Chung Chi-man. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 91-94). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.ii / 摘要 --- p.iii / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Table of Contents --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction / Chapter 1.1 --- Agency Theory --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Separation of Large and Small Shareholders --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Role of Auditing in Corporate Governance --- p.5 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- The Framework of Corporate Governance and External Auditing in Hong Kong / Chapter 2.1 --- Corporate Governance in Hong Kong --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2 --- External Auditing in Hong Kong --- p.12 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Construction of the Data / Chapter 3.1 --- Assembly of the Primary Data --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2 --- Traces of the Identities of the Ultimate Owners --- p.17 / Chapter 3.3 --- Construction of the Industry-Adjusted Audit Rate Data and Some Descriptive Statistics --- p.19 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Ownership and Control Patterns / Chapter 4.1 --- An Improved Research Methodology --- p.24 / Chapter 4.2 --- Discussions of Ownership and Control Patterns --- p.26 / Chapter 4.3 --- Ownership and Control by Owner Types --- p.30 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Examples of Typical Ownership Patterns / Chapter 5.1 --- The Li Ka-Shing Business Group --- p.35 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Swire Group --- p.40 / Chapter 5.3 --- The Kuok Khoon-Ean Business Group --- p.41 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Regression Analyses / Chapter 6.1 --- The Variables --- p.43 / Chapter 6.2 --- Regression Results and Discussions --- p.46 / Chapter 6.3 --- A Restricted Model --- p.52 / Chapter Chapter 7 --- Some Concluding Remarks --- p.55 / Tables / Table 1 Description Statistics of the Unadjusted Auditing Rate Data --- p.57 / Table 2 Separation of Ownership and Control Rights --- p.58 / "Table 3 Control of Publicly Traded Companies, by Owner Types" --- p.59 / Table 4 Description of Regression Variables --- p.60 / Table 5 Regression Results on the Relationship between Industry- Adjusted Auditing Rates and the Largest Shareholders' Ownership and Control (Full Sample) --- p.63 / Table 6 Regression Results on the Relationship between Industry- Adjusted Auditing fee and the Largest Shareholders' Ownership and Control (Family-controlled or Corporate-Entity-controlled Firms Only) --- p.66 / Figures / Figure 1 The Structure of Hang Seng Composite Index --- p.68 / Figure 2 The Relationship between Different Types of Large Shareholders --- p.69 / "Figure 3a The Li, Ka-Shing Group" --- p.70 / Figure 3b Details of the Calculations of the Concentrated Ownership and Control Stakes --- p.71 / Figure 4 The Connections of the Chinese Government and a Diverse Corporation (Swire Group) --- p.72 / "Figure 5 The Kuok, Khoon-Ean Group (An Example of Flat Structure)" --- p.73 / Appendices / Figure A1 HSBC Holdings PLC --- p.74 / Figure A2 The Bank of East Asia --- p.75 / Figure A3 JCG Holdings Limited --- p.76 / Figure A4 Moulin International Holdings limited --- p.77 / Figure A5 Yue Yuen Industrial (Holdings) Limited --- p.78 / Figure A6 Orient Overseas (International) Limited --- p.79 / Figure A7 Sun Man Tai Holdings Company Limited --- p.80 / "Figure A8 The Lee, Shan-Kee Group" --- p.81 / Figure A9 China National Aviation Company Limited --- p.82 / Figure A10 ICBC (Asia) Limited --- p.83 / Figure A11 MTR Corporation --- p.84 / "Figure A12 The Liu, Lit-Man Group" --- p.85 / Table A1 Summary Description of the Data --- p.86 / Bibliography --- p.91

Using a sample of firms listed in China's A-share stock market, this study investigates whether the regional institutions and CEO's political connectedness will affect the listed firms' hiring and firing decisions about CEOs, and what are the channels of these effects. I find that, for state-owned enterprises, politically connected CEOs are less likely to be nominated to firms in industries with more specific knowledge, with more competition, cross-listed in Hong Kong stock exchange, and in regions with stronger institutions. However, there is no such pattern for non-SOEs. Second, as a consequence, CEOs' political connectedness of CEOs in SOEs reduces the sensitivity of their turnover to firm performance for SOEs. There is no such political connectedness effect on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity in non-SOEs. Third, the reduction on turnover performance sensitivity is mitigated by stronger institutions. The additional analysis finds evidence partially explaining why the politically connected CEOs are less likely to be dismissed because of their poor performance, that is, SOEs with politically connected CEOs can (1) get more subsidies from the governments when their performance is poor, and (2) tend to hire more employees when the regions in which they locate suffer from severe unemployment problem. / Yuan, Qingbo. / Adviser: T.J. Wong. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2123. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-57). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

