[pt] Essa dissertação investiga a presença de risco moral e de seleção adversa no mercado de crédito brasileiro de financiamento para investimento de micro, pequenas e médias empresas. Usando uma nova base de dados com mais de 15 mil operações de crédito indiretas do BNDES, nós exploramos uma especificadade das políticas de crédito do BNDES e mudanças periódicas nas condições de crédito ofertadas para identificação. Os resultados indicam que o risco moral é um fenômeno relevante que é parcialmente atenuado por seleção vantajosa nos empréstimos com taxas subsidiadas / [en] This paper investigates the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in the credit market of investment loans granted to micro, small and medium enterprises in Brazil. Using a novel database of over 15 thousand indirect credit operations from BNDES, we explore BNDES distinct credit granting policy and the horizontal changes over time in the offered credit conditions conditions for identification. The results indicate that moral hazard is a relevant phenomenon and that its effect is partially attenuated by advantageous selection in loans with subsidized interest rates.

[pt] Este artigo investiga a natureza das assimetrias de informação no mercado brasileiro de empréstimos consignados de 2013 a 2021. Desenvolvemos um modelo de demanda que leva em consideração o efeito da informação privada dos consumidores nas decisões de empréstimo. A novidade do modelo é sua capacidade de extrair informações sobre características não observáveis usando dados públicos a nível dos bancos. Empiricamente, utilizamos a variação das participações de mercado e das taxas de inadimplência dos bancos para estimar um parâmetro de utilidade que representa o sinal de seleção no mercado. Nossa análise revela evidências empíricas de seleção vantajosa dentro do mercado, indicando que os tomadores de empréstimos mais seguros estão mais inclinados a solicitar empréstimos. Além disso, expandimos o modelo para incorporar um parâmetro distinto para a Caixa Econômica, um banco estatal que exibiu comportamento diferente em comparação com outras instituições financeiras durante o mesmo período. Nossa análise revela um parâmetro de seleção significativamente menor em magnitude para a Caixa. / [en] This paper investigates the nature of information asymmetries in the Brazilian payroll loan market from 2013 to 2021. We develop a demand model that accounts for the effect of consumers private information on borrowing decisions. The novelty of the model is its ability to extract information on unobservable characteristics using publicly available firm-level data. Empirically, we use the variation of market shares and default rates within banks to estimate a utility parameter that represents the sign of selection in the market. Our analysis reveals empirical evidence of advantageous selection within the market, indicating that safer borrowers are more inclined to apply for loans. Additionally, we expand the model to incorporate a distinct parameter for Caixa Econômica, a state-owned bank that exhibited different behavior compared to other financial institutions during the same period. Our analysis reveals a significantly lower selection parameter in magnitude for Caixa.

Trust is essential for individuals. We want others to keep their promises and meet our expectations (Dan der Cruijsen et al., 2020, p.680-681). This also applies to banks. For many individuals, trusting their bank is essential to ensure financial security. The interest rate increases between 2022 and 2023, and the increased bank profits, as a result, caught the attention of many individuals. Could two events like these possibly disrupt individuals' trust toward banks? As a result of the high inflation in Sweden in recent years, interest rates increased significantly between 2022 and 2023 which shocked many individuals. Furthermore, banks' profits increased because of the increased interest rates. While banks are profit-making companies, they need to be cautious not to lose the trust of their customers.  This study is based on theories fundamental to answering the study's research questions and purpose. The purpose is to provide an understanding of the factors that affect individuals trust toward their main bank. In addition, the study analyzes factors that may influence the disruption of trust toward banks. The focus will be on whether the interest rate increases and banks' increased profits between 2022 and 2023 have disrupted individuals' trust. The theories used to respond to the purpose are the anchoring effect, point of reference, financial literacy, asymmetric information, and overconfidence.  A quantitative method was adapted for this study to collect data through a questionnaire. By building the questionnaire on appropriate theories, we could examine how our results were consistent with previous research. Later, a linear regression analysis was conducted in Stata based on our collected data. Correlation, multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity were tested to obtain proper values.  The results from this study show several factors that affect individuals' trust toward banks. Also, it indicates that the sudden interest rate increases and the increased bank profits between 2022 and 2023 disrupt individuals' trust toward banks. Some factors that affect the level of trust are whether the individual has experience of incorrect financial advice, lives in a small city, and feels that they do not receive enough information from the bank. These factors can be linked to previous research on asymmetric information. Other factors that affect trust are how easily individuals generally trust other people and whether individuals visit a bank office for banking affairs. These factors can be linked to previous research on point of reference. Furthermore, individuals having an elementary school degree as the highest education level and unemployed individuals are factors affecting trust that can be linked to financial literacy. These mentioned factors are only a few, the remaining ones are to be found in the result.  This study provides a better insight into trust and trust disruption because of the two events, increased interest rates, and increased bank profits. The results are beneficial both for individuals and banks.

