<p>I examine how employing workers with specific human capital affects capital structure decisions by employers. Based on plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, I use the opening of new plants as an exogenous reduction in human capital specificity-- the inability to transfer specific skill sets across employers--for incumbent workers in a local labor market. My results indicate that the opening of a new manufacturing plant in a given county leads to a 2.6-3.9% increase in the leverage of existing manufacturing firms in the county, relative to the leverage of manufacturing firms in an otherwise comparable county. Moreover, plant openings have a larger impact on firms that are more likely to share labor with the new plant, that have high labor intensity, and that have high marginal tax benefits of debt. Alternative explanations concerning productivity spillovers, product market competition, and county-wide shocks do not appear to account for the results. I find consistent evidence in a separate sample that contains a broad panel of firms. Overall, these results suggest that human capital specificity raises the cost of debt and thus decreases optimal leverage.</p> / Dissertation

本研究利用2000年至2004年的資料，分析獨立董事與監察人的設置 (以下簡稱為獨立董監) 與公司債務資金成本的關聯性。在以利息費用除以付息負債做為代理變數的前提之下，本研究的實證結果顯示，無論以當期利率水準、次期利率水準或者利率水準的變化做為被解釋變數，均顯示聘任獨立董監的企業會享有較低的債務資金成本。此外，進一步的分析也發現，無論以簡單的單變量模型、普通最小平方法或者利用縱橫面資料 (panel data) 模型，都得一致性地得到獨立董監得以有助於減緩公司與債權人間代理成本的實證結果。就控制變數而言，與預期相同，較完備的公司治理、較高的企業規模以及較佳的營運績效均與債務資金成本具有負向的關聯性。 / Corporate governance has become an imperative issue recently, especially the focus on the independent director system. Securities and Futures Commission has requested that those applying to be listed companies should set up the independent director systems for the purpose of building better corporate governance systems. In the framework of corporate governance formulated by the World Bank, as an essential capital provider or financial statement user, creditor plays an indispensable role. But few literatures has conducted to evaluate the relationship between the cost of debt financing and corporate governance, much less with the independent directors. Therefore, this study based on a sample of listed companies data in Taiwan Economic Journal over the period of 2000 to 2004 is to explore the relationship between independent directors and cost of debt and expected to provide the financial institutions determining the borrowing rate with some empirical results. The results indicate the cost of debt, whether based on the level analysis or change analysis of ordinary least square model or panel data analysis, is inversely related to the independent directors with significance at 1% level, suggesting that the enterprise with independent directors having the lower cost of debt in favor of the hypothesis. The analysis also indicates the relationship of the control variables of board characteristics, such as the ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors is inversely with cost of debt、the higher ratio of the pledged shares held by the board and supervisors with the higher cost of debt and the enterprise with the combined titles of the chairman and CEO has higher cost of debt, follow our expectation again.

