The early twentieth century witnessed the emergence of "objective relativism," a distinctly American school of metaphysical realism inspired by the works of John Dewey and A.N. Whitehead. Largely forgotten, objective relativism provided a metaphysical framework, based upon an ontology of events and relations rather than substances and discrete properties, that has continued relevance for contemporary metaphysical discussions. In this thesis, I attempt to chart the boundaries and pathways of this ontology, outlining what Dewey calls the "ground-map of the province of criticism." In particular, the ground-map of objective relativism is invoked to situate and analyze the model of psycho-physical emergence outlined in Dewey's Experience and Nature. Because it is a relational ontology, objective relativism avoids problems with emergence common to substantival models. Additional analyses of its ontological premises, both in Dewey's writings and elsewhere, demonstrate how compelling accounts of causation, consciousness, and meaning may be formulated within this model.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-01-10T11:26:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Vanessa Luciano Pozzoli.pdf: 797828 bytes, checksum: a0754d6892cfb9d0c313ca2348c6016a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-01-10T11:26:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vanessa Luciano Pozzoli.pdf: 797828 bytes, checksum: a0754d6892cfb9d0c313ca2348c6016a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-05 / Fundação São Paulo - FUNDASP / “You and Schiller carry Pragmatism too far for me” (CP 8.258). Thus, quite frankly, after asking the question of this lecture’s title (What do you understand by it [pragmatism]? (CP 8.253)), Peirce had expressed himself in one of the letters he wrote to William James in 1904. As already known, Pragmatism did not maintain a unity of interpretation among its theorists; on the contrary, it gave rise to a several nuances of thoughts, between them, that of Charles S. Peirce and William James, maybe the pragmatic philosophies most known. However, are these differences as big as we are used to say? What does each one mean by Pragmatism? What is the role of this theory in the conceptual universe of each author? Why does Peirce believe that James “carry Pragmatism too far”, as mentioned above? Where do they differ? To answer these questions, we propose the reader a diving in Peirce’s and James’ philosophies, selecting those aspects that we judge more relevant to this search. To this objective, we will follow a structure divided into three moments: the first will situate historically the term “pragmatism”; the second will show how Peirce and James conceive the notion of pragmatism; and, finally, taking into consideration the particularities of each, the last one will delineate some of the possible points of convergence and divergence between both conceptions / “Você e Schiller levam o pragmatismo muito longe para o meu gosto” (CP 8.258). É assim, muito francamente, que Peirce se expressa em uma das cartas que escreve a William James, em meados de 1904. Como já é sabido, o pragmatismo não manteve uma unidade de interpretação entre os seus teóricos; ao contrário, deu origem a matizes de pensamentos dos mais diversos, entre eles, o de Charles Peirce e o de William James — talvez as filosofias pragmáticas mais conhecidas. Mas seriam essas diferenças tão grandes quanto se costuma dizer? O que ambos entendem por pragmatismo? Que papel essa teoria exerce dentro do universo conceitual de cada autor? Por que Peirce acredita que James “foi longe demais”? Onde eles divergem? Essas são algumas das questões que esta pesquisa buscará investigar. E para respondê-las, propomos ao leitor um “mergulho” nas filosofias de Peirce e James, pinçando aqueles aspectos que julgamos mais relevantes para o objetivo que aqui se busca. Para isso, seguiremos a seguinte estrutura, dividida em três momentos: um primeiro que irá situar historicamente a corrente pragmática; um segundo que mostrará, especificamente, como Peirce e James compreendem o pragmatismo; e um último, partindo das particularidades de cada um, que buscará traçar alguns dos possíveis pontos de convergência e divergência entre uma concepção e outra

This dissertation investigates the narrative practice of Latin American Existentialism. My project tracks the structures, themes, and interpretations of Existentialism across national borders in the belief that a common expression exists which is distinctly Latin American. I begin this philosophical cartography, with four Existential(ist) novels produced in Latin America during the 1930s. Specifically, I will examine the Existentialist quality of Enrique Labrador Ruiz's El laberinto de si­ mismo (1933), Mari­a Luisa Bombal's La ultima niebla (1934) and La amortajada (1938), and Graciliano Ramos's Angustia (1936). These narratives are analyzed in relation to the core thematic of Existential philosophy. I read these narratives as Existential(ist) because they are of, relating to and characterized by a philosophy of existence, and because they simultaneously produce an Existential discourse. My study is, at one level, comparative in that I pursue the points of emergence of Existentialism's prominent categories not only across national borders, but also across disciplines. I relate the tradition of Latin American thought in the first half of the 20th century and Existential philosophy from Europe to collectivize the thematic points of contact. These I contrast with our literary production of the 1930s. By emphasizing the particularities and continuations of Latin America's contribution to the Existential canon I, in effect, periodize an era which is foundational in the history of Latin American literature. Furthermore, by acknowledging the literary presence of Latin American Existentialism we can appreciate the explicit narrative interrogation of the Self through aesthetic, ethical, and ontological parameters.

Departing from humanist models of American intellectual history, this dissertation proposes an alternative posthumanist approach to the thought of Jonathan Edwards, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Charles Sanders Peirce. Beginning with Perry Miller’s influential scholarship, American thought is often cast as a search for “face to face” encounters with the unaccountable God of Calvinism, a figure that eventually evolves to encompass Romantic notions of the aesthetic, imagination, or, most predominately, individual human feeling. This narrative typically culminates in the pragmatism of William James, a philosophy in which human feeling attains priority at the expense of impersonal metaphysical systems. However, alongside and against these trends runs a tradition that derives from the Calvinist distinction between a fallen material world and a transcendent God possessed of absolute sovereignty, a tradition that also anticipates posthumanist theory, particularly the self-referential distinction between system and environment that occupies the central position in Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory. After systems theory, the possibility for “face to face” encounters is replaced with the necessary self-reference of communication and observation, an attribute expressed in Edwards, Emerson, and Peirce through, respectively, the figures of “true virtue,” an absent and inexpressible grief and, in its most abstract form, Peirce’s concept of a sign. In conclusion, Edwards, Emerson, and Peirce represent an alternative posthumanist genealogy of pragmatism that displaces human consciousness as the foundational ground of meaning, communication, or semiosis.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1939. / Bibliography: p. [139]-143.

Thesis (M.A.)--Kent State University, 2007. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed July 3, 2008). Advisor: Jeffrey Wattles. Keywords: social self; self-other dialectic; pure experience; I-Me; I-Thou; sunyata; kenosis; basho; absolute nothingness; George H. Mead; Nishida Kitaro; Steve Odin. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1994. / Permission to use letters at end of volume 2. Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 462-595). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1994. / Permission to use letters at end of volume 2. Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 462-595). Also available on the Internet.

This essay proposes that theology and philosophy are not mutually exclusive or at odds with one another methodologically, but in fact that religious categories are useful in philosophical analyses, and particularly when it comes to ethics. In this essay, I examine the theological concept of sin as it is expressed in Latin American Liberation Theology (over and against the more traditional understanding of sin in Western Christianity) as the domination of the Other and the oppression of the poor through geo-political systems of power. I explore the responses to this notion from the Magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as my own critiques in terms of theoretical integrity with particular regard to claims of universalism. The essay then proceeds into a synthesis of these criticisms through the work of Josiah Royce on Community and Loyalty in

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