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Le système de justice constitutionnelle colombien est caractérisé par la richesse des moyens de protection de la constitution qu’il consacre. D’une part, il comprend un contrôle concentré dont la légitimité démocratique n’est guère questionnable au regard de son ouverture à la participation des citoyens et de son incidence autant sur la protection abstraite des droits fondamentaux que le sur contrôle des poids et contrepoids institutionnels. D’autre part, il existe un contrôle diffus qui, bien qu’il soit entré en vigueur au même moment que le contrôle concentré, n’a pas été véritablement au centre de la pensée juridique classique en Colombie. Il a fait l’objet d’un traitement très léger par la doctrine, la jurisprudence et la formation universitaire des juristes. En revanche, la culture juridique majoritaire, fortement « légicentriste », a conduit à des craintes autour de son utilisation qui se sont maintenues jusqu’à nos jours, malgré la transformation du droit impliquée par la Constitution de 1991. De plus, les contrôles diffus et concentré ne sont pas nés de manière coordonnée, la fonction de chacun n’étant pas délimitée. Tout au contraire, les dispositions qui les consacrent dans la Charte constitutionnelle octroient une portée très large au deux. Ainsi, l’étude s’achève-t-elle en proposant une conception du contrôle diffus qui interagisse de manière harmonieuse avec le contrôle concentré, afin de régler autant les inconstitutionnalités abstraites que concrètes. La thèse analyse donc quel a été - et quel devrait être - la place du contrôle diffus dans le système de justice constitutionnelle colombien en recourant à diverses méthodes de sciences sociales / The Colombian judicial review system is characterized by its wealth of methods of control. On the one hand, it has a concentrated control that reduces the democratic objection, comparatively speaking, because of the aperture to participation in its procedure and its impact both on the abstract protection of fundamental rights and on the control of respect for the checks and balances system. On the other hand, there is a diffuse control that, despite having entered into force at the same time as the concentrated control, has not been at the center of Colombian legal thought. In effect, its doctrinal and jurisprudential treatment has been scarce and superficial in the training of lawyers and judges. This is explained by a strongly exegetical law culture in which the idea of the non-application of rules was seen as a direct affront. Thus, fears were raised about the use of this mechanism that remain presently, despite the transformation of the concept of law as a result of the constitution of 1991. Indeed, the diffuse and concentrated controls were not conceived in a coordinated way, delimiting the function of each. In fact, the provisions that establish them tend to grant a very broad scope to both of them. Finally, this study proposes a concept of diffuse control that must interact harmoniously with concentrated control to restrain abstract and concrete unconstitutionalities. This thesis then ultimately analyzes the role diffuse control has had in (and should have in) the Colombian system of judicial review through various methodologies of the social sciences

It is the purpose of this Thesis to start an analysis of metaconstitutional review, understood as the process through which an entity such as a Constitutional Court or Supreme Court reviews the compliance of the acts of the Constituent with superior values or fills constitutional gaps with such values. This, in order to explain its separate nature from constitutional review, to determine whether it is compatible with the traditional conception of popular sovereignty as the ultimate source of power and the legitimizing element of the constitutional system and to determine whether or not metaconstitutional review could prevent social change by entrenching certain values.

It is the purpose of this Thesis to start an analysis of metaconstitutional review, understood as the process through which an entity such as a Constitutional Court or Supreme Court reviews the compliance of the acts of the Constituent with superior values or fills constitutional gaps with such values. This, in order to explain its separate nature from constitutional review, to determine whether it is compatible with the traditional conception of popular sovereignty as the ultimate source of power and the legitimizing element of the constitutional system and to determine whether or not metaconstitutional review could prevent social change by entrenching certain values.

