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The Flicker of Freedom: A Reply to StumpCapes, Justin A. 01 January 2014 (has links)
In a fascinating article in The Journal of Ethics, Eleonore Stump contends that while the flicker of freedom defense is the best available strategy for defending the principle of alternative possibilities against the threat posed to that principle by the Frankfurt cases, the defense is ultimately unsuccessful. In this article I identify a number of difficulties with Stump’s criticism of the flicker strategy. Along the way, I also clarify various nuances of the strategy that often get overlooked, and I highlight the advantages of one version of it in particular.
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Frankfurt Cases: The Fine-Grained Response RevisitedCapes, Justin A., Swenson, Philip 01 April 2017 (has links)
Frankfurt cases are supposed to provide us with counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities. Among the most well known responses to these cases is what John Fischer has dubbed the flicker of freedom strategy. Here we revisit a version of this strategy, which we refer to as the fine-grained response. Although a number of philosophers, including some who are otherwise unsympathetic to Frankfurt’s argument, have dismissed the fine grained response, we believe there is a good deal to be said on its behalf. We argue, in particular, that reflection on certain cases involving omissions undermines the main objections to the response and also provides the groundwork for an argument in support of it.
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Does Justin Capes successfully show that Eleonore Stump’s rejection of the flicker of freedom defense fails?Josephsson, Elias January 2023 (has links)
Firstly, I will introduce the thought experiments known as the Frankfurt-style cases. Secondly,I will present the flicker of freedom defense. Thirdly, I will clarify why Stump rejects the flicker of freedom defense. Then I will present Capes’s response to Stump’s assessment of the 2flicker of freedom defense. Next, I will analyze Capes’s and Stump’s positions and argue that Capes successfully shows that Stump’s rejection fails. Lastly, I will discuss an implication the flicker of freedom defense has for the Frankfurt-style cases, which has not been addressed to my knowledge.
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Alternativní možnosti přepravy zboží mezi EU a východní Asií s důrazem na železniční dopravu / Alternative possibilities of cargo transportation between the EU and East Asia with focus on rail transportMarek, David January 2013 (has links)
The diploma thesis is focused on the analysis of the possibilities of cargo container transportation between the EU and East Asia using different modes of transport, especially railways. In the theoretical part, the author presents possible ways of transport between the EU and East Asia, with an emphasis on the Trans-Siberian Railway. In thesis is also mentioned the issue of containerization. The practical part consists of specific examples showing the differences in usage of maritime or rail transport on the given route, especially in case of costs and transit time.
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Les contre-exemples de Frankfurt ratent leur cible : un nouveau heaume pour le principe des possibilités alternativesChevarie-Cossette, Simon-Pierre 06 1900 (has links)
Les contre-exemples de Frankfurt sont inoffensifs contre l’argument de la conséquence (consequence argument), l’argument qui, à partir du principe des possibilités alternatives et du déterminisme, montre que nous ne pouvons être tenus moralement responsables de nos actions. En effet, ils sont formulés soit dans un cadre déterministe, soit dans un cadre indéterministe. S’ils sont formulés dans un cadre indéterministe, ils sont inoffensifs parce qu’ils contreviennent à un principe méthodologique que nous défendons : le principe de non-négation des prémisses (PNNP). En fait, nous montrons que pour tout argument donné, il est proscrit de supposer la négation d’une prémisse afin de réfuter une autre prémisse à moins que l’attaque réussisse à réfuter les deux prémisses en question. Or, d’une part, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt indéterministes supposent explicitement qu’une prémisse de l’argument de la conséquence – le déterminisme est vrai – est fausse; et d’autre part, ils ne peuvent pas nous donner de raisons de croire en l’indéterminisme, ce que nous montrons grâce à des considérations sur la transmission de la justification. Construire des contre-exemples de Frankfurt indéterministes est donc incorrect pour des raisons méthodologiques et logiques. S’ils sont formulés dans un cadre déterministe, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt font face à une autre accusation d’entorse argumentative, présentée dans la défense du dilemme (Dilemma Defence) de Kane-Ginet-Widerker : celle de la pétition de principe. Nous inspectons et nuançons cette accusation, mais concluons qu’elle tient puisque les contre-exemples de Frankfurt déterministes supposent au final une analyse des agents contrefactuels dans les mondes déterministes