This article uses the counterinsurgency framework of Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. to analyze a case study of Plan Colombia from 2000-2011. In particular, it studies the impacts of Plan Colombia-funded economic programs and their relationship to violence in the Colombian conflict. Previous academic works have looked at efficacy of counter-insurgency and the impacts of strategies from a \"hearts and minds\" approach, while this article attempts to look at the efficacy from a systemic approach. This systemic approach views insurgencies as a system that requires inputs, conversion of these inputs and the outputs or activities. Leites and Wolf further highlight that this capacity is incumbent upon: 1) the government\'s adherence to law and order in contrast to the insurgency and 2) its ability to demonstrate that it can govern and complete programs and activities. With this theoretical framework, there is also an assumption that increases in government effectiveness and control increase legitimacy in said areas and thus blunt insurgent activities. Thus, in order to relate this framework, this research uses a logical approach by linking the Leites and Wolf framework to the concepts laid out by Galula regarding counterinsurgency and the importance of the populace. This article studies the trend between the change in economic values and the change in insurgent activity. This research does not try to show a causal relationship between the two datasets, but only that there is a relationship between the increase in economic indicators and a decrease in events and attacks that can be associated the overall effects of the two economic programs. This article suggests that there is an inconclusive relationship and although there is drop in insurgency attacks and events, more research is necessary to ascertain the actual correlation between the effect of economic programs on insurgency attacks and events. / Este artigo usa a estrutura de contra-insurgência de Nathan Leites e Charles Wolf, Jr. para analisar um estudo de caso do Plano Colômbia de 2000-2011. Em particular, estuda os impactos dos programas econômicos financiados pelo Plano Colômbia e sua relação com a violência no conflito colombiano. Trabalhos acadêmicos anteriores analisaram a eficácia da contra-insurgência e os impactos das estratégias de uma abordagem \"corações e mentes\", enquanto este artigo tenta analisar a eficácia a partir de uma abordagem sistêmica. Essa abordagem sistêmica considera as insurgências como um sistema que requer entradas, conversão dessas entradas e saídas ou atividades. Leites e Wolf destacam ainda que essa capacidade se deve a: 1) a adesão do governo à lei e à ordem em contraste com a insurgência e 2) sua capacidade de demonstrar que pode governar e concluir programas e atividades. Com esse arcabouço teórico, também existe uma suposição de que aumentos na eficácia e no controle do governo aumentam a legitimidade em tais áreas e, assim, embotam as atividades insurgentes. Assim, para relacionar este arcabouço, esta pesquisa utiliza uma abordagem lógica, ligando o arcabouço de Leites e Wolf aos conceitos apresentados por Galula sobre a contra-insurgência e a importância da população. Este artigo estuda a tendência entre a mudança nos valores econômicos e a mudança na atividade insurgente. Esta pesquisa não tenta mostrar uma relação causal entre os dois conjuntos de dados, mas apenas que existe uma relação entre o aumento nos indicadores econômicos e uma diminuição nos eventos e ataques que podem ser associados aos efeitos gerais dos dois programas econômicos. Este artigo sugere que há uma relação inconclusiva e, embora haja queda nos ataques e eventos da insurgência, mais pesquisas são necessárias para averiguar a correlação real entre o efeito dos programas econômicos nos ataques e eventos da insurgência.

