No description available.

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan / The United States penal system, fragmented by contradictory impulses toward retribution and incapacitation, is in need of coherent objectives for its prisons and jails. This dissertation draws upon the resources of virtue ethics to suggest a new model of justice, one which claims that a Christian theological framework can offer insight for public correctional institutions. In developing a model of justice as virtue, I incorporate rehabilitative goals and contributions from restorative justice. Advancing beyond these foundations, I draw upon two key sources. First, from a study of virtue and justice in the work of Thomas Aquinas, I argue that the virtue of legal justice - an orientation toward the common good - is the fundamental lens for understanding punishment. The prison can only cultivate justice to the extent that it empowers moral agency and (re-)orients offenders toward right relationship with the community. Second, an inclusive, restorative account of biblical justice - developed particularly from Isaiah, the Psalms, and the New Testament - establishes justice as a saving intervention. Thus, punishment can be a legitimate means but is not constitutive of justice itself. Despite its necessary limitations, the prison must empower the moral agency of inmates through just action, reformulate the role and practices of correctional staff, and facilitate just relationships between offenders and their communities and families. Furthermore, prisons themselves can be understood as moral agents that bear responsibility for cultivating justice in society. For the United States prison, a model of justice as virtue mandates unremitting efforts to transform offenders and the larger community into just moral agents. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan / The dissertation will contribute not only to an appreciation and critical evaluation of fortitude in the Philippine context, but has a wider significance for the practice of virtue ethics. The thesis is that (a) virtue must be analyzed contextually, in specific social contexts, as well as (b) in dependence upon the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of the virtues, that (c) social virtue as well as individual virtue exists, and that (d) this social, contextual, Aristotelian-Thomistic approach to virtue provides a basis for a social-ethical critical evaluation and prescription for particular societies. If virtue ethics is to generate sound social normative claims, its argument needs to be based not merely upon the classical tradition, but also on a socially, historically and culturally aware analysis of the way virtues are fleshed out in context. This dissertation will argue that the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition still has much to teach us about courage or fortitude, and in dialogue with contemporary social science still provides legitimate moral insights into fortitude today. Second, it will argue that virtue takes on a particular color or texture in specific social contexts, and will argue this in relation to the Filipino context: Philippine fortitude is Thomistic, with unique attributes of resilience and joy. Third, it will argue that it is necessary to engage in a social-ethical critique of social virtue, arguing that there are deficiencies in Philippine fortitude in that it lacks a crucial link with justice. This critical evaluation will lead to the elaboration of an ethical and social imperative for the Filipino people to develop good anger to fuel a less passive, more assertive fortitude that is ordered to justice. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Thesis advisor: James M. O'Toole / In the 1960s and 1970s American Catholics invoked conscience inordinately. They claimed to possess “sacred rights of conscience.” Catholics produced a thick psychological literature on the “formation of conscience.” They also made clear that conscience could never be handed over to an authority figure, whether in the church or state. The term conscience then became a keyword in the rights discourse of late twentieth century America. This dissertation seeks to explain why Catholics invoked conscience so frequently in the 1960s and 1970s, and it aims to chart how conscience became important to the rights vernacular of the late twentieth century. Catholics invoked conscience frequently in an effort to remain in and expand tradition. The theology of conscience had roots in the thirteenth century work of Thomas Aquinas -- a tradition American Catholics studied in the 1940s and 1950s. This study also shows how the human rights advocates of Amnesty International and a community of mainline Protestants appropriated the Catholic theology of conscience and used it for their own purposes. The 1960s and 1970s, rather than witnessing the end of tradition, facilitated its growth.

