Impact of the Leniency Program and the Institution of Settlement upon the Civil Enforcement of Competition Law Keywords: competition law, leniency program, private enforcement of competition law The purpose of this thesis is to assess the mutual interference between the private and public enforcement of competition law. In the public enforcement there is growing trend of using modern tools such as leniency programme or settlement decisions. These are based on the cooperation between competition authorities and undertakings. On the other hand such cooperation and very often disclosure of confidential information by undertakings may threaten their position in terms of potential civil law suits by consumers or business partners. It is often claimed that private and public enforcement are complementary but when it comes to these modern tools a clear conflict arises. The thesis consists of two following two chapters. First chapter describes the evolution of private enforcement of competition law within EU. From its underdeveloped beginnings ten years ago it started to attract attention. European Commission has recently published a proposal of a directive which should foster the private enforcement within EU. Second half of the first chapter describes the development of new modern tools within the public...

The aim of this thesis is to examine trademarks and the possibilities of their application and use in the context of business competition. Trademarks are used widely in business and form part of an important and independent branch of the law. The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first deals with the inclusion of trademark law into the broader area of intellectual property law. The following chapter describes the concepts of trademarks and legal sources. The law of trademarks is divided into a three level jurisdictional system - international, European and domestic law. The chapter also discusses the division of trademarks and describes their function. The conclusion of the chapter is devoted to the reasons for the refusal of registration of trademarks - namely absolute and relative. The third chapter focuses on the ways how trademark law is established. The establishment of trademarks is fundamentally based on the principle of registration. The exception is well known trademarks, which enjoy legal protection despite not being registered. The chapter is divided into three parts dealing with the registration procedure at the domestic, European and international level. In contrast, the fourth chapter contains circumstances under which trademarks lapse and are no longer in effect. The...

O exercício do poder de tributar pela União, Estados-Membros, Municípios e o Distrito Federal, dentro dos limites das competências que lhes foram outorgadas pelo Legislador Constituinte Originário, pode implicar em distúrbios na concorrência. Assim, com fundamento nos princípios da livre iniciativa e da livre concorrência, partindo-se da análise da estrutura dos mercados e as distorções a eles inerentes, das formas de intervenção do Estado no domínio econômico, bem como em razão de expressa disposição constitucional no sentido de que o Estado deve manter uma posição de neutralidade tributária em relação à concorrência, conforme preconiza o artigo 146-A da Carta Magna, busca-se analisar alguns dos efeitos produzidos pela tributação, tais como os impactos da guerra fiscal entre estados da federação, as implicações das decisões judiciais em matéria tributária e questões relacionadas à imposição de deveres instrumentais (obrigações tributárias acessórias), sobre a concorrência. / Exercise of the taxing power by the Brazilian Federal, State and Local government levels, within the scope of their jurisdictions as granted by the Original Constitutional Legislature, may imply competitive disturbances. Therefore, based on the principles of free enterprise and free competition, and based on an analysis of market structures their inherent distortions; of forms of State intervention in the economic domain; and also as a result of an explicit constitutional provision in the sense that the State must maintain tax neutrality vis-à-vis competition, as per Article 146-A of the Brazilian Constitution; we analyze some of the effects of taxation, such as the impacts of interstate tax warfare, the implications of tax-related court decisions, and aspects associated with the imposition of instrumental duties (ancillary tax obligations) on competition.

by Mok Wai Chung, David and Dai Yat Hang, Alice. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991. / Bibliography: leaf 66. / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii / LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS --- p.iv / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.v / Chapter / Chapter I. --- "THE COMPANY, ITS PRODUCTS AND ITS COMPETITORS" --- p.1 / Company Profile --- p.1 / Corporate Culture and Company Philosophy --- p.2 / Organization Structure --- p.3 / Property Development vs Property Investment --- p.4 / Process of Property Development --- p.5 / Classification of Competitors --- p.8 / Strengths and Weaknesses of Cheung Kong --- p.10 / Chapter II. --- MARKET PROFILE --- p.12 / The Building Industry Development --- p.12 / Building Types --- p.13 / Profit Contribution --- p.15 / Market Structure Characteristics --- p.17 / Competitive Strategy of Rival Firms --- p.19 / Chapter III. --- IDENTIFICATION OF THE UNSERVED MARKET NICHE --- p.20 / Public Housing Scenerio --- p.20 / Rental --- p.21 / HOS/PSPS --- p.22 / Supply and Demand of Public Housing --- p.23 / The Cost-Focus Approach --- p.24 / Consumer Profile --- p.25 / Objective --- p.25 / Sampling Method --- p.25 / Observation --- p.26 / Chapter IV. --- COST-FOCUS STRATEGY --- p.27 / Cost and Price Analysis --- p.27 / Acquisition of Land --- p.29 / Chapter V. --- MARKETING STRATEGY --- p.30 / Product Strategy --- p.30 / Product Differentiation --- p.30 / Quality --- p.31 / Management --- p.32 / Maintenance --- p.32 / Pricing Strategy --- p.33 / Markup Pricing --- p.33 / Reduction in Construction Cost --- p.33 / Incremental Pricing Strategy --- p.35 / Distribution Strategy --- p.35 / Improvement in Existing Distribution Channels --- p.36 / Creation of District Sales Office --- p.36 / Promotion Strategy --- p.37 / Chapter VI. --- CONCLUSION --- p.39 / APPENDIX --- p.41 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.66

