Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T19:14:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 24 / Nenhuma / O objetivo deste estudo foi verificar se as formas de remuneração dos executivos das Companhias Latino-Americanas influenciam o gerenciamento de resultados contábeis. Realizou-se uma análise empírica de 48 empresas, de 4 diferentes países latino-americanos em um período de 5 anos (entre 2002 e 2006), perfazendo um total de 240 observações. Para verificar a ocorrência de gerenciamento de resultados nas companhias latino-americanas, foi adotado o modelo Kang e Sivaramakrishnan (1995). Os testes estatísticos utilizados foram: U Mann-Whitney e Teste Wald. Os resultados do estudo indicaram indícios de maior nível de gerenciamento de resultados nas empresas que fornecem remuneração não fixa aos seus executivos. / The objective of this study was to determine whether the forms of compensation for executives of companies Latin American influence earnings management. There was an empirical analysis of 48 companies, of 4 different Latin American countries in a period of 5 years (between 2002 and 2006), which totaled of 240 observations. To check the occurrence of earnings management in Latin American companies, the model adopted was Kang and Sivaramakrishnan (1995). The statistical tests used to the validity of regressions were: Mann-Whitney U test and Wald. The findings the study showed signs of greater level of earnings management in companies that ofter variable pay to their executives.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-12-20T16:38:59Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Kélim Bernardes Sprenger_.pdf: 631926 bytes, checksum: 252828806d3d6757ac0475db132cf8b0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-20T16:38:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Kélim Bernardes Sprenger_.pdf: 631926 bytes, checksum: 252828806d3d6757ac0475db132cf8b0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-11-18 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos / Tendo em vista que o resultado de uma entidade impacta na decisão dos investidores, no mercado e na administração da empresa, determinados gestores podem se utilizar da discricionariedade no processo de mensuração e evidenciação contábil para gerenciar os resultados. Visando compreender as circunstâncias que estão atreladas à essa prática no Brasil, esta pesquisa teve como objetivo analisar a relação entre as características do Chief Executive Officer (CEO) e o gerenciamento de resultados em empresas listadas na BM&FBovespa. Para a consecução deste estudo, foram coletadas as informações do CEO de cada empresa, como idade, gênero, experiência anterior, nível de escolaridade e área de formação, bem como sua forma de eleição e os cargos por ele ocupados, no período de 2010 a 2015, por meio do Formulário de Referência. Para detectar o gerenciamento de resultados, foram utilizados os modelos de Jones (1991) e de Jones Modificado (1995), cujos resíduos representam os accruals discricionários, vistos pela literatura como proxy do gerenciamento de resultados. Dessa forma, para cada empresa e em cada ano, foram estimados os accruals discricionários e estes foram considerados como a variável dependente de uma regressão múltipla elaborada para estabelecer uma relação entre as características do CEO e o gerenciamento de resultados. Os dados foram organizados e estimados em poll de cross section. Os principais resultados indicam que quanto maior a medida de remuneração por desempenho (MRD) do CEO, menor será o uso de accruals discricionários na empresa e, consequentemente, haverá menor nível de gerenciamento de resultados. Também se verificou que há relação entre a idade e o gênero do CEO com o gerenciamento de resultados, indicando que quanto maior a idade do CEO, menor é o gerenciamento de resultados e que os homens fazem mais uso dos accruals discricionários. Identificou-se ainda que as empresas cujo controle acionário é estrangeiro estão menos relacionadas com o gerenciamento de resultados. / Considering that the outcome of a company affects the investors’ decision in the market and in the company’s management, some managers may use the discretion in the measurement and accounting disclosure process to manage the results. To further understand the circumstances linked to this practice in Brazil, this study aimed to analyze the relationship between the characteristics of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and earnings management in companies listed on the BM&FBovespa. To achieve this study, each company CEO’s information was collected, such as age, gender, previous experience, level of education and area, as well as their form of election and positions held by them in the period 2010-2015, through the Formulário de Referência (reference form). In order to detect earnings management, Jones model (1991) and Jones Modified model (1995) were used, which residues represent discretionary accruals, considered in the literature as earnings management’ proxy. Thus, for each company and each year, discretionary accruals were estimated and considered as a dependent variable in a multiple regression designed to establish a relationship between the CEO characteristics and earnings management. Data were organized and estimated at pool of cross-section. The main results indicate that the higher the payment for performance measurement (MRD) of the CEO, the lower the use of discretionary accruals. Consequently, there will be a lower level of earnings management. It was also found that there is a relationship between the age and gender of the CEO with the management results, indicating that the higher the age of the CEO, the lower the earnings management, and that men make more use of discretionary accruals. It also identified that companies with foreign stock control are less related to earnings management.

