Submitted by Fernando Salazar (fernando.salazar@votorantimcorretora.com.br) on 2013-08-22T19:23:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_FernandoSalazar_final.pdf: 716420 bytes, checksum: 1581ff723525f8a036c7a630a8650453 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2013-08-23T12:25:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_FernandoSalazar_final.pdf: 716420 bytes, checksum: 1581ff723525f8a036c7a630a8650453 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-23T12:36:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_FernandoSalazar_final.pdf: 716420 bytes, checksum: 1581ff723525f8a036c7a630a8650453 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-05 / This paper aims to investigate the competition aspects of banking multiproduct operation. Based on an extension of Panzar and Rosse (1987)’s test to the case of a multiproduct banking firm, we take advantage of a new dataset constructed to Brazilian banking conglomerates to infer the impact of conglomeration on market power. We find that banks offering classic (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other bank products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than the ones which offer only classic products. Results suggest a positive bias on the traditional estimates of competition in which the multioutput actions are not taken into account.

Previous studies seem to agree that increased competition would cause riskier banking behavior. This dissertation shows that when competition intensifies, banks have greater incentives for screening loan applicants, and thus loan quality may improve. In addition, competition fosters banks to rely less on collateral requirements. Hence, banks may be less vulnerable to asset price shocks. The empirical chapter finds evidence of loan quality improvement after removing cross-border entry restrictions in the EU. There is also evidence that banks' behavior across EU countries has converged. / Ph. D.

Since the dawn of the European Union, insurance and banking undertakings claimed to be subject to a special status vis-à-vis the application of EU competition law, due to the quasi social nature of the services they provide. Within the financial services industry, anti-trust concerns do arise in relation to mergers and acquisitions, possible abuses of dominant position and state aid; however Art. 101 TFEU and the regulation of forms of co-operation arguably represent the paramount and most intricate aspects of the application of the EU competition rules to the financial services sector. This is due to the fact that the insurance and banking industries historically have been characterised by intense forms of horizontal co-operation between undertakings deemed necessary for the correct functioning of the financial services industry. On a general level, any agreement establishing a homogeneous pricing structure vis-à-vis consumers represents a blatant violation of Art. 101 TFEU giving rise to serious anti-trust concerns. Nevertheless, as will be explored in this thesis, in the financial services sector the Commission has often allowed what the doctrine has correctly defined as “forms of horizontal agreements concerning a relevant cost element making up the final price vis-à-vis customers”1 through its decisions relating 1 See Faull & Nikpay, “The EC Law of Competition” OUP 2007, p. 636.to interbank fees in payment systems and through the enactment of a block exemption for the insurance industry. Art. 101 thus seems to manifest a common element for these two industries, presenting interesting and intricate teleological quandaries. This thesis endeavours to break the impasse down into questions to which an answer may be provided: Ought Art. 101 to apply to the financial services sector at all? If so, to what extent? Is there any justification for a block exemption in the insurance sector? Indeed, should the banking sector too benefit from a block exemption? This thesis endeavours to answer the above questions and thereby to contribute to the identification of an ideal regulatory framework for forms of horizontal co-operation in the financial services sector.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1989.

[pt] Como políticas macroprudenciais no mercado de crédito afetam o spread bancário? Para responder essa questão nós propomos um modelo de competição bancária que contempla diferenças de comportamento observadas entre bancos públicos e privados bem como particularidades do mercado de crédito para pessoas jurídicas vis-à-vis o mercado de crédito para pessoas físicas. Nós resolvemos o modelo e o calibramos usando parâmetros da economia Brasileira, onde os bancos públicos possuem quase metade do estoque de crédito da economia, além de terem desempenhado forte papel contracíclico no mercado de crédito nos últimos anos. Subsequentemente, nós usamos as condições de equilíbrio do modelo para estudar os efeitos de medidas macroprudenciais no mercado de crédito sobre os spreads bancários. Os resultados mostram que políticas de expansão de crédito via bancos públicos são mais eficientes em reduzir o spread quando implementadas durante períodos de recessão do que quando implementadas em períodos expansão econômica. / [en] How countercyclical macroprudential credit policies affect the loan spread? To answer this question, we propose a microeconomic model of bank competition that contemplates differences in the behavior of public and private banks and the peculiarities of the market for corporate loans vis-a-vis the market for consumer loans. We solve the model and calibrate it using parameters of the Brazilian economy, where government-owned banks not just have accounted for almost half of the outstanding loans in the credit market but also have played a strong countercyclical role in the economy. Subsequently, we use the equilibrium conditions of the model to study the effects of macroprudential credit policies on loan spreads. The results indicate that credit expansion by public banks is more effective to reduce loans interest rates during recession periods than during periods of economic expansion.