Economic principal-agent theory deals with asymmetric information. It has two aspects. (i) If one person is better informed than another one, the former may outwit the latter. Kauṭilya, the Arthaśāstra’s author, and other artha or dharma authors had a very good understanding of outwitting. (ii) Economic theory teaches that the person in command of superior knowledge may not always be able to benefit from this knowledge. He may need the uninformed side to agree to some mutually beneficial venture. The very fact of asymmetric information may then harmalso the informed side. Judging from the literature surveyed by the author, the artha and dharma literature had no explicit (openly expressed) understanding of this second aspect. In the author’s mind, this discussion is related to the “Varuṇa rule”. This rule (specified in the Manusmṛti) stipulates that the king is to throw confiscated property into water. We explain this apparent waste of resources as an implicit solution to the second aspect of principal-agent theory mentioned above.

Strategies to increase sustainability are of growing relevance for supply chains and especially for the management of production processes. In this paper, we build on existing literature in closed-loop supply chain management and consider a two-period game-theoretic model in which product returns are reused in the manufacturing process. In all scenarios, we assume that the return rate of used products is random and not known to the players at the beginning of the planning horizon, thus, they have to deal with uncertainty in period 1. In contrast to existing literature, we will also address the circumstance that the players’ level of information in period 2, after the returns have been realized, can be linked to the collection mode in the supply chain. In Scenario A, the retailer is involved in the collection of the used products and transfers them to the manufacturer, so that symmetric information is available. In Scenario B, on the other hand, the used products reach the manufacturer directly from the customer, so that the manufacturer has an information advantage over the retailer. By comparing these scenarios and a vertically integrated supply chain benchmark case, it becomes clear that, depending on the actual return rate, the presence of private information can be either beneficial or detrimental to the manufacturer. The retailer, on the other hand, can compensate for information disadvantages in most cases over the multi-period planning period due to its position as a Stackelberg leader. Regardless of the amount of a transfer payment offered to it by the manufacturer, it prefers the collection of the goods by the manufacturer itself. These findings contribute to literature on symmetric information, where, for example, a retailer-led collection is preferred (Savaskan et al. Manage Sci 50(2):239–252, 2004) or the decision depends on the amount of the transfer payment (Modak et al. J Clean Prod 171:512–528, 2018). However, we show that cooperation between the players leads to the best results not only economically but also from an ecological point of view.