Problem Investigated. This dissertation is a study of the political effects of low-intensity warfare in Indonesia since 1945. In particular, it examines the interaction between general principles and contextual variables in guerrilla conflict, to determine whether such conflict causes the diffusion of political power. Analysis of insurgent movements indicates that power structures within a guerrilla group tend to be regionalised, diffuse and based on multiple centres of roughly equal authority. Conversely, studies of counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques indicate that successful COIN depends on effective political control over the local population. This tends to be exercised by regional or local military commanders rather than by central authority. Based on this, the author???s initial analysis indicated that one should expect to see a diffusion of political authority from central leaders (whether civilian or military) to regional military leaders, when a society is engaged in the conduct of either COIN or guerrilla warfare. The problem investigated in this dissertation can therefore be stated thus: To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect? Procedures Followed. The procedure followed was a diachronic, qualitative, fieldwork-based analysis of two principle case studies: the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-1962 and the campaign in East Timor 1974-1999. Principle research tools were: ??? Semi-structured, formal, informal and group interviews. ??? Analysis of official and private archives in Australia, Indonesia, the Netherlands and the UK. ??? Participant observation using anthropological fieldwork techniques. ??? Geographical analysis using transects, basemapping and overhead imagery. ??? Demographic analysis using historical data, cartographic records and surveys. Research was conducted in Australia, Indonesia (Jakarta and Bandung), the Netherlands (The Hague and Amsterdam) and the United Kingdom (London, Winchester, Salisbury and Warminster). Fieldwork was conducted over three periods in West Java (1994, 1995 and 1996) and one period in East Timor (1999-2000). General Results Obtained. The two principal case studies were the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-62 and the campaign in East Timor since 1974. The fieldwork data showed that low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 did indeed demonstrate the political power-diffusion effect posited by the author. This effect was triggered by the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, which itself flowed from crises generated by processes of modernisation and change within Indonesian society from traditional hierarchies to modern forms of social organisation. These crises were also affected by events at the systemic and regional levels of analysis ??? the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by Japan, the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis and increasing economic and media globalisation. They resulted in a breakdown or weakening of formal power structures, allowing informal power structures to dominate. This in turn allowed local elites with economic, social or religious influence and with coercive power over the population, to develop political and military power at the local level while being subject to little control from higher levels. This process, then, represented a power diffusion from central and civilian leadership levels to local leaders with coercive means ??? most often military or insurgent leaders. Having been triggered by guerrilla operations, however, the direction and process by which such power diffusion operated was heavily influenced by contextual variables, of which the most important were geographical factors, political culture, traditional authority structures and the interaction of external variables at different levels of analysis. Topographical isolation, poor infrastructure, severe terrain, scattered population groupings and strong influence by traditional hierarchies tend to accelerate and exacerbate the loss of central control. Conversely good infrastructure, large population centres, good communications and a high degree of influence by nation-state and systemic levels of analysis ??? particularly through economic and governmental institutionalisation ??? tend to slow such diffusion. Moreover, while power may be diffusing at one level of analysis (e.g. nation-state) it may be centralising at another (e.g. into the hands of military leaders at local level). Analysis of the Malayan Emergency indicates that, in a comparable non-Indonesian historical example, the same general tendency to political power diffusion was evident and that the same broad contextual variables mediated it. However, it would be premature to conclude that the process observed in Indonesia is generally applicable. The nature and relative importance of contextual factors is likely to vary between examples and hence additional research on non-Indonesian examples would be necessary before such a conclusion could be drawn. Further research on a current instance of guerrilla operations in Indonesia is also essential before the broader contemporary applicability of these findings can be reliably demonstrated. Major Conclusions Reached. Based on the above, the theses developed to answer the initial problem can be stated thus: The command and control (C2) structures inherent in traditional, dispersed rural guerrilla movements that lack access to mass media or electronic communications tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders. If COIN or Internal Security Operations are conducted, two factors will operate. First, there will be an increase in the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Second, where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, there will be an increase in control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders. Where the central government is civilian or has interests divergent from the military???s, the first of these factors will dominate. Where the government is military or has interests largely identical to those of the military, the second factor will be dominant. The process of power diffusion can thus be summarised as follows: A crisis driven by processes of societal change or by external causes, leads to the outbreak of violence, one facet of which may include guerrilla operations. If guerrilla operations do occur, the C2 structures inherent in such operations give a high degree of autonomy and independence to local military leaders. The same (or a contemporaneous) crisis produces a breakdown of formal power structures, causing organisations to fall back upon informal power structures. The nature of these informal power structures is determined by geography, political culture, patterns of traditional authority within the society and the degree of interaction of systemic/regional factors with local events. Thus the guerrilla operations and the concomitant breakdown in formal power structures form the trigger for political power diffusion. The precise nature and progress of this diffusion is then determined by contextual variables.