[pt] A partir de meados dos anos 90 diversas reformas institucionais e revisões normativas e legais ocorridas no Brasil provocaram uma onda de fusões e aquisições (F&As) bancárias. Como resultado de tal processo, o nível de concentração bancária tornou-se hoje no Brasil um dos maiores do mundo. O objetivo desta pesquisa é tentar evidenciar os efeitos da concorrência bancária sobre o crédito no Brasil através do estudo de dados de três dos principais eventos de F&A que ocorreram após o Plano Real. Para estimar o efeito da competição nas variáveis de crédito, foi utilizado o modelo de diferenças em diferenças (DD), desenvolvido no trabalho de Joaquim, Doornik e Ornelas (2019). Sob a hipótese de identificação de que na ausência de um episódio de F&A em um mercado bancário local, os resultados entre municípios expostos e não expostos serão semelhantes, foram considerados mercados tratados aqueles com pelo menos uma agência de ambos os bancos envolvidos no episódio de F&A. Ao replicar os resultados do modelo DD em questão para o caso do Itaú-Unibanco, utilizando apenas dados públicos, e realizar o estudo de caso dos episódios de F&A entre o Santander e ABN AMRO Real (2007) e Bradesco e HSBC (2016), foi evidenciado que uma redução na competição bancária através de bancos privados implica em uma redução no volume de empréstimos de bancos privados e que a trajetória do crédito privado tem pouco efeito sobre os rivais de propriedade pública. Além disso, foi observado que a presença geográfica dos bancos, ou número de agências espalhadas pelas regiões do Brasil não interfere nesses resultados. / [en] From the mid-1990s onwards, several institutional reforms and regulatory and legal revisions that took place in Brazil led to a wave of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As). As a result of this process, the level of banking concentration in Brazil has become one of the highest in the world. The objective of this research is to try to highlight the effects of bank competition on credit in Brazil through the study of data from three of the main M&A events that occurred after the Plano Real. The differences-in-differences (DD) model, developed by Joaquim, Doornik and Ornelas (2019), was used to estimate the effect of competition on credit variables. Under the identification hypothesis that in the absence of an M&A episode in a local banking market the results between exposed and unexposed municipalities will be similar, treated markets were considered those with at least one branch of both banks involved in the M&A episode. By replicating the results of Joaquim, Doornik and Ornelas (2019) DD model for the case of Itaú-Unibanco, using only publicly available data, and the M&A episodes between Santander and ABN AMRO Real (2007) and Bradesco and HSBC (2016), it was evidenced that a reduction in bank competition through private banks implies a reduction in private banks loans and that the trajectory of private credit has little effect on public banks. In addition, it was observed that the geographic presence of banks, or the number of branches spread across Brazil, does not interfere in these results.

