En Chine, avec l’établissement progressif du système d’économie de marché socialiste, les formes et la quantité de propriété privée des citoyens ont connu une évolution constante. L’amendement constitutionnel de 2004 a officiellement consacré la protection du droit de propriété privée dans la constitution. Un système juridique initial de protection du droit de propriété privée, qui a objectivement favorisé l’essor de l’économie chinoise, a été établi. Cependant, nous devons être conscients que la situation actuelle de la protection du droit de propriété privée n’est pas optimiste en Chine. Le point essentiel du problème réside non seulement dans les divers défauts de système juridique de la propriété privée, mais également dans le fait que les normes constitutionnelles sur la garantie du droit de propriété des citoyens n’ont pas été efficacement mises en œuvre. Le 19ème Congrès national du Parti communiste chinois de 2017 a proclamé officiellement l’objectif de faire progresser le système de contrôle de constitutionnalité, et ensuite, l’amendement constitutionnel de 2018 a établi une nouvelle commission spéciale destinée à effectuer un examen constitutionnel. Ces deux événements signifient-ils que la Chine s’est bien préparée pour la construction d’un État de droit, qui a pour effet d’améliorer le système actuel de protection constitutionnelle du droit de propriété des citoyens ? Partant de cette question, la présente thèse choisit donc une perspective de mise en œuvre de la constitution et utilise l’expérience du droit français comme référence, afin d’étudier le système de la protection du droit de propriété privée en Chine / In China, with the gradual establishment of the socialist market economy, the form and quantity of ownership of citizens have evolved constantly. The constitutional amendment of 2004 has formally consecrated the property rights in the constitution. An initial legal system of protection of property right, which has objectively favored the development of the Chinese economy, has been established. However, we must be aware that the current situation of the protection of property rights is not optimistic in China. The essential point of the problem lies not only in the various deficiencies of the legal system of property, but also in the fact that the constitutional laws on the guarantee of the property right of the citizens have not been effectively implemented. The 19th National congress of the Chinese communist party has formally proclaimed the purpose of advancing the constitutional examination system, and then the constitutional amendment of 2018 established a new special commission to carry out it. Do these two events mean that China has prepared well for the construction of the rule of law, which has the effect of improving the current system of constitutional protection of the property rights of citizens? Starting from this question, the present thesis thus chooses a perspective of the implementation of the constitution and uses the experience of the French law as reference, in order to study the system of the protection of the property right in China

O presente trabalho pretende estudar a rev1sao constitucional periódica estabelecida na Constitu ição da República Portuguesa de 1976 como ferramenta de aprimoramento institucional, vislumbrando a sua adequação ao ordenamento constitucional brasileiro. Inicialmente, resgatam-se os conceitos ligados ao poder reformador para depois estabelecer a trad ição histórica da reforma constitucional em Portugal, traçando um paralelo comparativo com o procedimento de alteração constitucional adotado no Brasil. Para tanto, foi necessária a análise do instituto da revisão constitucional portuguesa , explicitando, em especial, a periodicidade revisional, para verificar, através da experiência lus itana, a eficácia do instituto em questão. Por fim, apresenta-se a revisão constitucional periódica como instrumento apto para gerar estabilidade constitucional aliado a sua capacidade de oportunizar periodicamente o aprimoramento das institu ições do Estado. / This study aims to investigate the periodic constitutional review established as an institutional improvement tool in the Portuguese Constitution of 1976, setting a sight on its adequacy concerning the Brazilian constitutional order. This research recovers the concepts related to the reforming power in order to establish the historical tradition of the constitutional reform in Portugal, drawing a comparison with the constitutional amendment procedure adopted in Brazil. Therefore, the analysis of the Portugues.e lnstitute of constitutional review was necessary to particularly explain the reviewing periodicity in order to verify the effectiveness of the institute through the Portuguese experience. Finally, this study presents the periodic constitutional review as an effective means to generate constitutional stability together with its facility to periodically provide the opportunity for improvement of the national institutions.

