MONTE, José Cleyton Vasconcelos. Interfaces da corrupção política no Brasil: a CPMI dos correios. 2012. 119f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Sociologia) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Departamento de Ciências Sociais, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Sociologia, Fortaleza-CE, 2012. / Submitted by Maria Josineide Góis (josineide@ufc.br) on 2012-07-31T12:16:37Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2012_Dis_JCVMonte.pdf: 1078237 bytes, checksum: 8ab49b48e37c939e47119b7ec8ce292d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Josineide Góis(josineide@ufc.br) on 2013-02-16T18:35:19Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2012_Dis_JCVMonte.pdf: 1078237 bytes, checksum: 8ab49b48e37c939e47119b7ec8ce292d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-02-16T18:35:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2012_Dis_JCVMonte.pdf: 1078237 bytes, checksum: 8ab49b48e37c939e47119b7ec8ce292d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / The research aims to understand the phenomenon of political corruption in Brazil. Initially, I trace elements that characterize these practices, discussing the causes and implications of corrupt behavior to democracy, by reference to the international analysis and the main Brazilian studies on this topic. Next, we analyze the role of parliamentary committees of inquiry (PCI), highlighting its major challenges and critical discourse on corruption in the parliamentary arena and the relationship with the journalistic field. Based on material produced by the press and especially the Final Report prepared by the JPCI of the Post Office, which in 2005 and 2006 investigated famous scandal of the "monthly allowance", an elaborate analysis of the relationship between the Brazilian political system and corrupt practices highlighting the main points of discussion during the period of this scandal: the issue of campaign finance and the complex relationship between political parties, private and state companies, treated from the "valerioduct" and the debate on the formation and maintenance of parliamentary coalitions, approached through the "monthly allowance". In conclusion, it just draws attentions to some proposals for political reform, brought to the fore at the time of research and the need for parliamentary participation by civil society, conceived as mechanisms to combat corruption. / A pesquisa tem como objetivo compreender o fenômeno da corrupção política no Brasil. Inicialmente, traço os elementos que caracterizam essas práticas, discutindo as causas e consequências do comportamento corrupto para a democracia, tomando como referência as análises internacionais e os principais estudos brasileiros sobre o tema. Em seguida, analiso o papel das comissões parlamentares de inquérito (CPIs), ressaltando seus maiores desafios e críticas, os discursos sobre corrupção na arena parlamentar e a relação com o campo jornalístico. Partindo de matérias produzidas pela imprensa e, principalmente, do Relatório Final elaborado pela CPMI dos Correios, que investigou nos anos de 2005 e 2006 o famoso escândalo do “mensalão”, elaboro uma análise sobre a relação entre o sistema político brasileiro e as práticas de corrupção, destacando os principais pontos de discussão no período do referido escândalo: a questão do financiamento de campanha e a complexa relação entre partidos, empresas privadas e estatais, tratados a partir do “valerioduto” e o debate sobre a formação e manutenção das coalizões parlamentares, abordado através do “mensalão”. Na conclusão, chamo atenção para algumas propostas de reforma política, trazidas à tona no momento dos trabalhos de investigação parlamentar e a necessidade de participação por parte da sociedade civil, pensados como mecanismos para combater a corrupção.

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This dissertation contends that to appropriately address the state of political equality and pursue democratic interest(s) in an increasingly commodified world, we must understand the more complex, socio-legal, and interdependent actions, actors, discourse, laws, and ideas which have grown increasingly important within campaign finance judicial out-comes, as these impact political equality and democratic governance. Consequently, this dissertation examines the largely underexplored factors that shape judicial outcomes and practical application of campaign finance policy which are explanatory of the distribution of electoral participatory power. This electoral participatory power is a key indicator of political equality in democratic nation states. The underexplored factors that I examine include corporate identity as an analytical concept and power resource, commodification of political speech, constitutional constraints, intergovernmental dialogue, regulatory ac-tors, and varied judicial and legislative commitments to democracy. To do so, the thesis utilizes and modifies insights from historical institutionalism, power resources models, neopluralism, and dialogue theory literature, to contribute to knowledge about how and why campaign finance policies and electoral participatory power of individuals, groups, and corporations have changed over time through judicial outcomes, practical administration, and related reforms. Through this demonstration, the analysis of this thesis opens up space to explore and identify sources and modes of gradual institutional change within the context of campaign finance judicial outcomes. Specifically, this thesis documents and critically examines the actions, actors, discourse, laws, and ideas which have permeated judicial conflicts in Canada and the United States over several decades and illustrates how they have determined the scope of corporate constitutional rights and freedoms, potential for money in politics, and the distribution of political equality in these two advanced democracies. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This dissertation examines the sources and modes of gradual institutional change within the context of judicial campaign finance conflicts and related reforms. It argues that the scope of corporate constitutional rights, the commodification of political speech, and the distribution of electoral participatory power are best understood through an analysis that utilizes and modifies insights from historical institutionalism, power resources models, neopluralism, and dialogue theory literature. To demonstrate this, this thesis critically examines the complex, socio-legal, and interdependent actions, actors, discourse, laws, and ideas which have grown increasingly important within campaign finance judicial out-comes, as these impact political equality and democratic governance. Consequently, this thesis illustrates how the scope of corporate constitutional rights and freedoms, potential for money in politics, and the distribution of political equality in the context of elections in Canada and the United States have changed over time, and the reasons for which they have.

