Despite of the financial crisis managers are receiving large financial short-term incentives in form of bonuses. This has been criticized in the media and by governments, shareholders and numerous of studies have been made about financial incentives and whether they work or not and the results vary. What do the companies themselves say about this? Why do they use short-term incentives? The purpose of this thesis was to find out why companies choose to have short-term incentive plans which usually consist of an annual bonus. Moreover how the incentive plans are designed and what companies expects from them. A qualitative method is used in this thesis; five interviews were made in order to collect empirical material. The companies that participated in the study were Q-Med, Boliden, Johnson & Johnson, Nordea, and Siemens. The personnel who were interviewed were Human Resources (HR) directors or Financial Directors or had compensations and benefits as their main responsibility. All companies who participated in the interviews are public companies, although not all of them are listed at the Swedish Stock Exchange, Siemens and Johnson & Johnson are listed at the New York and Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The conclusion of this study is that companies use short-term incentives as a motivator for the management and to structure goals and set a common aim for the companies’ divisions. They also consider themselves to need them in order to attract and keep good managers. The incentive programme is structured with the aim to increase the company’s profit by motivating employees but also to rate and evaluate the manager. When the incentive programme is well designed and fulfils its purpose it will benefit the shareholders, who owns the company, as profits will increase.

I början av 2014 infördes ett nytt regelverk för hur företag och ekonomiska föreningar ska avsluta sina räkenskapsår. Inte förrän media började rapportera om problemet tidigare i år har diskussionen satts igång och flera organisationer har gjort uttalande och förenklingar. De har visat sig vara svåra att tolka och implementera och för en del bostadsrättsföreningar kan tillämpningen vara ödesdiger. Valet står mellan två regelverk i det så kallade K-projektet. Syftet med studien är att utifrån bostadsrättsföreningarnas perspektiv utforska vilka faktorer som påverkar och hur de påverkas beroende av redovisningsvalet styrelsen gör. Detta kommer utföras genom att studera ekonomiska förvaltare som förser föreningarna med rekommendationer och information. Studiens problemformulering är därför vilka faktorer påverkar föreningarnas val av regelverk. Studien kommer utgå från ett abduktivt resonemang vilket är väsentligt för en explorativ studie. Tillsammans med teorier om rationella beslut, principal-agent förhållande, intressenter och risk, kommer vi att skapa en förståelse för hur föreningar fattar beslut. För att uppnå detta mål och få en bra helhetsbild kommer vi att utgå från kvalitativa undersökningar med semi-strukturerade intervjuer. För att styrka studiens tillförlitlighet utgick vi ifrån tillförlitliga metoder som är en central del för en god forskning. Vi har varit konsekventa och opartiska där vi utgick från samma material vid samtliga intervjuer för att forskningsfrågan ska anses korrekt framförd. Genom att analysera empirin har vi kunnat skapa exempel på möjliga scenario i resultaträkningar för att enklare kunna göra kopplingar till teorin. Resultatet av studien konstaterade att det är flera faktorer som påverkar valet som styrelsen gör. Det visade sig att styrelsen är beroende av information utifrån och att det finns flera intressenter som har ett egenintresse i valet. / In early 2014 introduced a new framework for how companies and economic associations must end their fiscal year. Not until the media began to report on the issue earlier this year, the debate has been launched and several organizations have made statements and simplifications. They have proven to be difficult to interpret and implement, and for some housing associations, the application may be fatal. The choice is between two sets of rules in the K-project. Depending on the choice that the Board make, the consequences of the different choices differ markedly. The purpose of the study is that the basis of condominium associations' perspective, exploring the factors that influence and how they are affected, depends on the accounting elections board does. This will be carried out by studying financial managers that provide boards with information and recommendations. The problem of the study is therefore what factors affect board election of the regulations. The study will be based on an abductive reasoning which is essential for an exploratory study. Along with theories of rational decisions, the principal- agent relationship, stakeholders and risk, we will create an understanding of how associations make decisions. To achieve this goal and get a good overall picture, we will start from qualitative research with semi-structured interviews. In order to prove the reliability of the study, we started from reliable methods that are a central part of good research. We have been consistent and impartial where we started from the same material at all interviews, to research the matter shall be correctly performed. By analyzing empirical data, we have been able to create examples of possible scenarios in the financial statements for easier linkage to theory. Results of the study found that there are several factors affecting the choice that the board does. It turned out that the Board is dependent on information from outside and that there are multiple stakeholders who have a vested interest in the election.