Cette étude se penche sur les doctrines du droit parlementaire entendues comme les discours à prétention savante relatifs au droit des assemblées parlementaires. Elle s’attache à retracer l’apparition et l’évolution de ces discours en France et distingue trois groupes doctrinaux en fonction de la conception des rapports entre Droit et politique sur laquelle ils se fondent. Les trois parties de la thèse sont ainsi respectivement consacrées à chacun de ces groupes : la doctrine politique des « professeurs-parlementaires », la doctrine technique des « professeurs-administrateurs » et enfin à la doctrine juridique des « professeurs-universitaires ». La pertinence de cette typologie est éprouvée au regard de la notion de constitutionnalisation qui apparait particulièrement polysémique et dont l’application au droit parlementaire contemporain suscite des difficultés conceptuelles. Celles-ci s’expliquent notamment par le fait que chaque groupe doctrinal tend à développer une conception de la constitutionnalisation qui lui est propre en fonction de la théorie du Droit politique qu’elle adopte. La doctrine politique s’attache à une constitutionnalisation de conservation du droit parlementaire, la doctrine technique promeut une constitutionnalisation d’optimisation du droit parlementaire tandis que la doctrine juridique se rallie à une constitutionnalisation de subordination du droit parlementaire. / This study examines the doctrines of parliamentary law understood as scholarly speeches relating to the rules of parliamentary assemblies. It attempts to trace the appearance and evolution of these discourses in France and distinguishes three doctrinal groups according to the conception of the relations between Law and politics on which they are based. The three parts of the thesis are respectively devoted to each of these groups: the political doctrine of "parliamentary professors", the technical doctrine of "professors-administrators" and finally the legal doctrine of "university professors". The relevance of this typology is tested with regards to the notion of constitutionalization, which appears to be particularly polysemic and whose application to contemporary parliamentary law raises conceptual difficulties. These are explained in particular by the fact that each doctrinal group tends to develop its own conception of the notion of constitutionalization, according to the theory of the political right it adopts. The political doctrine focuses on a constitutionalization of the conservation of parliamentary law, the technical doctrine promotes a constitutionalization of optimization of parliamentary law while the legal doctrine is associated with a constitutionalization of subordination of parliamentary law.

O presente trabalho pretende estudar a rev1sao constitucional periódica estabelecida na Constitu ição da República Portuguesa de 1976 como ferramenta de aprimoramento institucional, vislumbrando a sua adequação ao ordenamento constitucional brasileiro. Inicialmente, resgatam-se os conceitos ligados ao poder reformador para depois estabelecer a trad ição histórica da reforma constitucional em Portugal, traçando um paralelo comparativo com o procedimento de alteração constitucional adotado no Brasil. Para tanto, foi necessária a análise do instituto da revisão constitucional portuguesa , explicitando, em especial, a periodicidade revisional, para verificar, através da experiência lus itana, a eficácia do instituto em questão. Por fim, apresenta-se a revisão constitucional periódica como instrumento apto para gerar estabilidade constitucional aliado a sua capacidade de oportunizar periodicamente o aprimoramento das institu ições do Estado. / This study aims to investigate the periodic constitutional review established as an institutional improvement tool in the Portuguese Constitution of 1976, setting a sight on its adequacy concerning the Brazilian constitutional order. This research recovers the concepts related to the reforming power in order to establish the historical tradition of the constitutional reform in Portugal, drawing a comparison with the constitutional amendment procedure adopted in Brazil. Therefore, the analysis of the Portugues.e lnstitute of constitutional review was necessary to particularly explain the reviewing periodicity in order to verify the effectiveness of the institute through the Portuguese experience. Finally, this study presents the periodic constitutional review as an effective means to generate constitutional stability together with its facility to periodically provide the opportunity for improvement of the national institutions.

