The Malayan Emergency is often considered the defining paradigm for a successful counter-insurgency campaign. The effective collection and management of intelligence by Special Branch dominates this paradigm. However, the intelligence architecture during Emergency was much more complicated than the simple Special Branch-Army nexus upon which existing studies focus. Other components of the intelligence included the Malayan Security Service (MSS), Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE), the Joint Intelligence Committee / Far East (JIC/FE), the Royal Air Force (RAF), the Army, and the mainstream police. Each component adapted to the challenge of insurgency in different ways – the civilian elements faring far worse than the military. Britain struggled to adapt to the post-war intelligence challenges in the Far East. Key intelligence components and capabilities were constituted in haste with overlapping and ambiguous remits. Consequently, there was bitter infighting at a number of levels, particularly between the various civilian intelligence agencies. In contrast, the Army and RAF demonstrated an instinctive ability to work in a ‘joint’ environment from the very beginning of the Emergency. In particular, the RAF took a leading role in creating a joint theatre-level intelligence apparatus which included establishment of a Joint Operations Room in Kuala Lumpur and the Joint Intelligence Photographic Intelligence Committee / Far East. However, the military were unable to provide the comprehensive human intelligence or strategic leadership necessary to make the broader apparatus effective. This could only come once the apparatus led by the civil agencies – chiefly the uniformed police as well as Special Branch – had learnt to adapt to the demands of waging a counter-insurgency campaign. Given that the British intelligence organisations had learnt to function in a joint manner during the Second World War, it is remarkable how much had apparently been forgotten in the three years preceding the outbreak of the Communist 1 AIR 20/7777, Report on the Emergency in Malaya, from April 1950 to November 1951, by Sir Harold Briggs. insurgency in Malaya and how long it took to create an effective method of coordinating intelligence during subsequent Emergency.

This research is the first of its kind to explore the complexity of the Irish interaction with empire using one particular case study, British Cyprus during the period of the EOKA insurgency, 1955-59. There are three main areas of enquiry. Firstly, it traces the Twenty-Six County response to decolonisation in Cyprus. Ireland’s anti-colonial credentials have been cited frequently but all too fleetingly. No comprehensive study has been done on post-independent Ireland’s response to British decolonisation anywhere. Popular opinion and how it was reflected in the Irish press organs is examined to gauge if the response was an expression of a wider Irish anticolonial sensibility or a suitable peg upon which to hang Irish nationalist grievances. In dealing with the republican response to the EOKA insurgency, it reveals that no closer relationship was formed between active Irish republicans and foreign anticolonial insurgents than that which existed between the IRA and EOKA. Secondly, this work deals with the Irish institutional response to the Cyprus Question. The motivations behind the muted response by the Catholic Church and the more active response by the Church of Ireland are examined. In the field of Irish foreign policy, it covers the Irish government’s official response and the substantial role played by Irish delegates at the Council of Europe and at the United Nations on the Cyprus Question. Thirdly, this work analyses the Irish participation in British Cyprus during the period of the EOKA insurgency. In the latter half of the 1950s, Ireland continued to be far more involved in Britain’s colonial outposts than the hegemonic nationalist narrative then or since has acknowledged. This work serves as a corrective by providing an account of the Irish judicial and military contribution to law and order in Cyprus during the period of the EOKA insurgency. The research sheds light on neglected aspects of 1950s Ireland and enriches the existing literature on Ireland and Empire. It adds new depths to the existing body of material dealing with the Cyprus Emergency. The importance of the discoveries made by analysing the Irish interaction with the Cyprus Emergency adds weight to the concept of approaching British imperial history using the archipelagic or ‘fournation’ model. The following provides one piece of that particular jigsaw.