The goal of this dissertation is to improve financial statement fraud detection using a cross-functional research approach. The efficacy of financial statement fraud detection depends on the classification algorithms and the fraud predictors used and how they are combined. Essay I introduces IMF, a novel combiner method classification algorithm. The results show that IMF performs well relative to existing combiner methods over a wide range of domains. This research contributes to combiner method research and, thereby, to the broader research stream of ensemble-based classification and to classification algorithm research in general. Essay II develops three novel fraud predictors: total discretionary accruals, meeting or beating analyst forecasts and unexpected employee productivity. The results show that the three variables are significant predictors of fraud. Hence Essay II provides insights into (1) conditions under which fraud is more likely to occur (total discretionary accruals is high), (2) incentives for fraud (firms desire to meet or beat analyst forecasts), and (3) how fraud is committed and can be detected (revenue fraud detection using unexpected employee productivity). This essay contributes to confirmatory fraud predictor research, which is a sub-stream of research that focuses on developing and testing financial statement fraud predictors. Essay III compares the utility of artifacts developed in the broader research streams to which the first two essays contribute, i.e., classification algorithm and fraud predictor research in detecting financial statement fraud. The results show that logistic regression and SVM perform well, and that out of 41 variables found to be good predictors in prior fraud research, only six variables are selected by three or more classifiers: auditor turnover, Big 4 auditor, accounts receivable and the three variables introduced in Essay II. Together, the results from Essay I and Essay III show that IMF performs better than existing combiner methods in a wide range of domains and better than stacking, an ensemble-based classification algorithm, in fraud detection. The results from Essay II and Essay III show that the three predictors created in Essay II are significant predictors of fraud and, when evaluated together with 38 other predictors, provide utility to classification algorithms.

This paper examines the occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation related to financial statement misstatements and the effect of auditor misstatement-based litigation on subsequent auditor behavior. The study is motivated by recent calls to limit auditor legal liability and the need to examine the ability of litigation to deter non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) financial reporting. I find that misstatement severity is the primary driver of auditor litigation. Specifically, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a regulatory investigation, a larger stock price decline, and/or a greater number of accounting application [i.e., Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)/GAAP) failures. In addition, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with engagement fees that consist of a greater magnitude or a greater proportion of non-audit service fees. Further, I find that misstatement severity and the size of the plaintiffs? claims are the primary drivers of auditor settlements resulting from misstatement-based litigation. Specifically, I find that an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a greater amount of alleged income or equity inflation over the class action time period, and/or a larger alleged percentage drop in share price over the class action time period. With respect to subsequent auditor behavior, I find evidence that auditor litigation results in more conservative subsequent auditor behavior across a litigated auditor?s office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the litigated client). Specifically, in the year following auditor litigation, I find evidence that litigation results in increased auditor constraint of client-reported positive and signed discretionary accruals, as well as longer audit report lags.

The topic of the effects of audit quality as a consequence of audit firm rotation has been debated for decades in business science. It has also been discussed in the political arena. In April 2013 the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Union voted for a draft law requiring mandatory audit firm rotation for periods of 14 years. Countries such as Sweden might face the possible changes in audit quality that the mandatory audit firm rotation entails. In the light of these events, we studied how the audit quality changes when audit firms rotate. Because we used the Jones Model and the Modified Jones Model, discretionary accruals were our proxy for audit quality. The initial sample consisted of all publicly listed companies which rotated audit firms from 2008 to 2012 in Sweden. We found that there was a statistically significant change in audit quality, in the form of higher discretionary accruals following the rotation. Based on earlier research claiming that higher discretionary accruals signifies lower audit quality, our results suggest that audit firm rotation in Sweden leads to a diminished audit quality. This might be due to the loss of firm-specific knowledge. Our results also indicate that the new auditing firms are more conservative than the auditor firm prior to the rotation, which might be explained by the increased audit risk that is related to the audit of the first-year client.