Problem Investigated. This dissertation is a study of the political effects of low-intensity warfare in Indonesia since 1945. In particular, it examines the interaction between general principles and contextual variables in guerrilla conflict, to determine whether such conflict causes the diffusion of political power. Analysis of insurgent movements indicates that power structures within a guerrilla group tend to be regionalised, diffuse and based on multiple centres of roughly equal authority. Conversely, studies of counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques indicate that successful COIN depends on effective political control over the local population. This tends to be exercised by regional or local military commanders rather than by central authority. Based on this, the author???s initial analysis indicated that one should expect to see a diffusion of political authority from central leaders (whether civilian or military) to regional military leaders, when a society is engaged in the conduct of either COIN or guerrilla warfare. The problem investigated in this dissertation can therefore be stated thus: To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect? Procedures Followed. The procedure followed was a diachronic, qualitative, fieldwork-based analysis of two principle case studies: the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-1962 and the campaign in East Timor 1974-1999. Principle research tools were: ??? Semi-structured, formal, informal and group interviews. ??? Analysis of official and private archives in Australia, Indonesia, the Netherlands and the UK. ??? Participant observation using anthropological fieldwork techniques. ??? Geographical analysis using transects, basemapping and overhead imagery. ??? Demographic analysis using historical data, cartographic records and surveys. Research was conducted in Australia, Indonesia (Jakarta and Bandung), the Netherlands (The Hague and Amsterdam) and the United Kingdom (London, Winchester, Salisbury and Warminster). Fieldwork was conducted over three periods in West Java (1994, 1995 and 1996) and one period in East Timor (1999-2000). General Results Obtained. The two principal case studies were the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-62 and the campaign in East Timor since 1974. The fieldwork data showed that low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 did indeed demonstrate the political power-diffusion effect posited by the author. This effect was triggered by the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, which itself flowed from crises generated by processes of modernisation and change within Indonesian society from traditional hierarchies to modern forms of social organisation. These crises were also affected by events at the systemic and regional levels of analysis ??? the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by Japan, the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis and increasing economic and media globalisation. They resulted in a breakdown or weakening of formal power structures, allowing informal power structures to dominate. This in turn allowed local elites with economic, social or religious influence and with coercive power over the population, to develop political and military power at the local level while being subject to little control from higher levels. This process, then, represented a power diffusion from central and civilian leadership levels to local leaders with coercive means ??? most often military or insurgent leaders. Having been triggered by guerrilla operations, however, the direction and process by which such power diffusion operated was heavily influenced by contextual variables, of which the most important were geographical factors, political culture, traditional authority structures and the interaction of external variables at different levels of analysis. Topographical isolation, poor infrastructure, severe terrain, scattered population groupings and strong influence by traditional hierarchies tend to accelerate and exacerbate the loss of central control. Conversely good infrastructure, large population centres, good communications and a high degree of influence by nation-state and systemic levels of analysis ??? particularly through economic and governmental institutionalisation ??? tend to slow such diffusion. Moreover, while power may be diffusing at one level of analysis (e.g. nation-state) it may be centralising at another (e.g. into the hands of military leaders at local level). Analysis of the Malayan Emergency indicates that, in a comparable non-Indonesian historical example, the same general tendency to political power diffusion was evident and that the same broad contextual variables mediated it. However, it would be premature to conclude that the process observed in Indonesia is generally applicable. The nature and relative importance of contextual factors is likely to vary between examples and hence additional research on non-Indonesian examples would be necessary before such a conclusion could be drawn. Further research on a current instance of guerrilla operations in Indonesia is also essential before the broader contemporary applicability of these findings can be reliably demonstrated. Major Conclusions Reached. Based on the above, the theses developed to answer the initial problem can be stated thus: The command and control (C2) structures inherent in traditional, dispersed rural guerrilla movements that lack access to mass media or electronic communications tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders. If COIN or Internal Security Operations are conducted, two factors will operate. First, there will be an increase in the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Second, where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, there will be an increase in control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders. Where the central government is civilian or has interests divergent from the military???s, the first of these factors will dominate. Where the government is military or has interests largely identical to those of the military, the second factor will be dominant. The process of power diffusion can thus be summarised as follows: A crisis driven by processes of societal change or by external causes, leads to the outbreak of violence, one facet of which may include guerrilla operations. If guerrilla operations do occur, the C2 structures inherent in such operations give a high degree of autonomy and independence to local military leaders. The same (or a contemporaneous) crisis produces a breakdown of formal power structures, causing organisations to fall back upon informal power structures. The nature of these informal power structures is determined by geography, political culture, patterns of traditional authority within the society and the degree of interaction of systemic/regional factors with local events. Thus the guerrilla operations and the concomitant breakdown in formal power structures form the trigger for political power diffusion. The precise nature and progress of this diffusion is then determined by contextual variables.

