O papel da razão (logos) em meio às ações (praxis) ainda vigora como um grande problema filosófico. Procura-se aqui tratá-lo a partir da filosofia de G. W. Leibniz. O ponto de partida é o próprio paradigma racional, deus. Delineia-se um panorama sobre as principais ideias envolvidas na escolha divina do melhor dos mundos, as quais servem para mostrar como podem ser pensados os atos humanos. Leibniz costuma desenvolver sua filosofia com o apoio de outros pensadores; dentre eles, Aristóteles tem lugar especial. Assim, busca-se mostrar parcialmente como Leibniz tira proveito de teses aristotélicas quando o filósofo moderno reflete sobre as ações humanas. Para isso, com relação a Aristóteles, monta-se um quadro geral de alguns dos principais conceitos da sua teoria da ação, como as noções de voluntário, de deliberação, de escolha deliberada, dentre outros que permitam esboçar sua noção de razão prática. Em seguida, é desenvolvida a ideia de ação humana desde os seus fundamentos segundo o pensamento leibniziano. Nessa perspectiva, para se chegar ao conhecimento do ato denominado racional, parte-se da ação das substâncias e mostra-se gradualmente como a razão passa a fazer parte das faculdades de certo grupo de seres, os quais a usam quando se movem. Por meio de todos esses passos, finalmente tenta-se chegar às especificidades do pensamento leibniziano quando ele trata do movimento humano e se ele teria o direito de invocar o pensamento aristotélico ao refletir sobre a ação racional. / The role of reason (logos) among the actions (praxis) still stands as a great question of philosophy. This work intends to explore it from G. W. Leibniz philosophical point of view. The starting line is the rational paradigm itself, god. Outlining an overview of the key elements involved in the divine choice of the best of worlds that serve to show how we can understand the human acts. Leibniz tends to develop his philosophy with the support of other thinkers, among them, Aristotle has a special place. Therefore we try to show partially how Leibniz takes advantage of Aristotelian theses when the modern philosopher reflects about human acts. To do this, regarding to Aristotle, a general framework about some of the main concepts of his theory of action is shown, such as the notions of voluntary, deliberation, deliberative choice, among others that allows sketching his notion of practical reason. Thereafter we develop the idea of human action from its basis according to Leibniz thought. From this perspective, to get to the knowledge of the act named as rational, we start with the action of the substances and shows up gradually as the reason becomes part of the faculties of a certain group of beings, which use it when they move. Through all these steps, we attempt to reach the details of Leibnizian thought when he comes to human movement and if he would be entitled to invoke the Aristotelian thought to reflect on rational action.

A concepção de matéria que emerge da dinâmica leibniziana é interessante pelo modo em que junta e contrapõe aristotelismo e mecanicismo. Embora Leibniz freqüentemente use um vocabulário aristotélico, às vezes parece reorientá-lo inteiramente para emoldurá-lo aos seus conceitos, enquanto outras o utiliza de maneira a sugerir não somente uma continuidade lexical, mas também conceitual. Leibniz retém do aristotelismo a noção que nos corpos há um princípio ativo e atual, do qual resultam sua substancialidade e potência de produzir efeitos, e, ademais, que há uma causa final atuante na natureza, como os aspectos potencial e teleológico da força viva indicam. E se é verdade que ele rejeita a noção cartesiana que a extensão é a essência dos corpos, entretanto, mantém que magnitude, figura e movimento são necessários para uma descrição dos fenômenos naturais. / The conception of matter that emerges from the leibnizian dynamics is interesting by the way in which joins and opposes Aristotelism and mechanicism. Although Leibniz often uses an Aristotelic vocabulary, sometimes he seems to reorient it totally for to frame it to its concepts, while others utilizes it of manner to suggest not only a lexical continuity, but also conceptual. Leibniz retains of the Aristotelism the notion that in the bodies there is an active and actual principle from which results their substantiality and potency to produce effects, and, besides, that there is a final cause acting in the nature, as the potential and teleological aspects of the live force indicate. Moreover, if it is true that he rejects the Cartesian notion that extension is the essence of the bodies, however, maintains that magnitude, figure and motion are necessary for a description of natural phenomena.

