbolic threshold.

Abduction of young girls by older men has been thought and also defined as culture, by those who believe in abduction. However, some people have come to realize that it is not culture but violence and abuse of women by male species. For too long, women have been treated as second class citizens and or objects. One day the researcher witnessed six men abducting a fifteen year old girl, while she was on her way to school. The girl said “no” but no one cared. She cried bitterly but they continued to drag her away. The girl shouted for help but the adults who were there turned a blind eye. One of the women who were there said: “we were also abducted too and this is the way how things are done. The researcher is ministering among the Bhaca people who are no strangers to this cruel practice. Some parents do not care about their children’s education, in a way that they orchestrate their children’s abduction. Their concern is the number of cattle they will get for their daughters. Perpetrators too do not care that they a ruining the girls future and their program of education is disturbed. The girls’ childhood is cut short, and they become mothers too soon and this leads them to traumatic experiences. Ministering among broken souls made the researcher’s pastoral work difficult hence, ninety percent of the congregants bear scars and hatred caused by abduction experiences. The whole community needed to be educated about abduction; men, women, young and old. Young women needed to be educated about their rights, restoration of their dignity, and the importance of their education. Some of the girls manage to escape from their forced marriages, when they arrive at their homes, their parents or relatives force them to return to their husbands. The church decided to build a care centre to accommodate those who are not welcomed at their homes. The government has passed a law, which stipulates that whoever abducts a girl, should be imprisoned together with the parents or relatives who orchestrated the plan. The girls are learning about their rights. The care centre is sheltering 34 girls under the age of 20years, who ran away form their forced marriages. These stress survivors decided to pursue their dreams. Some are taking part in athletic sport and some are helping newly admitted victims to deal with their pain, and focus on hope and a brighter future. Those who decide to stay in their marriages, are taught forgiveness, so that they can move away from their pain and learn to depend on what they can achieve, rather that their husband’s money. / Dissertation (MA(Theol))--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Practical Theology / unrestricted

Orientador: Ricardo Alexandre Ferreira / Resumo: O presente trabalho analisa a relação entre as tradições legislativas, primeiro lusa e depois brasileira, a respeito dos crimes de estupro e de rapto e os casos registrados, julgados e punidos, ou não, na cidade de São Paulo na vigência do Código Criminal do Império do Brasil. Primeiro código criminal do Brasil independente, elaborado com o objetivo de superar a legislação criminal herdada da antiga metrópole lusa, considerada pelos oitocentistas como inaplicável à nova realidade nacional, o Código guardou, contudo, continuidades e rupturas com a tradição portuguesa sobre o estupro e o rapto. Mudanças nas concepções sobre os crimes, as penas, as vítimas e os criminosos foram realizadas. Com a promulgação do Código do Processo Criminal, em 1832, emergiram novos procedimentos validadores da averiguação dos crimes e do julgamento do criminosos. A defesa da honra e a diferenciação moral entre as potenciais vítimas, entretanto, continuaram a guiar a legislação, ao passo que uma ampliação na compreensão do conceito de violência foi realizada, passando a considerar também as ameaças e o terror sofrido pela vítima como elementos que agravavam a culpa dos acusados. Apesar da nova legislação e da ampliação do sistema judiciário, as fontes policiais e judiciárias indicam que esses delitos, cuja ocorrência era considerada recorrente pelos contemporâneos, continuaram a ser alvo de pouca judicialização. Em observância às legislações principais e a alguns decretos complementares, os poucos ... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: The present work analyses the relationship amongst the legislative traditions, firstly portuguese and then brazilian at a later moment, regarding rape and abduction offenses and the registered cases, judged and convicterd, or not, in the city of São Paulo in force of the Criminal Code of the Empire of Brazil. First criminal code of Independent Brazil, elaborated with the objective of superseding the criminal legislation inherited from the old mainland, considered by the nineteenth century thinkers to be inapplicable to the new national reality, the new Code has kept, however, continuities and ruptures with the Portuguese tradition about rape and abduction. Modification in the wordings, penalties and the possible victims and perpetrators were made. With the promulgation of the Criminal Procedure Code, in 1832, new validating procedures in the investigation and prosecution of criminals emerged. However, the defense of honor and moral differentiation between potential victims kept on guiding the legislation, while the concept of violence was enlarged, also taking into consideration threats and horror suffered by the victim as aggravating elements of culpability to the accused. Despite the new legislation and the expansion of the judiciary, police and judicial sources indicate that these offenses, which occurrence was deemed common by contemporaries, continued to be the subject of little judicialization. In compliance with the main legislations and some complementary decrees, the... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Mestre

Magister Artium - MA / The study argues that ukuthwala is an old cultural practice that had been practised in the past by Xhosa people and other tribes. Ukuthwala traditionally does not involve rape, force and underage girls. The media revealed misuse of the ukuthwala practice by men and what these men are doing is purely crime. Ukuthwala is a cultural practise that was used to abduct girls into marriage with the consent of the girl and the parents. In this case the cultural practice of ukuthwala is deemed as one of the factors preventing progress while oppressing the women and children involved as media and government have reported that ukuthwala has markedly resurged in an insidious form that is exploitative and violent (Karimakwenda,2005:340).

No description available.

Cette thèse développe un modèle sémiotique de l’abduction pour représenter un processus de conception architecturale. Elle formalise ce processus par une dualisation hypostatique du rapport sémiotique entre un problème de conception, saisi en tant que signe, et la possibilité de sa matérialisation géométrique. La dualisation réintègre ce signe dans le domaine des systèmes de savoir-concevoir utilisés en conception architecturale, et par conséquent, elle génère de nouvelles solutions architecturales. L’abduction modifie les connaissances préalables engagées dans la production d’une solution (l’hypothèse) et en introduit de nouvelles. La complexité du processus de conception implique, au niveau méthodologique et à partir d’une position épistémologique constructiviste, l’intégration de la subjectivité du concepteur dans le modèle. Ainsi résulte une incertitude des interactions entre problème de conception, production de solution, concepteur et contexte. La sémiotisation de l’abduction architecturale explicite le rôle central de l’interprétation dans la création d’une solution. D’ailleurs, la dualisation s’appuie sur la théorie des possibilités pour opérationnaliser le calcul interprétatif incertain et pour valider les hypothèses générées. En retour, la gestion de la propagation de cette incertitude, dans le modèle sémiotique, facilite l’identification et la formulation des solutions, et rend possible une émergence observationnelle de la nouveauté. Le modèle développé est appliqué à un cas de transformations architecturales géométriques dans un milieu urbain fortement caractérisé. / This thesis develops a semiotic model of abduction to represent a process of architectural design. It formalizes this process by the means of a hypostatic dualization, applied to the semiotic relationship between, on the one hand, a design problem, considered as a sign, and on the other, the possibility of its geometric materialization. The dualization reintegrate this sign in the domain of know-how systems used in architectural design, and consequently, it generates new architectural solutions. Abduction modifies and augments the prior knowledge involved in producing the solution (the hypothesis). From a constructivist stance and the ensuing methodological viewpoint, the complexity of the design process implies embedding the designer’s subjectivity in the model. Thus arises an uncertainty about the interactions among design problem, solution production, designer and context. Semiotizing architectural abduction reveals the central role played by interpretation in creating a solution. Besides, dualization relies on possibility theory to formalize the resulting, and uncertain, interpretation calculus, and to validate the obtained hypotheses. In return, managing the uncertainty propagation within the semiotic model, facilitates the identification and the formulation of architectural solutions and allows for an observational emergence of novelty. The developed model is applied to a case of architectural geometric transformations in a heavily characterized neighborhood.