Magister Artium (Development Studies) - MA(DVS) / This study adopts a comparative approach to analysing the realisation of socioeconomic rights by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights as compared with the European Commission and the Inter-American Commission. It examines the different approaches the Commission has adopted in interpreting the socioeconomic rights provision of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights with a view to assessing its appropriateness or otherwise. In addition, the study discusses some of the major challenges facing the African Commission which sometimes makes it difficult for the Commission to meet its obligations in realising socioeconomic rights guaranteed in the Charter. It then compares the approach of the African Commission with other regional human rights bodies such as the European Courts on Human Rights and the Intern-American Commission on Human Rights. It concludes by noting that the African Commission can learn some lessons from the experiences of the European and Inter-American systems on human rights with regard to the realisation of socioeconomic rights.

Some worry has been expressed in human rights circles that the human rights archetype has for some time now, disproportionately preoccupied itself with the culture of rights and claims at the expense of individuals? duties and responsibilities. A claim is made that while rights are individualistic, self-seeking, unworldly, self-indulgent and anti-social, individual duties and responsibilities are collective, social, humane, nuanced and associated with correct traditional and social behaviour and human values. The language of rights has dominated the texts of bills of rights in constitutions, and international instruments, and many view this rhetoric as unproblematic. Others, however, consider the currency of that language as overlooking, with dire consequences to human society, the concept of duty as the missing link of human dignity. There have, accordingly, been calls for a renewed focus on individual duties and responsibilities in the human rights discourse. The question is whether focussing on individual responsibility is necessary to counterbalance what is viewed by some as a bias towards rights. Efforts to raise international consciousness of what is regarded as the limitation of a purely rights-based approach to human rights has been spearheaded by, among others, faith based organisations. These have advocated not only a more visible recognition of individual duties and responsibilities generally, but an international declaration of human responsibilities as a ?common standard for all people and all nations.? The calls being made are premised on, first, a view that a device in the form of an international declaration ? a set of international rules ? should be developed to change the current human rights architecture. This code of ethical obligations is necessary to guide and change individual behaviour. Second, a belief that greater emphasis should be laid on individual duty responsibility to supplement existing international human rights norms and standards, and finally, that human rights principles alone are inadequate for modern societies to regulate themselves well. With particular reference to perspectives from the African Charter based human rights system, this project interrogates these concerns regarding duties with a view to ascertaining whether there is justification in them. Using as a reference point the concept of duties in the African Charter and to a small extent that in the African Children's Charter, which represents the older ii and more established part of the African human rights system, the project concludes that although individuals? duties are important and deserve greater attention, there is no convincing case for the calls that are being made in this regard. / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2017. / Centre for Human Rights / LLD / Unrestricted

Since 1981, when the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted on the platform of the Organisation of African Unity, one of the main challenges for players in the field of human rights in Africa has been to find effective fora in which the rights of the most vulnerable can be vindicated. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, together with other African human rights instruments, the global human rights instruments to which African states are parties and national bills of rights entrenched in the national constitutions of most African states make up the body of human rights norms that exist for the benefit of victims of human rights violation in the continent. This body of normative standards are expected to be given effect at the national level. However, given that the expectation has not always been met, international supervisory bodies have played an increasingly important role in the African human rights landscape. At the continental level, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights which was established under the African Charter was the original forum for the vindication of human rights for a number of years. Over the years, other continental human rights supervisory bodies have been established under the defunct OAU and the AU. National human rights institutions and these continental bodies have gained recognition as the structures of the African human rights architecture. However, since the early part of the new millennium, new institutional actors have begun to appear in the African human rights landscape. Originally established as vehicles for subregional economic integration, regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa have expressly or implicitly authorised their organs and institutions to engage actively in the field of human rights. This trend has been most evident in the operations of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The entry of African RECs in the continental landscape has raised several questions. From the perspective of international law, against the background of the principle of attributed competence that guides the existence and operations of international organisations, the question of legality and legitimacy is triggered. From the perspective of protecting the unity and continued existence of the African human rights system, questions relating to the feasibility and desirability of REC involvement in the African human rights landscape emerge for determination. Using ECOWAS as the main case study but also touching on the budding human rights activities of the East African Community and the Southern Africa Development Community, this study has sought to demonstrate that REC involvement in the field of human rights is legitimate and feasible. Combining descriptive, prescriptive and comparative analytical approaches, this study argues that African RECs, in particular ECOWAS, can be effective vehicles for human rights realisation in Africa without compromising their original stated objectives or upsetting the work of the structures in the traditional African human rights architecture. Extracting the challenges that can be associated with REC involvement in the field of human rights, this study sets up the criteria for a non-disruptive model for subregional realisation of human rights under the platform of RECs in Africa. / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