In this thesis, I explore the topic of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in UK publicly traded firms. My objective is threefold. First of all, I investigate debt-holders‟ reaction to CEO compensation in terms of the cost of debt financing. Secondly, I examine the possible link between CEO compensation and expectation management. Thirdly, I examine whether and how the interactive relation between CEO career horizon and compensation package affects a firm‟s research and development spending. Multiple regression is employed in this thesis to investigate the causal relationship between these above mentioned aspects I‟m interested (the cost of debt, expectation management and research and development spending) and CEO compensation. I consider all major compensation components for a typical CEO in UK publicly traded firms: defined benefit pension, bonus, restricted shares, traditional stock options and performance-vested stock options. The accumulated equity incentives, such as ownership, are also examined. My major findings are as follows. First of all, I find that an increase in defined benefit pension and bonus in CEO compensation are associated with a lower bond yield spread, while an increase in stock options and ownership intensifies it. Secondly, I document that CEO equity incentives that will be vested in the following year are positively associated with the probability of employing expectation management to meet or beat financial analysts‟ forecasts about a firm‟s reporting earnings. Thirdly, I demonstrate that older CEOs will not spend less in research and development expenditures in general. However, older CEOs with more defined benefit pensions and ownership are reluctant to engage in such an investment. iii My results generate several implications for CEO compensation research. First of all, I show that debt-holders rationally incorporate the information of CEO compensation about risk-taking and risk-avoiding incentives when pricing a firm‟s publicly traded debts. Secondly, I provide the evidence that CEO compensation motivates top managers to manipulate information disclosure by employing expectation management for personal gains. Thirdly, the joint influence of CEO career horizon and compensation package on a firm‟s research and development spending is highlighted. CEO compensation motivates a short-sighed and risk-averse investment policy when top managers have a short career horizon. The first novel contribution in this thesis is the coverage of CEO pension, which is overlooked by the most of previous literature on compensation studies. Secondly, I provide the evidence that the popularity of expectation management in the UK, which is well documented in the literature, can be partly explained by CEO compensation. Finally, the interactive relation between CEO compensation and career horizon on a firm‟s investment policy is re-examined. It provides further material in the debate of career horizon problem, which has no consensus in the previous literature. Overall, this thesis generates some empirical evidence about the influence of CEO compensation on managerial behaviour. Some adverse effects of CEO compensation highlighted in this thesis may help remuneration committee to design a better pay package for top managers in the future.

O objetivo deste trabalho é identificar os principais demandantes pela auditoria independente em empresas desobrigadas legalmente a serem auditadas e se há valor para elas em se submeterem a esse processo de verificação. A base de dados utilizada foi a da FIPECAFI, que utiliza esses dados para classificar anualmente as 1.000 Melhores e Maiores empresas localizadas no Brasil. Optou-se por essa base por ela possuir informações econômico-financeiras e de auditoria não só de empresas abertas, mas também de fechadas de pequeno e de médio porte. Estas estão isentas pela Lei 6.404/76 e alterações posteriores de contratarem auditores externos para a verificação das suas demonstrações contábeis. Contudo, diversos órgãos reguladores, como ANEEL, ANTT, CVM, BACEN, SUSEP, entre outros, impõem que as empresas sob as suas supervisões sejam auditadas, independentemente do porte. Assim, após a análise da Lei societária e dos princípios normativos emitidos por esses órgãos, restaram 998 empresas desobrigadas legalmente a serem auditadas entre 2005 e 2015, gerando 4.531 observações. Destas observações, 56% compõe o grupo de interesse, ou seja, as que optam por serem auditadas, e 44% o grupo de controle. O tratamento estatístico dos dados contou com técnicas exploratórias descritivas, de correlações, bem como inferenciais através de regressões logísticas binomiais robustas para dados em painel. Os resultados indicam que empresas desobrigadas legalmente a serem auditadas apresentam maiores probabilidades de contratarem os serviços de auditoria externa por influência dos credores, não por intervenção dos seus controladores estrangeiros ou nacionais de grande porte. Adicionalmente, essas empresas, que optam voluntariamente por terem suas demonstrações financeiras verificadas sob a ótica legal, estão associadas a maiores oportunidades de investimento, a uma menor fragilidade financeira e menores custos de captação de terceiros em relação às não auditadas. / The purpose of this paper is to identify the main claimants by independent auditors in legally released companies to be audited and if there is value to them in submitting to this process. The database used is property of FIPECAFI, which uses this data to annually classify the 1,000 Best and Biggest Companies located in Brazil. This basis was chosen because it possesses economic, financial and audit information not only of open companies, but also of small and medium-sized private companies. These are exempt by Law 6.404/76 and subsequent amendments to contract external auditors to verify their financial statements. However, several regulatory agencies such as ANEEL, ANTT, CVM, BACEN, SUSEP and others require that companies under their supervisions be audited, regardless of size. Thus, after analyzing the Corporate Law and the main regulations issued by these agencies, left 998 private companies exempt from being audited between 2005 and 2015, generating 4,531 observations. Of these observations, 56% make up the interest group, that is, those who choose to be audited and 44%, the control group. The statistical treatment of the data counted on descriptive exploratory techniques, correlations, and also with inferential ones through robust binomial logistic regressions for panel data. The results show that companies legally released to be audited are more likely to contract the external audit services by influence of the creditors and not by intervention of their foreign or national large controllers. In addition, these companies, that voluntarily opt to have their financial statements verified from a legal standpoint, are associated with larger investment opportunities, lower financial weakness and lower cost of debt.