Diese Dissertation diskutiert zwei Modellvarianten der Spieltheorie und Industrieökonomik: asymmetrische Information und vertikale Beziehungen. In einem Reputations-Spiel, in welchem Kurzfristspieler hintereinander entscheiden, ob sie mit einem Langfristspieler interagieren wollen, stoppt die Interaktion oft für immer, sobald einer der Spieler sich entscheidet nicht zu interagieren. Ist der Aktionsraum des Langfristspielers ausreichend groß, kann es passieren, dass obwohl die Einschätzungen über die Reputation des Langfristspielers identisch sind, das Verhalten sich verändert, da der vorhergehende Stopp der Interaktion den Langfristspieler dazu bringt, sich mehr anzustrengen. In einer vertikalen Struktur, in welcher Intermediäre ein Input-Gut von einer exogenen Anzahl an Zulieferern beziehen müssen, können diese Intermediäre die Menge eines homogenen Produkts, welches an Konsumenten verkauft werden soll, wählen. Falls einer der Intermediäre in Form einer Genossenschaft organisiert ist, steigt der durchschnittliche Gewinn der Zulieferer, was zu einem ineffizient geringen Angebot an die Konsumenten führt. Eine Kooperative kann sich als Monopol behaupten, sofern die Kapazität der Zulieferer ausreichend gering ist, während eine Duopolstruktur vorliegt, wenn diese Kapazität hoch ist. In einer Wertschöpfungskette mit einem Zulieferer, einem Händler und Unsicherheit über die Nachfrage am Markt sind die Entscheidungen über kostenlose Informationsbeschaffung, um diese Unsicherheit aufzulösen, strategische Komplemente. Wenn die technische Beschränkung der Signalpräzision so ist, dass die Informationsbeschaffung nicht genug Unsicherheit beseitigt, ist die Informationsrente klein und der Zulieferer kann sich entscheiden uninformiert zu bleiben, um ein Glaubwürdigkeitsproblem zu umgehen und Verträge anzubieten die keine private Information signalisieren. Steigt die Signalpräzision, entscheiden sich beide Marktteilnehmer so gut wie möglich informiert zu sein. / This dissertation discusses two modelling variants in game theory and industrial economics: asymmetric information and vertical relations. In a reputation game, in which a sequence of short-run players chooses if to interact with a long-run player, often interactions stops forever, if one short-run player decides not to interact. If the long-run player''s action set is sufficiently rich, although beliefs about the long-run player''s reputation may be identical, choices may be different, as the preceding refusal to interact can lead the long-run player to improve on effort. In a vertical structure, in which intermediaries have to acquire an input from an exogenously given number of suppliers, intermediaries can choose the quantities of a homogenous product to be sold to consumers. In case one of the intermediaries is organized as a cooperative the average profit of suppliers, increases, leading to inefficiently low supply to consumers. Furthermore, a cooperative may be a monopoly in the downstream market, if the upstream production capacity is sufficiently small, whereas there is a duopoly with one firm maximizing its profit and one firm maximizing average profit, if upstream capacity is large. In a supply chain with one supplier, one retailer and uncertainty about market demand, the choices on costless information acquisition to resolve this uncertainty are strategic complements. If the technical limitation on the precision of the signals is such that being informed does not reduce enough uncertainty, the potential information rent is small and the supplier may choose to stay uninformed and avoid a credibility problem by offering pooling contracts. If the precision of private signals increases, both agents decide to be informed as much as possible.