State legislative campaign finance reform varies considerably among states and over time. Over the past 35 years states have adopted increasingly stronger reform policies; however, many disparities between states still exist. Current state legislative campaign finance laws range from disclosure only to clean elections programs. All states have disclosure laws, while only three have clean elections regulations. Many studies of state campaign finance reform examine the regulatory effects on campaigns and elections (e.g., Thompson and Moncrief 1998; Francia and Herrnson 2003) but none consider the causes of such reforms. This dissertation employs a unique research strategy by individually analyzing the specific types of state legislative campaign finance reform: 1) disclosure, 2) contribution limits, and 3) expenditure limits and public funding from 1970-2005. What emerges from these analyses indicates the conditions under which states have adopted more and less stringent types of legislative campaign finance reform. It examines the extent to which legislative professionalism, Democratic control of government, political scandals, and the initiative affect the stringency of campaign finance reform in the states. Just because a state requires legislative candidates to disclose campaign finance figures does not mean that the requirement is strong when compared to what other states are doing. Measuring the type of campaign finance reform based on a unique stringency scale allows us to understand the conditions under which a state supports strong or weak campaign finance laws. / Political Science

This thesis compares the public policies of campaign finance in Canada with those in the U.S. and the U.K. in the period 2000-2011. The majority of the Canadian literature on party finance demonstrates a belief in the efficacy and necessity of the enterprise. This dissertation suspends this disposition and offers a critical approach to the regulation of money in Canadian elections. This thesis situates the discussion of party finance regulation in the context of contending models of democracy. Campaign finance rule changes are conceptualized within a new institutionalist framework. Changes in campaign finance rules are seen as changes in incentives and are seen to work in configurations, that is, interacting with existing formal and informal constraints. New institutionalism provides the avenue of inquiry into the position of political parties on the boundary of the public and private spheres and how campaign finance regulation may shift that boundary. This thesis adopts a mixed-method approach, incorporating the results of 65 semi-structured interviews with academics and political practitioners with primary document research. This thesis demonstrates that campaign finance rule changes interact with other electoral rules, types of parties and the nation’s historic institutions. The need to meld Quebec’s statist and civil-code traditions with Westminster democratic traditions, the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the role of subsequent court decisions, and the role of Elections Canada in its political finance oversight capacity, constitute major catalysts for Canadian party finance rule changes and for understanding the impact of rule changes. Contrary to the majority of literature on campaign finance reform, this thesis demonstrates that there may be diminishing marginal returns to additional campaign finance regulations, at least in a mature democracy such as Canada. Campaign finance rules reveal preferences for different models of democracy. As such, they must be carefully monitored.

This thesis compares the public policies of campaign finance in Canada with those in the U.S. and the U.K. in the period 2000-2011. The majority of the Canadian literature on party finance demonstrates a belief in the efficacy and necessity of the enterprise. This dissertation suspends this disposition and offers a critical approach to the regulation of money in Canadian elections. This thesis situates the discussion of party finance regulation in the context of contending models of democracy. Campaign finance rule changes are conceptualized within a new institutionalist framework. Changes in campaign finance rules are seen as changes in incentives and are seen to work in configurations, that is, interacting with existing formal and informal constraints. New institutionalism provides the avenue of inquiry into the position of political parties on the boundary of the public and private spheres and how campaign finance regulation may shift that boundary. This thesis adopts a mixed-method approach, incorporating the results of 65 semi-structured interviews with academics and political practitioners with primary document research. This thesis demonstrates that campaign finance rule changes interact with other electoral rules, types of parties and the nation’s historic institutions. The need to meld Quebec’s statist and civil-code traditions with Westminster democratic traditions, the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the role of subsequent court decisions, and the role of Elections Canada in its political finance oversight capacity, constitute major catalysts for Canadian party finance rule changes and for understanding the impact of rule changes. Contrary to the majority of literature on campaign finance reform, this thesis demonstrates that there may be diminishing marginal returns to additional campaign finance regulations, at least in a mature democracy such as Canada. Campaign finance rules reveal preferences for different models of democracy. As such, they must be carefully monitored.