Background and problem: This paper illuminates the problem with temptation of earnings management. However, there are particular disadvantages when companies use this technique because it creates an information asymmetry at the stock market. Problem of earnings management is although not a new phenomenon there issue is the quality of financial reporting. The development is concerning, since recently the performance of financial report has a negative trend, a trend that could harm the financial world. If a company does not provide meaningful information the fundamentals of capital market lose confidence. Purpose: This study has two purposes. The first purpose is to evaluate the ability of various discretionary accruals model at Stockholm Exchange Market. The second purpose is concerning a new model in purpose to understand and reveal earnings management. Boundaries: Data contains only business corporations at large cap and operate at the Stockholm Stock Exchange market. Furthermore is this research based on a time series data from year 2000 – 2009 and cross section data from year 2009. Method: The approach of the methodology are inspired of prior earnings management research, as Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986) and Jones (1991) which have relied on discretionary accruals to detect earnings management. Conclusion: The result indicates that the Jones modified model is the most powerful models to explain earnings management, which also is consistent with prior studies. The result from the extended Jones modified model indicates no improvement, concerning on revealing earnings management. Further, the results confirm that the null hypothesis can be rejected at 1% significant level but the F-value fall drastically compare to Jones modified model. Suggestions for further research: One suggestion is that more research should be conducted in order to develop accounting policies aimed at limiting the application of earnings management. Alternatively, future research should base on data that measures the phenomenon of earnings management at a deeper level. Yet there are some obstacles to gather desire data and therefore it is not easily accessible. / Bakgrund och problem: Den här studien undersöker resultatstyrning, då det finns både fördelar och nackdelar med att tillämpa denna metod. Problemet med resultatstyrning är dock inte ett nytt fenomen, där tidigare studier visar att kvalitet på den finansiella rapporteringen kan ifrågasättas. Företagens årsredovisning skall speglar en rättvisande bild av verksamheten och således är utvecklingen oroväckande eftersom trovärdigheten för den finansiella rapporteringen har fått en negativ trend, en trend som kan skada den finansiella marknaden. Syfte: Den här studien utvärdera och jämföra hur befintliga disketionära modeller förhåller sig på Stockholmsbörsen. Dessutom utvecklas en förbättringsmodell. En model med förklaringsvariabler som ger ett nytt och/eller annorlunda perspektiv på fenomenet. Avgränsningar: Undersökningen omfattar endast företag som är registrerad på large cap och verkar på Stockholmsbörsen. Data som används i studien är dels en tidsserie data från år 2000-2009 och dels tvärsnittsdata från år 2009. Metod: Den här undersökningen tillämpar liknande metoder som tidigare studier, beträffande resultatstyrning såsom Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986) och Jones (1991) där de definierar diskretionär avsättning som vinstmanipulering. Slutsats: Resultaten visar att Jones modified model förklara och upptäcker resultatstyrning på ett bättre sätt än de andra modellerna. Denna slutsats överrensstämmer med tidigare studier. Resultaten från den utökande Jones modified model visar inte några förbättringar. Dock förkastar den noll hypotesen på 1 % signifikansnivå men F-värdet sjunker kraftigt jämförelsevis mot Jones modified model. Förslag till vidare forskning: Ett förslag är att framtida forskning bör bedrivas i syfte för att utveckla redovisningsprinciper som begränsar resultatstyrning. Alternativt förslag är att samla in data som mäter resultatstyrning på en djupare nivå, dock är det problematiskt med dagens

This paper examines the occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation related to financial statement misstatements and the effect of auditor misstatement-based litigation on subsequent auditor behavior. The study is motivated by recent calls to limit auditor legal liability and the need to examine the ability of litigation to deter non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) financial reporting. I find that misstatement severity is the primary driver of auditor litigation. Specifically, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a regulatory investigation, a larger stock price decline, and/or a greater number of accounting application [i.e., Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)/GAAP) failures. In addition, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with engagement fees that consist of a greater magnitude or a greater proportion of non-audit service fees. Further, I find that misstatement severity and the size of the plaintiffs? claims are the primary drivers of auditor settlements resulting from misstatement-based litigation. Specifically, I find that an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a greater amount of alleged income or equity inflation over the class action time period, and/or a larger alleged percentage drop in share price over the class action time period. With respect to subsequent auditor behavior, I find evidence that auditor litigation results in more conservative subsequent auditor behavior across a litigated auditor?s office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the litigated client). Specifically, in the year following auditor litigation, I find evidence that litigation results in increased auditor constraint of client-reported positive and signed discretionary accruals, as well as longer audit report lags.

