A presente tese se dedicou a investigar, a partir das doações de campanha, a relação entre o setor empresarial e o sistema político, e qual o peso dos partidos políticos nessa relação. O foco da análise recaiu sobre as receitas de campanha, nas eleições de 2006, para a Câmara dos Deputados, considerando tanto as carreiras individuais dos candidatos como sua filiação partidária. Esta última perspectiva revelou padrões de concentração entre os partidos de centro-direita. Entretanto, quando se desagrega as empresas segundo o setor de atividade e os candidatos segundo o distrito eleitoral, a distribuição de fundos tende a ser heterogênea. Quanto às carreiras individuais, a análise identificou forte influência do capital político dos candidatos, destacando-se a relevância de uma longa trajetória política aliada à experiência em secretarias e ministérios, bem como o estabelecimento de vínculos anteriores com associações patronais. Além dessas evidências empíricas, a presente tese buscou levantar importantes tensões teóricas e dilemas suscitados pelo debate sobre o financiamento de campanha. / This dissertation attempted to investigate the relationship between the corporate sector and the political system and the role parties play on it by examining private donations to political campaigns. The analysis focused on campaign expenditures in the 2006 election for the Chamber of Deputies, accounting both for the candidates career individually and for their party affiliation. The latter perspective revealed patterns of concentration among right wing and center parties. However, when disaggregating the companies by sector of activity and the candidates by electoral district, the share of funds tends to be heterogeneous. Concerning individual careers, the analysis identified marked influence of political capital, especially long-term political trajectories allied with prior experience in secretaries, as well as previous links with employers\' associations. Besides these empirical evidences, this dissertation aimed to raise relevant theoretical tensions and dilemmas brought by the debate on campaign finance.

Doações legais a campanhas eleitorais podem comprar influência? Diversos estudos desenvolvidos na literatura detectaram evidências de que empresas podem se beneficiar de conexões estabelecidas com políticos por meio de doações em campanhas eleitorais, sendo que a potencial influência pode ser entendida pelos investidores como uma vantagem competitiva. Com a mudança de cenário trazida pela decisão do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) de proibir as doações por pessoas jurídicas em campanhas eleitorais a partir de 2016, este trabalho buscou avaliar qual seria o possível impacto inicial que essa nova legislação eleitoral poderia trazer para o ambiente econômico. A amostra foi composta por empresas com ações negociadas na B3 durante o período de 2010 a 2017, sendo os dados referentes a doações para os cargos de presidente, senador e deputado federal nas eleições de 2010 e 2014. Esta pesquisa foi dividida em duas partes. A primeira parte utilizou a metodologia do estudo de evento, estabelecendo janelas de teste que representaram o andamento do processo jurídico e as repercussões no mercado. Os resultados sugerem que as empresas doadoras, principalmente as que contribuíram para candidatos da base governista, obtiveram retornos anormais positivos e significantes quando o supremo aceitou julgar essa matéria, porém o mesmo não se refletiu para as demais janelas de evento. Já a segunda parte buscou estimar se as doações geravam dois benefícios para essas entidades, que são: maior acesso a crédito com menor custo financeiro via BNDES e maior agressividade fiscal, devido ao exercício de influência que essas empresas doadoras poderiam ter sobre os legisladores e representantes do Estado. Os resultados dos modelos de regressões de dados em painel apontam que os empréstimos concedidos pelo BNDES tem relação positiva e significativa com as doações feitas por empresas. Das medidas de agressividade fiscal utilizadas nesta pesquisa, book tax difference (BTD) e effective tax rate (ETR), somente ETR foi negativamente significante. Essa variável representa a taxa efetiva de tributos sobre o lucro e a literatura diz que quanto menor o ETR, maior a probabilidade de a empresa ser fiscalmente mais agressiva. Complementando a análise, por meio de modelos de diferenças em diferenças, foi estimado o efeito da decisão final do STF sobre esses eventuais benefícios, porém, não houve indícios de que a proibição tenha afetado as variáveis estudadas. É importante mencionar que para as medidas de agressividade fiscal, é possível que o curto espaço de tempo não tenha sido o suficiente para poder observar o efeito da proibição, uma vez que esses efeitos iniciais podem demorar a surgir. / Can legal campaign contributions buy influence? Several studies in the literature have detected evidence that companies that donate can benefit from these established connections with politicians, and that potential influence can be understood as a competitive advantage for these companies. With the change brought about by the decision of the Supreme Federal Court (STF) to ban company donations in electoral campaigns from 2016, this work sought to evaluate what would be the possible impact that this new electoral legislation could bring to the economic environment. The sample comprised companies with shares traded at B3 during the period from 2010 to 2017, with data referring to the donations for the positions of president, senator and federal deputy in the 2010 and 2014 elections. This research was divided into two parts. The first part used the methodology of the event study, establishing event windows that represented the progress of the process and the repercussions in the market. The results suggest that donor firms, especially those that contributed to candidates from the ruling base, obtained abnormal positive and significant returns when the supreme judge accepted the matter, but the same effect was not reflected for the other event windows. The second part sought to estimate if the donations generated two benefits for these entities: greater access to credit with lower financial costs through BNDES and greater fiscal aggressiveness, due to the exercise of influence that these donor companies could have on the legislators and representatives of the State. The results of the panel data regression models indicate that loans granted by BNDES are positive and significant with the donations made by companies. Of the fiscal aggressiveness measures used in this research, the book tax difference (BTD) and effective tax rate (ETR), only ETR was negatively significant. This variable represents the effective tax rate on profit and the literature says that the lower ETR, the greater the probability that company will be more tax aggressive. Complementing the analysis, by means of models of differences in differences, the effect of the final decision of the STF on these possible benefits was estimated. Only the BNDES loans were negatively and significantly affected by the change, suggesting that the grants could represent a way of influencing the investment decisions of this government-controlled bank. Regarding measures of fiscal aggression, it is possible that the short time was not enough to be able to observe the effect of the prohibition, since these initial effects may be slow to arise in this case.

