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International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 30-November 02, 1995 / Riviera Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada / This paper suggests possible applications of telemetry as a cooperative measure in potential, future arms control agreements related to missiles and space launch vehicles (i.e., an agreement leading to clarification of the ABM Treaty for theater missile defense, and a notional regional or global ban on ground-launched, theater-range missiles). The opportunities for telemetry as a cooperative measure in future international arms control agreements should certainly grow, as confidence and appreciation in its utility are realized from the on-going ballistic missile telemetry exchanges between the US and Russia in START implementation.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Boost phase interception of ballistic missiles is envisioned as the primary response of the layered defense architecture implemented in the ballistic missile defense system. A limited time frame in which to take action and the necessity to implement hit-to-kill technology in the kill vehicle counterbalances the many advantages of boost phase interception. Direct hit missile technology is constrained by the requirement to minimize miss distance to a negligible amount between the kill vehicle and optimum aimpoint on the target. This thesis examines kill vehicle effectiveness, which is tantamount to miss distance, as a function of both the kill vehicle maximum acceleration capability and the guidance system time constant necessary to destroy a target. The kill vehicle guidance system is modeled in MATLAB as a fifth-order binomial series with proportional navigation. The simulation examines the effect of an accelerating target attributed to powered flight and aimpoint displacement caused by a shift in tracking point from the target plume to the payload when resolution occurs. The kill vehicle minimum requirements as indi-cated by the simulation include a lateral acceleration capability of four times the target acceleration and a guidance system time constant that is less than one-tenth the estimated flight time. / Lieutenant, Canadian Navy

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / The United States is embarking on a course of designing and fielding a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to protect the US and her citizenry against ballistic missile attacks. The BMDS will need a Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) organization/system to support military and national decision makers in times of crisis. The C2BMC must also be able to react quickly once a missile event has occurred. This thesis will cover the doctrinal issues with merging Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and the National Missile Warning System into one system, how the Unified Command Plan affects missile defense efforts, the lessons learned from Desert Storm, and presents alternative chains of command that might allow the BMDS to engage threat missiles in a timely and efficient manner. Preliminary findings indicate that a 'flattened' chain of command for missile defense forces seems to be a positive starting point for the initial deployment of the BMDS. / Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

South Korea should join the US BMD in Northeast Asia. Application of Offensive Realism clearly shows that China is a potential threat to South Korea, and Seoul requires an alliance partner in order to counter the threat from the west. The immense latent power and offensive military capabilities of China, coupled with its nuclear strategic weapons render China as a potential threat to South Korean national security. No independent action from South Korea would be sufficient to balance against China, hence the need for an ally. The United States is already engaged in relative power maximization against China. In addition, its role as an offshore balancer and status as a regional hegemon in the western hemisphere makes the US the most ideal alliance partner for South Korea. The alliance with the US to balance against China cannot be built upon the existing ROK-US alliance, because the current status of the alliance has deteriorated. One of the key causes of alliance deterioration could be attributed to the unilateral American security assistance to South Korea. Seoul’s participation in the US BMD would solve the non-reciprocating role of South Korea found in the existing ROK-US alliance. Because the benefits from South Korea’s participation in the US BMD are great for Washington, Seoul would be able to secure the US as an alliance partner to balance against China. Keywords: US, South Korea, China, Ballistic Missile Defense, ROK-US Alliance, Offensive Realism.

The research explain because of the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, the United States suffers the threat of mass destruction weapons. For maintaining the hegemony position of the United States in global region, the United States announces the missile defense project to protect American mainland and the overseas garrison forces security. In the Asia-Pacific region, North Korea lunches the Taep¡¦o-dong 1 ballistic missile in 1998. The United States and Japan cooperate to develop Theater Missile Defense to respond the threat that may suffer from North Korea. China feels anxiety about United States and Japan strength their military relationship. China explains Theater Missile Defense is unstable for Asia-Pacific region. Theater Missile Defense will decrease China strategic nuclear weapon ability. Facing the Taiwan may join the Theater Missile Defense, China is strong objection. Taiwan is one part of China. China puts forward reactions. Militarily, China also understands to develop anti-system weapon is rather important. As increase the ballistic missile, enhance the nuclear weapon and develop the missile defense ability. In addition to enhancing self military force, through the performance of diplomacy and participate in multilateral organizations to reach consociations front of the objection the United States. Keywords: Weapons of Mass Destruction Taep¡¦o-dong 1 ballistic missile Minimum Deterence Theater Missile Defense

<p>Abstract</p><p>The focus of this paper is to discuss ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and their impact on international relations. I have a profound interest in the correlation between technological innovation/improvement and changes in international politics. I have therefore chosen the impact of BMD on global politics as the subject of discussion in my paper.</p><p>I begin the discussion by describing the technological segment of Ballistic Missile Defense systems, after which I indulge in the political aspect of it. There are three primary actors in the field: the United States of America, China, Russia. These three are the main focus of the debate, though not the only ones. During the Cold War it was the USA and Russia which pursued BMDS with most vigor, with China keeping a close eye on their progress as well as initiating its own BMD program. The emergence of the “New World Order” in the aftermath of the Cold War resulted in restructuring and re-organizing of the countries` strategic thinking, interests as well as defenses. The strongly criticized 2002 US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 became the latest milestone in the sphere of strategic defenses. US withdrawal from the Treaty paves way for a new kind of arms race between the three major powers of today: USA, China, Russia.</p><p>My conclusion is that US policy regarding strategic defenses is completely unacceptable. The US quest for “invulnerability”, by many experts seen as futile, is extremely dangerous and just another proof that USA continues to relentlessly pursue complete global military, political and economic domination. The international community, with China and Russia leading, must not ignore US strategic defense ambitions and it must act today. Tomorrow might be too late.</p>

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1992-93. / Title from title screen (viewed Oct. 28, 2003). "28 June 1993." Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): H. Lyman Miller, Gaye Christoffersen. Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-96). Also available online.

The intent of this study is to assess the role of fundamental Japanese security policy objectives in driving the significant shifts in Japan???s approach towards missile defence cooperation with the United States from 1993 to 2003. In studying the relative influence of the objectives that guided Japan???s approach towards missile defence cooperation, this thesis seeks to address a gap in the literature. A debate has occurred over the direction of Japanese security policy that is based on widely different assumptions on the importance attached to various fundamental security objectives. At the same time, Japan???s approach to missile defence has been the subject of considerable analysis that identified the crucial importance of the issue for the attainment of these fundamental security policy objectives. But no linkage has been established between these two levels of analysis. In particular, there has been an absence of assessments of what Japan???s decisions on missile defence cooperation indicate about the relative influence of the various objectives. This thesis developed an analytical framework to enable such an assessment by examining the structure of missile defence cooperation undertaken. Japan possessed a range of options in the level and type of involvement in missile defence cooperation. That involvement would determine the eventual type of benefits and costs incurred against the affected objectives. Cooperation agreed to (or rejected) over the ten year period thereby provides a means to determine the influence of key objectives on Japan???s approach, and in particular those objectives that restrained involvement. The thesis finds that a clear hierarchy existed in the influence of the various objectives on Japan???s approach with changes in their influence explaining the evolution of Japan???s commitment. The desire to strengthen the alliance, weakening domestic political constraints, and disregard of China???s opposition provide the key explanations. These findings not only point towards the respective strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches employed to explain Japanese security policy, but they also suggest the value of greater attention to the state???s ability to overcome domestic constraints in determining policy in order to fully understand the broader transformation of Japanese security policy.