Choi, Chi Kit. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-51). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.5 / Chapter 3. --- Research Hypothesis / Chapter 3.1 --- Institutional Setting --- p.10 / Chapter 3.2 --- Existence and magnitude of the value of corporate control --- p.11 / Chapter 3.3 --- Determinants of the value of corporate control --- p.13 / Chapter 4. --- Methodology / Chapter 4.1 --- Testing the existence of value of corporate control --- p.16 / Chapter 4.2 --- Typical eamples --- p.17 / Chapter 4.3 --- Testing the determinants of value of corporate control --- p.20 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Controlling Power --- p.20 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Regional Governance --- p.22 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Corporate Governance --- p.24 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- Firm Performance --- p.26 / Chapter 4.3.5 --- Control variables --- p.26 / Chapter 5. --- Data / Chapter 5.1 --- Existence of value of corporate control --- p.28 / Chapter 5.2 --- Determinants of value of corporate control / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Controlling Power --- p.30 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Regional Governance --- p.31 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Corporate Governance --- p.32 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- Firm Performance --- p.33 / Chapter 5.2.5 --- Control variables --- p.34 / Chapter 6. --- Empirical Results / Chapter 6.1 --- Existence of value of corporate control --- p.36 / Chapter 6.2 --- Robustness tests --- p.36 / Chapter 6.3 --- Determinants of value of corporate control --- p.38 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- Controlling Power --- p.38 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- Regional Governance --- p.39 / Chapter 6.3.3 --- Corporate Governance --- p.40 / Chapter 6.3.4 --- Firm Performance --- p.41 / Chapter 6.3.5 --- Multivariate regression analysis --- p.43 / Chapter 7. --- Summary and Conclusion --- p.47 / Chapter 8. --- References --- p.50 / Chapter 9. --- Appendix --- p.52

<p>Syfte:                                                                         </p><p>Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka hur organisation, intern kontroll och eventuella bolagsstyrningsrapporter förändrats i de tre undersökta bolagen i och med införandet av den reviderade koden den 1 juli 2008. Vidare är vårt syfte att undersöka om revisorernas arbete påverkats i och med införandet av den reviderade koden och hur Kollegiet upplever att implementering av densamma fungerat.</p><p>Metod:                                                     </p><p>Undersökningen bygger på en kvalitativ forskningsmetod där primärdata studerades i form av bolagsstyrningsrapporter från de granskade bolagens årsredovisningar samt intervjuer av semistrukturerad karaktär. Intervjuerna har gjorts med representanter för tre revisionsbyråer, tre börsnoterade bolag som följer koden sedan 1 juli 2008 samt Per Lekvall representant för Kollegiet för svensk bolagsstyrning.</p><p>Slutsats:                                                   </p><p>Författarna har kommit fram till att implementeringen av den reviderade koden inte har blivit så omfattande och krävt några större förändringar som många av de mindre/medelstora bolagen kanske oroat sig för. Anledningen till detta är att bolagen redan följer många delar av koden sedan tidigare samt att koden inte innehåller några revolutionerande förändringar för bolagen.</p> / <p>Purpose:                                                   </p><p>The purpose with this thesis is to study how the organization, intern control and possible corporate governance reports changed in three companies since they started to follow the modified code 1 july 2008. Further is the purpose to study if the work of the audits has been affected since the adoption of the modified code and how the Swedish Corporate Governance Board has experienced the implementation of the Swedish code of corporate governance.</p><p>Method:                                                   </p><p>The Research is built on a qualitative method where primary data was studied in form of corporate governance reports reports taken from the reviewed companies annual reports and from semi-structured interviews. The interviews has been done with representatives from three audit bureaus, three companies noted on the Swedish stock exchanged, who has followed the code since 1 july 2008 and Per Lekvall from the Swedish Corporate Governance Board.</p><p>Conclusion:                                             </p><p>The Authors has realised that the implementation of the modified code has not brought any big changes as many of the small/ medium-sized companies maybe worrying about. The reason is that many of these companies are already following a large part of the code and that the code does not contain any revolutionary changes.</p>

