Zugl.: Pisa, Scuola Normale Superiore, Diss., 2004

This dissertation focuses on how a specific conceptual thread of the history of mathematics unfolded throughout the centuries from its original account in Ancient Greece to its demise in the Modern era due to new mathematical developments and, finally, to its revival in the work of Brentano. In particular, we shall discuss how the notion of continuity and the connected notion of continua and boundaries developed through the ages until Brentano's revival of the original Aristotelian account against the by then established mathematical orthodoxy. Thus, this monograph hopes to fill in a gap in the present state of Brentanian scholarship as well as to present a thorough account of this specific historical thread.

Die „Österreichische Wertlehre“ ist ein eigenständiger Begriff, der eine spezifische Weise meint, den Wertbegriff zu erfassen, nämlich subjektiv, ohne subjektivistisch zu sein. Charakteristisch ist hierbei, dass das wertende Subjekt der Ausgangspunkt der Untersuchung ist und dass dieser Ansatz auf bestimmten Annahmen über die richtige Methode der Forschung und über die Ontologie beruht.Thema der Arbeit ist Untersuchung des philosophischen und ökonomischen Wertebegriffes bei den "Gündungsväter" der Österrichischen Schule, Franz Brentano und Carl Menger. / The Austrian theory of value is a subjectiv theory of value and is built up on the basis of a special scientific method and an aristotelian ontology. Economic und philosophical value always depends on the value-judgement of the individual and has therefore a psychological dimension. In this survey I analyse the concept of value of the founders of the Austrian school, Franz Brentano and Carl Menger.

[pt] Partindo da relação entre Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) e Franz Brentano (1838-1911), respectivamente aluno e professor durante o intervalo que se estendeu de 1874 a 1876, o presente trabalho trata dos possíveis frutos teóricos decorrentes deste encontro, visíveis na obra posterior do inventor da psicanálise. A articulação conceitual se constrói por meio dos conceitos freudianos de concomitância dependente, representação e pulsão, não se limitando à obra pessoal do filósofo, mas procurando abarcar, sempre que possível, o contato com toda uma tradição filosófica, por sua vez permitido pelos ensinamentos do neoescolástico. / [en] From the relationship between Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and Franz Brentano (1838-1917), respectively student and professor during the interval that extended from 1874 to 1876, the present work deals with the possible theoretical fruits resulting from this encounter, visible in the later work of the inventor of psychoanalysis. The conceptual articulation is constructed through the Freudian concepts of dependent concomitance, representation and drive, not limiting itself to the personal work of the philosopher, but seeking to cover, whenever possible, the contact with an entire philosophical tradition, in turn allowed by the teachings of the neo-scholastic.

Le problème de l'existence est réputé l´un de plus anciennes et de plus difficiles à résoudre de la philosophie: Que voulons-nous exprimer quand nous disons que quelque chose existe ou, pire encore, que quelque chose n´existe pas? Intuitivement, il semble que nous avons tous une prise ferme sur ce que nous voulons exprimer. Mais comment devrions-nous expliquer la différence – s´il y en a – entre les énoncés existentiels d´une coté et les plus communs énoncés prédicatifs de l´autre? Quelle est la différence entre dire que quelque chose existe et dire, par exemple, que quelque chose est rouge, lourde, moue, etc.? Dans cette étude nous allons nous pencher sur ces questions.Dans la première partie, cette étude porte sur les auteurs qui ont étés les plus persuasifs et les plus influents à creuser l´écart qui sépare les énoncés existentiels de plus communs énoncés prédicatifs. Notamment, il s´agirait ici de David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Franz Brentano et Gottlob Frege. Selon cette famille d'approches l'existence devient quelque chose de très différent d'une propriété des objets. Dans la deuxième partie, cette étude se penche sur des tentatives plus récentes qui ont pris la direction opposé et sont allez jusqu´à réduire l'existence à une propriété (plus ou moins) ordinaire des objets. Les philosophes qui seront discutés ici seront Alexius Meinong, Richard Routley, Terence Parsons, William Rapaport, Edward Zalta et Graham Priest.Finalement, la troisième partie de cette étude développe une approche selon laquelle la notion d'existence est étroitement liée à la notion de vérité: dire que telle ou telle chose existe est équivalent à dire qu'il est vrai que quelque chose est telle et telle. L'avantage de cette stratégie est, d´une coté, qu'elle ne réduit pas l´énoncé que quelque chose n´existe pas á une contradiction - un résultat fréquent ceci des approches discutées dans la première partie. De l´autre coté, cette stratégie évite les épicycles communs aux approches discutées dans la deuxième partie, lesquelles sont strictement liés à la réduction de l'existence à une propriété des objets. / The problem of existence is reputed to be one of the oldest and most intractable of philosophy: What do we mean when we say that something exists or, even more challengingly, that something does not exist? Intuitively, it seems that we all have a firm grip upon what we are saying. But how should we explain the difference – if there is any – between statements about existence and other, garden-variety predicative statements? What is the difference between saying that something exists and saying, for instance, that something is red, heavy, soft, etc.? These questions provide the focus for the present study.In the first part, this study addresses those authors that have been most effective and influential at widening the gap between statements about existence and garden-variety predicative statements. These are David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Franz Brentano, and Gottlob Frege. According to this family of approaches, existence becomes something very different from a property of objects. In the second part, this study turns to more recent attempts that have moved in the opposite direction by trying to reduce existence to a – more or less – plain property of objects. The philosophers that are going to be discussed here are Alexius Meinong, Richard Routley, Terence Parsons, William Rapaport, Edward Zalta, and Graham Priest. Eventually, the third part of this study develops an account according to which the notion of existence is strictly linked to the notion of truth: To say that such and such a thing exists is to say that it is true that something is such and such. The advantage of this strategy is that it does not make it contradictory to say that something does not exist – a frequent upshot of the approaches discussed in the first part. At the same time, this strategy avoids the epicycles common to the approaches discussed in the second part, which are strictly linked to the reduction of existence to a property of objects.