Titel: Finansiella målsättningar inom årsredovisningar – En kvantitativ studie av svenska börsbolag Nivå: C-uppsats i ämnet företagsekonomi Författare: Andreas Hamrén och Nils Ryngmark Handledare: Arne Fagerström Datum: 2016 – januari Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att beskriva och jämföra skillnader angående finansiella målsättningar i årsredovisningar samt hur förutbestämda faktorer påverkar dessa skillnader.   Metod: Studien har en kvantitativ metod som utgår från en deduktiv ansats. Insamlingen av data har skett från årsredovisningar, som sedan ställts mot tidigare forskning och teorier. Dokumenten har granskats med en innehållsanalys för att sedan undersökas genom korrelationsanalyser som presenteras tillsammans med resultatet. De oberoende variablerna som studien utgått ifrån är bransch, storlek, antal styrelseledamöter, lönsamhet och skuldsättningsgrad. Resultat och slutsats: Studiens resultat tydliggör flertalet skillnader och likheter gällande finansiella målsättningar. De slutsatser som dras utifrån de statistiska testerna är att storlek och skuldsättningsgrad hade signifikanta samband med antalet finansiella målsättningar. Styrelseledamöter visade ett svagare samband, medan lönsamhet inte hade någon korrelation. Den deskriptiva variabeln bransch åskådliggjorde stora skillnader mellan segmenten och gav en bild av tillhörighetens betydelse för differensen. Uppsatsen bidrag: Det praktiska bidraget ger en bild över förekomsten av finansiella målsättningar på Stockholmsbörsen samt vilka typer av mål som är vanligast förekommande. Bidraget kan ge ett förslag till nynoterade bolag i uppbyggnadsfasen angående i vilken utsträckning marknaden presenterar målsättningar. Det teoretiska bidraget kan stärka intressent- och signaleringsteorins betydelse gällande frekvensen av målsättningar. Förslag till fortsatt forskning: Förslag till vidare forskning är att komplimentera studien med intervjuer, detta för att få en uppfattning av de bakomliggande faktorerna till utformandet av målsättningarna. Ett ytterligare förslag är att inkludera exempelvis den danska börsen som är liknande den svenska för att finna avvikelser mellan företagskulturerna. Nyckelord: Finansiella målsättningar, frivillig information, framåtblickande information, årsredovisningar, asymmetrisk information, intressentteorin, signaleringsteorin / Title: Financial targets in annual reports – a quantitative study of swedish listed companies Level: Final assignment for Bachelor Degree in Business Administration Author: Andreas Hamrén and Nils Ryngmark Supervisor: Arne Fagerström Date: 2016 - January Aim: The purpose of this study is to describe and compare differences regarding the financial objectives in the annual reports and how predetermined factors influence the differences. Method: This study has a quantitative method based on a deductive approach. Data have been collected from annual reports, which are then set against previous research and theories. The documents were reviewed by a content analysis then examined by correlation analysis and presented along with the results. The independent variables of the study were industry, company size, number of board members, profitability and debt ratio. Result and conclusion: The result of the study make clear majority of the differences and similarities regarding financial objectives. The conclusions drawn on the basis of the statistical tests are that the size and debt ratio have a significant correlation with the number of financial objectives. Board members showed a weaker correlation, while profitability had no correlation at all. The descriptive variable industry illustrated the large differences between the segments and gave a picture of the importance of industry affiliation. Contribution of the thesis: The practical contribution illustrates the occurrence of financial targets on the Stockholm Stock Exchange and the types of goals that are most common. The contribution may give proposals to new listed companies in the construction phase regarding the extent to which the market presents the objectives. The theoretical contribution can give strength to the importance of stakeholder and signaling theory regarding the frequency of objectives. Suggestions for future research: Suggestions for further research is to implement studies with interviews, in order to gain an understanding of the underlying incentives of the financial objectives. A further proposal is to include, for example, the Danish stock exchange that is similar to the Swedish in order to find similarities and differences between corporate cultures. Key words: Financial objectives, goals, voluntary information, forward-looking information, annual reports, asymmetric information, stakeholder theory, signaling theory

Dominant market theories analyze markets as ahistorical entities without the need for professional groups that manage crucial functions within them. This thesis, in contrast, approaches markets as historical systems that develop over time and that can be constituted in many different ways because of different historical trajectories. Different professional groups managing market routines, further, are seen as a crucial part of markets. Two concepts are introduced: “market architecture”, the specific way a market is constituted at a given time; and “market technocrats”, the seemingly disinterested third party functionaries that manage routines in markets and advocate changes in market architecture. The thesis argues that market technocrats exist because of uncertainty and lack of trust between market actors, and that they are an important part of how market architectures develop over time. It presents an analytical framework for understanding market technocrats and how they interact with and develop markets. Four different aspects of market technocrats are explored: the process of establishing market technocrats in market routines; the capture of the authority of market technocrats by other market actors; the expansionistic behavior of market technocrats; and the way changes in economic theory, as an important part of how economists with technocratic authority advocate market change, can help to explain changes in markets. These aspects are explored through four empirical papers: The Market Technocracy of Import Substitution: The Role of Asymmetric Information and The Swedish Seed Association 1880–1935; Limits of Market Technocracy: Swedish Fertilizer Research and the Crisis of Objectivity 1945–1960; Central Banks, and the Pursuit of Influence, Prestige, and Legitimacy: The Creation of the Nobel Memorial Prize; and From Market Engineering to Institutional Engineering: Reform Economics in Sweden 1950–2000. The results of the papers form the basis of a hypothetical narrative of how the role of market technocrats has changed during the 20th century. This provides a roadmap for further research in the development of markets and the role of market technocrats.

