Este trabalho analisa a trajetória da assistência dos Estados Unidos da América à Colômbia para o combate às drogas a partir de 2002. Considerando o histórico de aproximação entre os dois países relativa a políticas sobre drogas, pretende-se explicar o motivo da diminuição da assistência antidrogas dos Estados Unidos à Colômbia no final da década de 2000. A hipótese deste estudo assinala que esta diminuição é explicada devido à posse de Barack Hussein Obama como presidente dos Estados Unidos, em 2009, e às alterações da política externa da Colômbia com a eleição do novo presidente Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, em 2010. Com efeito, houve diminuição considerável do poder das Forças Armadas Revolucionárias da Colômbia (FARC) após o Plano Colômbia, facilitando a abertura dos diálogos de paz e seu tratamento menos militarizado nos mandatos de Santos e Obama. Neste trabalho, são apresentados um histórico do combate às drogas e aos grupos insurgentes, além das principais diretrizes da Polícia Externa da Colômbia e suas relações com os Estados Unidos. Ademais, são expostos os dados referentes à assistência policial, militar, humanitária e econômica estadunidense à Colômbia para o combate às drogas, as agências norte-americanas de fomento à assistência internacional, os acordos bilaterais vigentes entre estes países, bem como a legislação que rege o repasse de recursos norte-americanos ao exterior. / This paper intends to present the trajectory of U.S. assistance to Colombia in regards to drug fighting from the year of 2002. Considering the historical alignment between these two countries concerning drug policies, this study intends to explain the reason behind the decrease in counternarcotics assistance provided by the USA to Colombia at the end of 2000s decade. The hypothesis of this work suggests that the reduction in counternarcotics assistance is resulting from the beginning of the American presidential term of Barack Hussein Obama in 2009, and the change in Colombian foreign policy with the new president Juan Manuel Santos Calderón in 2010. In fact, the power of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) decreased after Plan Colombia, hence it enabled the beginning of peace talks and its less militarized treatment during Santos and Obama terms. In this work, the history of the fight against drugs and insurgent groups will be discussed, as well as the main guidelines followed by the Colombian Foreign Policy, and its relations with the USA. Additionally, it will be present data on the United States military, police, humanitarian and economic assistance used to combat the drug problem in Colombia, and information on American agencies that promote international assistance. Further information on the bilateral agreements between these countries, as well as legislations that allow American resources abroad will be discussed.

The War on Drugs in Latin America: How Misinterpretation Led to Failed Policy investigates how and why United States counternarcotics policy failed abroad, specifically in the northern Andean region. This work examines the entire history of the US waged War on Drugs abroad beginning with President Richard M. Nixon and concluding with current President Barack Obama. After this thorough examination alternative counternarcotics policies are examined.

Este trabalho analisa a trajetória da assistência dos Estados Unidos da América à Colômbia para o combate às drogas a partir de 2002. Considerando o histórico de aproximação entre os dois países relativa a políticas sobre drogas, pretende-se explicar o motivo da diminuição da assistência antidrogas dos Estados Unidos à Colômbia no final da década de 2000. A hipótese deste estudo assinala que esta diminuição é explicada devido à posse de Barack Hussein Obama como presidente dos Estados Unidos, em 2009, e às alterações da política externa da Colômbia com a eleição do novo presidente Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, em 2010. Com efeito, houve diminuição considerável do poder das Forças Armadas Revolucionárias da Colômbia (FARC) após o Plano Colômbia, facilitando a abertura dos diálogos de paz e seu tratamento menos militarizado nos mandatos de Santos e Obama. Neste trabalho, são apresentados um histórico do combate às drogas e aos grupos insurgentes, além das principais diretrizes da Polícia Externa da Colômbia e suas relações com os Estados Unidos. Ademais, são expostos os dados referentes à assistência policial, militar, humanitária e econômica estadunidense à Colômbia para o combate às drogas, as agências norte-americanas de fomento à assistência internacional, os acordos bilaterais vigentes entre estes países, bem como a legislação que rege o repasse de recursos norte-americanos ao exterior. / This paper intends to present the trajectory of U.S. assistance to Colombia in regards to drug fighting from the year of 2002. Considering the historical alignment between these two countries concerning drug policies, this study intends to explain the reason behind the decrease in counternarcotics assistance provided by the USA to Colombia at the end of 2000s decade. The hypothesis of this work suggests that the reduction in counternarcotics assistance is resulting from the beginning of the American presidential term of Barack Hussein Obama in 2009, and the change in Colombian foreign policy with the new president Juan Manuel Santos Calderón in 2010. In fact, the power of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) decreased after Plan Colombia, hence it enabled the beginning of peace talks and its less militarized treatment during Santos and Obama terms. In this work, the history of the fight against drugs and insurgent groups will be discussed, as well as the main guidelines followed by the Colombian Foreign Policy, and its relations with the USA. Additionally, it will be present data on the United States military, police, humanitarian and economic assistance used to combat the drug problem in Colombia, and information on American agencies that promote international assistance. Further information on the bilateral agreements between these countries, as well as legislations that allow American resources abroad will be discussed.