In context of the forthcoming Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, this study examines how scope 3 emissions and the reporting thereof affect the cost of debt. Further, it investigates how scope 1 emissions affect the cost of debt and how the two scopes differ in materiality. As a theoretical foundation, this thesis uses previous research on environmental risk management, carbon risk premium, scope 3 emissions and cost of capital. By collecting a sample of 1710 firm-year observations for publicly listed European companies during the period 2019-2022, this quantitative study utilizes fixed effect regression models to find the relationship between scope 3 emission and cost of debt. No evidence of a relationship between scope 3 emissions and cost of debt is found. When looking at scope 1 emissions, the results show that companies with lower scope 1 emissions are rewarded by creditors with a reduced cost of debt. Regarding reporting of scope 3 emissions, we find no evidence suggesting that scope 3 disclosure lowers the cost of debt.

<p>This thesis focuses on three important topics in corporate finance: corporate governance, management efforts to avoid debt covenant violations and the cost of such violations. The thesis adds to these aspects of the finance literature and the findings are reported in chapters two, three and four.</p> <p>The second chapter focuses on the role of corporate governance in determining the interactions between financial leverage and profits and attests to the validity of the trade-off theory of capital structure. It examines management’s financing choice behaviour in distinctly different corporate governance settings to ascertain the effect of governance mechanisms on such behavior. The estimation methodology allows for financial leverage, profits and governance to be determined jointly, using an instrumental variable approach. The results of the paper demonstrate that leverage is increasing in profits when controlled for agency problems, and good governance firms exhibit the results predicted by the trade-off theory of capital structure.</p> <p>The third chapter examines management’s earnings manipulation activities around debt covenant violation through accrual manipulation and real earnings management. Covenant restrictions are expected to influence these activities in the quarters surrounding and the quarter of the violation. Cross-sectional analyses reveal the use of such strategies to report higher earnings in the periods surrounding the covenant violation. The results also show disparity in the use of accrual based and real earnings management techniques.</p> <p>The fourth chapter investigates the relation between debt covenant violation and the cost of new borrowing from three different aspects: the incidence of violation, the timing of violation and the frequency of violation. The results show that there are significant benefits to not violating a debt covenant and violators are penalized by the creditors for not upholding the contractual restrictions.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between audit quality, with a specific focus on auditor size and audit fees, and the cost of debt and access to debt for medium-sized privately held enterprises in Sweden. Additionally, we seek to explore how family firms moderate these relationships.   Theoretical perspective: This paper combines signaling theory and agency theory to theorize how Big-4 classifications of audit firms and audit fees signal audit quality and different levels of agency cost of debt to creditors. Further, it explores the moderating effect of family firms using socioemotional wealth theory alongside agency theory.   Method: This study is based within the positivistic paradigm, employing a deductive approach. The study uses a quantitative methodology, gathering data from 463 medium-sized privately held enterprises in Sweden. The empirical data is analyzed using multiple linear regressions, with the moderating effects of family firms.    Findings: The findings of this study suggest that firms engaging Big-4 audit firms do not experience lower costs of debt nor improved access to debt. However, audit fees demonstrate a positive relationship with both the cost of debt and access to debt. Further, the study indicates that family firms do not have a moderating effect on these relationships.