Inledning: Modigliani och Miller-teoremet betraktas som en milstolpe och ett paradigmskifte inom Corporate Finance. Forskningen bakom teoremet har gett upphov till den kontroversiella slutsatsen att ett företags kapitalstruktur är irrelevant på en jämviktsmarknad, utan beskattning. När beskattning däremot förekommer, ökar företagsvärdet motsvarande den avdragsgilla skatten på räntekostnader vid belåning. Teoremet har dock inte varit utan kritik. Flera forskare har undersökt teoremet och kritiserat teoremets antaganden. Syfte: Syftet med studien är att undersöka Modigliani och Miller-teoremet i avseende av kapitalstrukturens inverkan på företags aktiekurser. Tidigare forskning: Modigliani och Miller-teoremet med dess antaganden presenteras inledningsvis som studiens grundläggande teori. Därefter presenteras agentteorin, signaleringsteorin, trade-off-teori och effektiva marknadshypotesen tillsammans med tidigare forskningsstudier om teoremet och antagandena. Metod: Studien tillämpar en kvantitativ metod, med tre regressionsmodeller. Det slumpmässiga urvalet består av tio företag inom industribranschen som är registrerade på Stockholmsbörsen. Urvalet består av paneldata från företagen under perioden 2005 till 2012. Studiens empiri består av historiska aktiekurser och årsredovisningar. Resultat: Skuldsättningsgraden visar en låg och icke signifikant korrelation med aktiekurserna för de undersökta företagen, i samtliga tre regressionsmodeller. Skatteskölden visar en högre och signifikant korrelation med aktiekursen, medan kontrollvariabeln vinst per aktie EPS visar den högsta korrelationen med aktiekursen, som responsvariabel. Slutsats: Studiens resultat visar inget empiriskt stöd för Modigliani och Miller-teoremet i dess helhet. Förklaringen till resultaten kan vara att antagandena inte tillfredsställs inom empirin. Agentteori, signaleringsteori, trade-off-teori och effektiva marknadshypotesen kan stå som förklaringar till studiens resultat. / Introduction: Modigliani and Miller theorem is regarded as a milestone and a paradigm shift in Corporate Finance. The research behind the theorem has given rise to the controversial conclusion that a company's capital structure is irrelevant in an equilibrium market, without taxation. In contrast, when taxation occurs firm value will increase equivalent to the deductible tax on interest expense when debt is issued. The theorem has not been without criticism. Several researchers have examined the theorem and criticised its assumptions. Purpose: The purpose of the study is to investigate the Modigliani and Miller theorem in respect of capital structure’s impact on companies' share prices. Literature Review: The Modigliani and Miller theorem with its assumptions is initially presented as the study’s main theorem. The presentation of the theorem is followed by a description of agency theory, signalling theory, trade-off theory and the efficient market hypothesis, along with previous studies on the theorem and its assumptions. Research Methodology: The study applies a quantitative approach, with three regression models. The random sample consists of ten companies in the industrial sector, that are listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The sample is based on panel data of the companies during the period 2005 to 2012. The study's empirical data consists of historical stock prices and annual reports. Empirical Results: The leverage ratio, i.e. debt to equity ratio, indicates a low and non-signif-icant correlation with the stock prices of the examined companies, in all three regression models. The tax shield indicates a higher and significant correlation with the stock price, while the control variable earnings per share EPS indicates the highest correlation with the stock prices, as the response variable. Conclusions: The study’s results show no empirical support for the Modigliani-Miller theorem in its entirety. The explanation for the findings may be that the assumptions are not satisfied in the empirical data. Agency theory, signalling theory, trade-off theory and the efficient market hypothesis may serve as explanations of the study’s results.

i Abstract This Master Thesis is focused on under-pricing of initial public offering. We examine the possibility of signaling by IPO under-pricing on Polish data over the period 2005 - 2010. Signaling by IPO under-pricing is analyzed using signaling model. Taking into consideration the uniqueness of Polish sample, we also analyze the signaling by IPO under- pricing used to the build up the government reputation as market-oriented. Our results suggest the statistical significant positive effect of IPO under-pricing on probability of seasoned equity issue as well as on size of seasoned issue. These findings together with negative relation between IPO under-pricing and lag between IPO and seasoned issue are consistent with predictions of signaling model. We do not find any statistical significant evidence that the Polish government tries to build up reputation for its privatization policy over time by under-pricing and selling a high fraction at the initial offer. Keywords IPO under-pricing, signaling hypothesis, Central Europe, asymmetric information, seasoned equity offering, privatization