The problem area was identified due to the fact that research within internal audit is fragmented and insufficient, simultaneously to internal audit becoming more common in the public debate. Crises and scandals in companies such as Enron in the US and Skandia in Sweden have resulted in new regulations regarding how companies should be governed. These regulations have been established in Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in the US, and in Sweden the Swedish code for corporate governance will be implemented in 2005. The regulations imply that companies must provide sound internal control and to accomplish that, companies should have an auditing and consulting internal audit function. The Swedish code for corporate governance denotes that companies can decide to comply or explain why the code is not complied. SOX on the other hand require that the regulation is being followed. The raised question is how internal audit is performed. International research has thrown light upon this question but few studies have been made in a Swedish perspective. The purpose with this thesis is to describe the role of internal audit in Swedish companies, to examine if the role is perceived as a watchdog or as a consultant, and to analyze to what extent present regulations affect internal audit. The choice of method in the thesis has taken the form of a profound qualitative research in three companies accompanied by a quantitative research to examine if the results from the qualitative study could be confirmed. The qualitative research consisted of interviews with three companies, which all have an established internal audit function. The interviews were followed by a questionnaire presented to all companies listed on the Swedish stock exchange most traded A-list. The results show that of the companies listed on the Swedish stock exchange most traded A-list only 32 percent have an internal audit function. This can be perceived as low when previous studies in the area have shown that internationally it is a common function. In the companies where there is an internal audit function, the role has mainly transformed back to a watchdog perspective from previously been heading towards a consulting role. This shift in the role of internal audit mostly derives from the exceeded regulations within corporate governance. / Det identifierade problemområdet tar sin början i att forskning inom internrevision är fragmenterad och ofullständig samtidigt som internrevision har blivit allt vanligare i den allmänna debatten. Kriser och skandaler i företag som till exempel Enron i USA och Skandia i Sverige har lett till nya regleringar hur företag ska styras och förvaltas. Dessa regleringar har tillkommit i form av Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) i USA och i Sverige kommer Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning att implementeras under 2005. Regleringarna säger bland annat att företaget måste tillgodose en god intern kontroll och att företagen för att uppnå detta, bör ha en granskande och konsulterande internrevisionsfunktion. Den svenska koden anger dock att företaget kan välja att i stället förklara varför koden inte efterföljs, detta till skillnad från SOX som kräver att regelverket följs. Frågan väcks hur internrevisionen i företag ser ut. Viss internationell forskning har belyst denna fråga, men studier i ett svenskt perspektiv lyser med sin frånvaro. Syftet med uppsatsen är att beskriva internrevisionens roll i svenska företag, att undersöka om rollen upplevs som övervägande granskande eller konsulterande, samt att analysera i vilken utsträckning aktuella regelverk påverkar internrevisionen. Metodvalet i uppsatsen har tagit sig uttryck i en djupgående kvalitativ undersökning av tre företag, åtföljt av en kvantitativ undersökning för att undersöka om resultaten från den kvalitativa studien bekräftas. Den kvalitativa undersökningen består av intervjuer med tre företag som alla har en väl etablerad internrevisionsfunktion. Efter dessa intervjuer formulerades ett antal frågor som sammanställdes i en enkät. Dessa frågor ställdes till företag på Stockholmsbörsens A-lista, mest omsatta. Resultaten som framkom, visar att av företagen på Stockholmsbörsens A-lista, mest omsatta, är det enbart 32 procent som har en internrevisionsfunktion vilket kan anses som lågt då tidigare studier inom området pekar på att det internationellt är en vanlig funktion hos företagen. Där det finns en internrevisionsfunktion har dess roll till övervägande del gått tillbaka till att bli alltmer granskande, från att tidigare ha varit på väg mot en konsulterande roll. Detta skift i internrevisionens roll har framförallt sin grund i den ökade regleringen inom corporate governance.

