Submitted by Marilene Donadel (marilene.donadel@unioeste.br) on 2017-09-19T18:43:57Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Renato_F_Merli_2016.pdf: 2940827 bytes, checksum: 2fdcd7a1048f212c5d632e6f0849a570 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-19T18:43:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Renato_F_Merli_2016.pdf: 2940827 bytes, checksum: 2fdcd7a1048f212c5d632e6f0849a570 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-10-27 / Mathematics, according to most people, is an exact science - but what it means to be exact? Or, if it is accurate, as are their objects? Exactly? Or rather, what is a mathematical object? How to differentiate a mathematical object to another? What characteristics / properties are necessary for an object to be mathematical? Be accurate means to be intelligible? These questions, which are not the subject of discussions in this work were the triggering of this study. The proposal is to discuss the Cartesian refusal of the Greek criterion of demarcation between the two types of curves and try to understand the establishment of new criteria adopted by Descartes. Thus, looking along the dissertation seek to understand the reasons that led the philosopher to discuss and reclassify the curves. To understand the Cartesian distinction between geometric curves and mechanical curves we must first present the context in which these curves appear. In this aspect, it is initially held a historical retrospect of the main curves studied and investigated by the Greeks, as well as its main geometers representatives. In this context, it is reviewed and discussed the key role of the classic problems, which influenced the appearance and desevolvimento of such curves. Are they triggered new investigations and the appearance of new curves. Following a discussion of the Geometry test is carried out, containing an overview of the work, a characterization and demarcation of curves in this area. Next is discussed the understanding of Descartes to distinguish between geometrical and mechanical curves. Finally, conclusions are drawn about the view expressed here. According to Bos (2001), the argument adopted by Descartes to classify the curves was the "philosophical analysis of gemétrica intuition", namely the construction and representation of curves served to create objects known. Behind any choice of procedures for the construction was the intuition of "known-unknown", or, in general, the certainty of intuition in geometry. The overview that fincava her stakes was that the geometry has been shaped by a philosophical concern based on the certainty of geometrical operations, particularly buildings, ie the Cartesian mathematics was (and still is) the mathematics of a philosopher, in this context, that mathematics can not posit no arguments. In this respect, it is understood that Descartes had an idea of rationality based on continuity. Continuing this presupposes that a continuous movement of insights that can be reduced in a whole or in several movements, since continuous and intelligible. For example, in a spider's web, there is a main wire which is touched, it moves all other wires. So is the intuitive continuous movement presupposed by Descartes to the understanding of a geometric curve. The continuity of the generation of a geometric object corresponds to the continuity of mathematical thinking and therefore of understanding of the object continuously. / Matemática, segundo a maioria das pessoas, é uma ciência exata - mas o que significa ser exata? Ou ainda, se é exata, como são seus objetos? Exatos? Ou melhor, o que é um objeto matemático? Como diferencio um objeto matemático de outro? Que características/propriedades são necessárias para que um objeto seja matemático? Ser exato significa ser inteligível? Essas perguntas, que não serão alvo de discussões neste trabalho, foram as desencadeadoras do presente estudo. A proposta é discutir a recusa cartesiana do critério grego de demarcação entre os dois tipos de curvas e procurar entender o estabelecimento de novos critérios adotados por Descartes. Sendo assim, procura-se ao longo da dissertação buscar entender as razões que levaram o filósofo a discutir e reclassificar as curvas. Para compreender a distinção cartesiana entre as curvas geométricas e as curvas mecânicas é preciso inicialmente apresentar o contexto em que tais curvas aparecem. Nesse aspecto, inicialmente é realizado um retrospecto histórico das principais curvas estudadas e investigadas pelos gregos, bem como os seus principais geômetras representantes. Nesse contexto, é comentado e discutido o papel fundamental dos problemas clássicos, os quais influenciaram no aparecimento e desevolvimento de tais curvas. São eles que desencadearam novas investigações e o aparecimento de novas curvas. Na sequência, é realizada uma discussão sobre o ensaio A Geometria, contendo um panorama geral sobre a obra, uma caracterização e uma demarcação das curvas nesse âmbito. Em seguida é discutido o entendimento de Descartes para a distinção entre as curvas geométricas e mecânicas. Por fim, são apresentadas as conclusões a respeito da tese aqui defendida. Segundo Bos (2001), o argumento adotado por Descartes para classificar as curvas foi a “análise filosófica da intuição gemétrica”, ou seja, a construção e a representação das curvas serviram para criar objetos conhecidos. Por trás de qualquer escolha dos procedimentos para a construção estava a intuição do “conhecido-desconhecido”, ou, em geral, a intuição da certeza na geometria. A visão geral que fincava suas estacas era a de que a geometria foi moldada por uma preocupação filosófica baseada na certeza das operações geométricas, em particular das construções, ou seja, a matemática cartesiana era (e ainda é) a matemática de um filósofo e, nesse contexto, essa matemática não se pode postular sem argumentos. Nesse aspecto, fica compreendido que Descartes teve uma ideia de racionalidade baseada na continuidade. Continuidade essa que pressupõe um movimento contínuo de intuições que podem se reduzir em um todo ou em vários movimentos, desde que contínuos e intelegíveis. Por exemplo, em uma teia de aranha, há um fio principal que se tocado, movimenta todos os outros fios. Assim também o é o movimento contínuo intuitivo pressuposto por Descartes para o entendimento de uma curva geométrica. A continuidade da geração de um objeto geométrico corresponde à continuidade do pensamento matemático e, portanto, de compreensão desse objeto de forma contínua.