Cette thèse de Doctorat représente une première évaluation empirique des implications de l’interaction entre la compétition bancaire et la titrisation des crédits sur l’efficience, le risque, et la structure du capital des banques commerciales Américaines. Précisément, l’objectif principal de cette thèse de Doctorat est de répondre aux questions suivantes : 1) Quel est l’impact de la compétition et de la titrisation, séparément et conjointement, sur l’efficience bancaire ? 2) La titrisation réduit-elle le risque bancaire sous la pression de la compétition bancaire ? 3) Quelles sont les implications de l’interaction entre la compétition bancaire et la titrisation sur la structure du capital des banques commerciales Américaines ? Le développement de ces questions est motivé par la croissance rapide de la titrisation, par l’évolution de la compétition bancaire à travers diverses réglementations bancaires Américaines, par le débat en cours entre les partisans et les opposants à la compétition et la titrisation, et par le caractère novateur de ces sujets. Après la mise en œuvre de la méthode de score de propension, le premier chapitre suggère que la titrisation augmente significativement l’efficience bancaire mesurée par la méthode de frontières stochastiques (SFA). Cet effet positif est plus prononcé au sein des marchés bancaires compétitifs. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous utilisons un modèle à effets fixes à partir duquel nous démontrons que la titrisation semble avoir un effet négatif sur le risque bancaire, particulièrement et de manière surprenante lors de la crise financière récente, mais uniquement si les banques titrisent fortement les crédits dans des marchés bancaires compétitifs. Le troisième chapitre démontre que la compétition bancaire pourrait être considérée comme un canal qui explique comment la titrisation influence, d’une manière significative, la structure du capital des banques commerciales Américaines. Nos enquêtes plus approfondies, introduites par la régression quantile, indiquent que les banques légèrement capitalisées, qui titrisent largement des crédits dans les marchés compétitifs, ont augmenté leurs divers ratios de capital, tandis qu’une réduction dans ces derniers est signalée pour les banques fortement capitalisées. En plus d’apporter des contributions empiriques, opérationnelles, managériales et politiques, cette thèse de Doctorat souligne l’importance d’établir une réglementation bancaire prudente sur la titrisation prenant en compte les réponses hétérogènes de la capitalisation bancaire, les différentes réactions des divers crédits titrisés, ainsi que l’effet extrêmement significatif de la structure du marché bancaire Américain. / This PhD dissertation represents a first empirical assessment of the implications of the interaction between banking competition and securitization on efficiency, risk, and capital structure of US commercial banks United States. Precisely, the main objective of this PhD dissertation is to answer the following questions: 1) What is the impact of competition and securitization, separately and jointly, on bank efficiency? 2) Does securitization reduce bank risk under competitive pressure? 3) What are the implications of the interaction between competition and securitization on bank capital structure? The development of these questions is motivated by the rapid growth of securitization, the evolution of bank competition through various US bank regulations, the ongoing debate between proponents and criticizers of competition and securitization; and the novelty of these topics among academics and practitioners. After implementing a propensity score matching technique, the first chapter suggests that securitization significantly increases bank efficiency as measured by the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). This positive impact appears to be more pronounced in competitive banking markets. In the second chapter, we use fixed-effects model through which securitization is found to have a negative impact on bank risk, particularly and surprisingly during the recent financial crisis, but only if banks highly securitize loans in competitive markets. The third chapter argues that banking competition could be considered a channel that explains how securitization significantly influences US commercial banks’ capital structure. Specifically, deeper investigations, introduced by the quantile regression, show that less-capitalized banks that highly securitize loans in competitive markets are more likely to increase their overall capital ratios, whereas a decrease in these ratios is reported for highly-capitalized banks. Providing several empirical and operational contributions as well as important managerial implications and policy recommendations, this PhD dissertation emphasizes the importance of considering a careful banking regulation on securitization that takes into account the heterogeneous responses of bank capitalization, the different reactions of various securitized loans, and the overall significant effect of US banking market structure.