Syfte:                                                                          Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka hur organisation, intern kontroll och eventuella bolagsstyrningsrapporter förändrats i de tre undersökta bolagen i och med införandet av den reviderade koden den 1 juli 2008. Vidare är vårt syfte att undersöka om revisorernas arbete påverkats i och med införandet av den reviderade koden och hur Kollegiet upplever att implementering av densamma fungerat. Metod:                                                      Undersökningen bygger på en kvalitativ forskningsmetod där primärdata studerades i form av bolagsstyrningsrapporter från de granskade bolagens årsredovisningar samt intervjuer av semistrukturerad karaktär. Intervjuerna har gjorts med representanter för tre revisionsbyråer, tre börsnoterade bolag som följer koden sedan 1 juli 2008 samt Per Lekvall representant för Kollegiet för svensk bolagsstyrning. Slutsats:                                                    Författarna har kommit fram till att implementeringen av den reviderade koden inte har blivit så omfattande och krävt några större förändringar som många av de mindre/medelstora bolagen kanske oroat sig för. Anledningen till detta är att bolagen redan följer många delar av koden sedan tidigare samt att koden inte innehåller några revolutionerande förändringar för bolagen. / Purpose:                                                    The purpose with this thesis is to study how the organization, intern control and possible corporate governance reports changed in three companies since they started to follow the modified code 1 july 2008. Further is the purpose to study if the work of the audits has been affected since the adoption of the modified code and how the Swedish Corporate Governance Board has experienced the implementation of the Swedish code of corporate governance. Method:                                                    The Research is built on a qualitative method where primary data was studied in form of corporate governance reports reports taken from the reviewed companies annual reports and from semi-structured interviews. The interviews has been done with representatives from three audit bureaus, three companies noted on the Swedish stock exchanged, who has followed the code since 1 july 2008 and Per Lekvall from the Swedish Corporate Governance Board. Conclusion:                                              The Authors has realised that the implementation of the modified code has not brought any big changes as many of the small/ medium-sized companies maybe worrying about. The reason is that many of these companies are already following a large part of the code and that the code does not contain any revolutionary changes.

In the past few years many businesses has suffered some serious setbacks and some banks have even undergone bankruptcy. That’s why Corporate Governance (CG) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) have increasingly become very important in the recent years. This thesis investigates the role played by CG and CSR in business expansion. Further it examines what is CG and CSR and how it can bring about growth in a business. For better understanding of the theories we used a case study approach and chose Grameen Bank (GB) a Bangladeshi bank because of its tremendous success and growth over the years even in the middle of the turbulent financial crisis. We wish to find out the role CG and CSR played in this success critically. The expected contributions of this work will be to see the visibility of CG CSR in a bank like GB which has deviated from conventional banking models and how this has influenced its growth.

This study examines the relationship between SAHA’s corporate governance rating score and firm performance in Turkey for the period between 2008, 2009 and 2010. The purpose of study is to analyze whether there is a relationship between Saha’s corporate governance score which is based on the principles of Capital Market Board of Turkey and firm performance for 16 companies listed in corporate governance index Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) by using Saha’s Corporate Governance. It also aims to determine this relationship by attempting to answer the question of whether better governed firms as measured by high corporate governance score have higher firm performance in Turkey. With this purpose three analyses were conducted and random effect model, one type of panel data, is used to analyze whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The conceptual framework for this study is a combinationan of approaches to agency, stakeholder and stewardship theory. Panel data is created as unbalanced data and random effect model is used.Accounting based performance measures of firms: return on asset, return on equity and returnon sales were used to compare with Saha’s Corporate Governance Rating Score based on four sub-indices: 1) shareholder rights, 2) public disclosure and transparency, 3) stakeholders and 4) board of directors. The results based on Saha’s Corporate Governance Score show that corporate governance does matter in Turkey. The study shows that better governed firms measured by high corporate governance score have better performance in Turkey. The result of regressing return on asset, return on equity against Saha’s corporate governance rating score indicates that there is a significantly relationship between corporate governance and firm performace. However, the result of regressing return on sales indicates that there is no statistically significant relation between Saha’s corporate governance score and return on sales.

Författare:                   Marcus Davidsson, Camilla Johansson och Johanna Nilsson Handledare:                 Ola Nilsson Titel:                             Hur hanterar företagen kravet på revisionsutskott? – en studie av fem svenska börsföretag Bakgrund:                   Under sommaren 2008 blev Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning obligatorisk för samtliga svenska företag som är noterade på den svenska börsen. Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning stadgar bland annat att företagens styrelser skall inrätta ett revisionsutskott. Företagen kan dock välja att inte inrätta ett revisionsutskott och då förklara varför, enligt principen ”följ eller förklara”. Syfte:                            Syftet med studien är att öka kunskapen kring hur företag hanterar Svensk kod för bolagsstyrnings krav kring revisionsutskott samt vilken nytta revisionsutskottet upplevs tillföra i styrelsearbetet. Metod:                          En kvalitativ intervjustudie har genomförts. Studien omfattade fem styrelseledamöter från fem börsnoterade företag på OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm. Slutsats:                        Studien visar att fyra av de fem företagen som ingått i studien har valt att inrätta revisionsutskott. Majoriteten av dessa har inrättat revisionsutskotten som ett resultat av strävan att följa Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning. Vidare har studien visat att styrelserna har satt samman revisionsutskott på olika sätt, både vad gäller ekonomisk kompetens och oberoende. Merparten av företagen i studien ställer höga krav på vad revisionsutskotten skall utföra för uppgifter och upplever att utskotten tillför nytta i styrelsearbetet.