O presente estudo tem por objetivo analisar, sob a perspectiva antropológica, representações envolvidas no universo simbólico da etiqueta a partir de um campo privilegiado de observação empírica - os cursos de etiqueta oferecidos na cidade de São Paulo nos anos de 1990 - e, também, de instrumentos midiáticos como sites, livros, programas televisivos que constroem um repertório cultural do qual o público se utiliza para consumir tal bem simbólico. Analisamos, por fim, de que forma os aspectos conflitivos e simbólicos que emergem nesse campo polissêmico nos ajudam a compreender a "teia de significados" construída pelos sujeitos envolvidos nessa prática cultural. / The aim of the present study is to anaylise the representation involved in the symbolic universe of etiquette from an anthropological view, based on a privileged field of empirical observation - the etiquette courses taking place in the city of São Paulo in the 1990´s - and also on the media (web sites, books, magazines and tv programmes), which build a cultural fund that provides the public with such symbolic goods. At last we have analysed how the symbolic and conflitive aspects that come out from this varied help us to understand the "web of meanings" created by the individuals involved in this cultural practice.

In this paper, we show how this plural legal landscape is negotiated by litigants, especially women, and thereby illustrate the procedural interplay between civil and religious courts through this adjudication process. The ethnography of adjudication at the Darul-Qaza situated in a large Muslim neighbourhood in Kanpur and the institution’s intersections with the societal (We mean the tribunals that function at the neighbourhood or community level) secular courts show how Muslim personal law functions. In this paper, we identify both the links between the Darul-Qaza and civil courts, and the processes of evidence making and legal reasoning that are integral to this interlegality. We argue that the issue of personal law should be understood within the post-colonial legal structure of India and with a good understanding of the processes through which disputes in the delicate area of family, affect and kinship are addressed and resolved. The above case shows how resolution occurs in a family dispute when plural institutional mechanisms are at work. This paper explores the adjudication process at a Darul-Qaza to understand how religion-based family laws get constituted as litigants seek both religious counsel and civil authority.

For the last few decades, sociological debates about religion and secularisation have been characterised by confrontation between (often American) critics and (mostly European) defenders of secularisation theories. There has also been a remarkable rise in academic and public debates about the role of secularism in political regimes and in national as well as civilisational frameworks. These debates are shaped by the context of the changing position of the West in world politics, Islamist terror and the war on terror, struggles of religious minorities for recognition and influence, and the concomitant negotiations over the place of religion in the public sphere, as well as the emergence of post-national citizenship. Contributions from political theory, social anthropology and religious studies that emerged from this context have enriched the debate, but also contributed to fragmenting existing theories on the relationship between religion and modernity. Whereas scholars previously aimed to develop ‘general theories’ of secularisation that included deviations from the general model, newer approaches tend to highlight the specificity of Western European developments as opposed to those in the rest of the world, and sometimes even highlight their incomparability.

The project seeks to explore the boundaries that distinguish between the religious and non-religious, in modern as well as pre-modern societies. In doing so, we are aligning ourselves with current debates but we are approaching the debated issues from a basic theoretical perspective. At present, a general distinction can be drawn between three narratives: The first claims the dwindling presence and relevance of religion (“secularisation”); the second regards religion to be returning globally, consequently irritating the self-perception of modern societies (“return of religions”, “post-secular society”). According to the third, religion has always been present and has simply changed shape, meaning secularisation assumptions are misleading (“invisible religion”). There is also a theoretical-methodological conflict to be taken into consideration. Where the secularisation hypothesis considers its theories and methods to be universally applicable, the critics of this theory not only increasingly challenge the transferability of Western development paths, but also the transferability of the concepts used. This applies right down to the challenge of the religious/secular dual, which is understood to be an expression of Western experience and power of interpretation that forces other cultures into Western schematisations. In contrast, we are formulating an alternative position, in which we are trying to explore the boundaries between the religious and non-religious beyond normative concepts. We are particularly seeking such boundaries in regions that differ greatly from the so-called “West” in the “Modern World” in terms of culture and history: In various Asian regions and – partly overlapping with these – in the so-called “Islamic World”, but also in different epochs. This is linked to a plea for comparability across multifaceted regions and cultural contexts, and for investigating their entangled history.

