Bekämpningen av penningtvätt på kapitalmarknaden är ett viktigt arbete för att värna om det finansiella systemets stabilitet. Banker har en synnerligen viktig roll i upprätthållanden av en trygg och ändamålsenlig kapitalmarknad till följd av verksamheternas riskfyllda natur. Under de senaste åren har flera svenska storbanker utpekats som särskilt bristfälliga i det penningtvättsförebyggande arbetet av såväl nationella som utländska tillsynsmyndigheter. Det gemensamma för dessa banker är att de bedrivs genom koncernorganisationer där en moderbank disponerar över flera helägda dotterbanker i aktiebolagsform. I två färska beslut från Finansinspektionen (FI) om att ingripa mot Swedbank och SEB för bristande åtgärder mot penningtvätt, särskilt i bankernas baltiska verksamheter, skildras den styrningsproblematik som uppstår i aktiebolagsrättsliga bankkoncerner. Att varje bolag är att betrakta som en självständig juridisk person är en hörnpelare i den svenska aktiebolagsrätten. Det innebär att en moderbank enligt aktiebolagsrättsliga grundprinciper endast har möjlighet att utöva inflytande över dotterbankerna på bolagstämman i egenskap som aktieägare. Samtidigt uppställer de finansiella regelverken och föreskrifterna krav på att regelefterlevnaden ska uppfyllas på gruppnivå, vilket ålägger ansvaret för att dotterbankerna bedriver ett effektivt penningtvättsarbete på moderbankerna. För egen del anförde de båda moderbankerna att de utökade kraven på styrning och kontroll av dotterbankerna som förutsätts enligt de finansiella bestämmelserna hindras av det tillämpliga associationsrättsliga regelverket. Således finns det inneboende svårigheter med att styra dotterbanker på detaljnivå till följd av den rådande normkonflikten mellan de aktiebolagsrättsliga- och finansiella regelverken. För att stärka regelefterlevnadsnivån och därmed skydda det finansiella systemets stabilitet och allmänhetens förtroende för kapitalmarknaden argumenteras i denna uppsats att den svenska aktiebolagsrätten bör modifieras. Som förslag anförs det att särskilda regler för banker alternativt en materiell koncernrätt bör inrättas för att tillförse moderbanker med en lagstadgad rätt att styra koncernerna i linje med regelefterlevnadskraven på gruppnivå. En sådan modifiering skulle underlätta moderbankers möjligheter att leda koncernernas arbete mot penningtvätt och risken för att det finansiella systemet utnyttjas för penningtvätt skulle minska. / The fight against money laundering on the capital market is an important work to protect the stability of the financial system. Banks play a significantly important role in the upkeeping of a safe and expedient capital market due to the risky nature of the businesses. In recent years, several Swedish banks has been pointed out as particularly deficient with AML-compliance by national and foreign supervisory authorities. What binds these banks together is that they are operated by group organizations whereas one parent bank possesses over multiple wholly owned limited liability companies, LLCs. In two recent decisions by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority to intervene against Swedbank and SEB for inadequate measures against money laundering, especially in the Baltic subsidiaries, the problems that occur in limited liability company groups with controlling the subsidiaries was clearly exhibited. According to the Swedish Companies Act, every LLC is considered to be an independent judicial person. Therefore, the basic principles of the company law, states that a parent bank can only govern its subsidiaries through the shareholders general meeting in their capacity as a shareholder. At the same time, the financial regulations demands that the compliance is to be fulfilled on group level, which means that the responsibility for the subsidiaries conducting an effective work against money laundering lies upon the parent banks. Both parent banks emphasized the fact that the level of governance and control that is required by the financial provisions is hindered by the Companies Act. Because of the prevailing normconflict between the LLC- and financial laws, there are inherent difficulties with governing and controlling subsidiaries AML-compliance. It is argued in this Master Thesis that the Swedish Companies Act needs to be modified in order to strengthen the level of compliance and hence protect the stability of the financial system and the public trust for the capital market. As a suggestion, it is stated that special rules for banks alternatively a codified law for company groups should be introduced to provide parent banks with a statuary right to manage the group in accordance with the compliance requirements on group level. A regulation like the just mentioned would favor parent banks possibilities to govern the groups AML-compliance and the risk of the financial system being used for money laundering would decrease.

Critical failings with AML-compliance have been observed in multiple Swedish banks over a period of time. The banks referred to often have complex organisational structures, where a parent company owns several subsidiaries, and the companies within the group are limited liability companies, LLCs. According to the law regulating LLCs, every LLC is an independent judicial person. The Swedish regulation has no specific set of rules applicable to LLCs in a company group. The AML-regulation can request a parent bank to fulfil the compliance standard on a group level. As a consequence, the parent bank becomes responsible for the subsidiary’s AML-compliance. In a recent case from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, a parent bank emphasised that the LLC-regulation won’t allow a bank to carry out the governance and control necessary to comply with the AML-regulation. The same problem has been identified in the legal doctrine. According to The Swedish Companies Act, a parent company may only govern its subsidiary by bringing about decisions in the shareholders general meeting, in its capacity as a shareholder. The shareholders general meeting is the highest decision-making body in the company. However, the board have authority over the organisation and management of the company. In conclusion, there are significant difficulties imbedded in the LLC law since a parent company has no lawful right to instruct the subsidiary’s board, which obstructs the parent company from governing the subsidiary regarding AML- compliance. In this Master Thesis, I argue that the Swedish regulation needs modification and that the German law for company groups could efficiently serve as a model. Germany has had a codified law for company groups for a long time. As an example, a parent company and a subsidiary may enter into a control agreement which allows the parent company to instruct the subsidiary’s board directly. The German law also ensures protection for the subsidiary’s creditors since the parent company is obliged to cover any eventual losses in the subsidiary, if there is a said control agreement in place. A similar regulation in Sweden would facilitate for parent companies to govern subsidiaries regarding AML-compliance.