I början av 2014 infördes ett nytt regelverk för hur företag och ekonomiska föreningar ska avsluta sina räkenskapsår. Inte förrän media började rapportera om problemet tidigare i år har diskussionen satts igång och flera organisationer har gjort uttalande och förenklingar. De har visat sig vara svåra att tolka och implementera och för en del bostadsrättsföreningar kan tillämpningen vara ödesdiger. Valet står mellan två regelverk i det så kallade K-projektet.Syftet med studien är att utifrån bostadsrättsföreningarnas perspektiv utforska vilka faktorer som påverkar och hur de påverkas beroende av redovisningsvalet styrelsen gör. Detta kommer utföras genom att studera ekonomiska förvaltare som förser föreningarna med rekommendationer och information. Studiens problemformulering är därför vilka faktorer påverkar föreningarnas val av regelverk.Studien kommer utgå från ett abduktivt resonemang vilket är väsentligt för en explorativ studie. Tillsammans med teorier om rationella beslut, principal-agent förhållande, intressenter och risk, kommer vi att skapa en förståelse för hur föreningar fattar beslut. För att uppnå detta mål och få en bra helhetsbild kommer vi att utgå från kvalitativa undersökningar med semi-strukturerade intervjuer. För att styrka studiens tillförlitlighet utgick vi ifrån tillförlitliga metoder som är en central del för en god forskning. Vi har varit konsekventa och opartiska där vi utgick från samma material vid samtliga intervjuer för att forskningsfrågan ska anses korrekt framförd.Genom att analysera empirin har vi kunnat skapa exempel på möjliga scenario i resultaträkningar för att enklare kunna göra kopplingar till teorin. Resultatet av studien konstaterade att det är flera faktorer som påverkar valet som styrelsen gör. Det visade sig att styrelsen är beroende av information utifrån och att det finns flera intressenter som har ett egenintresse i valet. / In early 2014 introduced a new framework for how companies and economic associations must end their fiscal year. Not until the media began to report on the issue earlier this year, the debate has been launched and several organizations have made statements and simplifications. They have proven to be difficult to interpret and implement, and for some housing associations, the application may be fatal. The choice is between two sets of rules in the K-project. Depending on the choice that the Board make, the consequences of the different choices differ markedly.The purpose of the study is that the basis of condominium associations' perspective, exploring the factors that influence and how they are affected, depends on the accounting elections board does. This will be carried out by studying financial managers that provide boards with information and recommendations. The problem of the study is therefore what factors affect board election of the regulations.The study will be based on an abductive reasoning which is essential for an exploratory study. Along with theories of rational decisions, the principal- agent relationship, stakeholders and risk, we will create an understanding of how associations make decisions. To achieve this goal and get a good overall picture, we will start from qualitative research with semi-structured interviews. In order to prove the reliability of the study, we started from reliable methods that are a central part of good research. We have been consistent and impartial where we started from the same material at all interviews, to research the matter shall be correctly performed.By analyzing empirical data, we have been able to create examples of possible scenarios in the financial statements for easier linkage to theory. Results of the study found that there are several factors affecting the choice that the board does. It turned out that the Board is dependent on information from outside and that there are multiple stakeholders who have a vested interest in the election.

Chief Executive Officers (CEO) remuneration has been a hot topic the last couple of years and has brought a great amount of attention in the media, when some companies have increased the CEO’s compensation even though the firm have been reporting lower earnings. Bonus systems have recently become more frequent to increase CEOs incentives, but have also been a disputed subject since the financial crisis in 2008. The aim of this thesis is to study the relation between CEO compensation and companies’ size as well as performance. The study extends over a four-year period, from 2007 to 2010, comprising the companies within the finance and real estate industry listed under large-, mid and small cap on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. A four-year period from 2000 to 2003 and a  three-year period after the financial crisis from 2011 to 2013 is analyzed and taken into account in the study to get a deeper understanding of how the compensation has varied over time. The study takes a quantitative approach using secondary data from the companies’ annual reports. A pooled regression analysis is used as the statistical method where we are able to take multiple companies into account over several periods. The empirical results find that there is no significant relation between CEO compensation and firm performance. The study does however show a strong positive relation with market capitalization, suggesting that the companies’ size have a great effect on the CEO compensation.

Diploma thesis tests the existence of luck premium on U.S. CEOs' compensations. Luck premium means that in case of high principal-agent costs, CEOs are rewarded for random luck and not only for their productivity. Thesis uses financial crisis in 2008 as a breaking event after which attention and control of CEOs' remuneration by owners, public, and media intensified. Using regression with fixed effects on panel data between years 2004 and 2012 thesis proved impact of luck premium before 2008 while the influence was not significant after 2008. Results were not robust for other model specifications, which might be caused by selectivity of the dataset. Thesis then presents overview of theoretical approaches to CEOs' compensation analysis and recommendations for optimal compensation set-up.