There are many major shipping companies which operate fleets comprised largely of vessels which are time chartered and subsequently sub-chartered on voyage terms. Legal risks will arise for the time charterer due the differing natures and terms of time and voyage charters. The essential question examined in this thesis is that of whether, and to what extent, legal risk can be minimized by the negotiation of equivalent contractual terms under time and voyage charter parties. The key areas addressed in this thesis are delivery under time charters compared to readiness under voyage charters, off hire under time charters versus suspension of laytime under voyage charters, obligations relating to cleanliness of cargo spaces, rights and responsibilities relative to safe berths and ports, the time charterer's position under bills of lading, and issues relating to redelivery of the vessel and consequent voyage charter liability if the vessel is unable to undertake the final voyage. The methodology applied is an examination of the case law, with a primary focus on the extensive body of English jurisprudence. This analysis of the case law is accompanied by a consideration of provisions of major charter party forms. The analysis leads to the conclusion that risk, to varying degrees, can be minimized through the application and clarification of contractual language. With respect to readiness of the vessel it is considered that risk will be reduced through agreeing contractual language which requires early notification of the vessel's delay. As regards off hire and laytime wording that clarifies non physical deficiencies is proposed. With regard to vessel cargo spaces intermediate cleanliness is identified as the greatest risk. Safe port and berth warranties are determined to represent an area of easily manageable risk, while letters of indemnity relating to bills of lading continue to represent very significant risk with suggested but no certain solution. Finally, with respect to redelivery a final voyage clause for time charters has been proposed which serves to almost eliminate risk in this area. Therefore, it is broadly concluded that risk can be managed but not eliminated through drafting of appropriate contractual terms.

Mobility, as the ability among newcomers and citizens to move temporarily and circularly across international borders and between states, has become a pervasive norm for a significant portion of Canada’s population. Despite its pervasive nature and the growing public interest, however, current research has been limited in how Canadian policies are reacting to the ability of citizens and newcomers to move. This thesis seeks to fill that gap by analyzing Canada’s treatment of mobility within and across policies of immigration, citizenship and foreign affairs. An analytical mobility framework is developed to incorporate interdisciplinary work on human migration and these policy domains. Using this framework, an examination of policy developments in each domain in the last decade reveals that they diverge in isolation and from a whole-of-government perspective around the treatment of mobility. In some instances policy accommodates or even embraces mobility, and in others it restricts it.

Within the field of religious studies, the definition of religion is constantly debated. While subjective definitions of this concept may be useful in day to day conversation, what happens when “religion” and other religious language is mentioned in constitutionally entrenched documents and policies? Drawing on critical theory, this thesis examines the biases associated with the the protection of freedom of religion and the preamble to Canada’s constitution which states that, “Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and rule of law”.