Depuis la création du Conseil constitutionnel, onze professeurs de droit ont accédé à l’institution. Il s’agit ici de comprendre et de définir les mécanismes à l’origine de leur sélection, leurs rôles spécifiques dans le processus d’élaboration des décisions de façon à délimiter leurs apports à la juridiction constitutionnelle. Il apparaît alors nécessaire de repenser les conditions d’accès au Conseil constitutionnel tant la contribution de ces universitaires à l’élaboration et à l’essor des méthodes de travail et de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel a été considérable, au point d’approfondir les rapports entre fonction doctrinale et fonction de juger. / Since the establishment of the Constitutional Council, eleven law professors have joined the institution. This thesis then began to understand and define the mechanisms behind their selection, their specific roles in the decision-making process so as to define their contributions to the constitutional court. It appears then necessary to reconsider the conditions of access to the Constitutional Council as their contribution to the development and the development of working methods and jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council was considerably developed to deepen the relationship between teaching office and judicial function.

The aim of the thesis is to address the jurisprudence of constitutional conflict between the Court of Justice and national courts with constitutional jurisdiction. It seeks to determine how the principle of primacy of EU law works in reality and whether the jurisprudence of the courts under analysis supports this concept. In so doing, the goal is to determine if the theory of constitutional pluralism can explain and guide the application of the principle of primacy of EU law in the jurisprudence of constitutional conflict. The analysis has been carried out on two levels. First, by exploring sovereignty claims by the courts under analysis, as well as reconciliatory vocabulary they employ to manage and contain constitutional conflict. Second, by further studying the three areas of constitutional conflict - ultra vires review, identity review, and fundamental rights review - to provide more nuance in the analysis of the way the Court of Justice has expanded the self-referential system of the Treaties; the different limits that constitutional adjudicators have placed on the principle of primacy as a result; and what possible solutions they envisage in the event of a constitutional conflict. All the courts under analysis have employed the vocabulary of mutual respect and self-restraint as principles guiding the resolution of constitutional conflict. Constitutional conflict is managed through incremental and permanent contestation and accommodation of their opposing claims to sovereignty (the auto-correct function of constitutional pluralism) that results in the uniform interpretation and application of Union law, but keeping in line with conferral as its defining principle. The analysis demonstrated the existence of a heterarchical constellation - the potential of all the courts involved for being ranked in a number of different ways at different times - grounded in mutual respect and self-restraint.

L'instauration de la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité permet d'ancrer définitivement la justice constitutionnelle au sein du régime politique de la Cinquième République. En déconnectant le contrôle de la loi de la procédure législative, le nouveau mécanisme induit un renouvellement de la relation unissant le Parlement au Conseil constitutionnel. Il acte un déséquilibre institutionnel inhérent à la fonction juridictionnelle du Conseil. Seule cette évolution était susceptible de renforcer l'équilibre fonctionnel entre les deux institutions. Le processus conduit à s'interroger sur la place accordée aux juges au sein d'un régime démocratique. / The implementation of the “priority preliminary rulings on the issue of constitutionality” definitely installs the constitutional justice in the political system of the Fifth Republic. The new mechanism induces a renewal of the relationship between Parliament and the Constitutional Council. It causes an institutional imbalance inherent in the judicial function of the Council. This change reinforces the functional balance between the two institutions. The process raises questions about the place given to the judges in a democratic regime.

