This paper investigates the correlation between how Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) vote and their respective domestic democracy level. In doing so, it tests two hypotheses – first, that domestic democracy level affects MEP voting conduct. Second, that domestic democracy level affects the way MEPs tend to be disloyal to their European Party Groups (EPGs). The first hypothesis regarding the correlation between democracy level and MEP voting conduct is analysed statistically through logistic regression, the data for which has been collected from VoteWatch, whereas the second hypothesis is tested in a qualitative discussion based upon a smaller dataset.                       Both hypotheses are supported by the data, but because the study is based on a single issue, one can only feasibly generalise the findings to similar cases voted upon by the European Parliament. This paper uses a motion in the Parliament that directly concerns democratic values – as such, any conclusions drawn only apply to other cases similarly centred on democratic values. However, the findings of this study underline the importance of further studies on the topic of the influence of democracy levels on the political process of the European Union.

This dissertation seeks to explain variation in legislative strategies to control policymaking across institutional contexts. Of these many strategies, I focus particularly on the use of statutory language meant to direct agency action and on the use of oversight hearings. I argue that while low levels of oversight activity need not imply that a legislature is helplessly abdicating policymaking responsibility to unelected agencies, this may be the case in some circumstances. With the goal of establishing when the lack of oversight may mean such normatively problematic abdication, I develop a signaling model of delegation and oversight which proposes that oversight depends on institutional features (such as legislative capacity, the existence of legislative term limits and a legislative veto), political features (such as policy conflict within the government and within the legislature and the policy preferences and activism of important judicial actors), and the legislature's initial delegation of policymaking discretion to an agency. Critically, the pursuit of either strategy depends on alternative strategies available as well as on the likely actions of other institutions with the power to affect policy outcomes. The dissertation extends our theoretical understanding of legislative-executive relations and provides one of the first large-scale empirical analyses of legislative policymaking. In the first empirical chapter of this dissertation, I assess the predictions of the theory concerning congressional oversight activity from 1947-2006. I find that both the extent to which a congressional committee's ideology diverges from an agency's and the policy-specific expertise of said committee affect the number of oversight hearing days the committee holds, but only when policy disagreements are sufficiently conflictual. This last condition suggests, contrary to previous research, that the extent to which oversight should be necessary, to either legislative policymaking or democratic legitimacy, varies across preference arrangements. In the next empirical chapter, I switch my focus from the analysis of a single legislature over time to a cross-sectional study of the extent to which U.S. state legislatures delegate authority to bureaucratic agencies. Here, I find that the amount of discretion that a legislature delegates to an agency charged with implementing Medicaid policy is nonlinearly related to the extent to which state courts are likely to affect policy outcomes, as captured by a new measure of judicial activism. These analyses confirm that legislatures consider alternative methods of control as well as the likely actions of external institutions when crafting their policymaking strategies.

<p>The Swedish Code for Corporate Governance was introduced on July 1, 2005. All companies then listed at OM Stockholmsbörsen A-list and those on the O-list with a market value of more than three billion SKr must implement the rules in the Code. The Code includes rules for corporate governance as a complement to the legislation. The Code is based on the principle comply or explain. This means that the companies are aloud to diverge from the rules if they explain why. The reason for this principle is that it enables a much higher level of ambition in the Code than if it would be legislated.</p><p>The Swedish Code for Corporate Governance has introduced much tougher rules on internal control than the existing legislation demands. The Code demands a good internal control without defining what it means. The idea is that the companies themselves are responsible for developing a standard for good internal control. It also includes that the board should sign an annual report about the companies internal control and establish a special internal audit function for evaluating the internal control system.</p><p>The main purpose with this paper is to study the implementation of the Code in Swedish companies concerning the rules on internal control of the financial reporting.</p><p>The paper is limited to the companies listed at OM Stockholmsbörsen former A-list which apply with the Code. Five companies are being interviewed on their work with internal control. All companies at the former A-list are included in the study of the existence of an internal audit function.</p><p>The paper is based on both secondary and primary data, mainly focused on the latter. The secondary data is collected from literature, journals, internet and annual reports from the companies included in the study. Primary data has been collected via e-mail and telephone contacts. One of the interviews was done via telephone and the others through meetings at the companies head offices.</p><p>The study shows that exactly half of the companies have an internal audit function and the existence of the function is strongly related to the ownership structure. Only companies with a wide spread in ownership and nationalized companies has the function.</p><p>There is a great uncertainty about what good internal control means. A suitable solution to apply with the rules in the Code is therefore to use COSO’s definition and recommendations on internal control. The framework also includes guidelines on how to evaluate and improve internal control.</p>