The market conditions in the banking sector, the corporate governance structure of banks, and the financial accounting practices have been highlighted among the key causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2010. In this thesis, I analyse the ‘dark side' of competition by casting the spotlight on the relationship between competition, corporate governance, financial stability, and financial misreporting. I also bring corporate governance into the fray by analysing its link to financial misreporting. Probing the interplay between banking sector competition, corporate governance, financial stability and financial misreporting provides a fantastic setting to tap into and provide unique insights across the accounting, banking and finance domains. In putting together this piece of work, I extracted data from sources including Bankscope, Compustat, SEC enforcement releases and the World Bank Doing Business survey among others. In the 1st chapter, I regress financial stability proxies against various competition/concentration proxies using the GMM estimator with an instrumental variable technique to address potential endogeneity. In the 2nd chapter I use difference-in-difference analysis to analyse how changes in the competitive landscape in the US financial services industry instigated by the financial crisis as an exogenous factor led to an increase in misreporting incidences. The 4th chapter is an evaluation of how five corporate governance dimensions impacted on financial misreporting in US commercial banks subject to SEC enforcement actions from 2000 to 2016. I uncover strong evidence to support the competition-fragility view, without yet being able to disprove the competition-stability view. My results suggest that greater banking competition yields riskier loan portfolios, but this increased risk is more than offset by banks holding higher capital and liquidity thresholds. I also study the link between competition and incidences of financial misreporting in the US financial services industry and the results suggest a significantly positive association between competition and financial misreporting. Furthermore, there is evidence that an exogenous increase in competition because of the financial crisis also fuelled financial misreporting incidences in the financial services industry. I then investigate the impact of corporate governance on financial misreporting in US commercial banks subject to SEC enforcement actions. My results are mixed across the five corporate governance dimensions utilised for this study. Consistent with the ‘agency cost' hypothesis, I find a negative association between board size and financial misreporting, yet CEO power asserts a positive association with financial misreporting in violation of both the ‘stewardship' and ‘entrenchment' hypotheses. The equity-based portion of executive compensation is negatively related with misreporting, whereas there is a positive association between the cash-based portion and misreporting. My research not only contributes to literature on competition, market power, bank risk, financial stability, corporate governance, and financial misreporting; but also provide several practical and theoretical implications for regulators, academics, governments and policymakers on the effective and efficient regulation of the governance and competitive landscapes in financial services. I specifically shine the spotlight on emerging literature on the pervasive effects (dark side) of competition from a purely financial services perspective and within the context of the global financial crisis of 2007-2010.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universite de Geneve, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 497-539) and index.

<p>Competition law is an area which is going through changes over time, especially EC competition law in regard to the ongoing process of market integration. The definition of the relevant geographic market within EC competition law is of importance to define, both in case law and for undertakings and their businesses, as the law should be predictable. Before Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits abusive behaviour by undertakings, is applicable the relevant geographic market has to be defined. As is the case with the Merger Regulation, the relevant geographic market has to be defined to make an assessment of the undertakings’ activities. The definition of the geographic market is then used as a tool in the analysis of the assessment of competition and the effects of measures carried out by undertakings which restrain competition. Thus, the definition of the relevant geographic market is crucial for the purposes of Community competition law.</p><p>The definition of the relevant geographic market can be said to be an area where “the objective conditions of competition applying to the product in question must be the same for all traders” as established in United Brands. In Deutsche Bahn it was clarified that “... the definition of the geographical market does not require the objective conditions of competition between traders to be perfectly homogenous”. It is enough if they are similar, therefore areas in which the objective conditions of competition are different, are not considered to be a uniform market.</p><p>In the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law the Commission’s work to define the relevant geographic market is described as well as the evidence the Commission contemplates in its assessment. The substitutability test is relied on by the Commission. In case law from the European Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, and the Commission, different factors are scrutinized to establish the relevant geographic market. Such factors are e.g., the undertakings’ activities, barriers to trade, and barriers to entry.</p><p>The significance of the evidence and the factors used in the definition of the relevant geographic market are debatable. The factors considered vary on a case to case basis and they need to differ to make a correct assessment of the relevant geographic market in every case within EC competition law.</p>

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Bayreuth, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [213]-223) and index.