This study argues that a comparison of human nature, divine grace, and theological virtue in the theologies of John Wesley and Thomas Aquinas provides resources for constructing iconic dignity as a vital theological perspective. Iconic dignity names a radiant-yet-reflected human worth rooted in the image of God, whose grace empowers response, transformation, and virtuous participation in God’s loving essence. The dissertation responds to the absence of a focused analysis of nature, grace, and virtue in Wesley-Aquinas studies—a nascent field with only three major publications (on historical-moral theology, Christian perfection, and pneumatology). The project’s contributions to theological reflection and practice have become especially clear in our current context of social-existential fragmentation and bigotry. Iconic dignity begins with an intuitional methodology and proceeds with textual analysis, critically comparative construction, and practical contributions. These methods characterize iconic dignity as participatory, incarnational, relational, dynamic, encompassing, transformational, and loving. These characteristics embrace our inter/personal nature, our development in grace, and our work with God toward virtuous flourishing. The dissertation’s explanatory power and generative potential capacitates constructive doctrinal reflection and practical embodiments of iconic dignity. After detailing “iconicity” and “dignity,” the theological comparison of Wesley and Aquinas traces general contours of their shared theological anthropology. As embodiments of God’s image, humans possess intellect, will, and volitional liberty, which together establish our moral capacity. This holistic anthropology is then analyzed with respect to human acts, their relation to habitus (Aquinas) and tempers (Wesley), and sin (actual and original). Following a constructive exploration of iconic dignity and ecological stewardship, the study shifts to grace. Close stereoscopic reading reveals the congruity of grace’s nature, divisions, and dynamics for Wesley and Aquinas. Throughout, the constructive comparison illustrates the strength of iconic dignity’s theological perspective. Wesley and Aquinas are shown to be similar enough to converse but different enough to contribute: to one another, out of their shared theological departures and destinations; and to our practical-theological conversations, including a repudiation of total depravity, an embrace of universal grace, joint ecological stewardship, radical hospitality, and ongoing Methodist-Catholic ecumenical dialogues. Still, many opportunities remain for developing iconic dignity in practice. First, more research is needed on the means of grace and the nature and exercise of theological virtue for Wesley and Aquinas. Second, future research should focus on additional topics like ecclesiology, moral virtue, sociality, and an expansion beyond Wesley and Aquinas. Finally, the need remains for further study into practices of iconic dignity, including the development of stereoscopic reading for local congregations and communities.

The central aim of this dissertation is to provide a conceptual framework for people wishing to consider how their desires are shaped by forces often unnoticed by them and how they can regain some degree of control over those desires. To this end, it offers a model for desire that acknowledges the importance of social forces in shaping a person's desire, and consequently moral character. It examines the specific social context of American capitalism, and American consumption, in order to understand how it is that many Americans seem to desire and act in ways that appear contrary to their well-being. This dissertation is a work of descriptive Christian virtue ethics, meaning that it considers the desire for and consumption of material goods in light of a person's commitment to a greater system of beliefs and values. Taking the approach of virtue ethics, it considers how a person's desires are shaped by what she takes to be constitutive of her well-being, or her telos. It argues that many Americans participate in practices that dispose them to acquire habits of desiring, consuming, and enjoying material goods in ways that tend over time to distort participants' abilities to judge and reason well about the ends that are really worth pursuing, both on the part of individuals and on the part of societies. When a person participates in a practice she acquires habits of thinking, feeling, and acting that enable her to engage in such practices effortlessly. A practice is often oriented by certain rules and standards of excellence that orient the practitioners to certain ways of thinking, feeling, and acting over others. Taking advertising as a key example, participants often acquire habits that lead them to accept a conception of well-being that is based on the ideas that growth is always to be pursued and more of a good thing is always better. Such an orientation, in turn, can direct a person's desires so that she becomes disposed to satisfy her immediate desires without seriously considering whether those desires will contribute to her well-being and, more broadly, whether the vision of the good life she has in mind is truly worth pursuing. This dissertation offers a way of engaging in critical reflection that can enable a person to bring to awareness many of these unseen social forces, and consider the ways in which participation in her many practices does or does not contribute to her well-being. It suggests that, for Christians in particular, a vision of the good life might focus on the cultivation of virtue--especially the virtues of temperance and justice. Considering a person's practices in light of virtue can be helpful for articulating clearly and strategizing effectively about how to engage in consumer activity in ways that contribute to her well-being.

The introduction of a Thomistic framework to contemporary models of addiction provides new insight that may prove useful in efforts toward therapy and understanding. Aquinas's conception of the human soul and its proper functioning contrasts with the suggested disordered functioning of the addict's soul in such a way that this may prove useful for addicts attempting to interpret their physical, psychological, and moral feelings or intuitions. This framework can then be related to the common contemporary addiction therapy found in Alcoholics Anonymous and other Twelve Step programs in order to provide a greater understanding of what psychological and moral processes may be at work within the addict with the hope that greater understanding will lead to more effective therapy.