<p>Goodwill accounting treatment has been a subject of heated debate for a long time in many countries around the world. Changing to international accounting standards and settings was much discussed in Sweden. International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) issued Exposure Drafts, which were related to goodwill accounting treatment in 2002. In this thesis, two respondents groups’ positions, regarding the disclosure information on goodwill impairment test, and assumption are examined by studying comment letters that submitted to the IASB. It is suggested that the two groups lobbied the proposal because the new standard has economic consequences. The result shows that, as hypothesized, non-preparer group supported more than the preparer group for disclosing variety information on goodwill impairment test and assumption. Furthermore, it would be interesting to see what kind of arguments from two different groups, and how they argue for their positions. The result is both groups used IASB framework are based on useful arguments to support their positions at the same extent, although the objects behind the lobbying activities are different from two groups.</p>

<p>Despite of the financial crisis managers are receiving large financial short-term incentives in form of bonuses. This has been criticized in the media and by governments, shareholders and numerous of studies have been made about financial incentives and whether they work or not and the results vary. What do the companies themselves say about this? Why do they use short-term incentives?</p><p>The purpose of this thesis was to find out why companies choose to have short-term incentive plans which usually consist of an annual bonus. Moreover how the incentive plans are designed and what companies expects from them.</p><p>A qualitative method is used in this thesis; five interviews were made in order to collect empirical material. The companies that participated in the study were Q-Med, Boliden, Johnson & Johnson, Nordea, and Siemens. The personnel who were interviewed were Human Resources (HR) directors or Financial Directors or had compensations and benefits as their main responsibility. All companies who participated in the interviews are public companies, although not all of them are listed at the Swedish Stock Exchange, Siemens and Johnson & Johnson are listed at the New York and Frankfurt Stock Exchange.</p><p>The conclusion of this study is that companies use short-term incentives as a motivator for the management and to structure goals and set a common aim for the companies’ divisions. They also consider themselves to need them in order to attract and keep good managers. The incentive programme is structured with the aim to increase the company’s profit by motivating employees but also to rate and evaluate the manager. When the incentive programme is well designed and fulfils its purpose it will benefit the shareholders, who owns the company, as profits will increase.</p>

The Swedish Code for Corporate Governance was introduced on July 1, 2005. All companies then listed at OM Stockholmsbörsen A-list and those on the O-list with a market value of more than three billion SKr must implement the rules in the Code. The Code includes rules for corporate governance as a complement to the legislation. The Code is based on the principle comply or explain. This means that the companies are aloud to diverge from the rules if they explain why. The reason for this principle is that it enables a much higher level of ambition in the Code than if it would be legislated. The Swedish Code for Corporate Governance has introduced much tougher rules on internal control than the existing legislation demands. The Code demands a good internal control without defining what it means. The idea is that the companies themselves are responsible for developing a standard for good internal control. It also includes that the board should sign an annual report about the companies internal control and establish a special internal audit function for evaluating the internal control system. The main purpose with this paper is to study the implementation of the Code in Swedish companies concerning the rules on internal control of the financial reporting. The paper is limited to the companies listed at OM Stockholmsbörsen former A-list which apply with the Code. Five companies are being interviewed on their work with internal control. All companies at the former A-list are included in the study of the existence of an internal audit function. The paper is based on both secondary and primary data, mainly focused on the latter. The secondary data is collected from literature, journals, internet and annual reports from the companies included in the study. Primary data has been collected via e-mail and telephone contacts. One of the interviews was done via telephone and the others through meetings at the companies head offices. The study shows that exactly half of the companies have an internal audit function and the existence of the function is strongly related to the ownership structure. Only companies with a wide spread in ownership and nationalized companies has the function. There is a great uncertainty about what good internal control means. A suitable solution to apply with the rules in the Code is therefore to use COSO’s definition and recommendations on internal control. The framework also includes guidelines on how to evaluate and improve internal control.

