Abstract Since being developed in 1956, no matter it¡¦s category, function or quantity, Chinese ballistic missiles have kept renewing and increasing. For example, the development of its strategic missiles has undergone the 1st through the 3rd generation with models from Dongfeng-1 to currently developing Dongfeng-41 Ballistic Missile, and its warhead has been gradually developed from carrier of single nuclear head to combination of both traditional and nuclear warheads and to multiple warheads now. Under such multiple developments, Chinese nuclear strategy according to their official speech has still adopted ¡§minimum deterrence¡¨ claimed by the 1960¡¦s and 1970¡¦s until now, and which has already led to external speculations. They think that Chinese has devoted to modernization of ballistic missiles lately, actively developed more land-based strategic missiles and sea-based nuclear submarines, techniques of multiple warheads and space-based weapons, and reinforced the practicality of tactical nuclear missiles etc. that such development has already exceeded the ¡§minimum deterrence¡¨ strategy, which even develops towards the ¡§limited deterrence¡¨ strategy. Therefore, whether China¡¦s deterrence strategy is changing is one of the assumptions in this study. If China¡¦s deterrence strategy is no longer equipped with the minimum deterrence, then whether the most important features of the minimum deterrence by ¡§no use of nuclear weapons at first¡¨ and China¡¦s¡§three nos principle on nuclear weapons¡¨will be changed accordingly is the second assumption in this study. Chinese ballistic missiles apart from being used as deterrence can also be used to practice coercive and annihilative strategies. Especially in the issue of Taiwan, when Chinese deterrence strategy fails in terms of Taiwan, it may use coercive or annihilative strategies to achieve their political and military objectives. As the ability of Taiwan¡¦s anti-ballistic missile is obviously insufficient; so if Taiwan suffers the attack from Chinese missiles, the result will be unimaginable. Therefore, how to prevent the attack from its missiles is what I would like to discuss in this paper. For the probable battle by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in the future, in order to quickly facilitate the victory, whether Chinese will use micro-kiloton nuclear warhead to destroy the important and stable military targets in Taiwan to help smooth the warfare and further crash the myth that Chinese will not use nuclear weapons against Taiwan is the 3rd assumption in this paper. Finally how to increase our defense against ballistic missiles and whether we should participate in the TMD (Theatre Missile Defense) provided by America, I will provide several suggestions for references of the related units, hoping to make certain contributions towards Taiwanese prevention against the threat from Chinese ballistic missile.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): David S. Yost, James J. Wirtz. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Title from cover. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 50-53). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Title from title screen (viewed June 24, 2005). "September 2004." Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-74). Also issued in paper format.

Thesis (M.S. in Systems Engineering)--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Phillip E. Pace, Murali Tummala. Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-74). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Jerry L. McCaffery, Rodney E. Tudor. "AD-A403 151." Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-91). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Civil-Military Relations))--Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. / Title from title screen (viewed July 18, 2006). "September 2005." Includes bibliographical references (p. 133-140). Also issued in paper format.

International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 30-November 02, 1995 / Riviera Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada / The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is developing new Theater Missile Defense (TMD) weapon systems to defend against the rapidly expanding ballistic missile threat. The tactical ballistic missile threats include systems with range capabilities greater than 1000 kilometers. The development and testing of systems such as the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3), the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Navy Area Defense, and the System Integration Tests (SIT) to address the interoperability of this family of systems, will require the development of the Transportable Range Augmentation and Control System for Multiple Shot Engagements (TRACS - MSE). Congress has mandated that these systems be tested in multiple simultaneous engagements. These systems will be tested at several ranges to meet all the developmental and operational testers' needs. Potential range locations include White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), Kwajalein Missile Range (KMR), the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) and the Gulf Range at Eglin Air Force Base. Due to the long distances separating the target launch site and the interceptor site, the TRACS - MSE will be required at multiple sites for each range used. To be cost effective, transportable systems should be developed to augment existing capabilities. Advances in Global Positioning System (GPS) technology and high data rate receivers make telemetry based solutions attractive. This article will address the requirements for range safety, for Time, Space, Position Information (TSPI) collection and processing requirements to support a TRACS - MSE capability.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Many potential adversaries seek, or already have theater ballistic missiles capable of threatening targets of interest to the United States. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency and armed forces are developing and fielding missile interceptors carried by many different platforms, including ships, aircraft, and ground units. Given some exigent threat, the U.S. must decide where to position defensive platforms and how they should engage potential belligerent missile attacks. To plan such defenses, the Navy uses its Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) system afloat and ashore, the Air Force has its Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS) used in air operations centers, and the Missile Defense Agency uses the Commander's Analysis and Planning Simulation (CAPS). AADC uses a server farm to exhaustively enumerate potential enemy launch points, missiles, threatened targets, and interceptor platform positions. TBMCS automates a heuristic cookie-cutter overlay of potential launch fans by defensive interceptor envelopes. Given a complete missile attack plan and a responding defense, CAPS assesses the engagement geometry and resulting coverage against manually prepared attack scenarios and defense designs. We express the enemy courses of action as a mathematical optimization to maximize expected damage, and then show how to optimize our defensive interceptor pre-positioning to minimize the maximum achievable expected damage. We can evaluate exchanges where each of our defending platform locations and interceptor commitments are hidden from, or known in advance by the attacker. Using a laptop computer we can produce a provably optimal defensive plan in minutes. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 28-31, 1996 / Town and Country Hotel and Convention Center, San Diego, California / The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is developing new Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD) weapon systems to defend against the expanding ballistic missile threat. In the arms control arena, theater ballistic missile threats have been defined to include systems with reentry velocities up to five kilometers per second and strategic ballistic missile threats have reentry velocities that exceed five kilometers per second. The development and testing of TMD systems such as the Army Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) Lower Tier, and NMD systems such as the Army Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle and the Army Ground-Based Radar, pose exceptional challenges that stem from extreme acquisition range and high telemetry data transfer rates. Potential Central Pacific range locations include U.S. Army Kwajalien Atoll/Kwajalein Missile Range (USAKA/KMR) and the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) with target launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Wake Island, Aur Atoll, Johnston Island, and, possibly, an airborne platform. Safety considerations for remote target launches dictate utilization of high-data-rate, on-board instrumentation; technical performance measurement dictates transmission of focal plane array data; and operational requirements dictate intercepts at exoatmospheric altitudes and long slant ranges. The high gain, high data rate, telemetry acquisition requirements, coupled with loss of the upper S-band spectrum, may require innovative approaches to minimize electronic noise, maximize telemetry system gain, and fully utilize the limited S-band telemetry spectrum. The paper will address the emerging requirements and will explore the telemetry design trade space.