Political corruption is a cancer - a malignant phenomenon that affects every political system and every person in the world. Corruption undermines the very fabric of society and the faith of people in their government. It makes goods more expensive, stymies development in developing nations, and it makes both the United States and the world a more dangerous place. Because of its negative effects and universality, corruption should be studied. Its study leads to greater understanding, the discovery of effective approaches to prevention, and restored faith in political systems. Its study also illuminates and breaks down barriers to effective government while empowering officials who put constituents before themselves to act. In this analysis, modern literature and analyses are examined to gain better understanding of the nature and wider study of corruption, rankings of the American states are analyzed and a meta-study completed to rank the states along broader criteria, and one particular state - Florida - is examined closely as a case study in political corruption. Why Florida? Florida is the fourth largest state in the United States, has a racially and socioeconomically diverse population, and the highest number of convictions for corruption of any other state for the last decade. The result of this study is a deeper insight into political corruption as a field of study, better understanding of defining and measuring political corruption, and potential policy remedies to reduce it. The results come with implications for a wide variety of academic fields with vested interest in the study of political corruption along with nonacademic audiences seeking to rid themselves of this cancer of government.

No description available.

The dissertation investigates a constitutional amendment to the 2012 legislation of the presidential election. The amendment introduced an election of the president through a popular vote, which was a historical milestone for the Czech legal system. However, the new adjustment was adopted in haste and evinces many deficiencies; that was proven in the 2013 presidential election. Therefore, the aim of the dissertation is to describe problematical parts of the new legal adjustment and find some possible solutions. The main topics are as follows: 1) modification of the basic concepts of the election system, 2) candidate nomination process, 3) election campaign funding and 4) ethical aspects of the election campaign. A comparison of legal adjustments of 14 EU countries with the direct presidential election (the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Croatia, Ireland, Cyprus, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Austria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) was done, in order to find appropriate solutions. Apart from the results of comparison, the dissertation is based on reports by GRECO, OSCE and the corresponding Czech judicature. In conclusion, the Czech adjustment of the presidential election meets every democratic principle, but, at the same time, contains many mistakes. Especially the queries of "election campaign...