In the media today, remuneration programs to CEO’s are frequently discussed. Media are usually focusing on the large amounts paid out rather than why the companies use the programs. The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the conflict of interest presented by the Principal Agent Theory is affected by a CEO remuneration program. To reach the purpose, an inductive method has been used. Questionnaires have been send out by e-mail and phone interviews have been carried out with two sample groups, one with remuneration programs, and one that do not use remuneration programs. The main theoretical framework used is Principal Agent Theory. With the help of other supporting and complementing theories the authors have been able to analyze the empirical findings gathered, and come to a conclusion. The authors were able to come to the conclusion that an effective remuneration program can to some extent steer a CEO’s behavior in the short term, and thereby affect the conflict of interest going on between principals and agents according to Principal Agent Theory. At the same time the authors have come to the conclusion that it is more difficult to make any clear connections between remuneration programs and being able to steer CEO’s behavior in the long run. However the long run reason for a remuneration program is to create a loyalty between the owners and managers. It has also been seen that companies without a remuneration plan tend to apply a Stewardship relationship rather than a principal agent relationship, and are thereby managing to decrease the conflict of interest between the two parties. / Bonusprogram är ofta diskuterade i media idag. Fokus ligger oftare på storleken på beloppen som betalas ut snarare än varför företagen väljer att använda sig av programmen. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka huruvida intressekonflikten presenterad i Principal Agent Teori påverkas av ett bonusprogram till VD. För att uppnå syftet har en induktiv metod används. Frågeformulär har skickats ut via e-post och telefonintervjuer har genomförts med två olika urvalsgrupper, en där företagen använder sig av bonusprogram till sin VD och en där företagen inte använder sig av bonusprogram till sin VD. Den huvudsakliga teorin som använts är Principal Agent Teori. Med hjälp av andra stödjande samt kompletterande teorier har författarna kunnat analysera det empiriska materialet som samlats in och på så sätt lyckats komma fram till en slutsats. Författarna kom fram till slutsatsen att ett effektivt bonusprogram kan till viss del styra en VD:s beteende på kortsikt, och på så sätt påverka den intressekonflikt som pågår mellan principal och agent enligt Principal Agent Teorin. Samtidigt har författarna kommit fram till slutsatsen att det är svårare att se något klart samband mellan bonusprogram och möjligheten att styra en VD:s beteende på långsikt. En annan anledning för att använda ett bonusprogram är att skapa en lojalitet mellan ägare och chefer på långsikt. Det har även framkommit att företag som inte använder sig av ett bonussystem tenderar att ha en Stewardship relation snarare än en principal agent relation mellan ägaren och VD. På så sätt lyckas dessa företag minska intressekonflikten mellan de två parterna.

Goodwill accounting treatment has been a subject of heated debate for a long time in many countries around the world. Changing to international accounting standards and settings was much discussed in Sweden. International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) issued Exposure Drafts, which were related to goodwill accounting treatment in 2002. In this thesis, two respondents groups’ positions, regarding the disclosure information on goodwill impairment test, and assumption are examined by studying comment letters that submitted to the IASB. It is suggested that the two groups lobbied the proposal because the new standard has economic consequences. The result shows that, as hypothesized, non-preparer group supported more than the preparer group for disclosing variety information on goodwill impairment test and assumption. Furthermore, it would be interesting to see what kind of arguments from two different groups, and how they argue for their positions. The result is both groups used IASB framework are based on useful arguments to support their positions at the same extent, although the objects behind the lobbying activities are different from two groups.

<p>In the media today, remuneration programs to CEO’s are frequently discussed. Media are usually focusing on the large amounts paid out rather than why the companies use the programs. The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the conflict of interest presented by the Principal Agent Theory is affected by a CEO remuneration program.</p><p>To reach the purpose, an inductive method has been used. Questionnaires have been send out by e-mail and phone interviews have been carried out with two sample groups, one with remuneration programs, and one that do not use remuneration programs.</p><p>The main theoretical framework used is Principal Agent Theory. With the help of other supporting and complementing theories the authors have been able to analyze the empirical findings gathered, and come to a conclusion. The authors were able to come to the conclusion that an effective remuneration program can to some extent steer a CEO’s behavior in the short term, and thereby affect the conflict of interest going on between principals and agents according to Principal Agent Theory. At the same time the authors have come to the conclusion that it is more difficult to make any clear connections between remuneration programs and being able to steer CEO’s behavior in the long run. However the long run reason for a remuneration program is to create a loyalty between the owners and managers. It has also been seen that companies without a remuneration plan tend to apply a Stewardship relationship rather than a principal agent relationship, and are thereby managing to decrease the conflict of interest between the two parties.</p> / <p>Bonusprogram är ofta diskuterade i media idag. Fokus ligger oftare på storleken på beloppen som betalas ut snarare än varför företagen väljer att använda sig av programmen. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka huruvida intressekonflikten presenterad i Principal Agent Teori påverkas av ett bonusprogram till VD.</p><p>För att uppnå syftet har en induktiv metod används. Frågeformulär har skickats ut via e-post och telefonintervjuer har genomförts med två olika urvalsgrupper, en där företagen använder sig av bonusprogram till sin VD och en där företagen inte använder sig av bonusprogram till sin VD.</p><p>Den huvudsakliga teorin som använts är Principal Agent Teori. Med hjälp av andra stödjande samt kompletterande teorier har författarna kunnat analysera det empiriska materialet som samlats in och på så sätt lyckats komma fram till en slutsats.</p><p>Författarna kom fram till slutsatsen att ett effektivt bonusprogram kan till viss del styra en VD:s beteende på kortsikt, och på så sätt påverka den intressekonflikt som pågår mellan principal och agent enligt Principal Agent Teorin. Samtidigt har författarna kommit fram till slutsatsen att det är svårare att se något klart samband mellan bonusprogram och möjligheten att styra en VD:s beteende på långsikt. En annan anledning för att använda ett bonusprogram är att skapa en lojalitet mellan ägare och chefer på långsikt. Det har även framkommit att företag som inte använder sig av ett bonussystem tenderar att ha en Stewardship relation snarare än en principal agent relation mellan ägaren och VD. På så sätt lyckas dessa företag minska intressekonflikten mellan de två parterna.</p>

