Bakgrund: Inom den kommunala hemsjukvården utförs många hälso- och sjukvårdsuppgifter på delegation av omvårdnadspersonal utan formell kompetens. Personalen har olika bakgrund avseende utbildning, erfarenhet och språkkunskaper. Syfte: Att beskriva omvårdnadspersonalens erfarenheter av att utföra delegerade arbetsuppgifter från distriktssköterska. Metod: Elva semistrukturerade intervjuer genomfördes våren 2017 med delegerad omvårdnadspersonal ur tre olika arbetsgrupper i en kommun i norra Sverige. Kvalitativ innehållsanalys med induktiv ansats användes som analysmetod. Resultat: Resultatet utmynnade i tre kategorier: ”Risker”, ”Förbättringsområden” och ”Framgångsfaktorer” utifrån tio subkategorier. Slutsats: Omvårdnadspersonalen önskar tydliga instruktioner och kontinuerlig kontakt med den sjuksköterska som gett delegering. En god kommunikation och nära samarbete främjer patientsäkerheten. Mer utbildning efterfrågades om olika läkemedel, biverkningar, diabetes och hjärt- och lungräddning. / Background: In the field of municipal home nursing, many health care services are carried out by delegation of nursing personnel without formal competence. The personnel have different backgrounds regarding education, experience and language skills. Aim: To deskribe unlicensed assistive/nursing/ personnel´s experience of performing delegated health care tasks. Method: Eleven semistructured interviews were undertaken in 2017 with unlicensed assistive/nursing personnel working in a municipality in the northern of Sweden. The applied method was qualitative contents analysis. Results: The study resulted in three cathegories “Risks”, “Improvement areas” and “Factors for success” from ten sub cathegories. Conclusions: The home care personnel wish for clear instructions and continuos contact with the delegating nurse. Safe communication promotes patient security. More education was requested about different medicines, side effects, diabetes and heart and lung resuscitation. / <p>Godkännandedatum: 2018-11-08</p>

<p>This dissertation explores delegation and democracy within the European Union (EU). The EU now constitutes one of the cornerstones of the democratic systems of its member states. The most vital instrument of democracy is lawmaking, which increasingly occurs at the European level. Many different actors contribute to the shaping of EU legislation. Among the most important of these are national bureaucrats representing their member states in Council negotiations. This thesis focuses on these bureaucrats. In particular it analyzes the delegation and accountability relationship between member states’ governments and their national bureaucrats stationed at the permanent representations (PRs) in Brussels. It is based on semi-structured elite interviews with 80 French and Swedish senior civil servants in Brussels, Paris and Stockholm.</p><p>Using an explorative and descriptive comparative case study of two EU member states, France and Sweden, the dissertation seeks to describe and analyse how delegation between member states’ capitals and Brussels are affected by: i) the coordination and preparation of EU issues in member states’ government offices, ii) the organisation and functioning of the permanent representations, and, most importantly, iii) existing accountability mechanisms. Applying a principal-agent approach, this study shows that the delegation between governments and their Brussels-based bureaucrats is adequate, despite relatively weak delegation and accountability designs. The study identifies institutional divergence between France and Sweden as regards the design of national systems of EU delegation, particularly monitoring and reporting requirements, where Sweden seems to have a more developed system. Both countries have similar contract design and screening and selection systems for employing national agents stationed at the PRs. The impact of domestic coordination of EU affairs is important in order to understand processes of both preference formation precedent to delegation and of preference transfer through instructions. In this case it is obvious that French coordination is more efficient. The functions of the permanent representation also influence delegation between national and European levels. For example, administrative procedures in the PRs in Brussels have had effects on the drafting of instructions, something that is particularly notable in the Swedish case.</p><p>The study identifies several central problems as regards delegation between bureaucrats in Brussels and governments in member states’ capitals. The first problem has to do with the ongoing blurring of political and bureaucratic dimensions. This inhibits the ability of principals (in our case member state governments) to hold their agents (Brussels-based bureaucrats) accountable. The second problem identified by this study as regards the working of democracy is the distinction between formal and informal processes. One conclusion is that informal processes should be formalised or made more transparent. Opacity in lawmaking processes has detrimental effects on long-term legitimacy of democratic systems. Holding de facto lawmaking bureaucrats, caught in a cross-pressure between national demands and European ambitions, accountable is essential for democracy. The dissertation includes practical suggestions as to how to improve delegation, and argues that additional research on both the roles and power of bureaucrats as well as issues of cross-pressure is necessary.</p>