Scope of the work - This research project involves two components. The first is a translation from Latin into English of St Thomas Aquinas’s Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis. This is an important, though largely neglected, work of St Thomas dating from 1267- 68, dealing with a range of issues relating to the two categories of created spirits recognised by Thomas, viz. angels and human souls. The perspective of the Angelic Doctor is principally, though not exclusively, that of philosophy rather than of theology. What is found in the disputed question is the development of a number of arguments, and the consequent taking up of a number of positions, that are the immediate source of what St Thomas has to say about angels and the human soul in the first part (prima pars) of his Summa Theologiae - a part which was completed by 1268. What he has to say about the Averroistic view that there is only one receptive intellect, and only one agent intellect, for all human beings (see Articles 9 and 10 of the disputed question) prepared the way for his crucially important polemical treatise of 1270, the De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas. The project provides a complete translation of the Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis which extends across eleven ‘articles’ addressing selected questions concerning angels and/or human souls, viz. matter/form composition, modes of union with (or separation from) matter, specific differences between angels, receptive intellect and agent intellect in human beings, and the distinction between the soul and its powers. Pages vi- vii of the Introduction to the project discuss the way in which the translation of the text of St Thomas has been approached. To cite one sentence: “An attempt has been made at all times to use a style of translation that is pleasantly readable, non-jarring, and non-pedantic” - but one that is subject to total fidelity to expressing the philosophical meaning of St Thomas. The second component of the project is eleven sets of notes (one hundred and seven pages in all), each set of which belongs to one or other of the eleven articles making up the text of St Thomas as translated. There is a degree of cross-referencing between some of the notes belonging to particular articles. The notes are of varying length and are concerned to facilitate an understanding of what the Angelic Doctor has to say in his Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis. Most of the notes fall into one or other of the following categories: biographical (providing information about a number of persons whose names appear in Thomas’s text), historical (giving information about institutions and events connected with the time, or life, of St Thomas), exegetical (explaining why a particular English translation of Thomas’s Latin has been used, or illustrating a point in the text by citations from other works of the Saint, or on occasion taking issue with some feature of the critical Latin text of Leo Keeler, S.J., on which the translation has been based), and ‘philosophical extension’ notes (seeking to amplify what St Thomas has been arguing in the disputed question on created spirits by considering related issues in other works of his, or by further exploration of a concept or notion used in the text but not dwelt on by Thomas). 2 Aim of the work - The aim of the project has been to make available an accurate, and attractive, English translation from thirteenth century Latin of an important work of Thomas Aquinas, and to support this activity with accompanying sets of notes. The achievement of appropriate scholarly standards has been a pervasive intention in all that has been undertaken.

The theme of truth in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre has rarely been developed. The present thesis aims at filling this lack. In a long first part the goes in details through the whole of MacIntyre’s work with a special attention to the item of truth, which is omnipresent. This heuristic part leads to a hermeneutic part, in which the thought of the Anglo-Saxon philosopher is compared with that of Hans-Georg Gadamer - to whom he affirms to be widely indebted - in order to discern the proper of the Macintyrian researcher and that of his access to truth, which he considers as absolute. The unifying thread of it is the dichotomy Aristotle vs. Heidegger in Gadamer’s work. This dichotomy, which is suggested by the Anglo-Saxon philosopher, proves to be an important key of interpretation of his thought in the field of hermeneutic. In a third part the author studies a diversity of themes for a right understanding of the Macintyrian conception of truth: today’s context of plurality of traditions and civilisations, Macintyrian Thomism, the absolute and what is relative and truth as a good. This thematic part is built upon a confrontation with the thought of the second Hilary Putnam, that of "Reason, Truth and History", which is used as a safeguard in the work of MacIntyre when he tries to define the conception of truth in the tradition rationality. The author makes some critics of MacIntyre’s thought, notably on the credit given to human rationality: the Anglo-Saxon philosopher does not seem to understand the limits proper to it, on theoretical level and practical level as well. / Le thème de la vérité chez Alasdair MacIntyre restait trop peu connu. Cette thèse entend contribuer à combler ce manque. Dans une longue première partie, l’ensemble de l’œuvre macintyrienne est épluché en suivant le thème de la vérité, qui y est omniprésent. Cette partie heuristique débouche sur une partie herméneutique, où la pensée du philosophe anglo-saxon est confrontée à celle de Hans-Georg Gadamer, envers lequel il reconnaît une dette importante, afin de discerner quelle est la part propre de la situation de l’investigateur macintyrien et celle de son accès à la vérité, qu’il considère finalement comme étant absolue. La dichotomie Aristote vs Heidegger chez Gadamer en constitue le fil rouge. Cette dichotomie, suggérée par le philosophe anglo-saxon, s’avère être une clé d’interprétation importante de sa pensée dans le champ de l’herméneutique. Dans une troisième partie sont étudiés divers thèmes importants pour une juste compréhension de la conception macintyrienne de la vérité : le contexte contemporain de la pluralité des traditions et des civilisations, le thomisme macintyrien, le relatif et l’absolu, et la vérité comme (un) bien. Cette partie thématique est charpentée par une confrontation avec la pensée du second Hilary Putnam, celui de "Reason, Truth and History", qui sert en quelque sorte de garde-fou dans l’œuvre macintyrienne quand il s’agit de définir la conception de la vérité impliquée dans la tradition rationality. Certaines critiques de la pensée d’Alasdair MacIntyre sont faites, notamment en ce qui concerne le crédit qu’il accorde à la rationalité humaine : le philosophe anglo-saxon ne semble pas prendre la mesure des limites qui lui sont propres, tant au niveau théorique qu’au niveau pratique.