På grund av alla redovisningsskandaler efter det senaste millennieskiftet diskuteras detmycket kring hur förtroendet för revisorer har påverkats. Enronskandalen som inträffade iUSA, var en av de största skandalerna som påverkade hela världens ekonomi. Även i Sverigeförekommer det redovisningsskandaler. Skandiaskandalen är en utav dessa under modern tid.Allmänheten har till följd av dessa skandaler ifrågasatt trovärdigheten i den granskningrevisorer gör i bolags finansiella rapporter. Det finns ett antal olika faktorer som ligger tillgrund för dessa skandaler. Bland de faktorer som låg till grund för skandalerna fannsintressekonflikter, exempelvis att revisorn hade hand om andra tjänster utöver revision, samtatt revisorn inte var oberoende i sin granskning. Som en naturlig effekt avredovisningsskandalerna efterfrågade allmänheten lagstiftningar och åtgärder för att repareradet skadade förtroendet. Koden var en av de åtgärder som infördes som en respons på dennasituation. Syftet med Koden är att vinna tillbaka allmänhetens förtroende för de svenskabörsnoterade bolagen och förbättra styrningen av bolagen. Det är dock inte säkert att Kodenverkligen åtgärdar problemet. Syftet med uppsatsen är att fördjupa diskussionen kringförtroendet för revisorer. Detta genom att undersöka dels huruvida Koden verkligen harpåverkat förtroendet för revisorer och dels genom att försöka identifiera de faktorer sompåverkar förtroendet för revisorer. För att kunna studera det identifierade fenomenet,förtroende för revisorer, och därmed svara på forskningsfrågorna har en kvalitativ ansatsanvänds. Resultatet av denna studie tyder på att Koden inte har haft avsevärd påverkan påförtroendet för revisorer. Dessutom identifierar studien de faktorer som faktiskt påverkarförtroendet för revisorer. En del av dessa faktorer beror på intressekonflikter och att alla parterär nyttomaximerade och andra beror på revisorns egenskaper. Dessa faktorer bör regleras merkring och förtydligas, visar vår studie, för att stärka och återupprätta det skadade förtroendetför revisorer. / As a result of a series of accounting scandals during the last turn of the millennium the debatehas revolved a great deal around how the trust for accountants has been affected. The ”EnronScandal” that occurred in the US, was one of the most immense scandals that affected theworld economy. Accounting scandals do occur in Sweden as well, the ”Skandia Scandal” isone of those scandals that have occurred in modern time. The public has questioned thecredibility in the type of review accountants do in a corporations financial reports. There are anumbers of factors that can be the cause for these scandals. Among the factors that were thecause behind these scandals, were conflicts of interest. Mainly that the accountant hadresponsibility of additional services alongside with audit, but also the independence of theaccountant. As a natural impact the public demanded legislation and legal actions to repair thedamaged trust. Swedish code for corporate governance was one of a couple of actions thatwere implemented as a response to the situation. The purpose to the code was to win back thepublics trust for the Swedish quoted companies and to improve the governance of thecorporations. It is however not quite certain that the code really is able to repair the problem.The aim of this essay is to deepen the discussion round the trust of accountants. By partlyexamining if the Swedish code for corporate governance really has impacted the trust foraccountants, and partly by trying to identify the factors that influences the trust foraccountants. To be able to study the identified phenomenon, the trust for accountants, and toaccordingly answer the questions in the research, a qualitative approach has been applied. Theresult of this study indicates that the code has not impacted the trust of accountantssignificantly. The study also identifies the factors that actually affect the trust for accountants.Some of the factors depend on conflicts of interest and that all parties are cost-benefitmaximized, others lie in the accountant’s qualities. The conclusion in our essay is that thesefactors should be increasingly regulated and explicated in order to reestablish the damagedtrust for accountants.