This article discusses four concepts: religionization, religio-secularization, religio-secularism, and religion-making. These concepts are proposed as heuristic devices for the analysis of the processes through which social networks, practices, and discourses come to be understood as ‘religious’ or ‘religion.’

Debates about the usability of the concept of ‘secularity’ in academic research are not merely theoretical. Standpoints are also politically informed and arguments are sometimes emotionally charged. To some, merely using the term ‘secularity’ seems to inflict violence upon certain objects of research or even upon themselves. Others object to applying the concept beyond a particular arrangement of secularity, lest that defense-worthy arrangement be undermined. Taking a step back, however, the actual hermeneutical problem and historical question still seems rather clearly to be this: is it possible to uncouple the link between secularism as a political regime and secularity as an analytical concept with broader historical purchase? In this paper, I argue that the basic approach of Multiple Secularities is indeed the commendable way forward, but could be refined and improved, also by learning from the valid points of its critical alternatives. Thus, this paper aspires to shed light on two basic questions, namely, how to take ‘secularity’ beyond the modern West, and, as a logical prior, why take ‘secularity’ beyond the modern West in the first place?

If any one thing marks early modern history, it is religious transformation. Confessional and pietist movements, both European firsts, are prominent examples of such catalysts for change.1 In large parts of the Islamic world in the 15th and 16th centuries, it was Sufi piety that carried the day. The historiographical record reveals strikingly new imaginaires and novel modes of connectivity to the past. The focus in this paper is on the manifold ways in which new forms of religiosity redefined the landscape of politics in the eastern Islamic world. It traces invocations of the past in Fakhr al-Dīn Kāshifī’s (d. 1532) Rashaḥāt ‘ayn al-ḥayāt 2 (Sprinklings from the Fountain of Life), a 16th-century collected biography of Naqshbandī Sufi masters, to argue that the classificatory schema adopted by the author reveals a template of secularity that marks a significant departure from past manners of adherence.

This working paper is derived from a larger research project exploring what I consider to be a tenuous but persistent form of “public culture” extending between Inner Asia and Europe over the course of the 18th and, especially, 19th centuries. This “stranger relationality,” as Michael Warner would have it, was mediated by new forms and routes of Eurasianist textual circulation. In this late imperial period, spread along the frontiers of the Qing, Tsarist, and British empires, Tibetan, Mongolian, and Buryat monks read works by European and East Asian intellectuals on all manner of technical knowledge, and began writing not to fellow scholastics or local readers, but to a global community of “the knowledgeable” (Tib. mkhas pa; Mon. baγsi, nomčin). The social site of what I am exploring as a new form of reading, interpreting, and writing in Asia’s heartland was the dispersed web of monastic colleges (Tib. grwa tshang; Mon. datsang) that connected generations of polyglot and cosmopolitan scholastics across the otherwise diverse and segregated socio-political blocs of late imperial Central and Eastern Tibet, north China, all Mongolian territories, and Siberia. My ongoing research is revealing how the practices of secularity (as defined by the Multiple Secularities framework) enacted by this commonwealth of frontier, synthetic scholastics was repurposed in the early 20th century, in the ruins of the Qing and Tsarist empires, to invent the social imaginaries, national subjects, civil societies, and other products of socialist secularism that produced modern Inner Asia (and continues to legitimize claims by Russia and the PRC on its Inner Asian frontiers). In this working paper, I will briefly introduce the social sites of my sources, the Buddhist monastic colleges that spanned the Sino-Russian frontiers, and provide a few examples of synthetic scholastic products that emerged in this previously unstudied form of Eurasianist public culture (c. 1750–1930s). I will also share some preliminary arguments I have drawn about the ways that practices of secularity amongst the actors my work considers led directly to the creation of the modern public sphere, civil society, and ironically, revolutionary institutional forms and models of history that had violently erased scholastic culture from public life.

This paper will examine the transformation dynamics of social change in Kurdish Alevi communities, while mostly focusing on the increasing sociopolitical and religious role of talips. Until the end of the 20th century, the socio-religious structure of Kurdish Alevis was dominated by two hereditary social positions, much like a caste system: on the one hand, the members of the sacred lineages (ocaks), who embody the religious authority, and on the other hand, the talips who are subordinated to the sacred lineages. This socio-religious structure provided a framework for Kurdish Alevi socioreligious organisations.