本研究利用2000年至2004年的資料，分析獨立董事與監察人的設置 (以下簡稱為獨立董監) 與公司債務資金成本的關聯性。在以利息費用除以付息負債做為代理變數的前提之下，本研究的實證結果顯示，無論以當期利率水準、次期利率水準或者利率水準的變化做為被解釋變數，均顯示聘任獨立董監的企業會享有較低的債務資金成本。此外，進一步的分析也發現，無論以簡單的單變量模型、普通最小平方法或者利用縱橫面資料 (panel data) 模型，都得一致性地得到獨立董監得以有助於減緩公司與債權人間代理成本的實證結果。就控制變數而言，與預期相同，較完備的公司治理、較高的企業規模以及較佳的營運績效均與債務資金成本具有負向的關聯性。 / Corporate governance has become an imperative issue recently, especially the focus on the independent director system. Securities and Futures Commission has requested that those applying to be listed companies should set up the independent director systems for the purpose of building better corporate governance systems. In the framework of corporate governance formulated by the World Bank, as an essential capital provider or financial statement user, creditor plays an indispensable role. But few literatures has conducted to evaluate the relationship between the cost of debt financing and corporate governance, much less with the independent directors. Therefore, this study based on a sample of listed companies data in Taiwan Economic Journal over the period of 2000 to 2004 is to explore the relationship between independent directors and cost of debt and expected to provide the financial institutions determining the borrowing rate with some empirical results. The results indicate the cost of debt, whether based on the level analysis or change analysis of ordinary least square model or panel data analysis, is inversely related to the independent directors with significance at 1% level, suggesting that the enterprise with independent directors having the lower cost of debt in favor of the hypothesis. The analysis also indicates the relationship of the control variables of board characteristics, such as the ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors is inversely with cost of debt、the higher ratio of the pledged shares held by the board and supervisors with the higher cost of debt and the enterprise with the combined titles of the chairman and CEO has higher cost of debt, follow our expectation again.

關係人交易向為我國上市公司常見之交易型態，關係人交易雖具內部交易利益，但交易對象存在特殊關係有助於「利益輸送」或「盈餘操縱」之操作，故有論者認為關係人交易乃控制股東侵佔其他股東財富之重要工具。而台灣獨特的家族型企業結構及其所衍生的不健全公司治理架構，可能是近年來我國資本市場關係人交易弊案頻傳的主因。 台灣證券交易所於2002年2月22日起，要求首次申請上市公司至少須設置二席獨立董事及一席獨立監察人，企望藉此改善上市公司之內部治理架構。儘管過去研究顯示，董事會獨立性是董事會功能能否發揮之重要因素，然各界對此制度仍有所疑慮。因此，本研究以多元迴歸分析及單變量檢定，探討獨立董監制度及關係人交易之關係，分析獨立董監制度對上市公司之實質效益。實證結論如下： 1.相較於未引進獨立董監制度公司，引進獨立董監制度公司在關係人進貨、關係人應付融資及關係人其他支出等可能具有內部利益之關係人交易型態，關係人交易比率較高，而這可能也是獨立董監制度積極監督之正面效應。 2.相對於未引進獨立董監制度公司，自願及非自願引進公司之關係人應收融資比率較高，代表獨立董事、獨立監察人對內部利益明顯的關係人應付融資交易，能扮演著積極推動並消弭歧見的角色。 3.相較於非自願引進獨立董監制度公司，自願引進公司具有較低之關係人背書保證比率。顯示自願引進公司藉獨立董監之監督，能有效減少不利公司績效之關係人背書保證交易。 4.適用獨立董監條款之新上市公司上市後第二年度關係人銷貨及關係人應收融資顯著低於上市前第二年度之水準，代表獨立董監制度的實質監督效果可能須經兩年以上時間才得以顯現。 基於上述結論，本研究對我國獨立董監制度提出下列建議：一、擴大獨立董監制度之適用範圍；二、考慮獨立董監實質效益之顯現時程，對其任期加以規範；三、積極建構完善的市場機制，迫使控制股東自發地強化公司治理機制。 / The related-party transaction is the general transaction mode in Taiwan. Although the related-party transaction brings internal transaction profit, the clients with special relationship could help earnings management or the interest conveyance so the related-party transaction is considered as the significant tool to keep the shareholders from invading other’s fortune. Besides, the malady of the related-party transaction happened frequently in the capital market in Taiwan, and this condition could be refer to the unique structure and the unsound governmence of the companies run by the family members. Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation(TSEC) claimed the qualification for the first time to apply to be the listed company that from Feb. 22, 2002, there should be at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor. By this way, TSEC hope to make an improvement on the governmance of the listed companies. The former research shows that the characteristic of independent directorate is the leading factor to decide if the directorate could be into full play, but we still doubt for this system. Therefore, this research adopts the Multiple Regression Analysis, T-test and Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test to illustrate the relations between the system of independent directors and supervisors and the related-party transaction, and to analyze the real effect which the system of independent directors and supervisors makes on the listed companies. The results are as follows, 1. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies with the system of independent directors and supervisors possess higher ratio of related-party transaction because the related- party have the internal transaction profit on merchandise, payables and other expenses. This condition could express that the system makes the positive effect on supervising. 2. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies voluntarily or involuntarily using the system of independent directors and supervisors possess higher ratio of the payables. This situation means that the independent directors and independent supervisors play the significant role on promoting the transactions and eliminating the diversities when the related-parties make payables transaction. 3. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies voluntarily using the system of independent directors and supervisors possess the lower ratio of the assurance of related- party. This condition illustrates that the system of independent directors and supervisors could reduce the adverse transaction of assurance. 4. The second year of the IPO companies which adopt the system of independent directors and supervisors have lower related-party sales and payables than before being listed companies in their second year. This fact tells us the real effect might take more than two years to carry out. In conclusion, this research offers the suggestions of the systems of independent directors and supervisors in Taiwan as below. First, the qualification of the system of independent directors and supervisors should be broadened. Second, the terms of the directors and supervisors should be made the reasonable consideration because the real effect might take time to carry out. Finally, the market mechanism should be more complete to force the blockholder to enhance the governmace of the company.

本研究以遞延所得稅費用作為衡量盈餘管理之代理變數，探討遞延所得稅費用及其組成項目與避免報導虧損行為間之關聯性，並加入股權結構、獨立董監及審計品質，檢視公司治理特性是否可有效降低管理當局利用遞延所得稅費用之會計處理達成避免報導虧損行為的傾向。 本研究之實證結果顯示，遞延所得稅費用及其具裁決性之組成項目如與銷貨有關的遞延所得稅費用、未實現費用產生的遞延所得稅費用及與資產評價科目有關的遞延所得稅費用，均與避免報導虧損行為間存在顯著的關聯性，顯示管理當局利用裁量性遞延所得稅費用之認列及沖轉來調整盈餘，以達成特定的盈餘目標。本研究發現，遞延所得稅費用項目在裁量性應計項目外，對管理當局避免報導虧損之行為，提供了增額的解釋能力。此外，本研究發現公司治理變數與避免報導虧損之行為不存在顯著為負的關係，僅機構投資人持股與獨立董監席次比率對降低管理當局透過遞延所得稅費用項目達成避免報導虧損之行為，具有邊際的增額解釋能力。 / We assess the usefulness of deferred tax expense (DTE) in detecting earnings management. We investigate the relation between changes in deferred tax liability components using data hand-collected from firm’s income tax footnote disclosures and avoid reporting a loss. We also explore the relationship between the structure of ownership, the independent members of broad, audit quality and the usefulness of deferred tax expense (DTE) in detecting earnings management. Our empirical results show the changes in the net deferred tax liability (DTL) component related to sales accruals, revenue and expense accruals and reserves can be used to detect earnings management to avoid an earnings loss. We evaluate the deferred tax expense can be used to meet the earnings target: to avoid reporting a loss. Deferred tax expense is incrementally useful to modified Jones model abnormal accruals in detecting earnings management to avoid a loss. Our empirical results show institutional investors and the independent members of broad have negative relationship with earning management.

