ITC/USA 2007 Conference Proceedings / The Forty-Third Annual International Telemetering Conference and Technical Exhibition / October 22-25, 2007 / Riviera Hotel & Convention Center, Las Vegas, Nevada / This paper presents a case study of the Western Range Centralized Telemetry Processing Subsystem (WR CTPS). This system was developed by Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems and Global Services and L-3 Communications Telemetry-West as part of the Range Standardization and Automation (RSA) IIA program. Requirements included real-time simultaneous acquisition of 16 PCM streams at rates of up to 30M bits per second; real-time processing; and data display on workstations connected over a gigabit Ethernet network. This system is designed for range safety and needs to be fault-tolerant while maintaining 100 percent data availability in the event of a single failure during an operation. The development of such a system demanded a rigorous Systems Engineering approach to ensure the successful upgrade and deployment onto the range infrastructure. This case study provides an overview of the system technical requirements and its architecture. The summary presents challenges encountered during the development and lessons learned while meeting them.

<p>Uppsatsen behandlar det amerikanska konceptet Distributed Operations (DO) kopplat mot den svenska doktrinutvecklingen. Uppsatsen bygger på Mika Ihalainens uppsats om DO som en framtida upprorsbekämpningsmetod. Uppsatsen avser fortsätta på Mika Ihalainens uppsats, och då främst med hans egna förslag på vidare forskning. Syftet med uppsatsen är att besvara frågeställningen ”Är Distributed Operations en förmåga eller en metod utifrån hur konceptet nyttjades under Falklandskriget?” och att ge ett konceptexempel på hur den svenska Försvarsmakten kan hantera en lågtek-nologisk fiende samt bidraga till den svenska doktrinutvecklingen, framförallt genom en definition av begreppen förmåga och metod. Ytterligare ett syfte med uppsatsen är att ”öppna upp” för vidare studier kring ämnet. Problemställningen har angripits med en kvalitativ textanalys där den nominella definitionen av begreppen förmåga och metod har väglett författaren genom empirin och slutligen resulterat i ett försöka att avgöra huruvida DO är en förmåga eller me-tod, sett från hur det nyttjades av SAS i Falklandskriget. Empirin har i huvudsak bestått av major Mika Ihalainens och major Brian L. Gilmans (USMC) uppsatser samt ett urval av deras källor. Även svenska ordböcker och doktriner har använts för framtagandet av en nominell definition av de för uppsatsen centrala begreppen. Uppsatsen visar att Distributed Operations bör betraktas som just ett koncept, ett koncept som skapar, binder samman och driver utvecklingen av metoder i syfte att uppnå vissa förmågor.</p> / <p>The essay deals with the American concept of Distributed Operations (DO) and the Swedish development of doctrines. The essay has its origin in major Mika Ihalainens essay on DO as a future method of fighting Small Wars. This essay intends to continue with Mika Ihalainens suggestion for future research and the dual purpose of this essay is to answer the question “Is Distributed Operations a capability or a method as seen from how it was used during the Falklands war?”. It’s second purpose is to describe a concept to the Swedish Armed Forces as an example on how to deal with a low-tech enemy and also to contribute to the Swedish doctrinal development, especially re-garding the definition of the concepts capability and method. Another purpose of this essay is to open up the subject for more widened and thorough studies. This study has been carried out through a qualitative analysis where the definition of capability and method has guided the author through the empiric material and has fi-nally resulted in an attempt to decide whether DO is a capability or a method, based upon how the concept was used by the SAS during the Falklands war. The empiric ma-terial has mainly consisted of major Mika Ihalainens and major Brian L. Gilmans essays and has been complemented with their original sources. The author has also used Swedish dictionaries and doctrines for the production of the nominal definition of the central notions of the essay. The result of the essay is that Distributed Operations should be considered as a con-cept which creates, binds together and forces the development of methods with the purpose to achieve certain capabilities.</p>