The impact of the political question doctrine on decision-making of judges of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic Abstract The thesis deals with the influence of the political question doctrine on decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic. It explains the meaning of the political question in the United States, describes what the possible Czech political questions could be and outlines reasons for judicial restraint in the cases lying on the boundary of law and politics. The first part of the thesis briefly presents relations between constitutional law and the part of politics which is closely connected to the constitutional judiciary. This relationship is explained by a phenomenon called the judicialization of politics which describes the growing role of constitutional courts in solving political controversies and policy questions. Moreover, to better understand the impact of the political question doctrine on decision-making of Czech constitutional judges, the second part of the thesis deals with the origin and an establishment of this doctrine in the Supreme Court of the United States, and indicates its future development. The third and fourth part of the thesis focuses on defining the Czech political question, its limits and also on its application by the Constitutional Court...

The last two decades have witnessed a period of constitutional change without precedent in the United Kingdom’s contemporary history, and prominent constitutionalists have suggested that these transformations signified primarily a legalisation of the British constitutional settlement. The present research hence offers a review of the most salient and impactful instances of constitutional change since 1997 with the aim of assessing in what ways the UK could be transitioning from a more political to a more legal constitutional framework. It highlights a greater reliance on legal devices to regulate constitutional processes and more frequent resort to judicial mechanisms of constitutional control. Indeed, the virtual entrenchment of various classes of norms (ECHR rights, common law constitutional rights and principles, Thoburn-‘constitutional statutes’) suggests the formation in British public law of a ‘bloc de constitutionnalité’ that could serve as basis for increasingly genuine forms of constitutional review. Concurrently, British courts are performing more of the functions of constitutional courts and appear willing to assume the role of constitutional guardian ascribed to the judiciary in a legal-constitutional model. Overall, the political constitution and its core principle of parliamentary sovereignty seem to be under challenge, particularly in judicial and jurisprudential debates grounded in the influential theory of common law constitutionalism. We therefore argue that the British constitution can no longer be described as exclusively ‘political’ and that there is at least some evidence of a trend towards legal constitutionalism in the UK.

« Lorsque, à l’occasion d’une instance en cours devant une juridiction, il est soutenu qu’une disposition législative porte atteinte aux droits et libertés que la Constitution garantit, le Conseil constitutionnel peut être saisi de cette question sur renvoi du Conseil d’Etat ou de la Cour de cassation… ». Le nouvel article 61-1 de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 a ouvert un champ contentieux inconnu en France : celui de la constitutionnalité de la loi en vigueur. Le pouvoir de révision constitutionnelle a renforcé et étendu la compétence d’une institution à caractère juridictionnel, le Conseil constitutionnel, bénéficiant d’une qualité spécifique d’attribution tirée de la source constitutionnelle. Dans un vocabulaire juridique largement admis, le juge constitutionnel est distinct d’autres catégories de juges : « juges ordinaires », ou « internationaux ». La question initiale est alors la suivante : pourquoi peut-il être fondé juridiquement de penser et de promouvoir le postulat, selon lequel le contrôle de la constitutionnalité des lois doit s’exercer de façon concentrée ? Parce qu’il apparaît qu’en France, le discours sur le juge constitutionnel et la justice constitutionnelle procède non d’un discours interne au système juridique (discours du droit) mais sur un discours externe (discours sur le droit), celui des juristes savants et de la prétention à connaître de façon scientifique l’objet juridique.Faisant le choix d’un paradigme herméneutique pour la connaissance juridique, le présent travail propose de traiter la question de la spécificité de l’office juridictionnel dans l’opération d’application du droit qui s’y rattache. La spécificité de la norme constitutionnelle fonde celle d’une fonction constitutionnelle au sein de l’ordre juridique, permettant de modéliser la voie d’un espace processuel de résolution éthique des conflits d’interprétation constitutionnelle. / “If, during proceedings in progress before a court of law, it is claimed that a legislative provision infringes the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the matter may be referred by the Conseil d’État or by the Cour de Cassation to the Constitutional Council…”The new article 61-1 of the Constitution of October 4th, 1958, strengthens the constitutional review of laws in France. For that purpose, the jurisdictional remit of the Constitutional Council has been extended. By its constitutional habilitation, this institution would be in a position to benefit from the recognition of a special authority. In the prevailing legal vocabulary, to describe a legal system such as the French one, the constitutional judge is singled out from other judges (“ordinary” judges for example, etc.).Therefore, the first question to be asked is: why should it be legally founded to think and promote the basic premise which is that the constitutional review of laws shall be exercised by a single body? In France indeed, developments about the constitutional judge or constitutional justice don’t stem from an internal perspective of the juridical system but originates from the external discourse of learned lawyers who ambition to scientifically approach law.With a hermeneutical paradigm for legal knowledge, this study tries to deal with the question of a judicial office through a process of normative concretization. In this view, the characteristics of the constitutional norm found a constitutional function into the legal order. Then, it seems to be possible to imagine a processual space allowing the ethical resolution of interpretative conflicts.

