CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / A pesquisa tem como objetivo compreender o fenÃmeno da corrupÃÃo polÃtica no Brasil. Inicialmente, traÃo os elementos que caracterizam essas prÃticas, discutindo as causas e consequÃncias do comportamento corrupto para a democracia, tomando como referÃncia as anÃlises internacionais e os principais estudos brasileiros sobre o tema. Em seguida, analiso o papel das comissÃes parlamentares de inquÃrito (CPIs), ressaltando seus maiores desafios e crÃticas, os discursos sobre corrupÃÃo na arena parlamentar e a relaÃÃo com o campo jornalÃstico. Partindo de matÃrias produzidas pela imprensa e, principalmente, do RelatÃrio Final elaborado pela CPMI dos Correios, que investigou nos anos de 2005 e 2006 o famoso escÃndalo do âmensalÃoâ, elaboro uma anÃlise sobre a relaÃÃo entre o sistema polÃtico brasileiro e as prÃticas de corrupÃÃo, destacando os principais pontos de discussÃo no perÃodo do referido escÃndalo: a questÃo do financiamento de campanha e a complexa relaÃÃo entre partidos, empresas privadas e estatais, tratados a partir do âvaleriodutoâ e o debate sobre a formaÃÃo e manutenÃÃo das coalizÃes parlamentares, abordado atravÃs do âmensalÃoâ. Na conclusÃo, chamo atenÃÃo para algumas propostas de reforma polÃtica, trazidas à tona no momento dos trabalhos de investigaÃÃo parlamentar e a necessidade de participaÃÃo por parte da sociedade civil, pensados como mecanismos para combater a corrupÃÃo. / The research aims to understand the phenomenon of political corruption in Brazil. Initially, I trace elements that characterize these practices, discussing the causes and implications of corrupt behavior to democracy, by reference to the international analysis and the main Brazilian studies on this topic. Next, we analyze the role of parliamentary committees of inquiry (PCI), highlighting its major challenges and critical discourse on corruption in the parliamentary arena and the relationship with the journalistic field. Based on material produced by the press and especially the Final Report prepared by the JPCI of the Post Office, which in 2005 and 2006 investigated famous scandal of the "monthly allowance", an elaborate analysis of the relationship between the Brazilian political system and corrupt practices highlighting the main points of discussion during the period of this scandal: the issue of campaign finance and the complex relationship between political parties, private and state companies, treated from the "valerioduct" and the debate on the formation and maintenance of parliamentary coalitions, approached through the "monthly allowance". In conclusion, it just draws attentions to some proposals for political reform, brought to the fore at the time of research and the need for parliamentary participation by civil society, conceived as mechanisms to combat corruption.

A vast literature acknowledges the corruptibility of regulators; however, empirical tests on the matter have been limited to two-agent models examining the rulemaking process and price regulation of natural monopolies. It remains an open question whether political contributions, by driving legislative pressure, can entice laxity from regulators in their application of the rules. To remedy this issue, I observe the highly-regulated coal mining industry for which there exists several points for inspector discretion. By comparing the outcomes with Congressional coal mining contribution levels, I am able to ascertain capture across several dimensions. Specifically, I find that contributions are associated with agency inspectors using their discretion to preempt violations requiring follow-up inspection, grant more inspections to waive safety requirements, conduct shorter inspections, and grant lower penalties. It is troubling that these findings occur at relatively low levels of contributions, suggesting a high level of corruptibility on the part of regulators.

Since its ruling in Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressed concern regarding corruption or the appearance of corruption stemming from political quid pro quo arrangements and the deleterious consequences it may have on citizens’ democratic behavior. However, no standard has been set as to what constitutes “the appearance of corruption,” as the Court was and continues to be vague in its definition. As a result, campaign finance cases after Buckley have relied on public opinion polls as evidence of perceptions of corruption, and these polls indicate that the public generally perceives high levels of corruption in government. The present study investigates the actual impact that perceptions of corruption have on individuals’ levels of political participation. Adapting the standard socioeconomic status model developed most fully by Verba and Nie (1972), an extended beta-binomial regression estimated using maximum likelihood is performed, utilizing unique data from the 2009 University of Texas’ Money and Politics survey. The results of this study indicate that individuals who perceive higher levels of quid pro quo corruption participate more in politics, on average, than those who perceive lower levels of corruption. This suggests that at least part of the Supreme Court’s rationale for upholding the FECA contribution limits in Buckley v. Valeo was unfounded. A similar test was performed using questions from the 2008 American National Election Study that have been used as proxies for corruption in previous studies, with inconclusive results. The more precise measure in the Money and Politics survey relates directly to the role of money in politics and provides better information than the ANES proxies have in the past, as those have been found to be related to factors other than money in politics. / text