Uppsatsen behandlar det amerikanska konceptet Distributed Operations (DO) kopplat mot den svenska doktrinutvecklingen. Uppsatsen bygger på Mika Ihalainens uppsats om DO som en framtida upprorsbekämpningsmetod. Uppsatsen avser fortsätta på Mika Ihalainens uppsats, och då främst med hans egna förslag på vidare forskning. Syftet med uppsatsen är att besvara frågeställningen ”Är Distributed Operations en förmåga eller en metod utifrån hur konceptet nyttjades under Falklandskriget?” och att ge ett konceptexempel på hur den svenska Försvarsmakten kan hantera en lågtek-nologisk fiende samt bidraga till den svenska doktrinutvecklingen, framförallt genom en definition av begreppen förmåga och metod. Ytterligare ett syfte med uppsatsen är att ”öppna upp” för vidare studier kring ämnet. Problemställningen har angripits med en kvalitativ textanalys där den nominella definitionen av begreppen förmåga och metod har väglett författaren genom empirin och slutligen resulterat i ett försöka att avgöra huruvida DO är en förmåga eller me-tod, sett från hur det nyttjades av SAS i Falklandskriget. Empirin har i huvudsak bestått av major Mika Ihalainens och major Brian L. Gilmans (USMC) uppsatser samt ett urval av deras källor. Även svenska ordböcker och doktriner har använts för framtagandet av en nominell definition av de för uppsatsen centrala begreppen. Uppsatsen visar att Distributed Operations bör betraktas som just ett koncept, ett koncept som skapar, binder samman och driver utvecklingen av metoder i syfte att uppnå vissa förmågor. / The essay deals with the American concept of Distributed Operations (DO) and the Swedish development of doctrines. The essay has its origin in major Mika Ihalainens essay on DO as a future method of fighting Small Wars. This essay intends to continue with Mika Ihalainens suggestion for future research and the dual purpose of this essay is to answer the question “Is Distributed Operations a capability or a method as seen from how it was used during the Falklands war?”. It’s second purpose is to describe a concept to the Swedish Armed Forces as an example on how to deal with a low-tech enemy and also to contribute to the Swedish doctrinal development, especially re-garding the definition of the concepts capability and method. Another purpose of this essay is to open up the subject for more widened and thorough studies. This study has been carried out through a qualitative analysis where the definition of capability and method has guided the author through the empiric material and has fi-nally resulted in an attempt to decide whether DO is a capability or a method, based upon how the concept was used by the SAS during the Falklands war. The empiric ma-terial has mainly consisted of major Mika Ihalainens and major Brian L. Gilmans essays and has been complemented with their original sources. The author has also used Swedish dictionaries and doctrines for the production of the nominal definition of the central notions of the essay. The result of the essay is that Distributed Operations should be considered as a con-cept which creates, binds together and forces the development of methods with the purpose to achieve certain capabilities.

A look at today's US military will see them operating much beyond the scope of protecting and defending the United States. These operations now consist of, but are not limited to humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and conflict resolution. This broad spectrum of operational environments has necessitated a transformation of the individual military services into a hybrid force that can leverage the inherent and emerging capabilities from the strengths of those under the umbrella of the Department of Defense (DOD), this concept has been coined Joint Operations. Supporting Joint Operations requires a new approach to determining a viable military logistics support system. The logistics architecture for these operations has to accommodate scale, time, varied mission objectives, and imperfect information. Compounding the problem is the human in the loop (HITL) decision maker (DM) who is a necessary component for quickly assessing and planning logistics support activities. Past outcomes are not necessarily good indicators of future results, but they can provide a reasonable starting point for planning and prediction of specific needs for future requirements. Adequately forecasting the necessary logistical support structure and commodities needed for any resource intensive environment has progressed well beyond stable demand assumptions to one in which dynamic and nonlinear environments can be captured with some degree of fidelity and accuracy. While these advances are important, a holistic approach that allows exploration of the operational environment or design space does not exist to guide the military logistician in a methodical way to support military forecasting activities. To bridge this capability gap, a method called A Technique for Logistics Architecture Selection (ATLAS) has been developed. This thesis describes and applies the ATLAS method to a notional military scenario that involves the Navy concept of Seabasing and the Marine Corps concept of Distributed Operations applied to a platoon sized element. This work uses modeling and simulation to incorporate expert opinion and knowledge of military operations, dynamic reasoning methods, and certainty analysis to create a decisions support system (DSS) that can be used to provide the DM an enhanced view of the logistics environment and variables that impact specific measures of effectiveness.