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o controle de constitucionalidade por omissão exercido pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal. Para tanto, foi realizado um estudo empírico com base no exame de um conjunto de ações diretas de inconstitucionalidade por omissão e mandados de injunção julgados pelo STF entre 1988 a 2009. A partir do exame dos mecanismos de proteção judicial contra a omissão do legislador, procura-se analisar a judicialização dos casos envolvendo as omissões legislativas e investigar o modo como o STF decide estes casos. Os dois tipos de controle constitucional por omissão previstos na Constituição Federal o concentrado e o difuso são objeto de análise na presente dissertação, atentando-se para as particularidades de cada um. No primeiro caso, o foco está nas causas e resultados da judicialização da política promovida pelos legitimados para a propositura das ADO. O perfil dos demandantes e a saliência das questões levadas à apreciação do Tribunal são fatores que contribuem para explicar a ampla judicialização protagonizada pelos partidos políticos. Já no segundo caso, o estudo está focado nas decisões concessivas de mandado de injunção e a sua relação com a efetividade das normas constitucionais. Nesse contexto, verifica-se que, embora o STF tenha sido muitas vezes chamado a se manifestar sobre as omissões inconstitucionais, foi apenas recentemente que ele optou por concretizar o direito dos demandantes, garantindo eficácia plena às normas constitucionais até que o legislador supra a omissão. O exame dos julgados do STF revela que o descumprimento (non compliance) de suas decisões declaratórias da omissão é um dos fatores que levam à adoção de uma postura mais propositiva do Tribunal, momento em que ele passa a determinar a regra aplicável ao caso concreto, sem necessariamente criar normas. Por esta razão, conclui-se que o Supremo Tribunal Federal concretiza o pedido do impetrante sem exercer um papel ativista, uma vez que ele não influi diretamente na atividade do legislador. / This thesis aims at examining the way the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal STF) handles legislative omission in matters involving constitutional issues. For this, we performed a research based on analysis of a series of STF decisions on legislative omission lawsuits (direct actions of unconstitutionality by omission and writ of injunction) from 1988 to 2009. By examining the constitutional protections against the absence of a regulatory provision that disables the exercise of constitutional rights, this study attempts to offer a diagnostic of the dynamics presiding Judicary actions in politically loaded issues and to investigate the ways the Court decides such cases. There are two types of legislative omission control express in the Constitution concentrated and diffuse which are analysed in detail. In the first case, the focus is on the causes and results linked to the judicialization of politics. The profile of the plaintiffs and the salience of issues are factors leading to the prominent role played by political parties here. In the second case, the study focuses itself on the injunctions granted by the Court and their connection to the efficacy of constitutional norms. This paper suggests that only recently the STF has decided to start granting injunctions guaranteeing that plaintiffs exercise specific, non-statutory rights until the Legislature remedies the omission on the matter. It also suggests that non compliance with the Courts previous rulings on legislative omission has been a key factor in the more resolute stance recently adopted by the Court, when it comes determining the rule applicable in this case, without playing a role of rule-maker. In conclusion, this study holds that the Courts actions are not a chapter of judicial activism insofar it does not directly interfere with the substance of legislative action.