<p>Nya typer av krigföring, så som COIN-operationer (Counter insurgency), ställer nya krav på flygstridskrafterna. Utvecklingen av det bemannade stridsflyget har, om man jämför med UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), trots detta stått relativt stilla. Obemannat stridsflyg har samtidigt utvecklat förmågor som gör funktionen till en värdig konkurrent på det moderna slagfältet. Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka huruvida obemannat stridsflyg kan överta det bemannade stridsflygets plats inom ramen för COIN-operationer. Detta avser jag uppnå genom att undersöka hur väl de båda funktionerna svarar uppmot de krav som ställs på ett stridsflygplan i en operation med inslag av COIN. Utifrån detta kommer jag bedöma vilka uppdragstyper som kan samt eventuellt inte kan lösas av en obemannad respektive bemannad flygfarkost. Resultatet i uppsatsen visar att bemannat stridsflyg är bättre anpassat till att genomföra markmålsoperationer inom ramen för COIN-operationer. Främst på grund av en bättre omvärldsuppfattning. Vid uppdragstyper kopplade till flygunderrätteleinhämtning är dock det obemannade stridsflyget bättre anpassat. Främst på grund av en längre uthållighet. Vad det gäller kostnadsaspekten så visar analysen att brukskostnaderna för det obemannade stridsflyget är betydligt lägre än hos det bemannade stridsflyget. Den höga anskaffningskostnaden för ett nytt UAV-system talar dock till dess nackdel. Skyddet som är integrerat i de obemannade plattformarna är sämre än hos den bemannade konkurrenten. UAV får i mångt och mycket lita till sin storlek för skydd. Slutsatsen jag kan dra av arbetet är att bemannat stridsflyg fortfarande har en plats på slagfältet inom ramen för COIN-operationer. Om utvecklingen fortsätter i samma takt och system som förbättrar omvärldsuppfattning för operatören på UAV samt möjliggör ett bättre självskydd kopplat till plattformen kan resultatet snart vara ett annat.</p> / <p>New types of warfare, such as COIN (Counter Insurgency), operations, mean new requirements for the Air Force. The development of the manned combat aircraft has, in comparison with the UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), shown relativly slow progress. Unmanned combat aircraft has on the other hand developed capabilities that make it a worthy competitor on the modern battlefield. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether unmanned combat aircraft can outrival the manned combat aircraft, in COIN-operations. I will achieve this by studying how well the two functions are responding to the demands of a combat aircraft in an operation with elements of COIN. From this, I will assess the mission types that can and can not possibly besolved by an unmanned, or a manned combat aircraft. The results of this paper show that the manned fighter is better suited to carry out counter land operations within thescope of COIN-operations, mainly due to a better situational awareness. Due to longer endurance, the unmanned combat aircraft is better suited to carry out missions like reconnaissance and surveillance. In the cost aspect, the analysis shows that the cost of using the unmanned combat aircraft is much lower than that of the manned combat aircraft. The high purchase cost of a new UAV-system, however, speaks against it. The protection that is integrated into the unmanned platforms is worse than for its rival. UAVs must largely rely on their size for protection. The conclusion I can draw from this paper is that manned fighter aircraft still has a place on the battlefield as a part of COIN-operations. If the development continues at this pace and systems that improve the situational awareness of the operator of UAVs, and allows for better self protection linked to the platform, the result may soon be another.</p>