The diploma thesis presents an alternative to the traditional representation of terrorism in the field of international relations. Terrorism is interpreted through the Fukuyamian-Hegelian prism of thymos, which allows it to be integrated into the framework of an anormatively defined global civil society. On a strategic-tactical level contemporary terrorism is identified with guerilla. On these foundations new primary and secondary categories for terrorism analysis are laid out, and possibilities of optimizing its strategies and tactics are suggested. The attention is then focused on the overlaps of such alternative conception on states - which so gain new possibilities in counter-strategies, adoption of methods or silent cooperation - and the non-governmental organizations. Both the analytical and political applications of the proposed approach are demonstrated in the two appendices to the thesis.

Au cours des dernières décennies, l’augmentation du nombre de guerres irrégulières place les armées modernes dans une situation délicate. Pour pouvoir relever ce nouveau défi, ces organisations militaires, avant tout destinées à mener des guerres interétatiques, se doivent d’innover. Plusieurs cas historiques montrent comment, face à de nouvelles formes de conflit, certaines armées se sont lancées dans un processus d’innovation. Le cas de l’armée française en Algérie en est un. L’objectif de ce mémoire est de comprendre comment l’innovation a émergé lors du conflit, et comment elle s’est diffusée au sein de l’organisation militaire. Un survol de la stratégie française en Algérie va permettre de dégager trois principales innovations : La mise en place de la doctrine de la guerre révolutionnaire, la création des Sections Administratives Spécialisées et l’approche de David Galula. L’étude de ses trois cas nous montre que, durant la Guerre d’Algérie, l’innovation provenait principalement des militaires, plus précisément du sommet de la hiérarchie. Cependant, certains exemples d’innovation par le bas existent. Dans ces cas-là, la diffusion se fera via la doctrine informelle. L’exemple de Galula nous prouve néanmoins qu’une innovation se diffuse beaucoup plus difficilement lorsqu’elle émane des hommes de terrain. / During the last decades, the increasing number of irregular wars brought the modern armies into a delicate situation. In order to overcome this new challenge, these military organizations primarily designed for interstate wars had to innovate. Many historical cases show how certain armies have launched into innovation processes because of new forms of conflict. The case of the French army in Algeria is a good example. The main goal of this paper is to understand how innovation has emerged during the conflict, and how it has diffused within the military organization. A glance at the French strategy in Algeria will allow us to highlight three main innovations: the development of the Revolutionary Warfare doctrine, the creation of “Sections Administratives Specialisées, and the David Galula approach. The analysis of these three study cases shows that innovation came mainly from militaries during the Algerian war, particularly those on top of the hierarchy. However, certain examples of bottom-up innovations do exist. In these cases, diffusion will take place via the informal doctrine. Nevertheless, the Galula example demonstrates that an innovation will diffuse with more difficulty when it comes from people on the ground.

L’Angola est devenue indépendante du Portugal le 11 novembre 1975, au milieu des disputes internes qui ont conduit à l'éclatement de la guerre civile provoquée par le fait que le MPLA a déclaré unilatéralement l'indépendance à Luanda. Ce moment a été déterminée en grande partie par le soutien reçu de Cuba et le bloc de l'Est, plus précisément l'URSS, au cours des 14 années de lutte anticoloniale. Dans la période postindépendance, entre 1975 et 1991, même si des bases militaires soviétiques ne furent pas été installées en Angola, il faut signaler l’influence politique-idéologique et la présence militaire de l’Union Soviétique, qui s’exerça à un degré élevé en comparaison avec d’autres pays dans le contexte d’une bipolarité mondiale. Du point de vue idéologique, l’influence soviétique se manifesta dans des actions de l’Etat angolais en ce que cela touchait à la construction d’un sentiment et d’une identité nationale, ainsi que dans l’appartenance à une nation angolaise, objectivée dans le processus de constitution de l’Homme Nouveau, promu par le Parti-Etat. Du point de vue militaire, l’implication de Moscou dans la guerre en Angola nous a amené à conclure que dans ce territoire les Soviétiques donnèrent une plus grande importance à la consolidation de l’Etat en ce qui touchait la sécurité et le renforcement des appareils politiques, en fournissant matériel et le soutien consultatif pour les forces militaires de l’Angola, bien qu'il soit important de remarquer que les Soviétiques n'ont pas contrôlé la politique intérieure du pays. / Angola became independent from Portugal on 11 November 1975, in the midst of internal disputes that led to the outbreak of civil war caused by the fact that the MPLA unilaterally declared independence in Luanda. This moment has been determined largely by the support received from Cuba and the Eastern bloc, specifically the USSR during the 14 years of anti-colonial struggle. In the post-independence period, between 1975 and 1991, although Soviet military bases were not been installed in Angola, it should be noted the political-ideological influence and military presence of the Soviet Union, which exercised a high degree compared with other countries in the context of global bipolarity. From an ideological point of view, Soviet influence was manifested in the actions of the Angolan government in that it affected the building and a sense of national identity, as well as membership in an Angolan nation, objectified in the process of formation of the New Man, promoted by the Party-state. From a military point of view, the involvement of Moscow in the war in Angola has led us to conclude that in this territory the Soviets gave greater importance to the consolidation of the state in which affected the safety and building equipment policies, providing material and advisory support to the military forces of Angola, although it is important to note that the Soviets did not control the internal politics of the country.