The present study reconstructs psychological, linguistic and ontological aspects of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy in the light of Brentano’s theory of intentionality. Brentano used intentionality as a psychological term to denote the ‘mental’ as opposed to the ‘natural’. Later, with Meinong, intentionality took an ontological commitment to assenting that ‘there are things that do not exist’. The chapters that discuss Ṣadrā’s philosophy reflect the two aspects with an investigation for the production process of intentional objects and an investigation of the status of these objects in ontology. The main aim of the research is to give an internalist and monist account for the nature of intentionality demonstrating an alternative approach to the concepts of existence and the soul. Ontologically, there is only one reality (existence) and nothing is left outside it. Accordingly, intentional objects are mental beings that are at a lower level of existence (wujūd ẓillī). The principles behind the monist ontology are: first, the gradational ontology (tashkīk) that all things are determined beings (mutamayyiz) and they are manifestations of a single reality at different levels of intensity (mutashakkik), and, second, the simplicity principle (basīṭ al-ḥaqīqa) in which existence is a simple reality that comprehends all beings whilst being the principle of multiplicity at the same time. Accordingly intentional objects are a level of existence, and share same reality. Epistemologically, all knowledge processes including external senses are regarded as internal processes in which the causal effect of the extra-mental object is reduced to being an accidental preparatory tool and faculties for the soul. Perception is always completed with the touch of imagination and the real object of perception is internally created. The soul is not the receiver of forms, but is the active agent. Moreover, the soul undergoes substantial change as the objects are being produced. The soul is then not a container of forms. It is rather the case that the forms themselves construct the soul. The last point is that knowledge is a mode of existence. This mode of being (knowledge) indeed is the very existence of the human soul. In this explanation, the soul is neither material nor immaterial per se: the soul starts her journey as a material substance and becomes more delicate and immaterial through her journey. The soul’s journey is made possible with the preparatory role of the processes of perception. Intentionality is soul’s action of creating mental forms. The products are identical to soul since soul and knowledge are identical. Consequently, intentional objects are dependent on the soul in their presence and creation.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ana Maris Petry.pdf: 721205 bytes, checksum: cc064bb634f036d7337e7d9b3094db0d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-03 / This work aims to present the program of an empirical psychology of Franz Brentano, identifying the author's fundamental contributions to the foundation of a psychological science. When psychology sought autonomy of the philosophy and recognition as a positive science, it was necessary to: distinguish psychic phenomena of physical phenomena, to justify the distinction of the psychology of physiology; to clarify the concept of psyche, to justify an autonomy of psychology in relation to the philosophy; and also, identify a methodological access such research objects as an alternative to introspection, a possibility strongly opposed not only by positivism, but also by Hume and Kant. Without a clear and distinct definition of such concepts a psychological science would not be possible. Starting from the 19th century scientific historical context, this text introduces the concept of an empirical psychology, the research object of this discipline and the method established for such study as were defined by Brentano. The text follows the development of work Psychology from an empirical standpoint, published in 1874. This is a review of this crucial work of Brentano, showing its key concepts. The particular Brentano s conception of phenomenon and the identification of intentionality as fundamental characteristic of psychic phenomena enable Brentano to define the project of a psychological science that follows the science positivist criteria and, at the same time to avoid a mere phenomenical psychology / Este trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar o programa de uma psicologia empírica de Franz Brentano, identificando as fundamentais contribuições do autor para a fundação de uma ciência psicológica. Quando a psicologia buscava autonomia da filosofia e reconhecimento como ciência positiva, era necessário: distinguir fenômenos psíquicos de fenômenos físicos, para justificar a distinção da psicologia da fisiologia; clarificar o conceito de psique, para justificar uma autonomia da psicologia em relação à filosofia; e ainda, identificar um acesso metodológico a tais objetos de investigação como alternativa à introspecção, possibilidade fortemente combatida não só pelo positivismo, mas também por Hume e Kant. Sem uma clara e distinta definição de tais conceitos uma ciência psicológica não seria possível. Partindo do contexto histórico científico do século XIX, esse texto apresenta o conceito de uma psicologia empírica, o objeto de investigação dessa disciplina e o método estabelecido para tal estudo como foram definidos por Brentano. O texto segue o desenvolvimento da obra Psicologia do ponto de vista empírico, publicada em 1874. Trata-se de uma revisão desta fundamental obra de Brentano, explicitando seus principais conceitos. A particular concepção brentaniana de fenômeno e a identificação da intencionalidade como fundamental característica dos fenômenos psíquicos possibilitou a Brentano delinear o projeto de uma ciência psicológica que atendesse aos critérios positivistas de cientificidade e, ao mesmo tempo, evitasse uma psicologia meramente fenomênica

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 252-266).

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