"The Ethiopian Constitution, in a 'creative stroke', provides the power to "interpret" the Constitution to the House of Federation (the House), which is referred to by some writers as the "Upper House" or "Second Chamber" of the bicameral parliament. The Constitution also establishes the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (the Council), a body composed of members of the judiciary, legal experts appointed by the House of Peoples' Representatives and three persons designated by the House from among its members, to examine constitutional issues and submit its recommendations to the House for a final decision. This is, of course, very different from a number of other more well-known legal systems which vest the power of constitutional review either in general courts or in constitutional courts set up exclusively for constitutional matters. The formal way through which issues of constitutional interpretation take place is via the Council. Issues of constitutional interpretation are referred to the Council by a court or "the interested party" to a dispute. The Council, after examining the constituitonal issue, can either remand the case to the competent court after it has found no need for constitutional interpretation, or submit its findings on constitutional interpretation to the House. The House, after deliberating on the suggestions of the Council, can either accept or reject the recommendations of the Council. It should be noted that a party not satisfied with the order of the Council to remand the case to the competent cout for lack of grounds of constitutional interpretation, may appeal against the order to the House. As indicated above, the House has the final and ultimate power to interpret the Constitution. However, the role of the courts in the interpretation of the Constitution is still far from settled. The function, relation and co-existence of the courts and other organs of state need to be spelled out clearly. The extent to which, and the circumstances under which, the judiciary should defer to other institutions, and especially to the House, need to be ascertained. The difficulty lies in determining where the role of the court ends and that of the other institutions (especially the Council and House) begins. The problem has a normative component as well. The Ethiopian approach to constitutional review, one may argue, is a response to the ocunter-majoritarian dilemma. By excluding the involvement of ordinary or special courts from the business of constiutional review ,the government has made it impossible for the court to "usurp legislative power". A question, however, remains whether this really represents an adequate response to the counter-majoritarian dilemma. This research paper investigates both the descriptive and normative component of the problem. As the title of the study and the discussion in the preceding paragraphs suggest, it asks who interprets the Constitution and who should do so. While the first part sets out to investigate the structure and institutions of constitutional review in Ethiopia, the second part evaluates the legitimacy of the system." -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2004. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Thesis "Does the change of the substantive requisites of the democratic, law-abiding State is really impermissible or unimaginable?" aims to answer the question if it is not really acceptable to change or modify the substantive requisites of the democratic, law-abiding State or their understanding. The main outcome of the work should be practical reflection of these issues. Paper is divided into seven parts. The first part defines the democratic, law-abiding (rule of law) State, Second part deals with the threats to the democratic, law-abiding (rule of law) State - these are the people (populous), elite and international community. Next part deals with the opposite - the system of protection. Fourth part presents comparison of approaches to the question of constitutional amendments and its limitations on examples of several states. Parts five and six are based on the approach of the Czech Constitutional Court to the change or modification of the substantive provisions of the democratic, law- abiding State and their understanding, from both, national and international perspective. The last section is based on past previous sections and tries to answer a title question in a practical and abstract ways; therefore this part is the highlight of the work.

O presente trabalho pretende estudar a rev1sao constitucional periódica estabelecida na Constitu ição da República Portuguesa de 1976 como ferramenta de aprimoramento institucional, vislumbrando a sua adequação ao ordenamento constitucional brasileiro. Inicialmente, resgatam-se os conceitos ligados ao poder reformador para depois estabelecer a trad ição histórica da reforma constitucional em Portugal, traçando um paralelo comparativo com o procedimento de alteração constitucional adotado no Brasil. Para tanto, foi necessária a análise do instituto da revisão constitucional portuguesa , explicitando, em especial, a periodicidade revisional, para verificar, através da experiência lus itana, a eficácia do instituto em questão. Por fim, apresenta-se a revisão constitucional periódica como instrumento apto para gerar estabilidade constitucional aliado a sua capacidade de oportunizar periodicamente o aprimoramento das institu ições do Estado. / This study aims to investigate the periodic constitutional review established as an institutional improvement tool in the Portuguese Constitution of 1976, setting a sight on its adequacy concerning the Brazilian constitutional order. This research recovers the concepts related to the reforming power in order to establish the historical tradition of the constitutional reform in Portugal, drawing a comparison with the constitutional amendment procedure adopted in Brazil. Therefore, the analysis of the Portugues.e lnstitute of constitutional review was necessary to particularly explain the reviewing periodicity in order to verify the effectiveness of the institute through the Portuguese experience. Finally, this study presents the periodic constitutional review as an effective means to generate constitutional stability together with its facility to periodically provide the opportunity for improvement of the national institutions.