This thesis has two aims. The first aim is to set out an argument for social insurance in the form of compulsory income insurance in the event of sickness or unemployment, and to explore two lines of arguments for social insurance policies that are commonly associated with an active welfare state that seeks to prevent or reduce reliance on social insurance. The second aim is to outline and defend an account of legitimacy that takes moral autonomy seriously by making legitimacy partly dependent on our entrenched values and preferences. The first aim is relevant for articles I-VI. In article I it is argued that the extent to which behavioural responses to social insurance is seen as ethically problematic, it is primarily a problem that concerns the institution rather than the morality of the individual whose behaviour is influenced by social insurance. Thus, insofar as behavioural responses to social insurance are an ethical problem, it is a problem for political philosophy rather than individual ethics. In article II an argument for social insurance in the form of compulsory income insurance in the event of sickness or unemployment is presented, viz. the argument from autonomy. It is based on a concern for the protection of our identity according to what is called a “thick” conception of the person, which holds that our identities as separate persons are constituted by our central aims and commitments. It is also argued that contrary to what has been claimed by its opponents; social insurance needs not lead to the bad risks exploiting the good risks, or be head-on in conflict with individual freedom. Article III identifies normative issues that deserve attention in relation to in relation to a general introduction of prevention policies in social insurance and market insurance. It is argued that the importance of these issues suggests that arguments and distinctions drawn from moral and political philosophy should play a more prominent role both in the debate on the shift towards an active welfare state and the use of prevention policies in market insurance. Article IV is a response to comments from Professor David Buchanan initiated by article III. Article V explores what is called the argument from autonomy for reduced compensation rates in social insurance or making compensation from such insurance conditional on different kinds of requirements such as participation in rehabilitation or vocational training. It is argued that such policies are justified if they tend to ensure an adequate level of autonomy, where autonomy is understood in the sense of a “thick” conception of personal autonomy based on Norman Daniel’s extension of the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Article VI discusses the objection that arguments pertaining to the principle of fairness often are irrelevant since the principle of fairness is based on the acceptance of the relevant benefits. It is argued that this objection from non-acceptance fails because we can – and do – accept the benefits form such institutions on a practical level and this is enough to ground obligations pertaining fairness. The implications of this argument for policies associated with the active welfare state are explored, taking a reform of the Swedish sickness insurance as an example. The second aim is relevant for article VII. In article VII it is argued that an account of legitimacy should satisfy three conditions. The justification thesis and the legitimacy thesis are presented as accounts of justification and legitimacy respectively. It is argued that the proposed accounts satisfy these conditions. An account of political obligations is also given. / <p>QC 20150121</p>

Depuis un certain nombre d’années, se manifeste tout spécialement en Europe l’influence de la thématique de l’activation des dépenses sociales dites « passives ». Ce discours politique imprègne les systèmes nationaux et se diffuse sur le plan normatif, conduisant à de nouvelles articulations entre logiques de protection sociale classique (indemnisation ou aide sociale) et d’emploi (droit du travail). Ces politiques actives s’appuient sur les fondements traditionnels du modèle social-démocrate nordique et du modèle anglo-saxon. L’Union européenne a fait sienne la dynamique d’activation et lui a accordé une place centrale dans sa stratégie pour l’emploi et dans la Méthode Ouverte de Coordination en matière de protection sociale. Cette stratégie a produit un impact sur les systèmes nationaux. Cet impact a pu être mesuré aussi bien sur les systèmes béveridgiens que sur les systèmes bismarckiens, laissant apparaître une multiplicité des visages de l’activation selon les Etats-membres, mais selon une référence plus marquée soit à une approche libérale soit à une approche dite « universaliste » ou « prospective », d’amélioration des trajectoires professionnelles. Les transformations récentes des dispositifs français (indemnitaires ou assistantiels), basées sur une logique de conditionnalité des prestations, ont conduit à des bouleversements au sein de la protection sociale qui invitent à questionner les logiques juridiques sous-jacentes de ces mutations et à proposer une analyse critique de la portée d’un tel renouvellement du contrat social. / The influence of the theme of activating "passive" social expenditure has been evidenced over the last few years and especially in Europe. This political discourse has filtered into the national systems and has spread to legislation, leading to new links between the logic of classic social protection (compensatory technique or social assistance claimants) and employment (employment law). These active policies are based on traditional socio-democratic nordic models and the anglo-american model. The European Union has adopted the activation concept and given it central place in its employment strategy and through the Open Method of Coordination for social protection. This strategy has had an impact on the national systems. This impact may be measured in Beveridgian systems as well as in Bismarckian systems, that shows the different aspects of activation depending on the Member States but with a more distinct difference depending on a more liberal or universalist approach. The recent transformations in the French system (unemployment insurance benefits or social assistance schemes) based on the conditionality of social protection, have led to significant changes to social protection which raises the issue of the underlying legal logic of these changes and a critical analysis of the extent of such a renewal of the social contract.