A concepção de matéria que emerge da dinâmica leibniziana é interessante pelo modo em que junta e contrapõe aristotelismo e mecanicismo. Embora Leibniz freqüentemente use um vocabulário aristotélico, às vezes parece reorientá-lo inteiramente para emoldurá-lo aos seus conceitos, enquanto outras o utiliza de maneira a sugerir não somente uma continuidade lexical, mas também conceitual. Leibniz retém do aristotelismo a noção que nos corpos há um princípio ativo e atual, do qual resultam sua substancialidade e potência de produzir efeitos, e, ademais, que há uma causa final atuante na natureza, como os aspectos potencial e teleológico da força viva indicam. E se é verdade que ele rejeita a noção cartesiana que a extensão é a essência dos corpos, entretanto, mantém que magnitude, figura e movimento são necessários para uma descrição dos fenômenos naturais. / The conception of matter that emerges from the leibnizian dynamics is interesting by the way in which joins and opposes Aristotelism and mechanicism. Although Leibniz often uses an Aristotelic vocabulary, sometimes he seems to reorient it totally for to frame it to its concepts, while others utilizes it of manner to suggest not only a lexical continuity, but also conceptual. Leibniz retains of the Aristotelism the notion that in the bodies there is an active and actual principle from which results their substantiality and potency to produce effects, and, besides, that there is a final cause acting in the nature, as the potential and teleological aspects of the live force indicate. Moreover, if it is true that he rejects the Cartesian notion that extension is the essence of the bodies, however, maintains that magnitude, figure and motion are necessary for a description of natural phenomena.

O papel da razão (logos) em meio às ações (praxis) ainda vigora como um grande problema filosófico. Procura-se aqui tratá-lo a partir da filosofia de G. W. Leibniz. O ponto de partida é o próprio paradigma racional, deus. Delineia-se um panorama sobre as principais ideias envolvidas na escolha divina do melhor dos mundos, as quais servem para mostrar como podem ser pensados os atos humanos. Leibniz costuma desenvolver sua filosofia com o apoio de outros pensadores; dentre eles, Aristóteles tem lugar especial. Assim, busca-se mostrar parcialmente como Leibniz tira proveito de teses aristotélicas quando o filósofo moderno reflete sobre as ações humanas. Para isso, com relação a Aristóteles, monta-se um quadro geral de alguns dos principais conceitos da sua teoria da ação, como as noções de voluntário, de deliberação, de escolha deliberada, dentre outros que permitam esboçar sua noção de razão prática. Em seguida, é desenvolvida a ideia de ação humana desde os seus fundamentos segundo o pensamento leibniziano. Nessa perspectiva, para se chegar ao conhecimento do ato denominado racional, parte-se da ação das substâncias e mostra-se gradualmente como a razão passa a fazer parte das faculdades de certo grupo de seres, os quais a usam quando se movem. Por meio de todos esses passos, finalmente tenta-se chegar às especificidades do pensamento leibniziano quando ele trata do movimento humano e se ele teria o direito de invocar o pensamento aristotélico ao refletir sobre a ação racional. / The role of reason (logos) among the actions (praxis) still stands as a great question of philosophy. This work intends to explore it from G. W. Leibniz philosophical point of view. The starting line is the rational paradigm itself, god. Outlining an overview of the key elements involved in the divine choice of the best of worlds that serve to show how we can understand the human acts. Leibniz tends to develop his philosophy with the support of other thinkers, among them, Aristotle has a special place. Therefore we try to show partially how Leibniz takes advantage of Aristotelian theses when the modern philosopher reflects about human acts. To do this, regarding to Aristotle, a general framework about some of the main concepts of his theory of action is shown, such as the notions of voluntary, deliberation, deliberative choice, among others that allows sketching his notion of practical reason. Thereafter we develop the idea of human action from its basis according to Leibniz thought. From this perspective, to get to the knowledge of the act named as rational, we start with the action of the substances and shows up gradually as the reason becomes part of the faculties of a certain group of beings, which use it when they move. Through all these steps, we attempt to reach the details of Leibnizian thought when he comes to human movement and if he would be entitled to invoke the Aristotelian thought to reflect on rational action.

