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This study examines if theory of deception can be understood in successful air operations on a tactical level. Research on deception is mostly conducted on a strategic level and the different theories vary in aim and tend to be comprehensive. Studies of air power are mostly conducted on a tactical level and deception within air power has become more common throughout the years. This study aims, using a theory testing case study, to explain how theories of deception work on a tactical level. The analysis is based on Barton Whaley’s structure of deception, and the cases that were analyzed were the Six-Day War and Operation Desert Storm. The result showed that the theory partly could describe deception on a tactical level as a majority of the different categories of Whaleys theory were present in both conflicts. However, the priority of the different categories in the theory did not correspond to either of the cases. This led to the conclusion that Barton Whaley’s theory of structure of deception does not alone describe success in air operations on a tactical level.

Russian application of deception in warfare has an extensive history. A lot of previous research has explored both its application and development through different historical conflicts. However, the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea has raised a debate that challenges the classic application of Russian deception methods. Nevertheless, many researchers claim that Russia continues to use traditional methods of warfare and deception, albeit adapted to a modern context.   This thesis explores these claims by a concrete comparison of the application of Russian deception methods during the annexation of Crimea with a successful historical Russian deception operation, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This is done by a comparative case study, which breaks down both cases with theoretical support from Barton Whaley's theory of deception. The study validates claims that traditional Russian deception methods are being applied in a contemporary context. What has changed, however, is how the different types of deception mutually support one another and are utilized to achieve synergy effects.

Deception seems to be a vital part for special forces operations and a new prioritized task in the future. Despite that, is deception a phenomenon that is not taking an independent starting point in special operations theories. The purpose of this study is to contribute to the debate about the role of deception in special forces operations. This has been done by examining the extent to which Barton Whaley’s theory can explain the outcome of special operations. By analysing Operation Neptune’s Spear and Operation Gothic Serpent with Whaley’s theoretical framework, the conclusion is that deception can, to some extent, explain the outcome. The operations are opposites, one successful and the other unsuccessful. The result shows that deception is more common in the successful one. Despite this, the result suggest that more research is needed to draw relevant conclusions. One can only say that the result gives an indication about the role of deception in these kinds of operations.

Deception has long been a central component of Russian warfare, a fact that has become evident in modern conflicts where the state has been involved, not least during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. After the armed conflict, an unstable period unfolded in several Ukrainian regions, as well as in the adjacent maritime areas of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Russia’s aggressive behavior in the sea regions was driven by a goal of dominance, manifested through multifaceted actions that included both conventional and unconventional methods. A gray zone conflict was launched in the maritime domains. Existing research studying Russia’s naval warfare has paid only limited attention to use of deception, which means it misses a key aspect of its on-sea activity. With the aim to contribute more broadly to research on Russian naval warfare, this study has used a theory of deception to describe how and when the state has employed methods related to the phenomenon in the gray zone conflict. The result of the analysis shows that Russia, in its multidimensional conduct across the broad spectrum between war and peace, has utilized deception methods in various instances, with an increased intensity in the year preceding to the conflict’s escalation into full-scale war.