In pace with a noticeably fiercer global competition and an increased customer awareness, today’s organizations are faced with vast requirements for higher productivity and stronger customerorientation. This transformation has denoted that human resources have become more and more accentuated, and a consensus has grown for the true power embraced within them. In Sweden, some few prominent leaders have distinguished themselves by being highly successful in reinforcing employee motivation, and their knowledge and experiences are priceless in the pursuit of utilizing the full potential of the workforce. The purpose with this thesis is to study how ten of Sweden’s most successful and acknowledged leaders view and work with employee motivation and critically examine their standpoints. The purpose is furthermore to exemplify how other leaders can strengthen employee motivation through adapting these motivational suggestions. Qualitative cross-sectional interviews were conducted for the empirical research, holding a hermeneutic and inductive research approach. The respondent pool is comprised by both commercial leaders, as well as leaders from the world of sports. They range from being managers over purely service-focused organizations, to being founders of innovative product-producing organizations. The major areas, which are touched upon are; general work motivation intrinsic/extrinsic motivation, communication, and lastly empowerment, responsibility and participation. Four major areas influence employee motivation (The Society and Social Surroundings, The Organization and Business Environment, The Manager and The Employee). This is visualized in the “Four-Factor Model”.

This dissertation explores delegation and democracy within the European Union (EU). The EU now constitutes one of the cornerstones of the democratic systems of its member states. The most vital instrument of democracy is lawmaking, which increasingly occurs at the European level. Many different actors contribute to the shaping of EU legislation. Among the most important of these are national bureaucrats representing their member states in Council negotiations. This thesis focuses on these bureaucrats. In particular it analyzes the delegation and accountability relationship between member states’ governments and their national bureaucrats stationed at the permanent representations (PRs) in Brussels. It is based on semi-structured elite interviews with 80 French and Swedish senior civil servants in Brussels, Paris and Stockholm. Using an explorative and descriptive comparative case study of two EU member states, France and Sweden, the dissertation seeks to describe and analyse how delegation between member states’ capitals and Brussels are affected by: i) the coordination and preparation of EU issues in member states’ government offices, ii) the organisation and functioning of the permanent representations, and, most importantly, iii) existing accountability mechanisms. Applying a principal-agent approach, this study shows that the delegation between governments and their Brussels-based bureaucrats is adequate, despite relatively weak delegation and accountability designs. The study identifies institutional divergence between France and Sweden as regards the design of national systems of EU delegation, particularly monitoring and reporting requirements, where Sweden seems to have a more developed system. Both countries have similar contract design and screening and selection systems for employing national agents stationed at the PRs. The impact of domestic coordination of EU affairs is important in order to understand processes of both preference formation precedent to delegation and of preference transfer through instructions. In this case it is obvious that French coordination is more efficient. The functions of the permanent representation also influence delegation between national and European levels. For example, administrative procedures in the PRs in Brussels have had effects on the drafting of instructions, something that is particularly notable in the Swedish case. The study identifies several central problems as regards delegation between bureaucrats in Brussels and governments in member states’ capitals. The first problem has to do with the ongoing blurring of political and bureaucratic dimensions. This inhibits the ability of principals (in our case member state governments) to hold their agents (Brussels-based bureaucrats) accountable. The second problem identified by this study as regards the working of democracy is the distinction between formal and informal processes. One conclusion is that informal processes should be formalised or made more transparent. Opacity in lawmaking processes has detrimental effects on long-term legitimacy of democratic systems. Holding de facto lawmaking bureaucrats, caught in a cross-pressure between national demands and European ambitions, accountable is essential for democracy. The dissertation includes practical suggestions as to how to improve delegation, and argues that additional research on both the roles and power of bureaucrats as well as issues of cross-pressure is necessary.

<p>In pace with a noticeably fiercer global competition and an increased customer awareness, today’s organizations are faced with vast requirements for higher productivity and stronger customerorientation. This transformation has denoted that human resources have become more and more accentuated, and a consensus has grown for the true power embraced within them. In Sweden, some few prominent leaders have distinguished themselves by being highly successful in reinforcing employee motivation, and their knowledge and experiences are priceless in the pursuit of utilizing the full potential of the workforce.</p><p>The purpose with this thesis is to study how ten of Sweden’s most successful and acknowledged leaders view and work with employee motivation and critically examine their standpoints. The purpose is furthermore to exemplify how other leaders can strengthen employee motivation through adapting these motivational suggestions.</p><p>Qualitative cross-sectional interviews were conducted for the empirical research, holding a hermeneutic and inductive research approach.</p><p>The respondent pool is comprised by both commercial leaders, as well as leaders from the world of sports. They range from being managers over purely service-focused organizations, to being founders of innovative product-producing organizations.</p><p>The major areas, which are touched upon are; general work motivation intrinsic/extrinsic motivation, communication, and lastly empowerment, responsibility and participation.</p><p>Four major areas influence employee motivation (The Society and Social Surroundings, The Organization and Business Environment, The Manager and The Employee). This is visualized in the “Four-Factor Model”.</p>