This dissertation explores how institutional settings regulating the media and campaigns affect voter participation. The broader question is what types of political communication systems are likely to produce the most engaged and participatory citizens as well as equal participation. Assuming that political participation is affected by its underlying costs and benefits, I hypothesize that political communication systems that lower information costs for voters have higher turnout levels and reduce upper class bias. Political communication systems are measured by media systems, access to paid TV advertising, and campaign finance laws. In the country-level turnout models, investigating seventy-four electoral democracies, I find that public broadcasting systems increase voter turnout, while changing the effect of paid advertising. Public broadcasting systems that allow paid TV advertising have a higher turnout levels than those that ban paid advertising. Conversely, paid advertising in private broadcasting systems have a negative marginal effect on voter turnout. On the other hand, campaign finance laws that allow more money to enter election campaigns increase voter participation. So campaign contribution and spending limits depress turnout and public finance increases it. The hierarchical models in Chapter 6 show that political communication systems also change the relationship between individual socioeconomic status and voter participation. Generally political communication environment that lower information costs for voters reduces socioeconomic bias for voters. Public broadcasting systems, access to paid TV ads, and free TV time, thus, mitigate the effect of education on voting. Additional investigation also shows that the age gap between voters and nonvoters is conditioned by different types of political communication systems. Both partisan press and public direct funding promote younger citizens’ participation, thus decreasing the generation gap. In contrast, campaign contribution/expenditure limits enlarge such gap. Broadcasting systems also affect the effect of age on voting. Because older people spend more time watching television than younger ones, the type of broadcasting system has a disproportionately larger impact on older citizens. / text

This dissertation offers a novel argument for the democratic importance of political parties and campaign finance. Taking issue with the United States Supreme Court's campaign finance and political party jurisprudence, which tends to value campaign spending and party activity for the role that they play in expanding voter choice, my account seeks, instead, to emphasize the role that these forms of political participation can play in countering the sense of political disenchantment which characterizes the political attitudes of a large number of American citizens today. I argue in this project that by subjecting their preferences to continuous contestation and challenge, parties and campaign finance can help instill an appreciation for compromise, as well as tolerance for political diversity and disagreement, among the disenchanted. This, in turn, has many beneficial implications for enabling good governance on the part of the American state. In the course of the dissertation, I also specify the many ways in which contemporary parties and campaign finance regimes need to be reformed in order for them to be able to perform this role. Questions of institutional design thus occupy an extremely prominent place in the project. / Government

This work argues that the Supreme Court incorrectly decided the case of Citizens United v. FEC (2010). Beginning with an analysis of past campaign finance law and jurisprudence, this paper then outlines the fact of the case in Citizens United and assesses each of the principle claims made by the majority and dissenting opinions. The analysis then pivots to a practical examination of the immediate legal and regulatory consequences of the decision, namely detailing the advent of super PACs. Furthermore, this paper evaluates the magnitude of super PAC and related dark money spending in the years following the decision and speculates about its impact on elections and shifting public opinion. Drawing from the historical precedent and empiric spending reality, this paper formally reargues the Citizens United case, striking down the five identified premises in the majority opinion’s ruling. These premises are as follows: money is speech, corporations are entitled to the same rights as natural persons, the governmental anticorruption interest is limited to only quid pro quo exchanges, the antidistortion rationale is unconstitutional, and disclosure requirements provide sufficient information to ensure transparency. This inquiry concludes that unlimited corporate independent expenditures have a distortionary impact on the electoral system, presenting a unique corruption threat. As such, Citizens United should be formally overturned.

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This dissertation consists of three projects related to reputational effects in legislative elections. Building on the candidate emergence, repeat candidates and congressional donor literatures, these articles use novel datasets to further our understanding of repeat candidacy and the impact of interest group endorsements on candidate contributions. The first project examines the conditions under which losing state legislative candidates will appear on the successive general election ballot. Broadly speaking, I find a good deal of support for the notion that candidates respond rationally to changes in their political environment when determining whether to run again. The second project aims to measure the impact of repeat candidacy on state legislative election outcomes. Ultimately I find a reward/penalty structure through which losing candidates for lower chamber seats that perform well in their first election have a slight advantage over first-time candidates in their repeat elections. The final chapter of this dissertation examines the relationship between interest group endorsements and individual contributions for 2010 U.S. Senate candidates. The results of this chapter suggest that some interest group endorsements lead to increased campaign contributions, as compared to unendorsed candidates, but that others do not. This research points to a number of opportunities for future research as the relationship between endorsements and campaign resources is vastly understudied. / Political Science

A presente tese se dedicou a investigar, a partir das doações de campanha, a relação entre o setor empresarial e o sistema político, e qual o peso dos partidos políticos nessa relação. O foco da análise recaiu sobre as receitas de campanha, nas eleições de 2006, para a Câmara dos Deputados, considerando tanto as carreiras individuais dos candidatos como sua filiação partidária. Esta última perspectiva revelou padrões de concentração entre os partidos de centro-direita. Entretanto, quando se desagrega as empresas segundo o setor de atividade e os candidatos segundo o distrito eleitoral, a distribuição de fundos tende a ser heterogênea. Quanto às carreiras individuais, a análise identificou forte influência do capital político dos candidatos, destacando-se a relevância de uma longa trajetória política aliada à experiência em secretarias e ministérios, bem como o estabelecimento de vínculos anteriores com associações patronais. Além dessas evidências empíricas, a presente tese buscou levantar importantes tensões teóricas e dilemas suscitados pelo debate sobre o financiamento de campanha. / This dissertation attempted to investigate the relationship between the corporate sector and the political system and the role parties play on it by examining private donations to political campaigns. The analysis focused on campaign expenditures in the 2006 election for the Chamber of Deputies, accounting both for the candidates career individually and for their party affiliation. The latter perspective revealed patterns of concentration among right wing and center parties. However, when disaggregating the companies by sector of activity and the candidates by electoral district, the share of funds tends to be heterogeneous. Concerning individual careers, the analysis identified marked influence of political capital, especially long-term political trajectories allied with prior experience in secretaries, as well as previous links with employers\' associations. Besides these empirical evidences, this dissertation aimed to raise relevant theoretical tensions and dilemmas brought by the debate on campaign finance.