In 1986, the Supreme Court of Canada cogently summarized various judicial concerns relating to the expansion of public interest standing. In doing so, the Supreme Court invited judges to engage in a purposive and functional enquiry in exercising their discretion to grant access to public interest litigants. That enquiry should take account of the broad social, political and legal factors that provide the backdrop to the constitutional claim. However, both judges and commentators alike have failed to meet this challenge. Instead, they have applied the principles of standing in an increasingly categorical and abstract manner. To this end, they have employed the abstractly defined, directly affected individual without considering who he or she is in the particular circumstances, or what benefits he or she would bring to the litigation process. This is of particular concern when our context is inequality. The increasing abstraction of public interest standing jars discordantly with the purposive interpretation of section 15(1) of the Charter, so that while equality is determined in a contextual fashion, equal access is still conceived of in an abstract fashion. In abstracting the directly affected individual out of relations of radical inequality, there has been a presumption that we all, as individuals, have an equal opportunity (and equal resources) to raise our constitutional concerns in the courts. This presumption cannot be accepted. We need to inject some context into standing. To do so, we must appreciate that inequality is a product of the distribution of power in society, and that equality is to be furthered through multi-dimensionality and respect for diversity. Armed with these insights, we must revisit the judicial concerns that underpin the development of the public interest standing doctrine, and unpack their meaning in a purposive fashion. When we do so, we will begin to appreciate that the traditional resolution of these concerns actually serves to exclude disadvantaged persons from enforcing their Charter rights and obscures the diffuse causality characteristics of disadvantage. From the contextual perspective of social-inequality-as-power, the concerns underpinning public interest standing actually promote judicial access for the public interest organization that represents disadvantaged persons. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Reputational interests are protected against defamatory and injurious statements by the common law o f defamation, which permits the targeted individual to recover damages for the injury to his reputation. At the same time, this body of common law sets limits to the constitutional right to free expression of the person who made the penalized communication. However, since s.32(l) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - according to the Supreme Court of Canada - restricts the Charter's application to the actions of legislative, executive and administrative branches of government, the Charter will be at best a bit player in defamation litigation governed by common law rule. This thesis deals with the tension between promoting free speech and protecting a person's reputation, i.e. with the questions whether the common law of defamation has achieved the correct balance between the protection of the individual's reputation and freedom of expression, or whether it needs to be modified in order to better accord with the Charter. A n important component of this thesis is its review of the decision of Hill v. Church of Scientology, where the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the question of whether defamation law needs to be reconsidered in light o f the Charter protection of free expression, and found the balance struck by the current law to be appropriate. A critical look at this decision, and more generally at the law of defamation itself, particularly its presumptions of falsity, malice and damages, will reveal the problems with the common law's resistance to making any major allowance for free expression. The author will argue that the Charter should apply to the common law in the same way as it applies to statutory law and that defamation law in particular would, in all probability, not survive the test under s.l of the Charter, concerning the justification of a limitation to a fundamental right. It will be concluded that the common law of defamation needs to be modified, i.e. that it must accord significantly more weight to freedom of expression in order to be consistent with the Charter. Insofar as the extent of such modification is concerned, the author will propose first of all to give the element of fault a more significant role in the common law of defamation. In addition, she will argue that the common law presumptions should be abolished. In sum, the author's reform proposal requires the plaintiff to prove not only that the words he complains of are defamatory, identify him and are published to a third person, but also that they are false, did indeed cause damage to his reputation and that the defendant acted with fault, i.e. intentionally or negligently, when publishing the defamatory falsehoods. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

The advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms signaled a new and vastly expanded role for the judiciary. By entrenching our civil liberties into the Canadian Constitution, the courts were given the express authority to override inconsistent statutes. Due to the inherent overlap between law and politics, election law is an area that is particularly sensitive to this recent enlargement of judicial power. Despite this, the courts have scrutinized many areas of election law and many federal and provincial statutes have been fundamentally altered. The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the courts have developed a uniform theory of judicial review where election law is concerned via four case studies: electoral boundary redistribution, prisoner voting rights, the publication of opinion polls during campaigns and third party spending limits. Through an extensive review of the relevant case law and literature, I conclude that the courts have failed to develop a coherent and consistent theory judicial review regarding the application of the Charter to election law. My analysis reveals that the inconsistencies stem largely from three main sources: first is the failure of the courts to adopt a single vision of what constitutes a fair electoral system; second is that the case studies are dealing with two different sections of the Charter (ss. 2(b) and 3); and third is the Oakes test which has expanded judicial discretion along with the potential for disparity. If consistency is ever going to be achieved, the courts need to adopt a single vision of democracy in Canada. Until then, we are left to guess when our political rights may be justifiably restricted under the Charter. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This thesis is concerned with those 'social' rights that relate to the provision of the basic necessities of life; that is the right to an adequate standard of living (including food, clothing and shelter), the right to health and the right to education. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights (ICESCR) recognises obligations pertaining to the progressive realisation of these rights, whilst leaving the method of implementation within domestic discretion. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms only accords domestic constitutional protection to civil rights, leaving the implementation of these social rights within government discretion. This study will examine what has, in the Canadian experience, proven to be the practical consequences of adopting such a policy of 'selective constitutionalisation,' that puts social rights by definition outside the ambit of legal enforcement. Firstly, it will examine the court's approach to cases that have, in the absence of constitutionalised social rights, attempted to indirectly invoke social rights by encouraging a positive social interpretation of the right to equality and the right to life, liberty and security of the person, and will illustrate that the courts have failed to interpret these rights so as to indirectly protect social rights. Secondly, it will consider the relationship between legal, political and social discourse, illustrating that, in light of the non- constitutionalised status of social rights, the values underlying these rights have been marginalised in political and social discourse, facilitating reforms that have restructured and eroded the welfare state, reducing the realisation of social rights within Canada. Thirdly, it will consider the practicability of adopting the alternative approach of according equal constitutional protection and justiciable status to social rights, through an examination of the theoretical literature and the approach taken to social rights under the Final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. It will illustrate that the philosophical arguments that have been utilised to support the nonconstitutionalised status of social rights are no longer sustainable and that the constitutional experience of South Africa provides evidence that a practical alternative to the position adopted in Canada exists. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate