Lower Canada occupied a strategic position in Britain's policies for the defence, trade and settlement of British North America. The smooth development of these three interests was threatened by the autonomist ambitions of the colony's French-speaking (Canadien) leaders. Between 1820 and 1841 British policy had to cope with the collapse of traditional canadien elites as reliable supporters of imperial interests, the persistent hostility of the new canadien leadership towards commerce and immigration, and the increased restlessness of the growing minority of English speaking colonists. During the 1820s, the Governor alienated the bureaucracy, the traditional social leaders of French Canada, and the elected Assembly by his encouragement of diverse efforts to anglicize the colony's administration, institutions and civil law. The political divisions of the British colonists encouraged the Canadiens to seek greater autonomy for tie colony, tb and British policy after 1828 favoured concession e the Canadiens as the best way to smooth out political obstacles to social and economic change. But increased immigration alarmed the Canadiens, created a larger and more complex British community in the colony, and made the imperial government more anxious to conciliate the British than the French colonists after a few of the latter revolted in 1837-38. Economic and demographic pressures were important but the debate over political legitimacy was a major element too. Belief in prescriptive legitimacy faded during the 1820s; the growth of liberal attitudes in the British part of the population brought impatience towards the colony's antiquated civil law and hastened the creation of suitable conditions for the growth of a modern commercial state. Britain imposed a new constitution giving greater powers to the fast-growing colony of Upper Canada and to the British merchants and settlers of Lower Canada.

While the annexation movement in British Columbia appears to have been short-lived and disorganized, it was nevertheless understood as a serious threat to British rule. This study seeks to reconcile this contradiction through an examination of newspapers, debates, despatches, and correspondence drawn from British Columbia, Britain, Canada, and the United States. In examining the movement, this study reveals both the peculiar capacity of the minor agitation to present an exaggerated image of its popularity, and the key geopolitical assumptions which led observers to overestimate its importance. As the narrative spectre of annexationism outpaced the actual strength of the movement, confederationist leaders and British and American authorities were led to embark on misguided political strategies. The British Columbian annexation movement’s disproportionate impact reveals the complex interaction between local politics and global forces in British North American history, and demonstrates the role of ideology and rumour-making in shaping global political narratives.

The original intention of this thesis was to study the opinions and activities of the Maritime colonies during the War of 1812, in an attempt to explain the colonies' almost neutral position throughout the hostilities. The Maritime attitude has already been explained in terms of economic ties binding the colonies' interests with those of New England. This thesis was therefore directed by a desire to ascertain whether or not such economic interests constituted the dominating influence in Maritime policy or whether there existed equally important influences of a political and social nature. The conclusion attributes Maritime reaction in 1812 to a combination of economic, political, and social factors shaping the colonies' activities during the preceding twenty years. In the course of defining these factors, however, the emphasis shifted from the war itself to the preceding two decades which emerged as a period of experiment and adjustment—a period of confused adolescent fumbling toward the larger powers and responsibilities of adulthood. Into the midst of these struggles the War of 1812 was projected, to be greeted by the Maritimers as an interruption meriting attention only in so far as it could contribute to their provincial interests. In this thesis, therefore, the War of 1812 is presented as but the epilogue illustrating the trend of Maritime interests and policy during the period 1790-1810. It is not the intention of this thesis to view Maritime history strictly in terms of a cyclical development paralleling the human life cycle. However, the contradictory character of the Maritime scene during this period, as the colonies see-sawed between dependency and self-sufficiency in their claims, resembles the confusion of adolescence and the title of Colonial Adolescence was chosen for lack of a better description of this transitional phase. In the study of the Maritime colonies' transitional struggles, this thesis seeks to illustrate how the social-economic complex of a community moulds and is reflected in its political life. Although the period 1790-1814 was one of isolation and individualism for the colonies, the majority of Maritime communities faced similar problems in their struggles for stability and identity. Geography had rendered them an economic unit; the British administration had endowed them with similar political organizations; and settlement had produced similar social problems. This thesis, therefore, treats its subject in terms of basic economic, political, and social situations as they were faced in the Maritimes, with whatever variations each colony might offer. The three chapters dealing with these situations constitute the core of the thesis. In the first chapter an attempt has been made to set the scene of British politics and administration, for it was in this context that the colonies pursued their objectives influenced at all times by the changing fortunes of British politics. The study throughout tends to concentrate upon the mainland colonies of Nava Scotia and New Brunswick, partly because the developments of this period were centered here, since Prince Edward Island remained a backward variant; and partly because the nature of sources dictated such an approach. Research was concentrated mainly upon the Colonial Office records pertaining to Maritime affairs during this period. These included the official correspondence passing between the Colonial Office and the colonial governors, in which the policy of the British administration and its colonial deputies is outlined and colonial reaction commented upon. Also included were the journals of Assembly and Council, shipping statistics, petitions and memorials from individuals and associations in the colonies reflecting something of colonial opinion, needs and activities. These records were supplemented by secondary sources, drawn upon for an outline of British and North American activities and policies; to a more limited extent colonial newspapers and private papers provided contemporary comment on the Maritime scene—but the Maritimers do not emerge from these researches as an articulate lot. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