Este trabalho analisa a trajetória da assistência dos Estados Unidos da América à Colômbia para o combate às drogas a partir de 2002. Considerando o histórico de aproximação entre os dois países relativa a políticas sobre drogas, pretende-se explicar o motivo da diminuição da assistência antidrogas dos Estados Unidos à Colômbia no final da década de 2000. A hipótese deste estudo assinala que esta diminuição é explicada devido à posse de Barack Hussein Obama como presidente dos Estados Unidos, em 2009, e às alterações da política externa da Colômbia com a eleição do novo presidente Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, em 2010. Com efeito, houve diminuição considerável do poder das Forças Armadas Revolucionárias da Colômbia (FARC) após o Plano Colômbia, facilitando a abertura dos diálogos de paz e seu tratamento menos militarizado nos mandatos de Santos e Obama. Neste trabalho, são apresentados um histórico do combate às drogas e aos grupos insurgentes, além das principais diretrizes da Polícia Externa da Colômbia e suas relações com os Estados Unidos. Ademais, são expostos os dados referentes à assistência policial, militar, humanitária e econômica estadunidense à Colômbia para o combate às drogas, as agências norte-americanas de fomento à assistência internacional, os acordos bilaterais vigentes entre estes países, bem como a legislação que rege o repasse de recursos norte-americanos ao exterior. / This paper intends to present the trajectory of U.S. assistance to Colombia in regards to drug fighting from the year of 2002. Considering the historical alignment between these two countries concerning drug policies, this study intends to explain the reason behind the decrease in counternarcotics assistance provided by the USA to Colombia at the end of 2000s decade. The hypothesis of this work suggests that the reduction in counternarcotics assistance is resulting from the beginning of the American presidential term of Barack Hussein Obama in 2009, and the change in Colombian foreign policy with the new president Juan Manuel Santos Calderón in 2010. In fact, the power of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) decreased after Plan Colombia, hence it enabled the beginning of peace talks and its less militarized treatment during Santos and Obama terms. In this work, the history of the fight against drugs and insurgent groups will be discussed, as well as the main guidelines followed by the Colombian Foreign Policy, and its relations with the USA. Additionally, it will be present data on the United States military, police, humanitarian and economic assistance used to combat the drug problem in Colombia, and information on American agencies that promote international assistance. Further information on the bilateral agreements between these countries, as well as legislations that allow American resources abroad will be discussed.

Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political organizations. Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters. Illicit groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar ways. Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and policy impact. The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research. To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO leaders, popularly known as the “Medellin Cartel.” In particular, the study focused on the external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the United States. The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating the illicit drug business. The study’s findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government’s push for tougher counternarcotics efforts.

This thesis investigates how and why U.S. policies and agencies are ill-equipped to respond to narco-terrorism and offers some policy recommendations for remedying that. Narco-terrorism is the merging of terrorism and drug trafficking. Terrorist organizations and narcotics traffickers each have much to offer the other; there is potential for symbiosis in the form of cooperation and even hybridization. Examination of the dynamics between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers, combined with an evaluation of the US responses to narcoterrorism in Colombia and Afghanistan, makes it clear that current US policy responses fail to recognize narcoterrorism as a unique challenge, and instead attempt to deal separately with terrorism and drug trafficking. This approach has the potential to actually worsen both situations. The US needs a narcoterrorism strategy and institutions in place to implement it.