Nya typer av krigföring, så som COIN-operationer (Counter insurgency), ställer nya krav på flygstridskrafterna. Utvecklingen av det bemannade stridsflyget har, om man jämför med UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), trots detta stått relativt stilla. Obemannat stridsflyg har samtidigt utvecklat förmågor som gör funktionen till en värdig konkurrent på det moderna slagfältet. Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka huruvida obemannat stridsflyg kan överta det bemannade stridsflygets plats inom ramen för COIN-operationer. Detta avser jag uppnå genom att undersöka hur väl de båda funktionerna svarar uppmot de krav som ställs på ett stridsflygplan i en operation med inslag av COIN. Utifrån detta kommer jag bedöma vilka uppdragstyper som kan samt eventuellt inte kan lösas av en obemannad respektive bemannad flygfarkost. Resultatet i uppsatsen visar att bemannat stridsflyg är bättre anpassat till att genomföra markmålsoperationer inom ramen för COIN-operationer. Främst på grund av en bättre omvärldsuppfattning. Vid uppdragstyper kopplade till flygunderrätteleinhämtning är dock det obemannade stridsflyget bättre anpassat. Främst på grund av en längre uthållighet. Vad det gäller kostnadsaspekten så visar analysen att brukskostnaderna för det obemannade stridsflyget är betydligt lägre än hos det bemannade stridsflyget. Den höga anskaffningskostnaden för ett nytt UAV-system talar dock till dess nackdel. Skyddet som är integrerat i de obemannade plattformarna är sämre än hos den bemannade konkurrenten. UAV får i mångt och mycket lita till sin storlek för skydd. Slutsatsen jag kan dra av arbetet är att bemannat stridsflyg fortfarande har en plats på slagfältet inom ramen för COIN-operationer. Om utvecklingen fortsätter i samma takt och system som förbättrar omvärldsuppfattning för operatören på UAV samt möjliggör ett bättre självskydd kopplat till plattformen kan resultatet snart vara ett annat. / New types of warfare, such as COIN (Counter Insurgency), operations, mean new requirements for the Air Force. The development of the manned combat aircraft has, in comparison with the UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), shown relativly slow progress. Unmanned combat aircraft has on the other hand developed capabilities that make it a worthy competitor on the modern battlefield. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether unmanned combat aircraft can outrival the manned combat aircraft, in COIN-operations. I will achieve this by studying how well the two functions are responding to the demands of a combat aircraft in an operation with elements of COIN. From this, I will assess the mission types that can and can not possibly besolved by an unmanned, or a manned combat aircraft. The results of this paper show that the manned fighter is better suited to carry out counter land operations within thescope of COIN-operations, mainly due to a better situational awareness. Due to longer endurance, the unmanned combat aircraft is better suited to carry out missions like reconnaissance and surveillance. In the cost aspect, the analysis shows that the cost of using the unmanned combat aircraft is much lower than that of the manned combat aircraft. The high purchase cost of a new UAV-system, however, speaks against it. The protection that is integrated into the unmanned platforms is worse than for its rival. UAVs must largely rely on their size for protection. The conclusion I can draw from this paper is that manned fighter aircraft still has a place on the battlefield as a part of COIN-operations. If the development continues at this pace and systems that improve the situational awareness of the operator of UAVs, and allows for better self protection linked to the platform, the result may soon be another.

It has been more than twelve years since the swift military operation removed Saddam Hussien's dictatorship from Iraq. Thousands of American soldiers participated in both combat and stabilization missions, the post-conflict reconstruction cost a significant amount of money. However, Iraq is far from being in peace. Therefore, the author of the thesis Iraqi Democracy: American Nation-building and Counter-insurgency in the Iraq War poses a question why the counter-insurgency and nation-building efforts did not meet with success in Iraq. He works with the assumption that one of the reasons the long-term stabilization mission in Iraq was unsuccessful was the American strategic culture, which is not ready for conflicts of the new century. Most contemporary conflicts are non-conventional; often we can see asymmetrical conflicts of low intensity without a direct conventional encounter of opposing armies. Using qualitative analysis of various combat and non-combat provisions in the Iraq War, the author concludes that under the influence of a long-term strategic culture and conventional mindset in the conduct of military operations, the United States didn't manage to adapt to the new type of conflict and it didn't learn its lesson from previous mistakes.

Nigeria has seen an upsurge in violent conflicts leading to insurgency and terrorism since it returned to civilian government in 1999, following sixteen years of military rule. The Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies stand out among conflict groups in Nigeria as they have produced global consequences, hence provoking domestic and international counter-insurgency efforts. Military responses remain primary, but development responses are being increasingly employed. Addressing issues of poverty, exclusion, injustice and underdevelopment is considered to be more fundamental to solving contemporary conflicts. In this sense, development and security are linked, and human, rather than state security is seen to be prioritised. However, the nexus between development and security is fraught with contradictions and the notion of human security is vague. Development intervention appears to be securitized such that it becomes a tool for protecting the strategic interests of external interveners and a tool of control by domestic interveners. Therefore, this thesis explores the prospect of a human rights approach to development as a means of mediating the tension between development and security. It attempts to intellectually consider the triad among the three concepts in relation to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts. The study explores how the internal and external development interventions towards the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts have been developed and the issues that have arisen concerning their effectiveness. The exploratory study uses a triangulation method that includes interviews, focus group, documentary analysis and observation. The thesis finds evidence of a paradigmatic shift towards a rights based approach to development in the internal and external interventions, but one that still yields to securitization and corruption and adversely affects sustainable development. Nonetheless, responses to the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts produce ramifications that justify general as well as specifically targeted responses to individual conflicts. More so, the study shows that the relationship between Nigeria and its external development partners seem to be less vertical.