Au cours des dernières décennies, l’augmentation du nombre de guerres irrégulières place les armées modernes dans une situation délicate. Pour pouvoir relever ce nouveau défi, ces organisations militaires, avant tout destinées à mener des guerres interétatiques, se doivent d’innover. Plusieurs cas historiques montrent comment, face à de nouvelles formes de conflit, certaines armées se sont lancées dans un processus d’innovation. Le cas de l’armée française en Algérie en est un. L’objectif de ce mémoire est de comprendre comment l’innovation a émergé lors du conflit, et comment elle s’est diffusée au sein de l’organisation militaire. Un survol de la stratégie française en Algérie va permettre de dégager trois principales innovations : La mise en place de la doctrine de la guerre révolutionnaire, la création des Sections Administratives Spécialisées et l’approche de David Galula. L’étude de ses trois cas nous montre que, durant la Guerre d’Algérie, l’innovation provenait principalement des militaires, plus précisément du sommet de la hiérarchie. Cependant, certains exemples d’innovation par le bas existent. Dans ces cas-là, la diffusion se fera via la doctrine informelle. L’exemple de Galula nous prouve néanmoins qu’une innovation se diffuse beaucoup plus difficilement lorsqu’elle émane des hommes de terrain. / During the last decades, the increasing number of irregular wars brought the modern armies into a delicate situation. In order to overcome this new challenge, these military organizations primarily designed for interstate wars had to innovate. Many historical cases show how certain armies have launched into innovation processes because of new forms of conflict. The case of the French army in Algeria is a good example. The main goal of this paper is to understand how innovation has emerged during the conflict, and how it has diffused within the military organization. A glance at the French strategy in Algeria will allow us to highlight three main innovations: the development of the Revolutionary Warfare doctrine, the creation of “Sections Administratives Specialisées, and the David Galula approach. The analysis of these three study cases shows that innovation came mainly from militaries during the Algerian war, particularly those on top of the hierarchy. However, certain examples of bottom-up innovations do exist. In these cases, diffusion will take place via the informal doctrine. Nevertheless, the Galula example demonstrates that an innovation will diffuse with more difficulty when it comes from people on the ground.

L’Amérique centrale, théâtre des dernières batailles rangées de la guerre froide, est aujourd’hui la région la plus violente au monde, selon les Nations unies. Notre étude s’intéresse à la forme de guerre irrégulière livrée par l’État guatémaltèque contre sa propre population pendant la deuxième moitié du vingtième siècle. À la lumière de rares témoignages d’exécutants et d’archives militaires et policières, nous examinons un mécanisme clandestin de répression dont les trois principales composantes – les enlèvements, la torture et les exécutions sommaires – pouvaient s’abattre sur toute personne soupçonnée, à tort ou à raison, de conspirer contre un statu quo d’exclusion. Au moment de leur articulation, ces moyens répressifs ont constitué un dispositif qui, à partir de 1966, s’est avéré d’une redoutable efficacité. Arme de prédilection des adeptes de la guerre antisubversive pendant plus de vingt ans, le dispositif permettait, telle une chaîne de production, l’accumulation des renseignements jugés indispensables à cette forme de guerre, ainsi que les cadavres dont l’absence éternelle ou la présence outrageuse sur la place publique servaient d’avertissement funeste à l’ensemble du corps social. Où chercher les origines d’un tel dispositif? À partir des ouvrages de référence cités dans le manuel de guerre contre-subversive de l’armée guatémaltèque, la réponse à cette question nous fera découvrir des parachutistes français pour qui la défaite militaire en Indochine et en Algérie pendant les années 1950 n’était pas une option et pour qui la victoire justifiait absolument tous les moyens. Le penchant de ces pionniers de la guerre hors-norme pour les cours magistraux, les entrevues et les articles, nous a permis d’étudier les méthodes qu’ils préconisaient et de repérer leurs traces au Guatemala. Alors que la guerre qui avait servi de prétexte au maintien du dispositif est terminée, sa très réputée efficacité assure encore aujourd’hui sa pérennité auprès de ceux qui peuvent s’offrir le service. En ce sens, la contre-insurrection se poursuit, et ce, malgré l’absence depuis une quinzaine d’années d’un conflit armé. Cette thèse aborde l’histoire de la guerre irrégulière et son déroulement au Guatemala. Les archives et les témoignages à notre disposition contredisent le déni des crimes commis dans les villes et les campagnes guatémaltèques, dont le génocide de 1982. Finalement, certains signes avant-coureurs indiquent que la violence et l’impunité actuelles