I examine the association between earnings quality and audit firm type using a three-tiered audit firm classification scheme which allows for an explicit examination of the quality of Second-Tier audited earnings. My tests are motivated by the lack of competition in the market for audit services, theoretical arguments which suggest a positive association between audit firm size and audit quality, evidence pointing to the rapid post-Andersen growth in Second-Tier audit practices, and the lack of empirical research that fully differentiates audit firm type. My results indicate that the post-Andersen growth of Second-Tier audit firms coincides with improved Second-Tier audit quality, relative to the other audit firm types (Big N and other non-Big N). Specifically, the results indicate that Second-Tier client earnings quality was not distinct from that of other non-Big N clients in the pre-Andersen period. However, in the post-Andersen period, the results indicate that Second-Tier client earnings quality was higher than that of other non-Big N clients. Moreover, the post-Andersen results provide partial evidence suggesting that there is no difference in Second-Tier and Big N client earnings quality and, thus, lend some credence to the notion of a new era for the Big 8. These results convey important information to market participants (e.g., investors, underwriters, analysts, etc.) who wish to assess the extent to which financial statements are likely to be free from opportunistic managerial manipulation, to clients that are contemplating switching to a Second-Tier audit firm, to government agencies who have expressed concern over the state of competition in the market for audit services, and to those who have promoted the use of Second-Tier audit firms in the wake of SOX-related resource constraints.

From the Asian Finance Crisis in 1997, to many scandals in U.S.A. in 2001, and lots of fraudulent practices for many years in Taiwan, these cases severely injured the investors and the whole society. In fact, before these fraud cases happening, a lot of scholars have proposed that manager can manipulate reports with accounting tactics to manage earnings and window dress the performance of the company. After these scandals bursting, the researches which discuss how to regulate CEO¡¦s behavior by using corporate governance mechanism get more attentions. A lot of researches point out that CEO¡¦s option-based compensation might be one of the reasons which result in the self-interested behavior, and provide their views about the monitoring effects of the corporate governance mechanism. However, the researches that discuss whether CEO¡¦s self-interested behavior will influence the monitoring effects of the corporate governance mechanism are few. This paper divides the pubic listed company that had issued warrants to CEO from 2001 to 2005 into two groups by the ratio of option-based compensation in CEO¡¦s total compensation. We want to know that whether the corporate governance mechanism has the same influence in earnings management and company¡¦s performance in different CEO¡¦s option-based compensation ratio. The corporate governance and compensation variables we used are institutional ownership in the firm, the number of institutional directors, board size, percent of independent outside directors on the board, percent of inside directors on the board, director and executive officer stock ownership, company size, and CEO¡¦s option-based compensation ratio. The conclusions as follows: 1. CEO¡¦s option-based compensation ratio forms the threshold effect to the monitoring effect of the corporate governance mechanism. When CEO¡¦s option-based compensation takes particular proportion of total CEO¡¦s compensation, the corporate governance mechanism will be more effective. 2. The corporate governance mechanism that has significant influence in earnings management and operating performance will be different when CEO¡¦s option-based compensation ratio is different. 3. Among these corporate governance mechanism, percent of independent outside directors on the board is the only one that can have similar and significant influence in earnings management no matter how high the CEO¡¦s option-based compensation ratio is. It may relate to the independence of independent outside directors.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of the new Financial Fair Play regulations set forth by the United European Football Association (UEFA) in 2011 on levels of earnings management in European professional football. The Financial Fair Play regulations were imposed as a means of controlling the exorbitant amounts of debt and player’s wages that have threatened the financial stability of many professional football clubs throughout Europe. While UEFA has boasted early success of the new regulations, citing reduced aggregate losses of all football clubs, reduced overdue payables, and less outstanding debt, this study examines levels of discretionary accruals before and after the new regulations were instated to determine if teams are managing earnings to avoid UEFA sanctions. This study collected data from 137 different teams competing in UEFA competition from 2007 to 2013. Discretionary accruals were estimated using the Jones model (1991) as modified by Kothari et al. (2005). The findings of this study were largely inconclusive as a significant difference could not be found in levels of abnormal discretionary accruals before and after the introduction of Financial Fair Play. These findings may suggest that UEFA has succeeded in creating regulations that have curbed an era of extreme leveraging and club losses while simultaneously restricting additional opportunities for club owners to manage earnings that reduce both earnings quality and financial transparency. Overall, the findings from this study highlight the need for more widely available financial information from European football clubs and additional years of financial data under the new regulations.