本論文之研究目的係驗證公允價值資訊是否會影響聯合貸款的借款條件。實證結果顯示公司採用更多公允價值，尤其是第1等級輸入值，可在聯合貸款市場中可取得較有利的聯合貸款條件，例如可取得更低的利率及更高額的貸款金額。然而實證結果也顯示，若公司採用更多公允價值，尤其是第1等級輸入值，會有更高的機會被債權人要求提供債務擔保。由此可知，公司採用更多公允價值可有助於取得更有利的聯合貸款借款條件，同時第1等級輸入值可獲得更顯著的結果。

近年來，我國上市上櫃公司發行公司債籌措資金的情形蔚為風潮。依據我國目前規定，公司擬發行的公司債須由證期會認可之信用評等機構進行評等，並出具報告。既無信用評等向來重視會計資訊的品質，因此引起了本研究探討資訊揭露是否會降低公司債資金成本的動機。關於資訊揭露與負債資金成本的關係，僅見於Sengupta(1998)的研究，而本研究則試圖以資訊揭露能降低代理成本的角度，探討在國內資本市場中，資訊揭露是否與負債資金成本存在一反向關係。 本研究評估揭露指數方法與之前文獻所採用的的內容分析法不同。本研究是以公司發行公司債前一年度盈餘概估情形評估揭露指數口本研究採用最小平方法迴歸分析(OLS)對測試假說，其結果如下： 1.公司發行公司債之增額負債資金成本與資訊揭露程度存在反向關係。 本研究之實證結果顯示，我國資本市場中，公司資訊揭露程度與公司債之殖利率存有顯著的反向關係。顯示在債券的初級市場中，除了債券的條件與公司體質的好壞以外，資訊揭露也可能成為公司債殖利率的決定因素。 2.若公司債的代理成本較高，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本之反向變動關係會較強。 本研究以公司債轉換條款與擔保條款的有無，區分公司債代理成本的高低。實證結果發現，發行具轉換條款公司債之公司與發行不具轉換條款公司債之公司，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本影響顯著較低。驗證了設有轉換條款或擔保條款之公司債將因為債券本身的代理成本下降，而削弱資訊揭露對公司債殖利率的影響。也就是說若公司債屬於普通公司債或無擔保公司債時，資訊揭露對公司債之殖利率影響更大。因此對於有意發行無擔保公司債或普通公司債的公司而言，資訊揭露將更能降低其負債資金成本。 關鍵字：代理成本，負債資金成本，揭露程度，資訊不對稱 / In recent years, it has become a common phenomenon for listed corporations to issue bonds in Taiwan. Currently in Taiwan, the Securities and Futures Committee (SFC) forbids a corporation to issue bonds unless it has been properly rated by a credit rating agency certified by the SFC. Since the credit rating agency all along have generally placed a great deal of emphasis on the quality of accounting information, this research purports to investigate whether fuller disclosure of accounting information can indeed reduce the cost of debt capital. Only one study by Sengupta (1998) focused on the cost of debt capital, and addressed the issue about the relation between the disclosure level the cost of debt capital, and this study attempts to investigate whether a reverse relationship exists between disclosure and cost of debt capital in Taiwan form the angle of the agency cost. The method to determine the score of the disclosure level applied by this research is different from the content analysis method applied by prior studies. This research uses the earning estimation disclosure made in the year prior to the bond issuance, for measuring the disclosure level. This research applies the QLS model to test the hypotheses. After controlling for other variables, this research concludes that: 1.There may exist a reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level. The result shows that there exists a significant reverse relation between the yield to maturity of bond and the corporate disclosure level. This finding leads us to conclude that because of the ability to lower the agency costs and control the information asymmetry, corporate disclosure level, couple with the terms of the bond and the issuing corporation's financial conditions, could be one determinant of the yield to maturity of the bond. 2.If the agency cost of the bond is higher, the reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be stronger. In this research, agency costs are considered low when the bond is convertible or secured, or vice versa. The result shows that for the corporation issuing convertible or secured bonds, the impact of the disclosure is less significant. This finding verifies that when the bond is convertible or secured, the reverse relation between the cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be weakened since the agency costs are lower. Therefore, this research draws a conclusion that for corporations that attempt to issue straight bonds or unsecured bonds, the disclosure level plays a more important rule to reduce the cost of debt capital. Key word: Agency Cost, Cost of Debt Capital, Disclosure Level, Information Asymmetry.