There is a great deal of work on campaign finance at the national level, however, state level research is sparse. My dissertation fills this void in the literature by examining the motivations of contributors to state legislators. The literature discusses two major motivations of contributors universalistic contributors, who hope to influence election outcomes, and particularistic contributors who hope to influence legislative votes. The primary hypothesis is that proximity to the general election is the primary factor in explaining contribution patterns in state legislatures; however, proximity to a legislative vote of interest to the contributor will also be significant in explaining contribution patterns. Additionally, the dissertation examines the impact of session limits on contribution patterns. I use campaign contribution data collected by the National Institute on Money in State Politics and select twenty-five bills in nine states to test the primary hypothesis. I use a contributor fixed effects model to test for increased or decreased levels of contributions for each contributor, given the proximity to the election and legislative votes important to the contributor. The results indicate that contributions increase across all states in the two months prior to the general and primary elections, and that proximity to the election is the most important factor in explaining campaign contributions in state legislatures. In 32% of all cases in the study, there was direct evidence of interest groups attempting to influence the outcome of legislative votes. Additionally, an increase in contributions close to a major legislative vote occurred in 77% of the cases without session limits, indicating that interest groups are highly active in attempting to influence policy outcomes. An additional examination of contribution patterns indicates that PACs shift their contributions to the beginning of the legislative session when faced with session limits. My research contributes to our understanding of the motives of campaign contributors and their actions when faced with legal restrictions on their contributions. This research, therefore, allows campaign finance reformers to make better reform decisions.

The intention of campaign finance regulations was to reduce the influence of special interest groups while increasing citizen contributions. Critics have suggested an unintentional consequence of this policy of increasing bias in campaign contributions in favor of incumbents. These claims of intentional and unintentional consequences, however, have rarely been tested. My dissertation examines the intentional and unintentional consequences of campaign finance regulations in the American states. This study adopts a theoretical framework emphasizing the different effects of regulations on two distinctive types of contributors. A particularistic contributor, whose motivation is influencing policy, is likely to be affected by contribution limits. A universalistic contributor, motivated by helping his or her favorite candidates, is not likely to respond to regulations. Furthermore, the disparity of contributions is not expected to be affected by contribution limits. Two specific hypotheses reflecting the theoretical consideration are tested: 1) Restrictive contribution limits reduce the number and amount of particularistic contributions and increase the disparity between the numbers as well as the amounts of contributions, and 2) Contribution limits do not affect the number, the amount, or the disparities of universalistic contributions. Individual contribution records on gubernatorial elections are collected from 1990 to 2000 in 42 states. After aggregating individual contribution records by state and candidate, two analyses are conducted at the state and candidate level. The results indicate that campaign finance regulations work without the unintentional consequence of providing a financial advantage to incumbents at both the state and candidate levels. Contribution limits increase the number of total contributors, reduce the number and amount of particularistic contributions, and increase the number of universalistic contributors. In addition, further analyses show a dynamic effect of contribution limits on corporations, labor unions, individuals, parties, and ideology PACs. Restrictive contribution limits reduce the number and amount of corporate contributions, but only reduce the amount of labor union contributions. On the other hand, strict contribution limits encourage individual contributions, but discourage party and ideological PAC contributions. The intentional consequence of campaign finance regulations does not result in the unintentional consequence of increasing bias in favor of incumbents. These findings suggest that current regulations that limit campaign contributions should remain in place.

In recent years, judicial elections have undergone a transformation: races once characterized by low levels of competition, interest and participation are now comparable, in some states, to races for governor or senator. Elections for the bench as a whole are now more expensive, competitive and politicized than ever before. Arguably the most influential change in the last ten years has been the emergence of independent expenditures by political action committees and other groups in races for seats on state supreme courts. Despite the growth of this type of spending, our understanding of independent expenditures is rather limited, as the distinction between independent expenditures and direct contributions to candidates is rarely made clear.I address this in this dissertation by examining the patterns of independent spending in states with elected supreme courts. In doing so, I develop a theoretical framework to explain the decision of individual groups to support a judicial candidate independently. I argue that this decision is shaped largely by the campaign regulations imposed on judicial candidates and their potential supporters. Expectations from this theory are tested throughout the remainder of the dissertation using an original set of data drawn directly from state disclosure records. I find that independent expenditures have been concentrated in only a few states in recent years and that campaign regulations are influential in shaping this aggregate behavior. Contribution limits, in particular, redirect money from candidates' campaigns to independent expenditures. This is particularly significant due to the unique nature of judicial elections and the role of a judge in American politics. The results of the statistical and case study analyses should give pause to participants in the normative debates regarding campaign finance and judicial reform as they suggest that regulations can have unintended, but important consequences.

This investigation into the rapid expansion of prison construction and mass incarceration in Eastern Kentucky under the leadership of Congressman and House Appropriations Committee Chairman Hal Rogers aims to determine why this policy has continued to be a viable political strategy for Rogers despite its apparent failure to advance social and economic development in the region. This analysis suggests that the Rogers Case can be used as a case study to greater understand the proliferation of political power available to elected officials in ANY district where the democratic incentive structure encourages politicians to represent the interests of private corporations and industries instead of constituents as long as they can count on their campaign contributions and the protection of their incumbencies.