O propósito deste trabalho é determinar a natureza, especificidade e necessidade da categoria da política no pensamento maduro de Aristóteles, tendo por eixo central o exame de três obras capitais: Ética Nicomaquéia, A Constituição de Atenas e Política. Estabelecer, portanto, os nexos e laços históricos que uniram e animaram o pensamento político do estagirita, relacionando-os à realidade ateniense do século do IV a.C que influenciou, sobremaneira, a démarche ideológica do filósofo em tela. Trata-se de apontar os elos que motivaram concretamente o autor a encontrar na política e na ética instrumentos a moderar, a impor limites ao modo de vida grego (à comunidade política) e à individualidade, respectivamente. O ideário político-ético aristotélico brotou dos desafios incontornáveis de uma pólis grega declinante, com suas adstringências ingênitas, de apoucadas forças produtivas. Assim, foi levado, historicamente, a responder ao grande desafio de seu tempo: recompor, a partir de certa exeqüibilidade, o equilíbrio citadino perdido por décadas de guerras internas e externas. De modo que, política e ética foram compreendidas como mecanismos reguladores a dirimir conflitos e tensões em momento singular da vida pública grega, a saber, em uma pólis prestes a perder sua autonomia política para Filipe e Alexandre. Em síntese, visava, portanto, intermediar relações, limitar e equilibrar a comunidade e o indivíduo que dela participava, pois, do contrário, a ausência de limites acabaria (como de fato ocorreu) impondo a dissolução da vida in communitas. / The purpose of this work is to determine the nature, specificity and necessity of the politics category in Aristotle\'s mature thought, having as central axis the examination of his major works: Nichomachean Ethics, Constitution of Athens and Politics. To find, therefore, the historical nexus and ties that animate and link the Stagirite\'s political ideology to the 4th-century BC Athenian reality, which strongly influenced the philosopher\'s ideological démarche. The point is to establish the links that concretely motivated the philosopher of Stagira to find in Politics and in Ethics the instruments to moderate and impose limits to the Greek way of life (the political community) and to individuality, respectively. Thus, the Aristotelian political-ethical ideology rises from the unescapable challenges of a declining Greek polis, with its innate restrictions of scarce productive forces. Such a reflection finds in the Athenian decline the motivation for its birth, that is, the Stagirite is historically driven to respond to the great challenge of his time: to recompose, within a certain degree of possibility, the city-state balance lost through decades of internal and external wars. In this way, Politics and Ethics are understood as regulative mechanisms to settle conflicts and tensions in a singular moment of Greek public life, that is, in a polis about to lose its political autonomy to Philip and Alexander. In synthesis, the aim of the Stagirite\'s political-ethical ideology is to intermediate relations, to limit and to equilibrate the community and its participant individual because, otherwise, the absence of limits would eventually impose (as it actually occurred) the dissolution of life in communitas.

O propósito deste trabalho é determinar a natureza, especificidade e necessidade da categoria da política no pensamento maduro de Aristóteles, tendo por eixo central o exame de três obras capitais: Ética Nicomaquéia, A Constituição de Atenas e Política. Estabelecer, portanto, os nexos e laços históricos que uniram e animaram o pensamento político do estagirita, relacionando-os à realidade ateniense do século do IV a.C que influenciou, sobremaneira, a démarche ideológica do filósofo em tela. Trata-se de apontar os elos que motivaram concretamente o autor a encontrar na política e na ética instrumentos a moderar, a impor limites ao modo de vida grego (à comunidade política) e à individualidade, respectivamente. O ideário político-ético aristotélico brotou dos desafios incontornáveis de uma pólis grega declinante, com suas adstringências ingênitas, de apoucadas forças produtivas. Assim, foi levado, historicamente, a responder ao grande desafio de seu tempo: recompor, a partir de certa exeqüibilidade, o equilíbrio citadino perdido por décadas de guerras internas e externas. De modo que, política e ética foram compreendidas como mecanismos reguladores a dirimir conflitos e tensões em momento singular da vida pública grega, a saber, em uma pólis prestes a perder sua autonomia política para Filipe e Alexandre. Em síntese, visava, portanto, intermediar relações, limitar e equilibrar a comunidade e o indivíduo que dela participava, pois, do contrário, a ausência de limites acabaria (como de fato ocorreu) impondo a dissolução da vida in communitas. / The purpose of this work is to determine the nature, specificity