Inledning: Modigliani och Miller-teoremet betraktas som en milstolpe och ett paradigmskifte inom Corporate Finance. Forskningen bakom teoremet har gett upphov till den kontroversiella slutsatsen att ett företags kapitalstruktur är irrelevant på en jämviktsmarknad, utan beskattning. När beskattning däremot förekommer, ökar företagsvärdet motsvarande den avdragsgilla skatten på räntekostnader vid belåning. Teoremet har dock inte varit utan kritik. Flera forskare har undersökt teoremet och kritiserat teoremets antaganden. Syfte: Syftet med studien är att undersöka Modigliani och Miller-teoremet i avseende av kapitalstrukturens inverkan på företags aktiekurser. Tidigare forskning: Modigliani och Miller-teoremet med dess antaganden presenteras inledningsvis som studiens grundläggande teori. Därefter presenteras agentteorin, signaleringsteorin, trade-off-teori och effektiva marknadshypotesen tillsammans med tidigare forskningsstudier om teoremet och antagandena. Metod: Studien tillämpar en kvantitativ metod, med tre regressionsmodeller. Det slumpmässiga urvalet består av tio företag inom industribranschen som är registrerade på Stockholmsbörsen. Urvalet består av paneldata från företagen under perioden 2005 till 2012. Studiens empiri består av historiska aktiekurser och årsredovisningar. Resultat: Skuldsättningsgraden visar en låg och icke signifikant korrelation med aktiekurserna för de undersökta företagen, i samtliga tre regressionsmodeller. Skatteskölden visar en högre och signifikant korrelation med aktiekursen, medan kontrollvariabeln vinst per aktie EPS visar den högsta korrelationen med aktiekursen, som responsvariabel. Slutsats: Studiens resultat visar inget empiriskt stöd för Modigliani och Miller-teoremet i dess helhet. Förklaringen till resultaten kan vara att antagandena inte tillfredsställs inom empirin. Agentteori, signaleringsteori, trade-off-teori och effektiva marknadshypotesen kan stå som förklaringar till studiens resultat. / Introduction: Modigliani and Miller theorem is regarded as a milestone and a paradigm shift in Corporate Finance. The research behind the theorem has given rise to the controversial conclusion that a company's capital structure is irrelevant in an equilibrium market, without taxation. In contrast, when taxation occurs firm value will increase equivalent to the deductible tax on interest expense when debt is issued. The theorem has not been without criticism. Several researchers have examined the theorem and criticised its assumptions. Purpose: The purpose of the study is to investigate the Modigliani and Miller theorem in respect of capital structure’s impact on companies' share prices. Literature Review: The Modigliani and Miller theorem with its assumptions is initially presented as the study’s main theorem. The presentation of the theorem is followed by a description of agency theory, signalling theory, trade-off theory and the efficient market hypothesis, along with previous studies on the theorem and its assumptions. Research Methodology: The study applies a quantitative approach, with three regression models. The random sample consists of ten companies in the industrial sector, that are listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The sample is based on panel data of the companies during the period 2005 to 2012. The study's empirical data consists of historical stock prices and annual reports. Empirical Results: The leverage ratio, i.e. debt to equity ratio, indicates a low and non-signif-icant correlation with the stock prices of the examined companies, in all three regression models. The tax shield indicates a higher and significant correlation with the stock price, while the control variable earnings per share EPS indicates the highest correlation with the stock prices, as the response variable. Conclusions: The study’s results show no empirical support for the Modigliani-Miller theorem in its entirety. The explanation for the findings may be that the assumptions are not satisfied in the empirical data. Agency theory, signalling theory, trade-off theory and the efficient market hypothesis may serve as explanations of the study’s results.