In international corruption indexes, such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Sweden often ranks as one of the least corrupt countries in the World. Despite this, the country still experiences corruption scandals, particularly in local government. In the wake of a scandal, municipalities tend to react swiftly and initiate anti- corruption reforms. However, despite such actions, new scandals re-emerge. The purpose of the study is to analyze why the undertaken reforms are not always successful in preventing new scandals from happening. In order to do so, I focus on anti-corruption measures in two large Swedish municipalities that have repeatedly experienced corruption scandals, despite having taken action and putting anti-corruption measures in place: the cities of Norrkoping and Gothenburg. Interviews on the scandals and the anti-corruption reforms were conducted with officials and politicians, and empirical evidence has also been gathered from public documents and audit reports. The principal-agent theory and the ideal types of “value based” and “compliance based” approaches are the theoretical tools which are used to analyze the undertaken anti-corruption reforms. The results show that the reforms undertaken indeed have improved the integrity systems of the cities. However, the reoccurring scandals can best be explained by the fact that the reforms have not been properly incorporated properly in the administrations, which in some cases have resulted in an ignorance of the rules. Some scandals can also be explained by conscious criminal acts from the agents, acts that are difficult to guard oneself against no matter how well-designed the anti-corruption institutions are. The results hence show that it is hard to design institutions that obliterate the corruption that are undertaken on purpose by agents.

The study is based on a hypothetical deductive approach. The study applies a quantitative method. The material covers 3926 firm years between 2007–2019. The data studied is obtained from the ASSET4 database. Analysis of data has taken place in the statistics program IBM SPSS. The study is based in corporate governance where the balance between shareholders and stakeholders forms the basis together with the countries' legal origins, i.e. how the legal traditions of different countries affect firms' reporting. To analyze this, two parts are used, a period of voluntary reporting of ESG(2007-2016) and a period covering the regulatory framework implemented in the European Union where mandatory reporting (2017-2019) of non-financial information such as environment and social aspects were introduced for larger firms in 2017. Based on this, a comparison is made whether higher ESG reporting is achieved in the voluntary or mandatory environment.  The study finds evidence that higher ESG reporting is achieved in the mandatory reporting and that the countries' legal differences decrease during the mandatory reporting period. The results show that firms of Scandinavian legal origin have lower ESG reporting and that a concentrated ownership structure leads to a lower ESG reporting.

This dissertation contains three essays on the impact of other-regarding behavior on human decision-making. Chapter II uses experimental methods to analyze the relative performance of a variety of compensation contracts. This study creates an environment in which individuals are paid via common payment mechanisms employed in the dual-principal agent relationships (Piece Rate, Flat Rate, Salary, Bonus and Socialization) and examines the effect that different incentive structures have on agent behavior. In Chapter III I explore the potential outcomes of blended payment structures in a dual-principal agent environment. I draw from the previously conducted experimental study in Chapter II and simulate agent behavior induced by blended payment mechanisms. In Chapter IV, I move away from studying payment mechanisms to investigate the impact of intentionality and responsibility on an individual's decision-making process. I explore the effects of direct and indirect responsibility as well as selfish and kind intentions using experimental methodology. Each of these essays provides further evidence that other-regarding behavior has a significant impact on the outcome of an economic situation; therefore, emphasizing the need to address such behavior in theoretical designs. / Ph. D.

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Under den senare delen av 1900-talet inträffade ett antal företagsskandaler, såsom Enron och Worldcom, vilket föranledde ett bristande förtroendet för såväl styrelsers som revisorers arbete. För att återfå förtroende på den svenska marknaden introducerades Koden och en uppdatering av Aktiebolagslagen gjordes. En av de förtroendehöjande åtgärderna innebar att revisionsutskotten introducerades. Revisionsutskottens införande innebar ett tydliggörande av styrelseledamöternas arbetsuppgifter, men medförde samtidigt att huvudmannaskapsproblematiken i styrelsen aktualiserades. Vilket leder till vår problemformulering: Hur har revisionsutskottens införande påverkat ansvarsfördelning i styrelsen?För att kunna besvara vår frågeställning har vi genomfört kvalitativa intervjuer utifrån ett expertperspektiv. Expertperspektivet har företrätts av institutionella ägare, revisorer och en advokat. Respondenternas olika relationer till fenomenet har bidragit till ett brett perspektiv.Empiriinsamlingen påvisar tydligt att införandet av revisionsutskott har aktualiserat huvudmannaskapsproblematiken. Empirin påvisar att en dualism, i styrelsen, kan ha uppstått utifrån vem som agerar i vems uppdrag. Dock åberopar respondenterna likt lagrum och rekommendationer att styrelsens huvudansvar i helhet kvarstår.Vår slutsats är att styrelsen inte har skapat sig ett alibi genom införandet av revisionsutskott, och att styrelsens ansvar i helhet kvarstår. Därmed kan vi konstatera att införandet av revisionsutskott har belyst ansvarsfrågan, men att ansvaret kvarstår hos styrelsen i sin helhet. Vi har även konstaterat att forskning om huvudmannaskapsproblematiken inom styrelsen är bristfällig och att mer forskning skulle berika området. / Program: Civilekonomprogrammet