La présente thèse analyse l’incidence de la concurrence bancaire sur le coût et la qualité du crédit produit par les établissements de crédit. Plus précisément, les investigations empiriques menées dans le cadre de ce travail visent deux objectifs complémentaires. Tout d’abord, évaluer dans quelle mesure le degré de rivalité entre les banques influence la stratégie de tarification des banques et par conséquent le coût de financement des entreprises. Le second objectif de cette thèse consiste à étudier l’impact de la concurrence bancaire sur la manière dont les banques produisent de l’information privée sur leurs clients. Pour cela, nous procédons en deux étapes. En premier lieu, nous examinons l’influence du degré de rivalité entre les banques sur la nature des informations utilisées par les chargés d’affaires dans l’évaluation de la qualité des emprunteurs. En second lieu, nous vérifions l’implication de la concurrence bancaire dans la rupture des relations de long terme. Nous adoptons pour toutes les analyses conduites dans cette thèse une démarche permettant d’exploiter la complémentarité entre différents indicateurs de concurrence utilisés dans la littérature afin d’appréhender au mieux le niveau de rivalité entre les banques. Plusieurs résultats se dégagent des multiples analyses empiriques menées dans le cadre de ce travail. Premièrement, il ressort de nos investigations empiriques que le pouvoir de marché des institutions financières découle de deux sources distinctes: le poids de la banque dans la structure du marché local du crédit et le degré d’efficience de l’établissement de crédit. Par conséquent, l’incidence de la concurrence bancaire dépend de sa capacité à influencer la structure du marché local du crédit ou bien l’efficience des banques. De plus, nous montrons qu’au sein d’un marché bancaire concentré, l’existence de fortes rivalités entre les banques réduit le coût de financement des entreprises si ces dernières disposent d’une relation bancaire principale. Enfin, nous démontrons que la concurrence bancaire accroît la longévité des relations de clientèle et encourage les chargés d’affaires à produire plus d’informations privées sur les emprunteurs. Toutefois, il serait prudent au niveau des banques de suivre l’évolution des comportements des gestionnaires de relations bancaires en matière de production d’informations afin d’adapter les mesures incitatives à mettre en place pour garantir la pérennité de leurs comportements. / This thesis investigates the effect of banking competition on the cost and the quality of lending to firms by financial institutions. Specifically, the empirical analyzes conducted in this thesis aim to reach two complementary objectives. First, assessing the degree to which the rivalry between banks influences their pricing strategy and therefore the cost of corporate financing. The second objective of this thesis is to study the impacts of bank competition on the way banks generate private information about their customers. To this end we proceed in two steps. First, we investigate whether banking competition affects the type of information used by loan officers to assess borrower’s quality. Then, we check the involvement of bank competition in the termination of bank-firm relationships. We consider for all the analyzes conducted in this thesis an approach where the complementarity between different competition indicators used in the literature is exploited in order to better understand the level of rivalry among banks. Several results emerge from the multiple empirical analyzes conducted in this thesis. First, these show that the market power of financial institutions result from two separate sources: the weight of the bank in the local credit market structure, and the level of efficiency of the credit institution. Therefore, the impact of competition between banks depends on the ability of banking competition to influence the local market structure of credit or the efficiency of bank. Moreover, we show that within a concentrated banking market, the existence of strong rivalries between banks reduced the financing cost of firms that had a house bank. Finally, we demonstrate that banking competition increases the duration of bank-firm relationships and encourages loan officers to produce more private information about borrowers. However, it would be safe for banks to monitor the behavior of loan officers regarding their role on information production, in order to design incentives that ensure a sustained effort on their part.

[pt] Esta tese de doutorado está dividida em três ensaios que têm como característica comum a análise de questões empíricas sobre o sistema bancário brasileiro. No primeiro ensaio, a estrutura concorrencial do mercado bancário brasileiro é estudada com o objetivo de avaliar se bancos públicos têm maior ou menor efeito competitivo vis-à-vis bancos privados. Para isso, utiliza-se metodologia de Bresnahan e Reiss (1991) para se estudar competição em mercados locais concentrados. Encontra-se robusta evidência empírica de que bancos públicos têm menores efeitos competitivos do que os bancos privados. No segundo ensaio, estuda-se o efeito da disseminação de uma nova modalidade de crédito no Brasil, o crédito consignado. Nesse tipo de crédito há uma colateralização total através da dedução do pagamento do empréstimo diretamente do salário do devedor. Para conseguirmos medir adequadamente o efeito da introdução da nova modalidade, utilizamos um outro tipo de modalidade de crédito, crédito para a aquisição de veículos, como grupo de controle. Os resultados mostram uma forte queda da taxa de juros e um expressivo aumento do volume de crédito, o que indica que a introdução do crédito consignado teve forte efeito sobre o mercado de crédito no Brasil. No terceiro ensaio, estuda-se a relação entre política monetária e o mercado de crédito bancário. A literatura internacional, tanto empírica como teórica, mostra que o mercado de crédito poderia ter importante papel como amplificador de choques de política monetária. Nesse estudo, o foco será o mercado de crédito bancário e o que a literatura convencionou chamar de canal de crédito bancário. Utilizando uma nova estratégia de identificação, baseada em um estudo de evento em torno da reunião do comitê de política monetária quando decidindo sobre a taxa básica de juros a vigorar na economia, mostra-se que não há evidência do canal de crédito bancário no Brasil. Apesar de o efeito direto da taxa