au pays pourraient mener à la répétition de tels crimes à l’avenir. / Central America, said to have harboured the Cold War’s last pitched battles, is the world’s most violent place today, according to the United Nations. This dissertation studies the form of irregular warfare that the Guatemalan state waged against its own population during the second half of the twentieth century. Through an analysis of a few extant perpetrator accounts as well as military and police sources, this study sheds light on the three main modes by which the Guatemalan government acted against individuals justly or falsely suspected of conspiring against an exclusionary status quo: kidnapping, torture and summary executions. Combined, these three separate acts constituted a covert apparatus of repression which, beginning in 1966, proved immensely efficient. As the weapon of choice for the practitioners of counterinsurgency warfare for over twenty years, the apparatus, not unlike a production line, allowed for the accumulation of intelligence that was essential for the prosecution of this kind of war, as well as the bodies that, in their perpetual absence or desecrated presence in the public domain, served as a deadly warning to the entire social body. Yet, what are the origins and history of this apparatus of state terror? Starting with the cited references in the Guatemalan military’s counter-insurgency field manual, the answer to this question led to French paratroopers for whom military defeat in Indochina and Algeria in the 1950s was not an option, and for whom victory justified all means necessary. The penchant of the pioneers of this form of no-holds-barred warfare for lectures, interviews and articles allowed us to study the methods they encouraged and to identify their tell-tale signs in Guatemala. While the war that justified the existence of this apparatus has ended, its reputable efficiency has allowed it to persevere among those who can afford to pay for its services today. In this sense, if the war has been formally over in Guatemala for over fifteen years, the counter-insurgency continues. This dissertation traces the roots of irregular warfare and how it played out in Guatemala. Historical sources, including state records and perpetrator accounts, make denial of the crimes committed in urban and rural settings, including genocide in 1982, ring hollow. Finally, present warning signs indicate that on-going violence and impunity in the country could lead to the repetition of such crimes in the future.

PhD (History) / Department of Development Studies / This study is about the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe’s national liberation struggle from 1960 to 1980. The study describes and explains how and to what extent Bulilima youths were involved and participated in Zimbabwean guerrilla war. Bulilima is a border district between Zimbabwe and Botswana which, from 1960 – 1980 became Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) guerrillas’ central and key strategic entry point into and exit out of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). For the purposes of this study, the term youth refers to young people between the ages of twelve and twenty-five, born in Bulilima District between 1945 and 1967. During the guerrilla war, the use of the category youth was political, with biological and cultural aspects also taken into account. The study is primarily based on the war experiences of twenty-six women and twenty-six men who were youths during the time period of the study (1960 – 1980). It is qualitative and involves forty-eight open-ended interviews in the major villages of Bulilima District. The interviews are complemented by a survey of both primary and secondary sources. It is hoped that the results of this study will raise salient issues on the involvement and participation of Bulilima youths in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.

The aim of this diploma thesis is to answer the question why the crisis caused by the Chechen struggle for independence gradually escalated into war, while the rest of North Caucasus remained relatively calm, despite the predictions of many authors. Also to determine to whether extend the repetition of Chechen scenario is nowadays possible. Or in other words what are the odds that a new ethnopolitical conflict will erupt in some other Muslim autonomous republic in the North Caucasus. The answers to these questions are sought via factors causing the emergence of ethnic conflict, as were defined by Svante E. Cornell in his book Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus - Cases in Georgia. These factors are continually confronted with empirical data, which are provided by the case study of Chechen conflict in the first part of the thesis. Presence or absence of those factors in other Muslim autonomous republics is examined by method of Process Tracing. The data obtained are then processed quantitatively, in the way that presence or absence of the factor in question by a certain score.