<p>The problem area was identified due to the fact that research within internal audit is fragmented and insufficient, simultaneously to internal audit becoming more common in the public debate. Crises and scandals in companies such as Enron in the US and Skandia in Sweden have resulted in new regulations regarding how companies should be governed. These regulations have been established in Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in the US, and in Sweden the Swedish code for corporate governance will be implemented in 2005. The regulations imply that companies must provide sound internal control and to accomplish that, companies should have an auditing and consulting internal audit function. The Swedish code for corporate governance denotes that companies can decide to comply or explain why the code is not complied. SOX on the other hand require that the regulation is being followed. The raised question is how internal audit is performed. International research has thrown light upon this question but few studies have been made in a Swedish perspective.</p><p>The purpose with this thesis is to describe the role of internal audit in Swedish companies, to examine if the role is perceived as a watchdog or as a consultant, and to analyze to what extent present regulations affect internal audit.</p><p>The choice of method in the thesis has taken the form of a profound qualitative research in three companies accompanied by a quantitative research to examine if the results from the qualitative study could be confirmed. The qualitative research consisted of interviews with three companies, which all have an established internal audit function. The interviews were followed by a questionnaire presented to all companies listed on the Swedish stock exchange most traded A-list.</p><p>The results show that of the companies listed on the Swedish stock exchange most traded A-list only 32 percent have an internal audit function. This can be perceived as low when previous studies in the area have shown that internationally it is a common function. In the companies where there is an internal audit function, the role has mainly transformed back to a watchdog perspective from previously been heading towards a consulting role. This shift in the role of internal audit mostly derives from the exceeded regulations within corporate governance.</p> / <p>Det identifierade problemområdet tar sin början i att forskning inom internrevision är fragmenterad och ofullständig samtidigt som internrevision har blivit allt vanligare i den allmänna debatten. Kriser och skandaler i företag som till exempel Enron i USA och Skandia i Sverige har lett till nya regleringar hur företag ska styras och förvaltas. Dessa regleringar har tillkommit i form av Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) i USA och i Sverige kommer Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning att implementeras under 2005. Regleringarna säger bland annat att företaget måste tillgodose en god intern kontroll och att företagen för att uppnå detta, bör ha en granskande och konsulterande internrevisionsfunktion. Den svenska koden anger dock att företaget kan välja att i stället förklara varför koden inte efterföljs, detta till skillnad från SOX som kräver att regelverket följs. Frågan väcks hur internrevisionen i företag ser ut. Viss internationell forskning har belyst denna fråga, men studier i ett svenskt perspektiv lyser med sin frånvaro.</p><p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att beskriva internrevisionens roll i svenska företag, att undersöka om rollen upplevs som övervägande granskande eller konsulterande, samt att analysera i vilken utsträckning aktuella regelverk påverkar internrevisionen.</p><p>Metodvalet i uppsatsen har tagit sig uttryck i en djupgående kvalitativ undersökning av tre företag, åtföljt av en kvantitativ undersökning för att undersöka om resultaten från den kvalitativa studien bekräftas. Den kvalitativa undersökningen består av intervjuer med tre företag som alla har en väl etablerad internrevisionsfunktion. Efter dessa intervjuer formulerades ett antal frågor som sammanställdes i en enkät. Dessa frågor ställdes till företag på Stockholmsbörsens A-lista, mest omsatta.</p><p>Resultaten som framkom, visar att av företagen på Stockholmsbörsens A-lista, mest omsatta, är det enbart 32 procent som har en internrevisionsfunktion vilket kan anses som lågt då tidigare studier inom området pekar på att det internationellt är en vanlig funktion hos företagen. Där det finns en internrevisionsfunktion har dess roll till övervägande del gått tillbaka till att bli alltmer granskande, från att tidigare ha varit på väg mot en konsulterande roll. Detta skift i internrevisionens roll har framförallt sin grund i den ökade regleringen inom corporate governance.</p>