The British North America Act, 1930 (the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements or NRTAs) marked the end of a lengthy battle between the provincial governments of Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Manitoba and the federal government of Canada. Prior to 1930, the provincial governments did not have administrative control over their natural resources, which were managed by the federal Department of the Interior. As a result, the three prairie provinces did not share equal constitutional status with the other Canadian provinces that did control their own resources. Under the terms of the new constitutionalized intergovernmental agreements the provincial governments agreed to fulfil all of the federal government’s continuing obligations to third parties after the transfer. One of these obligations was the redemption of Métis scrip issued by the federal government to extinguish the Métis share of Aboriginal land title. After the transfer, however, the provinces resisted granting more land to satisfy what they considered to be a federal obligation. The provinces refused to redeem Métis scrip entitlements and the federal government did not enforce the terms of the NRTAs. Both the federal and provincial governments failed to live up to the terms of the constitutional agreement and the Métis scrip issue fell through the jurisdictional cracks of Canadian federalism. This dissertation examines the historical context and consequences surrounding the Alberta and Saskatchewan government’s failure to recognize Métis scripholders’ rights-based claims to land. Each provincial government pursued different avenues with respect to natural resources and Métis policies. The purpose of this study is to examine the different phases of policy development in each province in light of the general failure of recognition. The transfer of control and administration of the public domain from one level of government to another provides interesting insights into the history of government-Aboriginal relations in Canada. Aboriginal people (including Métis) were not consulted during the negotiations leading up to the NRTAs; nevertheless (or perhaps as a result), the transfer agreements were a catalyst for political organization in several Métis communities. Métis who had been living on federal crown land were concerned that the transfer of lands to the provinces would negatively impact their right to pursue traditional livelihoods such as hunting, fishing and trapping. In Alberta, the NRTAs sparked the formation of the Métis Association of Alberta, a political lobbying group that advocated recognition of historical claims to land. During this period, parallel Métis living in Saskatchewan and Manitoba created parallel organizations. These political groups represent some of the earliest attempts by Aboriginal people in the prairie provinces to voice their concerns and influence government policy. There are three recurrent themes in this study. First, land appears as a point of convergence for Métis claims and an alternative to the distribution of government social assistance due to high levels of unemployment. Second, Métis political organizing affects government policy-making. Third, the thesis notes the marked change in policy direction by the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) government in Saskatchewan after its election in 1944. The CCF introduced natural resources policies based on social democratic principles such as collective marketing. This approach was a marked departure from the liberal approaches introduced by previous provincial governments in Alberta and Saskatchewan. / Graduate / 0398 / nobyrne.ca@gmail.com

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

Two prominent historians, David Cannadine and Brad Gregory, have recently contended that history is distorted by overemphasis on human difference and division across time and space. This problem has been acute in studies of Native-Newcomer relations, where exaggeration of Native pre-contact stability and post-contact change further emphasized Native-Newcomer difference. Although questioned in economic, social and political spheres, emphasis on cultural difference persists. To investigate the problem, this study examined the Algonquian wihtiko (windigo), an apparent exemplar of Native-Newcomer difference and division. With a focus on the James Bay Cree, this study first probed the wihtiko phenomenon’s Native origins and meanings. It then examined post-1635 Newcomer encounters with this phenomenon: from the bush to public opinion and law, especially between 1815 and 1914, and in post-1820 academia. Diverse archives, ethnographies, oral traditions, and academic texts were consulted. The cannibal wihtiko evolved from Algonquian attempts to understand and control rare but extreme mental and moral failures in famine contexts. It attained mythical proportions, but fears of wihtiko possession, transformation and violence remained real enough to provoke pre-emptive killings even of family members. Wihtiko beliefs also influenced Algonquian manifestations and interpretations of generic mental and moral failures. Consciously or not, others used it to scapegoat, manipulate, or kill. Newcomers threatened by moral and mental failures attributed to the wihtiko often took Algonquian beliefs and practices seriously, even espousing them. Yet Algonquian wihtiko behaviours, beliefs and practices sometimes presented Newcomers with another layer of questions about mental and moral incompetence. Collisions arose when they discounted, misconstrued or asserted control over Algonquian beliefs and practices. For post-colonial critics, this has raised a third layer of questions about intellectual and moral incompetence. Yet some critics have also misconstrued earlier attempts to understand and control the wihtiko, or attributed an apparent lack of scholarly consensus to Western cultural incompetence or inability to grasp the wihtiko. In contrast, this study of wihtiko phenomena reveals deeper commonalities and continuities. They are obscured by the complex evolution of Natives’ and Newcomers’ struggles to understand and control the wihtiko. Yet hidden in these very struggles and the wihtiko itself is a persistent shared conviction that reducing others to objects of power signals mental and moral failure. The wihtiko reveals cultural differences, changes and divisions, but exemplifies more fundamental commonalities and continuities.