This thesis is concerned with the regulation of corporate groups and more specifically, whether the adoption of group specific provisions in Swedish law that recognises the concept of “group interest” is motivated in light of efficient corporate governance. Swedish corporate law in general and the Companies Act were, in a historical context, developed, and still are, formed with the single entity corporation at heart. This development is reflected upon the general lack of provisions aimed at regulating corporate groups. The result is that groups has to accustom its operations based on the same legislation as the single corporate entity. However, as a form of conducting business operations, a corporate group operates under noticeably distinct conditions. The Companies Act thereby fails to address and govern different interest of conflicts that typically arise within group structures. As a result, business practices concerning the governance of corporate groups has shifted the balance of interests in a way that empowers the parent entity which en- hances the risks of unduly favouring towards minority shareholders and cred- itors. The entity-doctrine, of which corporate law was founded upon both in Sweden and world-wide, acts as an obstacle to accept the more recent con- cept of group interest. A group is not recognised as a legal entity but consists instead of the participating entities, all with a separate legal personality. It is therefore necessary to revisit the very core principles of which corporate law was founded upon. The essence of corporate group law is narrowed down to the questions of the parent’s right to manage its subsidiaries and the level of its responsibility. It is concluded that the incentives to engage in group structures also pro- vides compelling economic reasons for the legislator to introduce group pro- visions in order to enhance and facilitate both the formation of and the level of flexibility of the governance of a group structure. By way of comparative assessment with other jurisdictions, as well as the ongoing trends in Europe, this is possible while still maintaining an adequate level of protection to mi- nority shareholders and creditors. Although there are still major differences within EU member states on the topic, this thesis is clear in its conclusions; a recognized group interest is the right way forward.

Critical failings with AML-compliance have been observed in multiple Swedish banks over a period of time. The banks referred to often have complex organisational structures, where a parent company owns several subsidiaries, and the companies within the group are limited liability companies, LLCs. According to the law regulating LLCs, every LLC is an independent judicial person. The Swedish regulation has no specific set of rules applicable to LLCs in a company group. The AML-regulation can request a parent bank to fulfil the compliance standard on a group level. As a consequence, the parent bank becomes responsible for the subsidiary’s AML-compliance. In a recent case from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, a parent bank emphasised that the LLC-regulation won’t allow a bank to carry out the governance and control necessary to comply with the AML-regulation. The same problem has been identified in the legal doctrine. According to The Swedish Companies Act, a parent company may only govern its subsidiary by bringing about decisions in the shareholders general meeting, in its capacity as a shareholder. The shareholders general meeting is the highest decision-making body in the company. However, the board have authority over the organisation and management of the company. In conclusion, there are significant difficulties imbedded in the LLC law since a parent company has no lawful right to instruct the subsidiary’s board, which obstructs the parent company from governing the subsidiary regarding AML- compliance. In this Master Thesis, I argue that the Swedish regulation needs modification and that the German law for company groups could efficiently serve as a model. Germany has had a codified law for company groups for a long time. As an example, a parent company and a subsidiary may enter into a control agreement which allows the parent company to instruct the subsidiary’s board directly. The German law also ensures protection for the subsidiary’s creditors since the parent company is obliged to cover any eventual losses in the subsidiary, if there is a said control agreement in place. A similar regulation in Sweden would facilitate for parent companies to govern subsidiaries regarding AML-compliance.