The theme of truth in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre has rarely been developed. The present thesis aims at filling this lack. In a long first part the goes in details through the whole of MacIntyre’s work with a special attention to the item of truth, which is omnipresent. This heuristic part leads to a hermeneutic part, in which the thought of the Anglo-Saxon philosopher is compared with that of Hans-Georg Gadamer - to whom he affirms to be widely indebted - in order to discern the proper of the Macintyrian researcher and that of his access to truth, which he considers as absolute. The unifying thread of it is the dichotomy Aristotle vs. Heidegger in Gadamer’s work. This dichotomy, which is suggested by the Anglo-Saxon philosopher, proves to be an important key of interpretation of his thought in the field of hermeneutic. In a third part the author studies a diversity of themes for a right understanding of the Macintyrian conception of truth: today’s context of plurality of traditions and civilisations, Macintyrian Thomism, the absolute and what is relative and truth as a good. This thematic part is built upon a confrontation with the thought of the second Hilary Putnam, that of "Reason, Truth and History", which is used as a safeguard in the work of MacIntyre when he tries to define the conception of truth in the tradition rationality. The author makes some critics of MacIntyre’s thought, notably on the credit given to human rationality: the Anglo-Saxon philosopher does not seem to understand the limits proper to it, on theoretical level and practical level as well. / Le thème de la vérité chez Alasdair MacIntyre restait trop peu connu. Cette thèse entend contribuer à combler ce manque. Dans une longue première partie, l’ensemble de l’œuvre macintyrienne est épluché en suivant le thème de la vérité, qui y est omniprésent. Cette partie heuristique débouche sur une partie herméneutique, où la pensée du philosophe anglo-saxon est confrontée à celle de Hans-Georg Gadamer, envers lequel il reconnaît une dette importante, afin de discerner quelle est la part propre de la situation de l’investigateur macintyrien et celle de son accès à la vérité, qu’il considère finalement comme étant absolue. La dichotomie Aristote vs Heidegger chez Gadamer en constitue le fil rouge. Cette dichotomie, suggérée par le philosophe anglo-saxon, s’avère être une clé d’interprétation importante de sa pensée dans le champ de l’herméneutique. Dans une troisième partie sont étudiés divers thèmes importants pour une juste compréhension de la conception macintyrienne de la vérité : le contexte contemporain de la pluralité des traditions et des civilisations, le thomisme macintyrien, le relatif et l’absolu, et la vérité comme (un) bien. Cette partie thématique est charpentée par une confrontation avec la pensée du second Hilary Putnam, celui de "Reason, Truth and History", qui sert en quelque sorte de garde-fou dans l’œuvre macintyrienne quand il s’agit de définir la conception de la vérité impliquée dans la tradition rationality. Certaines critiques de la pensée d’Alasdair MacIntyre sont faites, notamment en ce qui concerne le crédit qu’il accorde à la rationalité humaine : le philosophe anglo-saxon ne semble pas prendre la mesure des limites qui lui sont propres, tant au niveau théorique qu’au niveau pratique.