本研究主要是探討公司治理結構與資訊透明度之間的關聯性，並進一步檢視公司治理結構與資訊透明度對於權益資金成本及分析師盈餘預測之影響。 在本研究的實證分析結果中，發現企業的資訊透明度確實會受到公司治理結構因素的影響。在股權結構方面，當控制股東所持有的現金流量權比率增加時，由於外部股東的持股相對減少，在監督成本大於效益的情況下，對於公司資訊的需求會降低，因此，管理當局會降低資訊的揭露水準，導致資訊透明度下降。在董事會組成方面，本研究的發現支持財富侵佔假說的論點，當控制股東所掌握的董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會提高控制股東剝奪外部股東財富的動機，使得控制股東傾向利用控制力以影響被投資公司的資訊揭露政策，造成被投資公司的資訊透明度下降。除此之外，研究結果也支持監督假說的預期，即獨立董監事的設置，能有效發揮監督管理當局與制衡控制股東的功能，有助於提昇公司的資訊透明度。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於權益資金成本的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳確實會影響外部投資人對於企業風險的評價，進而影響投資人所要求的必要報酬率(即企業的權益資金成本)。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東的持股比率增加時，其與外部股東的目標會趨於一致，發生代理問題的風險會降低，投資人承擔較低的代理風險。因此，控制股東持股比率增加所傳達予投資人是一項有利的訊息，以致於投資人願意降低必要的投資報酬率，使得公司的權益資金成本降低。董監事持股質押的行為對於投資人而言，可能是一項風險的訊號，理性的投資人預期未來可能被董監事剝奪財富的風險，以致於要求的投資報酬率會提高，企業的權益資金成本會增加。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於分析師預測的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳會影響企業資訊環境的品質，進而影響分析師預測誤差與離散性。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東所掌握之投票權比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的代理問題，降低財務報導的可靠性，因而導致分析師對於公司未來績效與前景的瞭解程度相對較低，分析師之間對於公司未來的盈餘並無一致的看法，即預測的離散性會增加，但是並不影響預測的誤差；當控制股東所掌握之董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率的偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的利益不一致，使得控制股東有誘因剝奪外部股東的權益，操縱公司的會計資訊，使得會計資訊的可靠性降低，以致於分析師預測未來盈餘所面臨的不確定性會愈大，預測誤差與離散性也會愈高。 關鍵詞：公司治理結構；資訊透明度；權益資金成本；分析師預測；控制股東；獨立董監事 / This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, which in turn examines the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on the cost of equity capital and the analyst’s earnings forecasts including forecast error and forecast dispersion. On the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the transparency is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the transparency is lower with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Finally, the transparency is higher with higher percentage of independent directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on cost of equity capital, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the cost of equity capital is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the cost of equity capital is higher with higher percentage of cash flow rights pledged by directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on analyst’s forecasts, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the forecast dispersion is higher with higher divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Second, the forecast error and dispersion are higher with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Keywords: Corporate governance structure；Transparency；Cost of equity capital；Analyst’s forecasts；Controlled stockholder；Independent directors and supervisors.

本文以Dittmar and Mart-Smith (2007)所使用的模型為基礎，研究公司治理對公司價值、現金持有價值以及股利的影響。以市值對淨資產比、資產報酬率(以同產業的平均ROA調整後)為衡量公司價值的變數。而以內部人的行為和公司監督機制2項指標來衡量公司治理。其中，公司內部人行為指標包括：董監質押比、盈餘股份比、關係人融資比。公司監督治理機制指標包括：法人持股比、大股東持股比、獨立董監席次比、外部董監席次比、外部持股比。 以民國85-95年上市櫃公司為研究對象，以panel data之fix effect方式進行分析，實證結果顯示(一)對公司價值影響方面：盈餘股份比和法人持股比與公司價值呈現顯著正向關係；而董監質押比、獨立董監席次比、外部董監席次比與公司價值呈負向關係。(二)在現金持有價值影響方面：內部人行為中，董監質押比、關係人融資比對現金持有價值影響為顯著負向，並無發現監督機制對現金持有價值有正向影響。(三)在股利影響方面：內部人行為中，董監質押比、關係人融資比對股利的影響為顯著正向，並無發現監督機制對股利有負向影響。整體來看，公司治理對公司價值確有影響，但對現金持有價值和股利的影響方面，並沒有發現如Pinkowitz et al. (2006)之實證結果。 / Based on Dittmar and Mart-Smith (2007) valuation models, I investigate how the corporate governance affects the contribution of cash holdings and dividends to firm value. Firm value was measured by market value to book value ratio and the adjusted return on assets. We use two major categories of corporate governance measures including the degree of insider acting and the presence of shareholder monitoring. The degree of insider acting includes the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged (dsip) , the ratio of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights to voting rights(ehb), and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp). The shareholder monitoring includes institutional holding(ihp), large shareholder holding(mhp), the ratio of independent directors and supervisors(idsp), the ratio of outside directors and supervisors(ocp), the ratio of outside directors and supervisors holding(ohp). Firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC during 1995-2006 are selected as the sample. The empirical results indicate that the ratio of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights to voting rights(ehb), and institutional holding(ihp) are significantly and positively related to market value and return on assets. Second, the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged(dsip), and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp) are significantly and negatively related to the value of cash holding. We didn’t find the shareholder monitoring significantly increase the cash holding value. Finally, only the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged(dsip) and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp) are significantly related to dividends value. The conclusion is that although corporate government affects firm value, corporate government doesn’t significantly determines the value of cash holding and dividends. That empirical result is not consistent with the one of Pinkowitz et al. (2006).