et de la relation « rendre inévitable » que ne peuvent endosser ni les incompatibilistes de la marge de manœuvre (leeway incompatibilists), ni les incompatibilistes de la source (source incompatibilists) ni non plus les semicompatibilistes. Conséquemment, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt ne peuvent plus soutenir la forme de compatibilisme à laquelle ils ont donné naissance. L’incompatibilisme de la source ne peut plus être préféré à l’incompatibilisme de la marge de manœuvre ni non plus rejeter toute participation des possibilités alternatives dans l’explication de la responsabilité morale sur cette seule base. / Frankfurt-type examples are inoffensive against the Consequence argument, which purports to show that from both the principle of alternative possibilities and determinism, we can deduce that we are not morally responsible for our actions. Indeed, they require either a deterministic context or an indeterministic one. If they require indeterminism, they are harmless because they violate a methodological principle that we defend: the no-premise-negation principle (PNNP). In fact, we show that for each given argument, we cannot legitimately suppose the negation of a premise in order to refute another, unless the attack succeeds to refute both premises. Yet, on the one hand, indeterministic Frankfurt-type examples explicitly suppose that a premise of the Consequence argument – determinism holds – is false; and on the other hand, Frankfurt-type examples do not give us reasons to reject determinism, which we show with considerations on the transmission of justification. To build indeterministic Frankfurt scenarios is therefore incorrect for methodological and logical reasons. If they require determinism, Frankfurt-type examples are facing a different, yet very serious, argumentative accusation (presented in the Kane-Ginet-Widerker famous Dilemma defence): begging the question. We inspect and qualify this accusation. However, we ultimately claim that it still holds because a deterministic Frankfurt-type example supposes an analysis of the role of counterfactual agents and of the relation “render inevitable” in deterministic worlds that is acceptable neither for a leeway incompatibilist, a source incompatibilist or a semicompatibilist. Thus, Frankfurt-type examples no longer successfully support the form of compatibilism they contributed to give birth to. Also, source incompatibilism may not be preferred to leeway incompatibilism, nor reject all use of alternative possibilities in the explanation of moral responsibility on the sole basis of Frankfurt scenarios.
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The Mechanics and Fixed Operations of Human ExperienceDi Netta, James Dominick 01 January 2016 (has links)
This paper will use the natural laws of the universe and amassed evidence to support a dynamic systems theory approach to explain the mechanics and fixed operations of the human experience taking place inside a causally determined universe without the possibility of free will. By reductionary methods, the universe and all its’ contents, including human agents, will be exemplified as complex dynamic systems. In so doing, the human experience is reduced to being comprised of information acting and reacting with other information existing in the universe, specifically ideas. Allowing ideas to take on a physical manifestation shows how the feedback of information directly results in the rise of human consciousness and the sensation of control and volition over actions. Thus, the methods and philosophies used in this paper will set out to rebut metaphysical libertarian views asserting alternative possibilities by way of Rollback Arguments and two other libertarian arguments raised by Alfred R. Mele. This paper aims to provide a description and deeper appreciation for the mechanics and fixed operations of the human experience in a universe where free will is nonexistent.
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The Incompatibility of Freedom of the Will and Anthropological PhysicalismGonzalez, Ariel 01 May 2014 (has links)
Many contemporary naturalistic philosophers have taken it for granted that a robust theory of free will, one which would afford us with an agency substantial enough to render us morally responsible for our actions, is itself not conceptually compatible with the philosophical theory of naturalism. I attempt to account for why it is that free will (in its most substantial form) cannot be plausibly located within a naturalistic understanding of the world. I consider the issues surrounding an acceptance of a robust theory of free will within a naturalistic framework. Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory effort in maintaining both a scientifically naturalist understanding of the human person and a full-blooded theory of agent-causal libertarian free will is considered. I conclude that Timothy O’Connor’s reconciliatory model cannot be maintained and I reference several conceptual difficulties surrounding the reconciliation of agent-causal libertarian properties with physical properties that haunt the naturalistic libertarian.
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