Despite the fact that the issue has been discussed for several decades, there are still no rules in Sweden mandating political parties and candidates to disclose received donations. Because of this lack of transparency, Sweden is not fulfilling some of its international obligations and has fallen behind in the international trend to increase the transparency of election campaign finance. The lack of disclosure rules in Sweden has led to extensive criticism, most notably from the Council of Europe´s group of states against corruption, Greco, who criticized Sweden in light of the guidelines on the subject from the Council of Europe. At this writing, a new proposal for disclosure rules is being prepared at the Department of Justice, DoJ. The proposal is to be presented in spring 2013. For the time being, the only thing that exists regarding transparency of election finance in Sweden is an agreement from 2000, struck between some of the parties in parliament, to voluntarily disclose some of their received donations. In 2004 a government report proposed implementing disclosure rules. The proposal received extensive criticism from the reviewing bodies regarding its compliance with the rights protection in the Swedish Instrument of Government, RF. RF provides absolute protection against the government forcing individuals to disclose their opinions in political matters and absolute protection against the government keeping records of individuals' political opinions. Since these rights are absolute, they can be restricted only by constitutional amendment. It is uncertain if disclosure rules can be considered infringements under these absolute provisions, but even if they are considered infringements, it is likely that the disclosure provisions can be designed so as not to violate the RF absolute protections. Furthermore, RF provides relative protection of the freedom of expression and association. Disclosure rules would probably not infringe the freedom of expression but are likely to be considered infringements of the freedom of association. Restrictions of the freedom of association can only be implemented in the order specified in RF and since the order for restricting the freedom of association is very rigid, it is unlikely that such a restriction would be allowed under the current RF. The DoJ has expressed that the pending proposal will not include a proposal for a constitutional amendment. For Sweden to fulfill its international obligations in regards of transparency in campaign finance, more extensive disclosure rules must be implemented than those included in the agreement between some parties in parliament and those included in the 2004 proposal. The DoJ has expressed, however, that the pending proposal will be modeled upon both the voluntary agreement and the 2004 proposal. It is therefore not entirely unlikely that the pending proposal will be either illegal under the constitution or not far reaching enough, or both. / I Sverige saknas regler som kräver av politiska partier och kandidater att redovisa mottagna donationer (redovisningskrav). Detta trots att frågan diskuterats under flera decennier. Frånvaron av redovisningskrav innebär att Sverige inte uppfyller vissa av sina internationella åtaganden och att Sverige halkat efter i den mycket tydliga internationella trenden att öka transparensen kring valkampanjernas finansiering. Frånvaron har även lett till omfattande kritik, framförallt från Europarådets grupp mot korruption, Greco, som kritiserat bristen utifrån Europarådets riktlinjer i ämnet. I skrivande stund bereds vid Justitiedepartementet ett förslag till redovisningskrav som kommer att presenteras under våren 2013. Tills vidare är det enda som finns avseende transparens i valkampanjfinansieringen en överenskommelse från 2000, mellan några av partierna i Riksdagen om att frivilligt redovisa vissa mottagna bidrag. År 2004 föreslog en offentlig utredning införandet av redovisningskrav. Förslaget mötte omfattande kritik från remissinstanserna gällande dess förenlighet med regeringsformens, RF:s, rättighetsskydd. RF innehåller ett absolut skydd mot att det allmänna tvingar en enskild att tillkännage sin politiska åskådning och ett absolut skydd mot att det allmänna registrerar en enskilds politiska åskådning. Eftersom dessa skydd är absoluta kan de endast inskränkas genom grundlags-ändring. Det är osäkert om redovisningskrav kan anses vara inskränkningar av dessa absoluta skydd. Om redovisningskrav är inskränkningar av dessa absoluta rättigheter torde det ändock vara möjligt att utforma kraven så att de är förenliga med skydden. RF innehåller även relativa skydd för yttrandefrihet och föreningsfrihet. Redovisningskrav skulle förmodligen inte vara en inskränkning av RF:s skydd för yttrandefriheten men troligtvis vara en inskränkning av RF:s skydd för föreningsfrihet. Detta innebär att inskränkningen endast får göras enligt i RF stadgad ordning. Eftersom möjligheterna att inskränka föreningsfriheten enligt RF är mycket små är det tveksamt om en sådan inskränkning är möjlig att införa utan grundlagsändring. Justitiedepartementet har dock uttryckt att det nya förslaget inte kommer att inkludera något förslag till grundlagsändring. För att Sverige ska uppfylla sina internationella åtaganden avseende öppenhet i valfinansieringen måste mer långtgående redovisningskrav införas än de som ingår i den frivilliga överenskommelsen och som föreslogs av utredningen 2004. Justitiedepartementet har dock uttryckt att just utredningen från 2004 och den frivilliga överenskommelsen ska ligga till grund för de nya redovisningskraven. Det är alltså inte helt osannolikt att det kommande förslaget till redovisningskrav kommer att vara antingen oförenlig med regeringsformen eller inte tillräckligt långtgående, eller både och