Competition law is an area which is going through changes over time, especially EC competition law in regard to the ongoing process of market integration. The definition of the relevant geographic market within EC competition law is of importance to define, both in case law and for undertakings and their businesses, as the law should be predictable. Before Article 82 of the EC Treaty, which prohibits abusive behaviour by undertakings, is applicable the relevant geographic market has to be defined. As is the case with the Merger Regulation, the relevant geographic market has to be defined to make an assessment of the undertakings’ activities. The definition of the geographic market is then used as a tool in the analysis of the assessment of competition and the effects of measures carried out by undertakings which restrain competition. Thus, the definition of the relevant geographic market is crucial for the purposes of Community competition law. The definition of the relevant geographic market can be said to be an area where “the objective conditions of competition applying to the product in question must be the same for all traders” as established in United Brands. In Deutsche Bahn it was clarified that “... the definition of the geographical market does not require the objective conditions of competition between traders to be perfectly homogenous”. It is enough if they are similar, therefore areas in which the objective conditions of competition are different, are not considered to be a uniform market. In the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law the Commission’s work to define the relevant geographic market is described as well as the evidence the Commission contemplates in its assessment. The substitutability test is relied on by the Commission. In case law from the European Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, and the Commission, different factors are scrutinized to establish the relevant geographic market. Such factors are e.g., the undertakings’ activities, barriers to trade, and barriers to entry. The significance of the evidence and the factors used in the definition of the relevant geographic market are debatable. The factors considered vary on a case to case basis and they need to differ to make a correct assessment of the relevant geographic market in every case within EC competition law.

Chinas first comprehensive competition law, the Anti-monopoly law of the People’s Republic of China (AML), was enacted on August 1, 2008. Despite a long history of planned economy, the Chinese economy has developed into one of the fastest growing economies in the world during the last decades. The adoption of the law was a crucial step towards a more market-based economy. Article 1 of the AML states that one of the aims to achieve with this law is to develop a socialist market economy. The notion was founded in the 1990s and can be found in several other Chinese legislations. The concept has no prominent definition and can be interpreted in many different ways, which opens up for the ruling Party to interpret the notion in accordance with their political believes. The central government will probably put most emphasize on the word “socialist” instead of “market economy” when interpreting the concept. The concept is of central meaning and will affect the interpretation of the other aims stated in article 1. The other aims are not ranked in any hierarchical order and are in conflict with each other. The central government will give priority to the aims which are beneficial for a socialist society. The aim to promote public interest, which includes state owned enterprises, will be strongly favored. Also the aim economic efficiency will be prioritized since China strives to become a rich country. Consumer welfare will not be highlighted but might be more important in the future. One reason that the aims are vague and not put in any hierarchical order could be that the objectives for adopting AML were not solely of competition reasons. The objectives show that AML is part of a wider economic policy. Neither does the central government strive towards a free market. Instead the goal is to establish a fair market. A fair market will most probably be a market beneficial for state owned enterprises and can therefore be contradictory to the keystones of competition. Competition principals arise from sophisticated market economies and China aims to apply those principals in the light of socialist ideology. AML covers the general competition provisions but with a specific chapter to regulate administrative monopolies. It can still be seen as contradictory to prohibit administrative monopolies but without any sanctions stipulated for violation of the provisions. Also the fundamental elements for establish effective competition are missing. The statute cannot be seen as objective or provide legal certainty and the competition authorities do not have divided responsibilities. Neither is any specific competition court established. Other factors that can contribute to an inefficient competition law are China’s history and culture, affected by socialist ideology. Time is required in China in order to develop an efficient competition culture. Altogether, it is no coincident that the notion of socialist market economy is undefined. The notion includes a quest to enhance the socialist society with strong economic development. More specific guidance is determined by the central government when the right time has come. From a Chinese perspective, the aims in article 1 will be achieved since the undefined concepts open up for different interpretations. From a sophisticated point of view, the aims will not be seen as achieved since no effective competition is established.