L'article 111-4 du Code pénal prévoit, par une formule laconique, que « la loi pénale est d'interprétation stricte ». Corollaire de la légalité criminelle, ce principe a vocation à protéger les individus des risques d'une répression arbitraire en soumettant toute atteinte à leur liberté au strict domaine de la loi, expression de la volonté générale. À dépasser les désaccords entourant les théories de l'interprétation, analysée comme un procédé de révélation ou de construction de sens, cet impératif intervient a minima comme une limite à la liberté de l'interprète. Or le principe de légalité dans lequel l'exigence tire son fondement a subi d'importantes mutations. L'admission de la représentation, l'inflation législative, et l'instrumentalisation de la fonction intimidatrice de la norme pénale, ont en effet entraîné une certaine déliquescence de la loi. L'instauration de contrôles de constitutionnalité et de conventionnalité de la loi participent à ce mouvement. Par un effet de balancier, le recul de la loi s'est traduit par une recrudescence du pouvoir judiciaire. Chargée de contrôler la conventionnalité de la loi et les conditions de renvoi d'une question prioritaire de constitutionnalité, la chambre criminelle a vu son office profondément modifié. La protection effective de la liberté individuelle est dorénavant réputée être mieux assurée par le contrôle judiciaire des normes pénales que par le recours à la loi : la légalité formelle se mue en une légalité matérielle. Or, en qualité de corollaire de la légalité criminelle, le principe d'interprétation stricte est nécessairement atteint par cette mutation. Bien que demeurant pareillement formulé, il voit en effet son fondement substantiellement modifié. L'exigence d'une stricte interprétation étant originellement justifiée par déférence à l'égard de la volonté générale exprimée par la loi, la reconnaissance de l'incapacité de cette dernière à la saisir entraîne une certaine souplesse dans l'application du principe. Dès lors qu'il est compétent pour contrôler la loi, le juge est par ailleurs davantage enclin à se libérer de son emprise. Il convient alors de s'interroger sur la manière dont la chambre criminelle applique le principe d'interprétation stricte de la loi pénale à l'aune des mutations de la légalité. Il apparaît que, sans suivre une ligne de conduite précise, la chambre criminelle tend à influer sur la politique pénale en usant de son pouvoir d'interprétation pour réajuster, de manière conjoncturelle et par touches d'ajustements ponctuels, le seuil de la répression fixé par le législateur. Dans un système de hiérarchie des normes se transformant en réseau normatif, l'interprétation devient outil de construction de la norme pénale. / Article 111-4 of the Penal Code succinctly provides that “criminal law is to be interpreted strictly”. Deriving from the principle of legality, the principle of strict construction intends to protect individuals from arbitrary repression by submitting any infringement on their freedom to the strict scope of the law, which is the expression of the general will. Setting aside the disagreements regarding the theory of interpretation – analyzed as a method of either revealing or constructing meaning – this imperative, at least, limits the interpreter's freedom. However, the principle of legality, on which the imperative of strict construction is based, has undergone significant changes. The adoption of a representative system, legislative inflation, along with authorities taking advantage of the deterrence provided by criminal norms has, to a degree, led to a decline of the law. The establishment of constitutionality and conventionality reviews of the law has also contributed to it. As a result of a seesaw effect, the decline of the law resulted in an increase in the role of the judiciary. The Criminal Division of the French Supreme Court of Appeal (Court de Cassation) is responsible for reviewing the conventionality of the law and the referral procedure of preliminary rulings on constitutionality. Consequently, the Criminal Division's function has undergone major changes. Protecting individual freedom is now deemed more effective when carried out by the judicial review of criminal norms rather than by resorting to the law. Procedural legality turns into substantive legality. Therefore, as a result of the principle of legality, the principle of strict construction is affected by this transformation. Even though the principle of strict construction remains formulated in the same way, its founding principle has substantially changed. The requirement of a strict construction was originally justified out of deference for the general will, which is expressed by the law. Thus, the acknowledgement of the law's incapacity to grasp the general will leads to some flexibility in the implementation of the principle. Since the judge has the authority to review the law, he is more inclined to interpret it freely. How the Criminal Division implements the principle of strict construction of criminal law in light of changes in legality needs then to be examined: The Criminal Division tends to influence criminal policies, even though it does not seem to be following a particular course of action, by exercising its power of interpretation to adjust, as circumstances dictate, the threshold for punishment set by the legislator. In a normative hierarchy system that turns into a normative network, interpretation becomes a tool to construct criminal norms.