Submitted by Jamile Barbosa da Cruz (jamile.cruz@ucsal.br) on 2017-01-16T13:56:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 COELHO JS 2014.pdf: 1406305 bytes, checksum: ea019e3bafe4975562e7719188d16578 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rosemary Magalhães (rosemary.magalhaes@ucsal.br) on 2017-01-16T18:41:58Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Josafa.pdf: 1406305 bytes, checksum: ea019e3bafe4975562e7719188d16578 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-01-16T18:41:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Josafa.pdf: 1406305 bytes, checksum: ea019e3bafe4975562e7719188d16578 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-09 / Este trabalho analisa a influência do poder econômico sobre o resultado das eleições para cargos eletivos. Pretende-se expor ao debate as características e os desafios da democracia representativa brasileira, especialmente da democracia baiana. Discute-se precisamente a influência dos gastos de campanha sobre o resultado das eleições políticas de 2010 e 2012 na Bahia. A influência do poder econômico, como chaga a adoecer a democracia, apresenta-se como fato capaz de recrudescer as limitações e acirrar as contradições do sistema representativo, não obstante o aparato legal relacionado com o processo eleitoral procure mitigar tais efeitos. Eis uma contradição do sistema representativo que se reveste de hipótese neste trabalho: no exercício do poder econômico os candidatos a cargo público têm seduzido a massa de eleitores com propaganda eleitoral grandiosa e ilusória, promessas e até entrega de bens e vantagens pessoais, transformando as eleições numa arena de disputa econômica. Assim, o voto não tem sido o resultado de uma decisão consciente que avalia ideias e projetos políticos, mas tem decorrido da capacidade de gasto do candidato. Contudo, numa verdadeira democracia, a representação política será mais legítima quanto mais livres, iguais e conscientes forem os eleitores e os candidatos a cargo eletivo, a ponto de o gasto de campanha não se tornar o fator determinante para a eleição dos governantes. A falta de representação política dos interesses da maioria da população implica uma limitação do sistema e denuncia a ausência de legitimidade dos representantes, o que mantém a democracia como um ideal romântico que não se realiza, ou uma mera carta de intenções que o jogo de poder não permite que se torne realidade. / This paper analyzes the influence of economic power on the outcome of elections for elective office. It is intended to expose debate the characteristics and limits of the Brazilian representative democracy, especially in Bahia democracy. Precisely we discuss the influence of campaign spending on the outcome of the 2010 and 2012 general elections in Bahia. The influence of economic power, as a sore sick democracy, is presented as fact able to intensify the limitations and intensify the contradictions of the representative system, notwithstanding the electoral process related to law enforcement seek to mitigate such effects . Here is a contradiction of the representative system which is of argument in this paper: the exercise of economic power candidates for public office have seduced the great mass of voters with electoral propaganda and illusory, and promises to deliver goods and personal advantage, turning elections an arena of economic struggle. Therefore, the vote has not been the result of a conscious decision that assesses political ideas and projects, but has elapsed the spending capacity of the candidate. However , a true democracy, political representation will be more legitimate the more free, equal and are conscious voters and candidates for elected office, to the point of spending campaign does not become the determining factor in the election of the governing factor. The lack of political representation of the interests of the majority of the population implies a limitation of the system and reports the lack of legitimacy of representatives, which holds democracy as a romantic ideal that is not realized, or merely a letter of intent that the power game does not allow to become reality.

Lobbying should be strictly regulated – that is the major finding of this thesis. The thesis presents many reasons to enact stricter regulations. The principle one being that, as lightly regulated as it is, lobbying is corroding democracy in both Canada and the United States. The thesis opens with a deep investigation of how lobbying works in both countries. There are examples taken from the literature, as well as original qualitative interviews of Canadian lobbyists, former politicians, and officials. Together, these make it clear that there is an intimate relationship between lobbying and campaign financing. The link between the two is sufficiently tight that lobbying and campaign financing should be considered mirrors of each other for the purposes of regulatory design and constitutional jurisprudence. They both have large impacts on government decision-making. Left lightly regulated, lobbying and campaign financing erode the processes of democracy, damage policy-making, and feed an inequality spiral into plutocracy. These have become major challenges of our time. The thesis examines the lobbying regulations currently in place. It finds the regulatory systems of both countries wanting. Since stricter regulation is required to protect democracy and equality, the thesis considers what constitutional constraints, if any, would stand in the way. This, primarily, is a study of how proposed stronger lobbying regulations would interact with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2 (free expression and association rights) and s. 3 (democratic rights). The principal findings are that legislation which restricted lobbying as proposed would probably be upheld by the Canadian court, but struck down by the American court, due to differences in their constitutional jurisprudence. The thesis contends that robust lobbying regulations would align with Canadian Charter values, provide benefits to democracy, improve government decision-making, increase equality, and create more room for citizen voices. The thesis concludes with a set of proposed principles for lobbying reform and an evaluation of two specific reforms: limits on business lobbying and funding for citizen groups. Although the thesis focuses on Canadian and American lobbying regulations, its lessons are broadly applicable to any jurisdiction that is considering regulating lobbying.

In a time when record numbers of dollars are being spent on campaigns the unregulated dollars are flowing faster than ever. Hundreds of millions of dollars in independent expenditures are being used for “issue advocacy”, print and broadcast advertising, which does not expressly endorse or oppose a candidate for office. The one-time campaign finance ceiling has become the campaign finance basement. Individuals are able to give unlimited dollars to 527 organizations, which function outside of all campaign finance regulation and provide a new path for the flow of political dollars. Since the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, commonly known as the McCain-Feingold Act, federally regulated lobbyists and PACS are being edged out of the political dollar due to contribution limits. It is in 1996 that we witness the birth of 527 organizations and the flourishing growth of soft money spending in the campaign process.

No description available.