and necessity of the politics category in Aristotle\'s mature thought, having as central axis the examination of his major works: Nichomachean Ethics, Constitution of Athens and Politics. To find, therefore, the historical nexus and ties that animate and link the Stagirite\'s political ideology to the 4th-century BC Athenian reality, which strongly influenced the philosopher\'s ideological démarche. The point is to establish the links that concretely motivated the philosopher of Stagira to find in Politics and in Ethics the instruments to moderate and impose limits to the Greek way of life (the political community) and to individuality, respectively. Thus, the Aristotelian political-ethical ideology rises from the unescapable challenges of a declining Greek polis, with its innate restrictions of scarce productive forces. Such a reflection finds in the Athenian decline the motivation for its birth, that is, the Stagirite is historically driven to respond to the great challenge of his time: to recompose, within a certain degree of possibility, the city-state balance lost through decades of internal and external wars. In this way, Politics and Ethics are understood as regulative mechanisms to settle conflicts and tensions in a singular moment of Greek public life, that is, in a polis about to lose its political autonomy to Philip and Alexander. In synthesis, the aim of the Stagirite\'s political-ethical ideology is to intermediate relations, to limit and to equilibrate the community and its participant individual because, otherwise, the absence of limits would eventually impose (as it actually occurred) the dissolution of life in communitas.

Le vieux différend entre le philosophe et le poète, entre logos et mythos, peut être converti en accord à condition de changer de point de vue. Alors que Platon n’a voulu voir dans leurs différences qu’une source de discorde et de division, Aristote en a tiré une poétique et une rhétorique, les poètes de la Renaissance une philosophie poétique et Vico une anthropologie du langage et une archéologie de la pensée. Ce qui est pour les modernes une « pensée sauvage » a longtemps été considéré par les anciens comme une sagesse archaïque, qui s’exprimait par figures et « traduisait en langue des dieux » les voix de la nature.On se propose ici de réévaluer les notions de pensée poétique et de pensée mythique en adoptantle point de vue des poètes de la Renaissance et de l’âge baroque, qui identifièrent l’une et l’autre à la pensée ingénieuse productrice de métaphores, de figures et de fictions. Mais il faut remonter aux sources antiques pour pouvoir rendre compte de l’active polysémie des anciennes méthodes d’interprétation des mythes qui, loin de séparer les points de vue de la physique, de la morale et de la théologie, les associaient en une « science poétique » qui faisait la synthèse de tous les savoirs du monde, et qui est désormais une science fossile. / The old dispute between the Philosopher and the Poet, which leads to the dichotomy betweenLogos and Mythos, can be turned into a settlement as long as one changes one’s viewpoint. WhilePlato only considered their difference as a source of discord and division, Aristotle drew from it aPoetic and a Rhetoric, the Renaissance poets a Poetical Philosophy, and Vico a language’sAnthropology and an Archeology of the Thought. What is considered by the Moderns to be a « wildthinking » was seen by the Ancients as an archaic wisdom, expressed through figures and« translating the voices of nature into the language of gods ».The purpose here is to reassess the concepts of Poetic and Mythic thought by adopting theviewpoint of the poets of the Renaissance and the Baroque era. Those cleary identified these twospecific thinkings with the wit’s power to produce metaphors, figures and fictions. In order to achievethis research, it is important to revisit the antic sources, so as to enlight the effective polysemysupporting the ancient ways used to interpret myths. Far from categorising the stance of the physics,the morals and the theology, the Ancients used to gather them into a comprehensive « poeticscience » : it reunited the synthesis of all knowledge but has become a fossilised science