básica de juros sobre o volume e a taxa de juros do crédito ter sido significativo, não se pode relacioná-lo ao canal de crédito bancário, uma vez que bancos menores e/ou menos líquidos não reagem mais a choques de política monetária do que os bancos maiores e/ou mais líquidos. / [en] This PhD thesis is divided in three essays on empirical microeconomics of banking. The first essay evaluates the competitive impact of public banks vis-à-vis private ones. A methodology based on Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) is used to access competition in local concentrated markets. We find robust evidence that, relative to private banks, state- owned banks are anti-competitive. In the second essay the introduction of a new type of credit, the payroll loans, is analyzed. In this type of credit there is a complete collateralization of the debt through the direct withdrawal of the loan payment from the debtor`s salary. In order to properly measure this effect we used another type of credit, automobile loans, as control group. Results show a statistical and economic significant reduction of interest rate and increase of credit volume, which show that the creation of payroll loans had strong effect on the Brazilian credit market. In the third chapter I study the relation between monetary policy and banking credit market. The international literature, both theoretical and empirical, suggests that credit markets could have important role in the amplification of monetary policy shocks. In this essay I focus on the banking credit market and what literature calls banking lending channel. Using a new identification strategy, based on an event study around monetary policy committee reunion setting the basic interest rate target, I find no evidence of banking lending channel in Brazil. Despite the significant direct effect of basic interest rate on credit interest rate and volume, there is no link between this effect and the banking lending channel, since smaller and/or less liquid banks do not react more to the monetary policy shocks than bigger and/or more liquid banks.

Teniendo en cuenta que el sector financiero puede ser un medio para promover el desarrollo económico de un país, influyendo en la inversión de capital hacía actividades productivas y expansión de mercados, analizar posibles determinantes que afecten su desarrollo es importante. El propósito de este trabajo de investigación es determinar si la competencia tiene un efecto en la calidad de la cartera crediticia de las instituciones otorgadoras de crédito, y, de ser así, analizar si el efecto es positivo o negativo. Se toma para el periodo de análisis los años 2010 al 2019 y para tres grupos de instituciones financieras que son banca y, en representación del sector micro financiero, tenemos a las cajas municipales y cajas rurales en el Perú. Estudios previos demostraron una relación en su mayoría positiva entre la tasa de morosidad y el incremento de competencia, sin embargo, no es un resultado concluyente para todos los países y periodos, por lo que determinar la relación para el caso peruano y en los años dados resulta innovador. Para contrastar de forma empírica que la competencia afecta la cartera crediticia, se tomó a la variable de tasa de morosidad para medir el impacto de calidad de cartera. Asimismo, se planteó estimar el índice de Lerner como indicador de poder de mercado en representación de la variable de competencia. Se realizaron las estimaciones con datos de panel, a través del cual, a raíz de las diferentes pruebas econométricas realizadas, se decidió utilizar el método GLS para las regresiones. Los resultados obtenidos permiten validar la hipótesis en que la relación de la competencia entre las instituciones financieras otorgadoras de crédito con la tasa de morosidad es positiva. Finalmente, los resultados obtenidos podrían justificar investigaciones relacionadas a la regulación en el sector financiero con respecto a la competencia bancaria y sus determinantes. / Considering that the financial sector can be a means to promote the economic development of a country, influencing capital investment in productive activities and expansion of markets, analyzing possible determinants that affect its development is important. The purpose of this research work is to determine whether competition influences the quality of the credit portfolio of credit granting institutions, and, if so, to analyze whether the effect is positive or negative. The years 2010 to 2019 are taken for the period of analysis and for three groups of financial institutions that are banks and, representing the microfinance sector, we have the municipal savings banks and rural savings banks. Previous studies have shown a mostly positive relationship between the delinquency rate and the increase in competition; however, it is not a conclusive result for all countries and periods, therefore determining the relationship for the Peruvian case and in the given years it is innovative. To empirically test that competition affects the loan portfolio, the default rate variable was used to measure the impact of portfolio quality. Likewise, it was proposed to estimate the Lerner index as an indicator of market power in representation of the competition variable. The data panel estimates were made, through which, because of the different econometric tests carried out, it was decided to use the GLS method for the regressions. The results obtained allow us to validate the hypothesis that the relationship between the competition between financial institutions granting credit and the delinquency rate is positive. Finally, the results obtained could justify research related to regulation in the financial sector with respect to banking competition and its determinants. / Trabajo de investigación