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o controle de constitucionalidade por omissão exercido pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal. Para tanto, foi realizado um estudo empírico com base no exame de um conjunto de ações diretas de inconstitucionalidade por omissão e mandados de injunção julgados pelo STF entre 1988 a 2009. A partir do exame dos mecanismos de proteção judicial contra a omissão do legislador, procura-se analisar a judicialização dos casos envolvendo as omissões legislativas e investigar o modo como o STF decide estes casos. Os dois tipos de controle constitucional por omissão previstos na Constituição Federal o concentrado e o difuso são objeto de análise na presente dissertação, atentando-se para as particularidades de cada um. No primeiro caso, o foco está nas causas e resultados da judicialização da política promovida pelos legitimados para a propositura das ADO. O perfil dos demandantes e a saliência das questões levadas à apreciação do Tribunal são fatores que contribuem para explicar a ampla judicialização protagonizada pelos partidos políticos. Já no segundo caso, o estudo está focado nas decisões concessivas de mandado de injunção e a sua relação com a efetividade das normas constitucionais. Nesse contexto, verifica-se que, embora o STF tenha sido muitas vezes chamado a se manifestar sobre as omissões inconstitucionais, foi apenas recentemente que ele optou por concretizar o direito dos demandantes, garantindo eficácia plena às normas constitucionais até que o legislador supra a omissão. O exame dos julgados do STF revela que o descumprimento (non compliance) de suas decisões declaratórias da omissão é um dos fatores que levam à adoção de uma postura mais propositiva do Tribunal, momento em que ele passa a determinar a regra aplicável ao caso concreto, sem necessariamente criar normas. Por esta razão, conclui-se que o Supremo Tribunal Federal concretiza o pedido do impetrante sem exercer um papel ativista, uma vez que ele não influi diretamente na atividade do legislador. / This thesis aims at examining the way the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal STF) handles legislative omission in matters involving constitutional issues. For this, we performed a research based on analysis of a series of STF decisions on legislative omission lawsuits (direct actions of unconstitutionality by omission and writ of injunction) from 1988 to 2009. By examining the constitutional protections against the absence of a regulatory provision that disables the exercise of constitutional rights, this study attempts to offer a diagnostic of the dynamics presiding Judicary actions in politically loaded issues and to investigate the ways the Court decides such cases. There are two types of legislative omission control express in the Constitution concentrated and diffuse which are analysed in detail. In the first case, the focus is on the causes and results linked to the judicialization of politics. The profile of the plaintiffs and the salience of issues are factors leading to the prominent role played by political parties here. In the second case, the study focuses itself on the injunctions granted by the Court and their connection to the efficacy of constitutional norms. This paper suggests that only recently the STF has decided to start granting injunctions guaranteeing that plaintiffs exercise specific, non-statutory rights until the Legislature remedies the omission on the matter. It also suggests that non compliance with the Courts previous rulings on legislative omission has been a key factor in the more resolute stance recently adopted by the Court, when it comes determining the rule applicable in this case, without playing a role of rule-maker. In conclusion, this study holds that the Courts actions are not a chapter of judicial activism insofar it does not directly interfere with the substance of legislative action.