Thesis (M.A.)--Baylor University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-107)

The aim of this work is to prove that a navy can play an important role during a counter-insurgency campaign and be involved in many different tasks both at sea and from sea, particularly due to its flexibility, mobility and versatility. The main research question of the thesis is: what role can a navy play in a counter-insurgency campaign? The decision to focus on the role of the Royal Navy is based on the fact, that the Royal Navy is probably the most experienced navy in the world in the field of counter-insurgency. Five counter-insurgency campaigns were selected as case studies for this thesis, namely Palestine (1945-1948), Malaya (1948-1960), Cyprus (1954- 1958), Malaysia (1963-1966) and Aden (1965-1967).

This Master's thesis will focus on the newest trends in the field of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations that are moving the organization to unknown territory by deploying in theatres where missions are faced with asymmetric threats. In this regard, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), constituted as a groundbreaking and innovative peacekeeping operation, is spearheading a realignment in peacekeeping that can potentially shape future operations to come, as mandates increasingly reflect roles in areas such as counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. The core objective of this study will be to analyze why MINUSMA is being forced to go green while studying how it is doing so, reflecting on past experiences from other operations such as the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF-I), that have guided changes in MINUSMA's doctrines and capabilities. Gabriel van Oppen Ardanaz

This article uses the counterinsurgency framework of Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. to analyze a case study of Plan Colombia from 2000-2011. In particular, it studies the impacts of Plan Colombia-funded economic programs and their relationship to violence in the Colombian conflict. Previous academic works have looked at efficacy of counter-insurgency and the impacts of strategies from a \"hearts and minds\" approach, while this article attempts to look at the efficacy from a systemic approach. This systemic approach views insurgencies as a system that requires inputs, conversion of these inputs and the outputs or activities. Leites and Wolf further highlight that this capacity is incumbent upon: 1) the government\'s adherence to law and order in contrast to the insurgency and 2) its ability to demonstrate that it can govern and complete programs and activities. With this theoretical framework, there is also an assumption that increases in government effectiveness and control increase legitimacy in said areas and thus blunt insurgent activities. Thus, in order to relate this framework, this research uses a logical approach by linking the Leites and Wolf framework to the concepts laid out by Galula regarding counterinsurgency and the importance of the populace. This article studies the trend between the change in economic values and the change in insurgent activity. This research does not try to show a causal relationship between the two datasets, but only that there is a relationship between the increase in economic indicators and a decrease in events and attacks that can be associated the overall effects of the two economic programs. This article suggests that there is an inconclusive relationship and although there is drop in insurgency attacks and events, more research is necessary to ascertain the actual correlation between the effect of economic programs on insurgency attacks and events. / Este artigo usa a estrutura de contra-insurgência de Nathan Leites e Charles Wolf, Jr. para analisar um estudo de caso do Plano Colômbia de 2000-2011. Em particular, estuda os impactos dos programas econômicos financiados pelo Plano Colômbia e sua relação com a violência no conflito colombiano. Trabalhos acadêmicos anteriores analisaram a eficácia da contra-insurgência e os impactos das estratégias de uma abordagem \"corações e mentes\", enquanto este artigo tenta analisar a eficácia a partir de uma abordagem sistêmica. Essa abordagem sistêmica considera as insurgências como um sistema que requer entradas, conversão dessas entradas e saídas ou atividades. Leites e Wolf destacam ainda que essa capacidade se deve a: 1) a adesão do governo à lei e à ordem em contraste com a insurgência e 2) sua capacidade de demonstrar que pode governar e concluir programas e atividades. Com esse arcabouço teórico, também existe uma suposição de que aumentos na eficácia e no controle do governo aumentam a legitimidade em tais áreas e, assim, embotam as atividades insurgentes. Assim, para relacionar este arcabouço, esta pesquisa utiliza uma abordagem lógica, ligando o arcabouço de Leites e Wolf aos conceitos apresentados por Galula sobre a contra-insurgência e a importância da população. Este artigo estuda a tendência entre a mudança nos valores econômicos e a mudança na atividade insurgente. Esta pesquisa não tenta mostrar uma relação causal entre os dois conjuntos de dados, mas apenas que existe uma relação entre o aumento nos indicadores econômicos e uma diminuição nos eventos e ataques que podem ser associados aos efeitos gerais dos dois programas econômicos. Este artigo sugere que há uma relação inconclusiva e, embora haja queda nos ataques e eventos da insurgência, mais pesquisas são necessárias para averiguar a correlação real entre o efeito dos programas econômicos nos ataques e eventos da insurgência.