Ein entscheidender Erfolgsgarant für die Abwicklung von FuE-Projekten durch ein internationales Projektteam liegt in der Kombination des Wissens aller Mitarbeiter. Manche Unternehmen können das spezielle Know how ihrer Mitarbeiter noch stärker nutzen und Entscheidungsbefugnisse für bestimmte Projektaufgaben delegieren. Zu empfehlen ist dies z. B. für die Innovationsaufgaben: Erstellung des Gesamtentwicklungskonzeptes und Ideenfindung. Unterscheiden sich die Unternehmenskulturen der beteiligten Projektmitarbeiter stark voneinander, ist die Erstellung des Gesamtentwicklungskonzeptes durch das Team nicht mehr sinnvoll. Die Aufgaben: Suche nach Projektmitarbeitern und Auswahl der Zulieferer sollte der Geschäftsführer aufgrund seiner besseren Zugangsmöglichkeiten zu anderen Unternehmensbereichen und externen Einrichtungen überwiegend selbst ausführen. Generell ist es ratsam, dass international agierende Konzerne individuelle Partizipationsmodelle gestalten und Probleme, die durch unterschiedliche Kulturausprägungen entstehen, verhindern bzw. beseitigen.

This thesis consists of four empirically oriented papers on central bank independence (CBI) reforms.    Paper [1] is an investigation of why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to control the economy. A new data-set, including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during 1980-2005, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country had been characterized by high variability in inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.    Paper [2], using a difference-in-difference approach, studies whether CBI reform matters for inflation performance. The analysis is based on a dataset including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during the period of 1980-2005. CBI reform is found to have contributed to bringing down inflation in high-inflation countries, but it seems unrelated to inflation performance in low-inflation countries.    Paper [3] investigates whether CBI-reforms are important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability, using a random-effects random-coefficients model to account for heterogeneity in the effects of CBI-reforms on inflation. CBI-reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average by 3.31 percent, but the effect is only present when countries with historically high inflation rates are included in the sample. Countries with more modest inflation rates have achieved low inflation without institutional reforms that grant central banks more independence, thus undermining the time-inconsistency theory case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI-reforms have contributed to lower inflation variability    Paper [4] studies the relationship between CBI and a suggested trade-off between price variability and output variability using data on CBI-levels, and data the on implementation dates of CBI-reforms. The results question the existence of such a trade-off, but indicate that there may still be potential gains in stabilization policy from CBI-reforms.

This thesis consists of four empirically oriented papers on central bank independence (CBI) reforms.    Paper [1] is an investigation of why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to control the economy. A new data-set, including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during 1980-2005, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country had been characterized by high variability in inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.    Paper [2], using a difference-in-difference approach, studies whether CBI reform matters for inflation performance. The analysis is based on a dataset including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during the period of 1980-2005. CBI reform is found to have contributed to bringing down inflation in high-inflation countries, but it seems unrelated to inflation performance in low-inflation countries.    Paper [3] investigates whether CBI-reforms are important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability, using a random-effects random-coefficients model to account for heterogeneity in the effects of CBI-reforms on inflation. CBI-reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average by 3.31 percent, but the effect is only present when countries with historically high inflation rates are included in the sample. Countries with more modest inflation rates have achieved low inflation without institutional reforms that grant central banks more independence, thus undermining the time-inconsistency theory case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI-reforms have contributed to lower inflation variability    Paper [4] studies the relationship between CBI and a suggested trade-off between price variability and output variability using data on CBI-levels, and data the on implementation dates of CBI-reforms. The results question the existence of such a trade-off, but indicate that there may still be potential gains in stabilization policy from CBI-reforms.

No description available.

This dissertation investigates the psychological processes relevant to consumers relinquishment of decision control to surrogates (e.g., physician, financial advisor). While the first essay investigates the antecedents of relinquishing decision control to surrogates, the second essay focuses on the consequences of such relinquishment of control. The first essay proposes that a key reason for consumers reluctance to relinquish the control of their decisions to expert surrogates is that such relinquishment contradicts their inherent motivation to experience an internal perceived locus of causality (PLOC) for their decisions. Based on this, I hypothesize that consumers become more likely to relinquish decision control either (1) when their motivation to maintain an internal PLOC is weakened or (2) when contextual factors specific to the decision itself are present that shift the anticipated PLOC for it from internal to external. Evidence from three studies provides strong support for this theoretical framework. I show that consumers willingness to relinquish decision control increases when an external PLOC is induced directly (Study 1), when an external event restricts the set of available alternatives (Study 2), and when an incentive to choose a particular alternative is present (Study 3). Based on the self-regulatory strength model and prior research on self-esteem threats, the second essay predicts and shows that delegating decisions to surrogates depletes consumers limited self-regulatory resources more than making the same decisions independently, thus impairing their subsequent ability to exercise self-control. This is the case even though decision delegation actually requires less decision making effort than independent decision making (Study 1). However, the resource depleting effect of decision delegation vanishes when consumers have an opportunity to affirm their belief in free will (Study 2). Moreover, remembering a past decision that one delegated impairs self control more than remembering a decision that one made independently (Studies 3 and 4). The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. / Marketing