Cette thèse présente la pensée d’al-Fārābī, premier des grands philosophes arabes aristotéliciens, comme une philosophie systématique de la réalisation. En partant du nœud problématique de l’articulation du théorique et du pratique, il s’agit d’interroger l’unification totalisante qui caractérise l’œuvre du « Second Maître ». Notre hypothèse est que cette réalisation, aussi bien intensive, comme parachèvement, qu’extensive comme intégration, s’opère grâce à une redéfinition de deux concepts (néo-)aristotéliciens : la métaphysique et la perfection. Ces deux notions qu’al-Fārābī transforme, afin de proposer des résolutions à des tensions propres aux positions aristotéliciennes, conduisent à un système philosophique original. La notion de fiṭra, qui définit la figure fārābīenne de l’homme, s’appuie sur l’interprétation essentialiste de la perfection d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise et permet de construire une nature humaine comme disposition prise dans une logique de substantialisation. Avec ce nouveau concept, al-Fārābī inscrit au cœur de la substance un dynamisme, tout en rendant essentiel son parachèvement. De cette étape fondationnelle, il fait émerger une véritable science pratique autour la vertu délibérative et des règles qu’elle produit. Or cela n’est possible que sur le fond de transformations ontologiques majeures : apparaît alors la chose, l’ontologie formelle qu’elle permet et la distinction entre l’essence et l’existence qu’elle présuppose. L’action politique du philosophe qui, par sa substantialisation, offre à tous, sous forme religieuse, leur réalisation permet l’intégration architectonique de l’ensemble des existants manifestant par là ce que c’est qu’être principe. / This PhD thesis is a study of the thought of al-Fārābī, the first of the main Aristotelian Arabic philosophers, and presents it as a systematic philosophy of realisation. Starting with the problematic crux of the articulation between the theoretical and the practical, it questions the totalizing unification that characterizes the “Second Master’s” work. Our hypothesis is that this realisation, both in its intensive form as completion and its extensive form as integration, takes place through a redefinition of two (neo-)Aristotelian concepts: metaphysics and perfection. These two notions, that al-Fārābī transforms in order to offer answers to tensions proper to the Aristotelian positions, lead to an original philosophical system. The notion of fiṭra, which defines the Fārābīan human figure, is based on Alexander of Aphrodisias’ essentialist interpretation of perfection. It enables an elaboration of human nature as a disposition in the logic of substantialization. With this new concept, al-Fārābī inscribes a dynamic at the heart of the substance while rendering its completion essential. From this foundational step, he erects a genuine practical science built around the deliberative virtue and the rules it produces. This is only possible through major ontological transformations: thus the concept of thing appears, as well as the formal ontology it enables and the distinction between essence and existence which it presupposes. Through his substantialization, the philosopher offers everyone their realisation in the form of religion, so that his political action enables the architectonic integration of all existents, hence showing what it is to be a principle.

Notre thèse d’analyse des idées politiques retrace l’histoire intellectuelle de larevue de pensée critique étasunienne Telos de 1968 à 2001. A travers notre travail denarration critique, nous cherchons à comprendre, au sens wébérien, l’évolution idéologiquesignificative de la publication-organisation, qui est passée en moins de trente ans d’unpositionnement néo-marxiste affilié à la Nouvelle gauche américaine à un populisme prochede la Nouvelle droite européenne. Notre hypothèse de travail est que le rapport que Telosentretient avec la Théorie critique de l’Ecole de Francfort est déterminant pour comprendreson évolution et écrire son histoire. Nous défendons ici la thèse que Telos constitue unorgane dissident de « théorie critique nord-américaine » (Mooney, Calhoun) qui s’exprimesous la forme d’un « traditionalisme critique » qui tient lieu de synthèse entre différentesbranches de théorie critique contemporaine. En tant que synthèse, la théorie telosiennedépasse l'héritage de la vieille Théorie critique francfortoise, dans un double rapportd’intégration et de négation. In fine, Telos produit sa propre critique, une autre théoriecritique. / Our doctoral dissertation traces the intellectual history of the American criticalthought journal Telos from 1968 to 2001. Through our critical narrative, we intend tounderstand, in the weberian sense, the significant ideological evolution of the publicationorganization,which, in less than thirty years, moved from a neo-Marxist position affiliatedwith the American New Left to a populism related to the European New Right. Our workinghypothesis is that the link between Telos and the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School isdecisive to understand its evolution and write its history. Our thesis is that Telos is adissenting organ of “North-American Critical Theory” (Mooney, Calhoun) expressed as a“critical traditionalism” that acts as a synthesis between various trends of contemporarycritical theory. As a synthesis, the telosian theory overcomes the legacy of the old Criticaltheory in a dual relationship of integration and negation. Ultimately, Telos produces its owncriticism, another critical theory.